China's Fissile Material Production and Stockpile

China's Fissile Material Production and Stockpile

China reportedly has produced enough fissile material (highly enriched uranium [HEU] and plutonium) to increase its current nuclear weapon stockpile of about 400 warheads. China may have a sufficient amount of fissile material to double or triple its current stockpile of nuclear weapons. China has not publicly stated that it stopped producing weapon-grade nuclear material but Chinese officials have informally told several US officials and scholars that such production has stopped. In its January 2001 report entitled, Proliferation: Threat and Response, the US Defense Department stated:

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, January 2001]

On 4 October 1994, China and the United States signed a joint statement pledging to work together on a universal agreement banning the production of "fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices." The statement is in combination with a US-China joint statement on missile proliferation. ["Joint United States-People's Republic of China Statement on Missile Proliferation/Stopping the Production of Fissile Materials for Nuclear Weapons," 4 October 1994.]

CHINA'S ESTIMATED FISSILE MATERIAL STOCKPILE

HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM (HEU)	PLUTONIUM (PU)	SOURCE
N/A	1.7-2.8 tons, weapon-grade 1.2 tons, commercial grade	1999 Department of Energy estimate. Robert S. Norris and William M. Arkin, "World Plutonium Inventories," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, September/October 1999, p. 71.
20 tons; 7 tons in operational weapons	3.5 tons; 1 ton in operational weapons	SIPRI Yearbook 1995
4-14 tons	1 ton	Albright, et al, 1992 World Inventory of Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium
20 tons	4 tons	Albright, et al, Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996
3 tons	1 tons	Union of Concern Scientists
15 tons; 7 tons in operational weapons	3 tons; 1.8 tons in operational weapons	Frans Berkhout, Oleg Bukharin, Harold Feiveson, and Marvin Miller, "A Cutoff In The Production Of Fissile Material," International Security, Winter 1994/95, p. 174.
20,000 kg	3,500 kg	The Risk Report, 11/95, p. 5.

(According to Alastair Johnston, "Current estimates of China's fissile material stockpile suffer from a large margin of error." [Alastair Iain Johnston, "Prospects for Chinese Nuclear Force Modernization: Limited Deterrence Versus Multilateral Arms Control," China Quarterly, June 1996, p. 562])

Weapons-Grade Uranium (90%+) and Highly-Enriched Uranium (HEU)

China first produced weapons-grade uranium in 1964 at Lanzhou. China reportedly halted uranium enrichment for military purposes in 1987. [Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996, pp. 128-129.] The Lanzhou facility has been closed since the late 1980s and is now being decommissioned. China is currently only producing HEU at gas-centrifuge facilities which were built with Russian assistance. One centrifuge facility is complete and two others are being constructed at a site called Heping.

Plutonium

China first produced weapons-grade plutonium in 1967 at Jiuquan. Since then, the Jiuquan and Guangyuan facilities have been the main sources of plutonium production for Chinese nuclear weapons. China reportedly ceased production of plutonium for weapons in 1991, although it has not officially announced the halt. [Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996, p. 128; SIPRI Yearbook 1995, p. 320; Lisbeth Gronlund, David Wright, and Yong Liu, "China And A Fissile Material Production Cut-Off," Survival, Winter 1995-96, p. 150; The Risk Report, November 1995, p. 5; Richard W. Fieldhouse, Chinese Nuclear Weapons, p. 12]

In February 1995, it was reported that Japan stated it had reached an accord with Russia, the United States, China, France, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Germany, and Switzerland to "publish plutonium inventories on a regular basis." The IAEA will be involved in the accord as an observer. The accord constitutes significant progress towards institutionalizing a plutonium control system at the international level. Other countries that maintain nuclear power plants will be free to participate in the "reporting scheme." ["Agreement Reached On Civil Pu Inventory Reporting," Nuclear News, February 1995, p. 60.]

On 20-21 September 1995, representatives from the United States, United Kingdom, Russia, China, France, Germany, Japan, Belgium, and Switzerland met and reached several agreements. First, the countries agreed to announce how much "civil" plutonium is held at their nuclear reactors, reprocessing plants, fuel fabrication plants, and other facilities. Second, each country is obliged to reveal data on the amount of its separated plutonium as well as the quantity of plutonium held in civilian reactors, spent fuel to be reprocessed, and spent fuel held at interim storage facilities. According to the "gentlemen's agreement," each country will annually disclose the amount of civil plutonium it possesses in 100 kg units for un-irradiated plutonium and ton units for plutonium held in spent fuel. [Shinichiro Izumi, "International Management Of Plutonium," Plutonium, Winter 1996, pp. 3-6]

This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by MIIS.