International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

Summary:

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), a specialized agency within the UN system, was established in 1957 to encourage and assist research on, and development and practical application of, atomic energy for peaceful uses throughout the world; to establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that such activity assisted by the Agency is not used in such a way as to further any military purpose; to apply safeguards to relevant activity at the request of member states; to apply, under the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and some other international treaties, mandatory comprehensive safeguards in non-nuclear weapon states party to such treaties.

For more in-depth information, please consult the Inventory of Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes, which can be found on the CNS website at: http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/.

China and the IAEA:

China first made unofficial inquiries about possible participation in the IAEA in 1978. China applied for membership in the IAEA in 1983, and became a member in January 1984. Since then, China has declared that China will apply IAEA safeguards on all of its nuclear exports. Since then, China has signed a number of agreements with the IAEA, applying safeguards to nuclear exports to Algeria, Chile, Ghana, Nigeria, Pakistan (2 agreements), and Syria. In 1988, China signed an agreement with the IAEA subjecting a number of facilities in China to IAEA safeguards, and also guaranteeing that China will require recipients of Chinese nuclear exports to accept IAEA safeguards. Currently, China has two facilities under IAEA safeguards: (1) its Qinshan-1 nuclear power reactor and (2) the HWRR-2 research reactor at the China Institute of Atomic Energy (CIAE), Beijing. In addition, the three-module centrifuge plant being built with Russian assistance at Hanzhong and the CANDU power reactors to be provided by Canada will be under IAEA safeguards. In 1991, China further declared that it would report to the IAEA any export or import of nuclear materials and all exports of nuclear equipment. However, although China has placed all of its nuclear exports under IAEA safeguards, it does not require full-scope safeguards.

In July 1998, China provided a synopsis of its cooperation with the IAEA in its white paper called China's National Defense:

"In November 1991 the Chinese government declared that it would report on a continuing basis to the IAEA any export to or import from non-nuclear-weapon states of nuclear materials of one effective kilogram or above. In July 1993 China officially promised that it would voluntarily report to the IAEA any imports or exports of nuclear materials, nuclear equipment and related non-nuclear materials. In May 1996 China promised that it would not offer help to nuclear facilities which had not accepted the IAEA's safeguards, including bans on exports of nuclear materials and personnel or technology exchanges and cooperation. In May 1997, the Chinese government published the Circular on Questions Pertaining to the Strict Implementation of China's Nuclear Exports Policy, which explicitly stipulates that no nuclear materials, facilities or related technologies exported by China may be supplied to or used by nuclear facilities which have not accepted the IAEA's safeguards. The circular also has strict provisions regarding exports of dual-use nuclear-related materials. In May 1997, China sent observers to attend a meeting of the Zangger Committee, one of the mechanisms of international nuclear export control, and formally joined the committee in October of that year. In September 1997, the Chinese government issued the Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Nuclear Export Control, banning any kind of assistance to nuclear facilities which have not accepted the IAEA's safeguards. In addition, nuclear exports are monopolized by the units designated by the State Council and can not be operated by any other units or individuals. The state practices a licensing system for nuclear exports, and has drawn up the Detailed List of Nuclear Export Control in light of the commonly accepted listings of this kind in the international sphere. On June 10, 1998, China promulgated the Regulations on the Control of the Export of Dual-Use Nuclear Materials and Related Technology, imposing strict control on the export of nuclear-related dual-use materials and related technology."

China signed an additional protocol with the IAEA in January 1999, intended to "strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency" of the IAEA's safeguard system, in particular with regard to China's cooperation in nuclear matters with non-nuclear weapon states. The protocol stipulates that China will bring its civilian nuclear program under IAEA supervision. China agreed to inform the IAEA of its nuclear cooperation, including, among other activities, nuclear imports and exports, with non-nuclear-weapon countries. In early 2002 China formally completed the domestic procedures for implementation of the additional protocol agreement between China and the IAEA.

The China Atomic Energy Authority (CAEA) is in charge of managing China's cooperation with the IAEA.

For additional information on China and the IAEA, see:

[TEXT OF IAEA STATUTE]

[IAEA SAFEGUARDS]

[CHRONOLOGY OF IAEA-RELATED STATEMENTS AND DEVELOPMENTS]

[LINK TO IAEA WEBSITE]

Key statements/documents on China and the IAEA:

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Other key IAEA documents:

For more general information on China's nuclear exports and nuclear export policy, see:

[CHINA'S NUCLEAR EXPORTS]

[CHINA AND THE NONPROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT)]

[CHINA'S EXPORT CONTROLS]

China has also participated in a number of other UN-related arms control and nonproliferation-related organizations, including:

[CHINA AND THE UN FIRST COMMITTEE (UNFC)], [CHINA AND THE UN DISARMAMENT COMMISSION (UNDC)], [CHINA AND THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD)], [CHINA AND THE UN SPECIAL COMMISSION ON IRAQ (UNSCOM)], and [CHINA AND THE UN REGISTER OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS (UNROCA)]

This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by MIIS.