General Armament Department (GAD)

General Armaments Department (GAD)

总装备部

DIRECTOR: Li Jinai (former political commissar of COSTIND and GAD)

VICE DIRECTORS: Lt. Gen. Li Andong, Lt. Gen. Chu Hongyan, Lt. Gen. Zhang Shiming, Lt. Gen. Zhu Fazhong, Lt. Gen. Zhu Zengquan.

RESPONSIBILITIES:

Following the civilianization of COSTIND, the Chinese government formed the GAD in April 1998. This new PLA general staff-level department combines the uniformed military from COSTIND with the General Staff Department’s Equipment Directorate and other military equipment-related offices within the General Staff system. The GAD’s main role is to oversee the development, procurement, supply, maintenance and the life-cycle management of the military’s weapons systems. To support these goals, the GAD has six sub-departments: comprehensive planning, arms and services equipment, army equipment, general equipment support, electronic information and technological groundwork and foreign affairs. The GAD was also tasked with overseeing the PLA’s weapons testing and training bases such as the Xichang satellite launch center. (See Subordinate Elements listed below.)

The GAD also has a limited role in vetting some military-related exports as well as voicing opinions in arms control negotiations affecting Chinese military capabilities. Specifically, the GAD’s role in arms control and nonproliferation policymaking results from three main activities. First, as mentioned above, the GAD now controls the “old” COSTIND’s arms control division, which tracks for the military the full spectrum of arms control and nonproliferation issues including nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons proliferation, exports controls, and nuclear testing issues. In addition, the China Defense, Science and Technology Information Center (CDSTIC), which conducts research on arms control and nonproliferation topics, now reports to the GAD. Formerly under the control of COSTIND, the CDSTIC is one of the military’s leading centers for expertise and research on arms control issues. Presumably, the results of this research are furnished to the office of the Chief of the General Staff for use in interagency discussions and to PLA representatives in the field at overseas embassies and at multilateral disarmament organizations such as within the United Nations.

Second, the GAD plays an active role in the export control review process. In the nuclear realm, for example, the GAD is responsible for controlling exports of nuclear materials. The GAD is also expected to have a hand in vetting exports of military products and certain missile systems along with other agencies such as the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM).

Lastly, the GAD has key inputs into Chinese arms control and nonproliferation policies owing to the influence of certain individuals. The GAD was initially headed by General Cao Gangchuan, head of the former COSTIND until its “civilianization” in March 1998. Cao was previously deputy chief of the General Staff and has played an important role in some of China’s more well-known arms export cases, such as the transfer of DF-3 intermediate range ballistic missiles to Saudi Arabia in 1998. He was also recently appointed to the Central Military Commission in October 1998, the military’s highest policymaking body. Zhu Guangya, an influential nuclear physicist closely associated with China’s nuclear weapons program, continues to head the Science and Technology Committee which formerly served as the chief advisory body to COSTIND, but which has now been transferred to the GAD. General Qian Shaojun, another physicist and also a member of the GAD’s Science and Technology Committee, is one of the military’s leading voices on arms control issues.

SUBORDINATE ELEMENTS:

Testing and Training Bases:

Beijing Command Center
021 Base-Northwest Nuclear test Base
023 Base-Shanghai Maritime Space Measurement Ship Base
024 Base-Taiyuan Satellite Launch Center
026-Base-Xichang Satellite Launch Center
029 Base-China Aerodynamics R&D Center
031 Base-Baicheng Weapons Test Center

[Sources: China's International Defense-Industrial Organizations Organizational Chart, Defense Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Reference Document DI-1921-60-98, 15 June 1998; Pai Chuan, “Command System of the Chinese Army,” Ching Pao, 1 December 1998, pp. 40-42 as translated in FBIS, 1 December 1998; Kuan Cha-Chia, "Jiang Zemin Sets Up General Equipemtn Department, Zhu Rongji Advances Military Reform," Kuang Chiao Ching, 16 April 1998, pp. 10-12; Tseng Hai-tao, “Jiang Zemin Pushes Forward Restructuring of Military Industry – Developments of State Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National defense and Five Major Ordnance Corporations,” Kuang Chiao Ching [Wide Angle], 16 July 1998, pp. 18-20 as translated in FBIS-CHI-98-209, 28 July 1998; Liu Xiaohua, “Zhu Rongji Discusses Matters of Vital Importance With Military—Inside Story of Reorganization of China’s Five Major Military Industry Departments,” Kuang Chiao Ching [Wide Angle], 6 February 1998 as translated in FBIS-CHI-98-065, 6 March 1998. For COSTIND’s continued role in defense conversion see Liu Jibin, “Implement the Guideline of Military-Civilian Integration, Rejuvenate the National Defense Science and Technology Industry,” Renmin Ribao, 2 February 1999, pp. 12 as translated in FBIS, 2 February 1999; Chinese Defence Today, 26 November 2003.]

Updated 11/26/ 2003

This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by MIIS.