International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (ICOC)

Summary:

While holding the chairmanship of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in 1999, the Netherlands delegation initiated preparations of a politically binding international code of conduct for the trade in missiles and missile technology. In October 2000, during the 15th plenary meeting of MTCR member states in Helsinki, delegations began developing a code in discussions regarding general principles, states' commitments, confidence building measures, and incentives for participation. Members continued discussions of these issues in the form of a draft during the 16th Plenary Meeting in Ottawa in October 2001. In February 2002, France hosted talks on a draft code of conduct in Paris. Eighty-six countries, including Iran, Israel, China, Russia, the United States, and nuclear rivals India and Pakistan, sent delegates to the Paris negotiations. Completion of the talks resulted in more than 80 countries announcing that they would back the draft version of the International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (ICOC). It was agreed that a final discussion of the draft would take place in Madrid with signing ceremony to be scheduled at the end of the year in The Hague. In June 2002, one hundred countries met in Madrid to continue negotiations to finalize changes to the draft ICOC. At The Hague on November 25-26, 2002 ninety-two nations signed the Code. However, a number of significant states chose not to sign the Code, including China, India, Pakistan, Iran, Syria, Israel, North Korea, and Iraq (which was not invited to attend the meeting.)

ICOC Principles and Purpose

The Code calls for greater restraint in developing, testing, using, and transferring ballistic missiles. It does not prohibit owning missiles or discriminate against their use in conducting peaceful operations in outer space. The key elements of the Code require state signatories to:

ratify, accede, or otherwise abide by the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (1967), the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (1972), and the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space (1975)
curb and prevent the proliferation of Ballistic Missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction, both at a global and regional level, through multilateral, bilateral and national endeavors
exercise maximum possible restraint in the development, testing and deployment of Ballistic Missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction, including, where possible, to reduce national holdings of such missiles, in the interest of global and regional peace and security
exercise necessary vigilance in the consideration of assistance to Space Launch Vehicle programs in any other country so as to prevent contributing to delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction, considering that such programs may be used to conceal Ballistic Missile programs
not contribute to, support or assist any Ballistic Missile program in countries which might be developing or acquiring weapons of mass destruction in contravention of norms established by, and of those countries' obligations under, international disarmament and non-proliferation treaties
present an annual declaration providing an outline of ballistic missile programs [land (test-) launch sites]
provide annual information on the number and the generic class of ballistic missiles launched in the previous year in regards to the pre-launch notification mechanism
present an annual declaration providing an outline of space launch vehicles launched during the previous year with respect to the pre-launch notification mechanism
consider, on a voluntary basis (including on the degree of access permitted), inviting international observers to land (test-) launch sites
exchange of pre-launch notifications on ballistic missile and space launch vehicle launches and test flights

In terms of incentives, the draft encourages states to consider providing on a voluntary and case-by-case basis incentives, such as rocket technology for space use, to states who choose to eliminate existing ballistic missile programs, and who commit to forgo such programs in the future. Due to concerns that this type of technology could be used for military use, the final implemented ICOC was changed to state that "Subscribing States could, as appropriate and on a voluntary basis, develop bilateral or regional transparency measures, in addition to those [stated] above [in the agreement]."

Critiques of the Code

Critics have cited a lack of incentives to join the Code for nations like North Korea, Iran, and Syria, which are pursuing ballistic missile programs. They also note other possible negative effects from implementing the Code. One such effect is that the Code will place itself in competition with such other currently discussed agreements as the Global Control System (GCS) and the work of the U.N. working group on missiles. Critics believe that this competition will allow for states to "venue shop" between agreements and would detract oversight efforts for other agreements like MTCR. Other critics, like Alex Wagner of the Arms Control Association, have commented that the Code may help to legitimize sales of ballistic missile sales amongst signatories in effect creating a "North America Free Trade Agreement for missiles." Mark Smith of the Mountbatten Centre of International Studies, notes that the Code's missile norms are weak and demonstrate a lack of agreement by the drafters. According to Smith, these norms, which are built upon transparency clauses, are more directed at covert missile programs than material proliferation.

China and the draft ICOC

Although not a member of the MTCR, China was invited to participate in the ICOC negotiations. China was among the 86 delegations involved in the Paris talks as well as in the final negotiations in Madrid and The Hague. However, Beijing ultimately chose not to subscribe to the Code. Kong Quan, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson, announced on 12 November 2002 that Beijing would not take part in the agreement of the Code after some of its proposed amendments were rejected. Kong stated that, "[China] regrets that the suggestions were not accepted. The issue created difficulty for China to participate in the code." Some of the reasons cited for China's reluctance to sign the agreement include certain aspects of the transparency and confidence-building measures in the Code. Furthermore, it was noted that China wanted the code to prohibit technology transfers that are a threat to China's security, such as the U.S. transfers to Taiwan.

Other dissenting countries

Following China's announcement, India announced on November 15th that it would not participate in the signing of the Code. A Foreign Ministry spokesman, Shri Navtej Sarna, cited that the Code did not effectively distinguish between the development of ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles. Sarna continued by saying that, "[India] finds it difficult to accept...the implied questioning of the right to peaceful uses of space technology." In addition, Sarna noted that other concerns included that the Code was very similar to the MTCR, of which India is not a party, and that "these regimes have proved ineffective in preventing acquisition of ballistic missile technology or nuclear weapon development through clandestine transfers and linkages."

Taking its lead from China and India, Pakistan announced in a written statement that it too would not subscribe to the Code. The written statement cited that the Code did not take into account some of Pakistan's concerns. Spokesman Asad Hayauddin reported that the Code did not address the issue of complimentary delivery platforms such as cruise missiles and sophisticated aircraft. He added that India is either developing such systems or is importing them from members of the European Union. Finally, Spokesman Hayauddin noted that Pakistan had concerns related to the drafting process which was completed through a short series of meetings that did not take into account concerns of other countries like Pakistan.

Despite criticisms and the clear absence of India, Pakistan, and China, the Code seeks to address some of the challenges posed by ballistic missile proliferation. Mark Smith of the Mountbatten Centre of International Studies highlights this fact in stating, "the code succeeds in putting all but one of the four challenges posed by ballistic missile proliferation on the table." As Smith states, the Code recognizes the security challenges involved with ballistic missiles, creates measures that non-possessor and possessor states can adhere to, and acknowledges that states may wish to pursue development of technology for peaceful space-launches. Consequently, while there are many disappointments in the Code, it succeeds in its goal of creating some demand-side norms on ballistic missiles. As such, the Code may prove to be a step toward future possible arrangements like GCS or later strengthening in the Code.

[Sources: Mike Nartker, "International Response: Chinese Opposition to Code of Conduct Might Inspire Others," Global Security Newswire, 13 November 2002; "China says it won't take part in missile-control agreement," Associated Press Worldstream, 12 November 2002; "International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, http://www.minbuza.nl/default.asp?CMS_ITEM=MBZ460166; "MTCR Draft Code of Conduct," International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation, http://www.inesap.org/bulletin18/bul18art04.htm; "90 nations sign missile code of conduct," The Times of India, 25 November 2002; "Ballistic missile non-proliferation initiative: 75 states sign code of conduct today," The Daily Times, 25 November; Mike Nartker, "International Response: Pakistan Rejects Missile Code of Conduct, Global Security Newswire, 20 November 2002; Mike Nartker, "International Response: India to Reject Missile Code of Conduct," Global Security Newswire, 18 November 2002; Mike Nartker, "International Response: Code of Conduct Ineffective, Experts Say," Global Security Newswire, 15 February 2002;]

Text of the International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation

For more on China and multilateral export control regimes, see:

[CHINA AND MULTILATERAL EXPORT CONTROL REGIMES]

[SUMMARY OF MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME (MTCR)]

[CHRONOLOGY OF MTCR-RELATED STATEMENTS AND DEVELOPMENTS]

For more on China's export controls, see:

[CHINA'S EXPORT CONTROLS]

[CHINA'S CONVENTIONAL ARMS AND MISSILE EXPORT CONTROLS]

For more on missile proliferation issues, see:

[CHINA'S MISSILE EXPORTS] (See especially [CHINA'S MISSILE EXPORTS AND ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN] and [CHINA'S MISSILE EXPORTS AND ASSISTANCE TO SYRIA])

This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by MIIS.