China and Multilateral Export Control Regimes

China and Multilateral Export Control Regimes

The multilateral export control regimes comprise the following:

Australia Group (covering chemical and biological weapon-related exports)
Missile Technology Control Regime (covering missile-related exports)
Nuclear Suppliers Group (covering nuclear and nuclear-related dual-use exports)
Wassenaar Arrangement (covering conventional weapon and dual-use exports)
Zangger Committee (covering nuclear-related exports)

Of the five regimes, China is presently a member of the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). China does not formally participate in the Wassenaar Arrangement, but it took important steps toward supporting the regime's objectives in 1998 by issuing export restrictions covering 182 dual-use technologies controlled by the arrangement. In 1997, China declined an invitation to join the Australia Group and continues to oppose the regime, arguing that its trade restrictions are discriminatory and incompatible with the Chemical Weapons Convention.

In a significant move, in September 2003 Beijing announced its interest in joining the MTCR. Discussions between China and MTCR member states began in February 2004. China has already pledged to abide by the original 1987 MTCR guidelines, and in 2002 it released strengthened domestic regulations on the export of missiles and missile-related items and technologies. Some Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) members have been opposed to Chinese participation in the MTCR, fearing that membership could provide China with access to sensitive missile design information.

Prior to the changes in China's export control policy of the last few years, the U.S. government was skeptical about China's commitment to controlling the export of sensitive materials. In its 1997 annual report, the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) stated:

"Problems have arisen primarily in the area of nonproliferation export controls, where China has failed to adopt an effective national system and has proven reluctant to embrace completely the norms established by the multilateral regimes, i.e. the Australia Group (CBW exports), the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Wassenaar Arrangement (conventional arms exports and related dual-use items)." [ACDA, 1996 Annual Report, "Regional Arms Control: China."]

China's Changing Export Control Policy

China had traditionally criticized the five international export control regimes as "discriminatory" and "exclusive." In an October 1997 statement to the UN First Committee, Chinese Disarmament Ambassador Sha Zukang stated:

"a small number of developed countries, with the purpose of deterring their opponents, set up a series of so-called non-proliferation mechanisms and arrangements. Although these mechanisms and arrangements may have played a certain role in non-proliferation, they are discriminatory and exclusive in nature and non-transparent in practice. As the above-mentioned international legal instruments are already or about to be in place, maintaining or even enhancing these discriminatory and exclusive mechanisms and arrangements clashes with the relevant international legal instruments. What’s even worse, they will continue to impede the social and economic development of all countries, the developing countries in particular." [Statement by H.E. Mr. Sha Zukang, Ambassador of the People’s Republic of China for Disarmament Affairs, at the First Committee of the 52nd Session of United Nations General Assembly, New York, October 14, 1997.]

In a similar statement, Chinese Foreign Ministry official Fu Cong stated in December 1997:

"the Chinese Government is of the view that non-proliferation should not hamper the normal and legitimate technological co-operations among nations, or be used as an excuse for discrimination and even willful sanctions against developing countries. A small number of discriminatory and exclusive export control groups should be reformed or dismantled, if necessary, to be replaced by international arrangements reached on a fairer, more transparent and more representative basis." ["An Introduction of China's Export Control System," statement by by Mr. Fu Cong, Department of Arms Control and Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, at Tokyo Workshop on Nonproliferation Export Control Regimes, 11-12 December 1997.]

In a drastic change from these statements of the late 1990's, China's White Paper on Non-Proliferation Policy, released in December of 2003 stated that:

"China will continue to take an active part in international non-proliferation endeavors, and exert great efforts to maintain and strengthen the existing non-proliferation international law system within the UN framework. It will constantly increase consultations and exchanges with the multinational non-proliferation mechanisms, including the “Nuclear Suppliers’ Group,” the MTCR, the “Australia Group” and the “Wassenaar Arrangement,” and continue to take an active part in international discussions related to non-proliferation."

The White Paper was quickly followed by the announcements of China's application for entrance into both the NSG and the MTCR.

CHINESE PARTICIPATION IN MULTILATERAL EXPORT CONTROL REGIMES

REGIME	CHINESE PARTICIPATION	DATES OF PARTICIPATION
Australia Group	No; Declined May 1997 US invitation to join; Beijing is currently in on-going discussions with group on possible Chinese participation.	NA
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)	Under discussion; began discussion with member states in February 2004 Pledged adherence to original 1987 guidelines;	Sent letter to Chair of MTCR announcing interest, September 2003. Written assurance (to US) February 1992;
Joint US-China statement on missile proliferation	Stated adherence to "inherent capability" concept; Agreed to discuss membership in MTCR	4 October 1994
Joint US-China statement	Agreed to "build on" the 1994 joint statement; Reaffirmed commitment to the MTCR "guidelines and parameters"	29 October 1997
International Code of Conduct (ICOC)	No; Participated in negotiations	NA
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)	Yes Joined May 28, 2004	Participant status took effect through exchange of notes on June 10, 2004
Wassenaar Arrangement (on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies)	No; Urged to join by US Beijing is currently in on-going discussions with group on possible Chinese participation.	NA
Zangger Committee (ZAC) (NPT Nuclear Suppliers Committee)	Yes	Attended as observer in May 1997; Joined 16 October 1997

[CHINA AND AGREEMENTS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND REGIMES]

[CHINA’S EXPORT CONTROLS]

Updated 06/20/2004

This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by MIIS.