International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards

Summary:

The basic purpose of IAEA safeguards is to verify that nuclear material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other explosive devices from peaceful applications. Deterrence is created by the risk of timely detection and international notice of any attempted diversion. If a country violates the IAEA safeguards, the IAEA's Board of Governors can notify the UN Security Council, whose members could impose economic, political, or military sanctions on the violator.

IAEA safeguards are contained in safeguards agreements between the IAEA and individual countries or groups of countries. The 1970 Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) extended the IAEA's mission and safeguards by requiring that all NPT non-nuclear-weapon states conclude safeguards agreements with the IAEA which cover all the nuclear materials on their territory (full-scope safeguards)--this includes both weapons-usable material and material that requires additional processing in order to become weapons-usable.

Limited-scope safeguards (covered under IAEA document INFCIRC/66):

Limited-scope safeguards are safeguards placed on individual plants, shipments of nuclear fuel, or supply agreements between importers and exporters of nuclear fuel or technology. Such safeguards are currently applied between the IAEA and states that are not party to the NPT, such as India and Pakistan. According to the NPT, all NPT members who export nuclear equipment must place such exports under safeguards by the recipient, even if the importer is not a member of the NPT. The NPT does not, however, obligate exporters to require recipients to adopt full-scope safeguards.

Full-scope safeguards (FSS--covered under IAEA documentINFCIRC/153):

Full-scope safeguards (FSS) are mandatory safeguards that are applied to all nuclear materials in all peaceful nuclear activities within a country's territory or under its control. All non-nuclear weapon state parties of the NPT are under full-scope safeguards. The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) obliges its members to require their recipients of nuclear exports to accept full-scope safeguards; currently the Zangger Committee (ZAC) does not require full-scope safeguards.

China and IAEA Safeguards:

In its 30 September 1997 statement to the IAEA General Conference, China stated:

[Statement by Mr. Jiang Xinxiong, Head of the Chinese Delegation to the 41st Session of the IAEA General Conference, 30 September 1997.]

Since its joining of the IAEA in January 1984 (it was still not a member of the NPT), China has declared that in its exports of nuclear material and equipment, it will require the recipient countries to accept IAEA safeguards and that nuclear material and equipment imported to China will only be used for peaceful purposes. However, although China has placed all of its nuclear exports under limited-scope (item-specific) safeguards, it does not require full-scope safeguards. China formalized this declaration by its accession to the NPT in 1992.

As a nuclear-weapon state under the NPT, China is not required to place its own nuclear materials and facilities under safeguards. But as a member of the NPT (since 1992), China is obliged to require any recipients of its export of nuclear material or equipment to place them under safeguards, even if the recipient is not a member of the NPT (such as Pakistan)--however, the NPT does not oblige China to require the recipient (e.g. Pakistan) to adopt full-scope safeguards.

Chinese nuclear industry is strongly opposed to the requirement of full-scope safeguards--requiring FSS would jeopardize its trade with Pakistan. Principle 12 of the document on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament (NPT/CONF.1995/L.4)", officially approved at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, stated: "New supply arrangements for...the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to non-nuclear weapon states should require, as a necessary precondition, acceptance of full-scope IAEA safeguards and internationally legally binding acceptance commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices." Although China is a member of the NPT and supported the document's adoption, its view is that the obligation pertains to only "new supply arrangements," and thus it may continue its sale of nuclear equipment to Pakistani facilities as long as the equipment is under limited-scope safeguards.

In September 1988, China signed an agreement with the IAEA voluntarily subjecting a number of its own civilian nuclear facilities to IAEA safeguards (INFCIRC/369) and in November 1991, China further declared that it would report to the IAEA on the export or import of nuclear materials exceeding one kg for peaceful purposes to non-nuclear-weapon states (INFCIRC/207/Add.2).

China signed an additional protocol to a strengthened safeguards and supervision treaty with the IAEA in January 1999. Under the protocol, China agrees to furnish to the IAEA details of its nuclear activities in involvement with or for the benefit of non-nuclear-weapon states. Ambassador Zhang Yishan stated that China signed the protocol to improve the efficiency and proficiency of the IAEA in an effort to achieving nuclear non-proliferation in the world. In early 2002 China formally completed the domestic procedures for implementation of the additional protocol agreement between China and the IAEA.

China's view on FSS has continued up to the 2000 NPT Review Conference. It argued in an April 2000 Zangger Committee meeting that the "Zangger Committee draws its authority from NPT Article III.2, which does not mention FSS." In addition, a senior Chinese official who attended this same meeting stated in a NuclearFuel article that "China has expressed its reservations about any claim that FSS be required." At the NPT Review Conference held from 14 April to 19 May 2000, China stated its objection to language in a draft final document restating the NPT's commitment to full scope safeguards. However, China dropped its opposition to the language after "members of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), in particular Egypt, objected that China was the only NPT state not accepting FSS as a trade principle."

[Sources: Office of Technology Assessment, Congress of the United States, Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, April 1995); Mark Hibbs and Michael Knapik, "U.S. Aims for China Certification Timed with Fall Visit by Jiang," NuclearFuel, 28 July 1997, p. 2; Mark Hibbs, "China Has Far To Go Before U.S. Will Certify, Agencies Now Say," Nucleonics Week, 12 December 1996, p. 9; Mark Hibbs, "China, Russia Challenge NPT Review Over Full-Scope IAEA Safeguards," NuclearFuel, Vol. 25, No.8, 17 April 2000; Mark Hibbs, "NPT Review Conference Rejects Ambitious Safeguards-Trade Link," NuclearFuel (online version), Vol. 25, No. 11, 29 May 2000; "China, IAEA Sign Additional Nuclear Protocol," Beijing Xinhua in English, 0430 GMT 01 January 1999, in FBIS FTS19981231001024.]

Key statements/documents on China and IAEA safeguards:

[CHINA AND THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA)]

[CHRONOLOGY OF IAEA-RELATED STATEMENTS AND DEVELOPMENTS]

[CHINA AND THE NONPROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT)]

[CHINA AND THE NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GROUP (NSG)]

[CHINA AND THE ZANGGER COMMITTEE (ZAC)]

[CHINA'S NUCLEAR EXPORTS]

[CHINA'S NUCLEAR EXPORTS AND ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN]

[CHINA'S EXPORT CONTROLS]

This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by MIIS.