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China's Missile Imports and Assistance From the United States
Although the United States has generally been the most critical of other countries' transfers of sensitive missile-related technology to China, a number of US exports to China have generated controversy within the United States. The most controversial proposed missile-related exports to China have been: supercomputers, engines, machine tools, and integration analysis technology. All of these items and technologies are dual-use, and though the exports have officially been for civilian purposesp, there have been worries that they will be diverted into missile programs or other military applications of concern.
Integration analysis technology was included in the 1994 sale of two Martin-Marietta satellites to China. Integration analysis would allow China to upgrade its satellite launch capabilities, but is also applicable to the development of multiple independently-targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs) for Chinese ICBMs.
Controversy over the sale of engines has revolved around the sale of engines from Allied Signals technology to China. The Bush administration approved the sale jet engines in December 1992, despite protests by the Defense Department and Arms Control and Disarmament Agency that the missile might be diverted for use in Chinese anti-ship cruise missiles. In April 1994, the Clinton administration approved Allied Signal's sale of the Garret gas-turbine engine. Some nonproliferation specialists feared the engpnes could be used to develop a longer-range cruise missile, able to hit Japan or India, with potential nuclear delivery capability. However, other experts asserted that the Garret engines involved neither military secrets or cutting edge technology, and pointed out that such engines were easily available on the international market from other suppliers. China also attempted to purchase technology that would allow it to produce the Garret engine indigenously, but Allied Signal's application to export enginep production technology to China was denied by the US Department of Commerce in November 1995, although the sale of complete engines was allowed to continue.
The sale of supercomputers has also generated controversy over potential diversion to military use. In December 1993, the United States relaxed its export controls on the sale of supercomputers to China, despite concerns that powerful computers, such as the Cray M92, could be diverted to military uses. The controls on computer exports were further relaxed in January 1996.
Finally, in 1996 the Pentagon has protested the diversion of US-supplied machine tools from a civilian factory to the Chinese factory that produces the Silkworm anti-ship missile. China, however, insisted that the tools would be used only for the manufacture of motorcycles, jet trainers, and crop dusters.
The transfer of dual-use technology is a particularly sensitive political issue in the United States, and reports of Chinese diversion of US technology to military uses may be as important for the impact such reports might have on US-China relations and cooperative activities as they are for nonproliferation and arms control concerns.
For additional information on open-source reports of Chinese imports and assistance from abroad, please consult the CNS Missile Abstracts database.
[CHINA'S MISSILE IMPORTS AND ASSISTANCE FROM ABROAD]
[CHINA'S CRUISE MISSILE DESIGNATIONS AND CHARACTERISTICS]
[CHINA'S NUCLEAR WARHEAD MODERNIZATION]
This
material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for
Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and
does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently
verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007
by MIIS.
