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China's Missile Imports and Other Assistance From Russia
Since the end of the Cold War, China and Russia have renewed and further developed a bilateral military trade relationship. Russia has provided parts, materials, and technologies pertaining to missiles, nuclear weapons, and anti-missile systems. The rationales for military cooperation between Russia and China, Russia's missile assistance to China, Russo-Chinese nuclear cooperation and missile defense exchanges between the two states are discussed below.
The Rationales for Military Cooperation
Russia and China have numerous reasons to cooperate with each other. Their common grievances against the US and other similarities have promoted their relationship, and both countries are apprehensive about a possible future world dominated by the United States. In his paper titled "The Dynamics of Russian Weapon Sales to China," Stephen J. Blank writes, "Russo-Chinese ties signal a relationship that is being driven by China's strategic interests and the private interests of Russia's arms dealers and other anti-Western elites as much, if not more, than by a reasoned calculation of Russian strategic or national interest." In addition, when speaking of China and Russia military relations, the U.S. ambassador to China from 1989-1991, James Lilley said, "The Russians have the technology, hardware and the personnel, and they're starving to death. The Chinese have got $140 billion in foreign exchange; it makes sense." [Ronald J. Laurenzo, "Russia, China Mutually Benefit From Closer Ties," The Washington Times, 7 June 1998.]
Russian Rationale
Since the end of Communism, Russia's economy has suffered drastically, including a decreasing defense budget and lower military procurements. This has created pressure for exports in order to obtain hard currency and sustain the defense industrial base. This necessity has prompted arms and weapon-related factories to look outside Russia for customers. China's willingness to pay for arms and technologies has substantially supported Russia's economy throughout the last decade. This trading relationship is more significant for Russia than it is for China, because while the exchanges compose only a small portion of China's economy, Russia depends on Chinese financial support. Furthermore, Russia is concerned with the developing characteristics of the Post-Cold War world, and it is striving to strategically align itself with certain emerging states in order to remain a significant power in the international system. "Increasingly, Russia is associating itself with China's policies for Asia and its outlook on world politics, seeing in this a way to obtain greater leverage as one of the poles of the emerging multipolar world." [Sherman W. Garnett, "Russian-Chinese Strategic Cooperation," Federal News Service, 25 March 1999. Stephen J. Blank, "The Dynamics of Russian Weapon Sales to China," 4 March 1997.]
Chinese Rationale
China is attempting to increase its military strength in order to raise the cost for the US to engage in a conflict with it, especially concerning Taiwan. China started dealing with Russia, because it lacks some of the necessary technology to develop advanced weapons and because the US ceased arms sales to China after the 1989 Tiananmen incident and other human rights violations. "Russia pointedly ignores China's domestic repression of human rights which remains a source of tension in the Sino-U.S. relationship." In addition, Russia's level of technology in the past greatly surpassed that of China due to Cold War competition with the United States, and, therefore, China has much to gain from cooperation with Russia. Finally, US missile defense intentions have caused China to align more closely with Russia. If the US enters a conflict on Taiwan's side, Russia announced that it would enter on behalf of China. [Stephen J. Blank, "The Dynamics of Russian Weapon Sales to China," 4 March 1997.]
Russia's Missile Assistance
China's most extensive missile and missile technology import relationship has been with Russia. In July of 1992, China began to actively seek weapon and technology-related assistance from Russia after former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev visited Beijing in 1989 normalizing Sino-Russian relations. According to a US official referring to China in 1992, "They're looking at MIG-31s and a whole set of new weapons and technology of mass destruction." [Jim Mann, "China Seeks Russian Weapons," Los Angeles Times, 12 July 1992.]
Moscow is suspected to have proceeded to export rocket engines, missile-guidance technology and other advanced weapons and technology to China. Russia did not deny the sale of S-300 SAMs, but vigorously denied the other allegations, saying that it had never sold missiles or missile technology to China. This vigorous response was prompted by the fact that Russia takes part in the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which prohibits the transfer of technology or materials that can be used to develop medium- to long- range missiles. Russia's transfer of missiles or missile technology to China would warrant sanctions from the US, so Russia denied the allegations. In addition to technology and material transfers, China was known in late 1992 to have recruited Russian technicians to work in Chinese defense plants in order to further advance its weapons systems. Many of these experts were reportedly working in Chinese missile plants to improve the accuracy of Chinese missiles. Finally, according to a senior US official, China has been trying to import Russia's high-technology base in order to be able to produce guidance systems, anti-submarine missiles, and cruise missiles. [Jim Mann, "Russia Boosting China's Arsenal," Los Angeles Times, 30 November 1992.]
In November 1993, China and Russia signed a five-year military cooperation agreement for exchange in experts and other personnel. US intelligence sources continued to be concerned that Russian missile scientists were assisting China, and that Russia was providing important missile technology and equipment, including solid rocket fuel, cruise missile engines, and technical assistance for improving missile launch from submerged submarines. In 1995, reports stated that Russia had also exported stealth technology to both China and North Korea, enabling them to develop cruise missiles with smaller radar cross-sections. In addition, it was reported in January 1996 that China had reached an agreement to purchase two Sovremenny-class guided missile destroyers from Russia, equipped with SS-N-22 "Sunburn" anti-ship cruise missiles. In May 2000, the first group of the anti-ship missiles for the destroyers were shipped to China, and China expressed interest in ordering several more destroyers. Following this transfer, the "Russian Anti-Ship Missile Non-Proliferation Act of 2000" was introduced in the United States in an attempt to stop Russian transfers of SS-N-22 missile to China since the U.S. Navy "has scant ability to defend against this 200 kiloton nuclear-capable weapon," according to U.S. Representative Dana Rohrabacher. ["First lot of Moskit missiles shipped to China," ITAR-TASS News Agency, 16 May 2000. "Rohrabacher Introduces Legislation To Stop Transfer Of Missiles From Russia To China,"www.house.gov/rohrabacher/NR20000321.html, 21 March, 2000.]
Reports also indicate that China expressed interest in purchasing submarine-launched cruise missiles, and possibly also SS-18 ICBM technology. The United States reacted particularly strongly to the latter reports, stating that transfers of SS-18 technology would violate both the START Treaty and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and would greatly improve China's ability to threaten the United States. Reports stated that, although China's interest in the SS-18 was ostensibly for space launch purposes, US intelligence officials believed it was directly related to China's strategic nuclear force modernization, particularly since many doubt that SS-18 technology is applicable for civilian space launch. In October 1999, a report was released that said that China had recently requested that Russia transfer more high-technology fiber optic gyroscopes. These items are necessary components for China's short-, medium-, and long-range missiles. In addition, it was announced in July 2000 that "Russia and China could be close to signing documents on cooperation in the use and advancement of Russia's global navigational system Glonass by late October, early November [2000] when Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov plans to visit Beijing." This system aids China in monitoring and targeting missiles and rockets. [Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough, "China Connection," The Washington Times, 19 November 1999. "Russia, China to Cooperate on Global Navigation System," FBIS CEP20000722000102 Interfax, 22 July 2000. John Pomfret, "Russians Help China Modernize Its Arsenal," Washington Post, 10 February 2000.]
Russia's Nuclear Assistance
Since resuming their relationship after the Cold War, Russia has helped China advance its nuclear program. Assistance in nuclear power plant projects characterized the nuclear relationship between the two states. The technology that was transferred for those projects, however, could have been adapted to advance China's nuclear weapons program. According to a senior Bush official in 1992, "Moscow is selling technology to the Chinese that can be used to enrich uranium. Washington is concerned that Beijing will use the technology to improve the design of its nuclear power plants, making them more attractive to third-world buyers and further undermining efforts to stop the spread of nuclear arms." As of February 1999, the Russians were assisting China in the technical design, construction, and operation of thirteen different nuclear facilities in China. In June 2000, Russia agreed to help China build a fast-breeder reactor and discussed the construction of two uranium enrichment plants in China. However, Russia has showed restraint in some exports. In May of 2001, Moscow denied permission to Minatom to export a Purex plutonium separation line citing proliferation concerns. Some Western officials downplayed the significance of this, citing that previously exported turnkey centrifuge uranium enrichments plants were more proliferation-sensitive. [Michael R. Gordon, "Moscow is Selling Weapons to China, U.S. Officials Say," The New York Times, 17 October 1992. "Russia To Help China Build Fast-Breeder Nuclear Reactor," Agence France Presse, 1 June 2000. "Russia Rejects Export to China of Reprocessing Equipment," Nuclear Fuel, 28 May 2001.]
Aside from nuclear power technology, in June 1996, a newspaper in Japan reported that Russia had sold China "computer simulation technology on nuclear warheads" in order to develop multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) for China's nuclear missiles. Russia, however, denied this. In addition, in October 1999, a Chinese military expert announced that the Russians were assisting China in developing a new type of nuclear-powered submarine that would use a new type of nuclear reactor and be capable of strategic nuclear strikes.
Russia's Missile Defense Assistance
With the recent threats of a US missile defense system, China has sought ways to develop its own system or an Asian system with the help of Russia. According to a Russian government source, if the US decides to deploy its national missile defense system, then Russia would assist China in creating one of its own. Russian assistance to China would automatically exclude both countries from further participation in the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty which prohibits the transfer of antiballistic systems. According to a 1992 New York Times article, though, "Moscow has sold S-300 surface-to-air missiles to China, [American] officials say. The S-300 is a patriot-like system designed to shoot down planes and missiles." In addition, in 1994, Russia sold China six more S-300 air defense systems with around 100 missiles. ["Russia Mulls Aid for China's Missile Defense to Counter U.S.," Japan Economic Newswire, 27 February 2000. Michael R. Gordon, "Moscow is Selling Weapons to China, U.S. Officials Say," The New York Times, 17 October 1992.]
For more in-depth information on open-source reports of Chinese imports and assistance from abroad, please consult the CNS Missile Abstracts database.
[CHINA'S MISSILE IMPORTS AND ASSISTANCE FROM ABROAD]
[CHINA'S CRUISE MISSILE DESIGNATIONS AND CHARACTERISTICS]
[CHINA'S BALLISTIC MISSILE DESIGNATIONS AND CHARACTERISTICS]
[CHINA'S NUCLEAR DELIVERY SYSTEM MODERNIZATION]
[CHINA AND THE START TREATIES]
[CHINA AND THE MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME (MTCR)]
This
material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for
Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and
does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently
verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007
by MIIS.
