Inhumane Weapons Convention (IWC)/Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW)

Inhumane Weapons Convention (IWC)/Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW)

Formal Title: CONVENTION ON PROHIBITIONS OR RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OF CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS WHICH MAY BE DEEMED TO BE EXCESSIVELY INJURIOUS OR TO HAVE INDISCRIMINATE EFFECTS [AKA THE WARSAW CONVENTION]

Summary:

The Inhumane Weapons Convention (IWC) was opened for signature on 10 April 1981 and entered into force on 2 December 1983.

The IWC/CCW is an "umbrella treaty" to which specific agreements can be added as protocols. Protocol I prohibits the use of any weapon whose primary effect is to cause injury with fragments that cannot be detected in the body with X-rays. Protocol II restricts the use of mines and booby traps, and aims to reduce civilian casualties caused by these devices during and after hostilities. Protocol III restricts the use of incendiary devices. The convention contains no verification provisions. As of October 2003, there are 91 States Parties to the IWC/CCW, and 8 states that have signed but not ratified.

At the 1996 Review Conference, the IWC/CCW parties added a revised landmine protocol, Amended Protocol II, which places new restrictions on the use, production, and transfer of anti-personnel landmines (APL). The new protocol requires that, within nine years, all parties must incorporate self-destruct and self-deactivation features in the mines they produce. These restrictions apply to mines used outside of marked and monitored areas or those which are remotely-delivered. Producing countries must also include materials or devices in all APLs manufactured after 1 January 1997 which make them more detectable. A global ban on APLs was not pursued during the Conference due to the strong opposition by many countries to such a ban.

The 1996 Review Conference issued an additional Protocol on Blinding Lasers (Protocol IV), which prohibits the use of laser weapons that are specifically designed to cause permanent blindness to unenhanced vision and the transfer of blinding laser weapons to any recipient. Blinding as an incidental or collateral effect of military use of other laser systems, including lasers used against optical equipment, is exempt from the prohibition and the production of blinding laser weapons has not been outlawed.

Negotiations continued in 2003 on a possible protocol or "instrument" detailing states' responsibilities related to explosive remnants of war.

For more in-depth information, please consult the Inventory of Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes, which can be found on the CNS website at: http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/index.htm.

China and the IWC/CCW:

China is a member of the Convention, having signed it on 14 September 1981, and deposited the Convention with the Secretary-General of the United Nations on 7 April 1982. However, upon signature, China voiced several reservations about the IWC/CCW, including the failure of the protocol on mines and booby traps to "provide adequately for the right of a State victim of an aggression to defend itself by all necessary means." China also objected to the fact that the protocol on incendiary devices did not restrict their use against combat personnel.

China strongly supported, and signed, the 1996 amended Protocol on landmines, but objected to the proposed total ban on APLs on grounds that such weapons may serve legitimate self-defense needs. The objections of China and other key countries prevented the IWC/CCW from pursuing the ban further.

According to Chinese statements, since 1998 China has implemented training programs for military officers and personnel to increase awareness and understanding of the requirements of Amended Protocol II related to landmines, and has undertaken various steps to comply with its technical requirements.

[TEXT OF IWC/CCW]

Key statements/documents on China and the IWC/CCW:

For more information, see:

[CHINA AND AN ANTI-PERSONNEL LANDMINE (APL) BAN]

[CHINA AND CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS NONPROLIFERATION]

Updated 10/24/2003

This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by MIIS.