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This chronology includes statements and developments on issues related to China and the North Korean nuclear issue, including the US-DPRK Agreed Framework, the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), and China's positions on the issues.
07/09/2004: In a visit to Seoul, National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice stated that North Korea, “will be surprised to see how much is possible” if it were to abandon its nuclear programs. North Korea has reacted negatively to the proposal calling it “unscientific and unrealistic.” Surprisingly, this offer came after a highly threatening statement made by North Korean defense minister Kim Il Chol, “The U.S. imperialists, robbers, are frantically stepping up the preparations for a war of aggression behind the curtain of the six-party talks in a bid to stifle the DPRK by a preemptive nuclear strike. If the U.S. imperialists start a war in the end, the North Korean People’s Army will mobilize the military deterrent force built up for years and thus conclude the confrontation with the United States with merciless crushing blows and accomplish the historic cause of national reunification without fail.” Despite Kim Il Chol’s statement, North Korea praised the “sincere atmosphere” of the multi-party talks and appeared pleased about the U.S. agreement to compensation for cessation of the DPRK’s nuclear programs. [Jong-Heon Lee. “In Seoul, Rice Offers Carrots to N. Korea.” United Press International 9 July 2004.]
06/26/04: The third round of the multilateral talks ended in Beijing with an agreement on the first step toward North Korean denuclearization. While the U.S. did not change its position on a complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantling (CVID) of North Korea’s nuclear weapons, the Bush administration agreed to shift the focus of the talks to the first step of denuclearization - a nuclear freeze. According to Wang Yi, head of the Chinese delegation and Vice Foreign Minister, “All parties concerned have acknowledged that the execution of a nuclear freeze and the application of corresponding measures are the first step of denuclearization.” In exchange for the nuclear freeze, North Korea would be given fuel oil. The United States and North Korea are in disagreement as to the scope of the freeze as well as the scope and method of denuclearization. While the U.S. insists on transparent and irreversible denuclearization, North Korea has only proposed a transparent process. North Korea continues to deny having any HEU program despite any previous admissions thereof. Further discussion is planned for September 2004. [“Text of News Conference Conducted by Wang Yi Following End of Six-Party Talks,” Beijing CCTV-4, 0340 GMT 26 June 2004 in FBIS CPP20040626000070; Sanger, David E., “U.S to Offer North Korea Incentives in Nuclear Talks,” New York Times 23 June 2004, late edition A3; “Russian Daily Considers DPRK Six-Party Talks Outcome,” Moscow Kommersant, 28 June 2004 in FBIS CEP20040628000101.]
05/04/04: North Korean officials denied allegation made by U.S. Vice President Cheney's speech in Shanghai that the DPRK is active in proliferating nuclear and missile technology. "We make a clear distinction between missiles and nuclear material. We're entitled to sell missiles to earn foreign exchange. But in regard to nuclear material our policy past, present, and future is that we would never allow such transfers to al-Qaeda or anyone else. Never," stated Kim Yong-nam, president of the Supreme People's Assembly. Paik Nam-soon, the DPRK foreign minister reiterated, "Let me make clear that we denounce al-Qaeda, we oppose all forms of terrorism and we will never transfer our nuclear material to others. Our nuclear program is solely for our self-defense. We denounce al-Qaeda for the barbaric attack of 9/11, which was a terrible tragedy and inflicted a great shock to America. Bush is using that shock to turn the American people against us, but the truth is that we want and need your friendship." [Harrison, Selig. "Inside North Korea." The Financial Times, 4 May 2004, Pg. 9]
04/23/04: The director of North Korea's Foreign Ministry, Jong Thae-yung, denied that Pyongyang possessed any uranium enrichment program accusing the United States of distorting the truth for its own ends. "No uranium enrichment program exists in our country in the first place," stated Jong. ["North Korea Denies U.S. Uranium Allegations, Wants to Discuss Compensation." Associated Press Worldstream, 23 April 2004.]
03/04/2004: Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Wang Yi stated that Chinese officials are now putting together proposals for the preparatory working group agreed to at the conclusion of the recent six-nation talks. China will send its proposals to the other five nations -- Japan, Russia, the United States and the two Koreas -- for review. "We hope they can start up quickly," said Wang, who led China's delegation at the four-day talks in Beijing. The six parties ended the talks by agreeing to hold the next meeting by the end of June, and to prepare for the event by setting up a working group. Wang noted that key issues at the next round of talks will be North Korea's right to use atomic energy after giving up nuclear weapons and the verification of any highly enriched uranium. ["6-Party Working Group To Be Formed This Month: China" in FBIS JPP20040304000094 Tokyo Kyodo World Service, 4 Mar 2004.]
2/28/04: The second round of six-party talks ended in suspense but without any major breakthrough, as deliberations over language pushed a formal announcement back three hours. A senior U.S. official said in a statement that the talks "exceeded his expectations in every aspect of utmost importance" and "very successfully" came close to the U.S. goal of the DPRK's abandonment of the nuclear program "in a thorough, inspectable, and irreversible method." Both DPRK delegation head Kim Kye-kwan and the senior official speaking on behalf of the U.S. praised China for its role in holding the second round of the six-party talks in Beijing and promoting the talks. ["US Side 'Secretive'; Delegations Positive About Second Six-Party Talks" in FBIS CPP20040301000043, Beijing Renmin Ribao 29 Feb 2004.]
2/25/04: A new round of six-party talks began in Beijing, focusing on allegations of a secret uranium enrichment program. Despite pressure by the U.S., North Korea continued to deny any uranium enrichment facilities, stating: "If the US insists on putting forward fictitious calls on a highly-enriched uranium program, and condemning North Korea, this will only result in the prolonging of the nuclear question." [Hamish McDonald, "US takes hard line with Pyongyang," Sydney Morning Herald, 24 February 2004.]
2/21/04: According to a report by the Asahi Shimbun, a U.S. Government official in charge of China-related affairs stated that in the summer of 2003, the Chinese Government confiscated nuclear weapons related material being imported by North Korea. Based on intelligence provided by the CIA, the material confiscated was tributyl phosphate (TBP), a solvent used for extracting weapons-grade plutonium from spent fuel rods. Upon checking a Pyongyang-bound train that appeared to carry a container with the TBP, the CIA notified the Chinese Government through diplomatic channels and requested that it intercept the transport.
Although China is not officially taking part in the US-led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), this seems to indicate some cooperation with the PSI behind the scenes. "It is evident that the U.S. and China are cooperating under the table for the sake of a nuclear-free zone in the Korean Peninsula," the report stated. "The North is likely to face a large difficultly in its move for a nuclear development plan, now that its great alliance nation began to obstruct it." ["China Blocked North's Nuclear Materials Imports," Dong-a Ilbo, 21 February 2004.]
2/03/04: North Korea announced by way of a radio address that six-way talks will resume February 25th in Beijing, according to the DPRK's central broadcasting station. The announcement came one hour after a ministerial delegation arrived in Seoul from Pyongyang. China's Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Zhang Qiyue said that China's vice foreign minister Wang Yi will continue to lead Beijing's delegation to the talks, despite indications that he had been designated the new ambassador to Canada. ["DPRK Envoy to N-S Talks: US 'at Last Perceived Our Actual Position' on 6-Way Talks," Seoul Chungang Ilbo, 04 February 2004 in FBIS KPP20040203000046.]
1/13/2004: North Korean officials told an unofficial delegation of U.S.
experts last week that the country has no clandestine program to enrich uranium.
"They absolutely, totally stuck to the script on the HEU [highly enriched
uranium] program: 'We don't have one,' " a senior administration official said.
The refusal to acknowledge the uranium effort has strengthened suspicions that
last week's display was intended to shift attention away from the topic of HEU
in upcoming six-nation negotiations, and especially to retain the support of
China. U.S. officials said they had three translators at the 2002 session
and have no doubt the North Koreans confirmed the program.
["N. Korea Still Denies Enriching Uranium; U.S. Delegation Told There Is No
Secret Program," Washington Post, 13 January 2004.]
1/11/2004: In a Foreign Ministry statement carried by the official
North Korean news agency, Pyongyang said it had shown its "nuclear deterrent
force" to an unofficial delegation of U.S. experts returning from a visit to
North Korea, headed by Stanford University scholar John W. Lewis:
"If the visit of Lewis and the nuclear specialist and their party helped the U.S. even a bit to drop its ambiguous view on [North Korea's] nuclear activities, it would serve as a substantial foundation for a peaceful settlement of the nuclear issue between [North Korea] and the U.S. in the future... The permission given by [North Korea] to visit the facility was aimed to give Americans an opportunity to confirm the reality by themselves."
["N. Korea Displays 'Nuclear Deterrent'; Freeze Possible, U.S. Team Is Told," Washington Post, 11 January 2004.]
1/7/2004: According to the Washington Post, China expressed doubts about U.S. claims that North Korea possessed a HEU program. At a meeting in Seoul between Chinese, South Korean and Japanese officials on the North Korean crisis, senior Chinese diplomat Fu Ying declared China did not believe North Korea had a highly enriched uranium program. She added that the U.S. government briefing provided to China had not been sufficient to convince China that North Korea had such a program. ["Chinese Not Convinced of North Korean Uranium Effort," Washington Post, 7 January 2004.]
12/15/2003: North Korea rejected a U.S. proposal to end the nuclear dispute and warned that Washington's "delaying tactics" would prompt Pyongyang to step up development of atomic weapons. "As the U.S. urges the DPRK to dismantle its nuclear weapons completely, verifiably and irreversibly, the latter has the same right to demand the U.S. . . . give it complete, verifiable and irreversible security assurances," North Korea's Rodong Sinmun reported. "Its delaying tactics would only result in compelling the DPRK to steadily increase its nuclear deterrent force." ["N. Korea Rejects U.S. Proposal," Associated Press 15 December 2003.]
12/10/2003: North Korea announced that it would freeze its nuclear
weapons programs in return for energy aid and being removed from the U.S. list
of countries that sponsor terrorism. The North added that the long-term
goal would be to "de-nuclearize the Korean Peninsula." Speaking at a news
conference with visiting Premier Wen Jiabao, President Bush rejected the offer.
"The goal of the United States is not for a freeze of the nuclear program," Bush
said. "The goal is to dismantle a nuclear weapons program in a verifiable and
irreversible way." ["Bush Rejects N. Korea's Offer of Nuclear
Programs Freeze for Energy Aid," Associated Press, 09 December 2003.]
12/09/2003: An EU delegation met with Chinese officials before
heading to North Korea to convey their support for a U.S. backed resolution to
the nuclear crisis. Foreign Ministry Spokesman Liu Jianchao said,
"[Director-General Fu Ying] expressed that China supports the European Union
playing a role in trying to resolve the nuclear issue."
["EU team heads to North Korea after briefing by Chinese Officials," Agence
France Press, 09 December 2003.]
10/31/2003: In talks with senior Chinese officials, North Korea agreed in principle to resume the six-party talks if these talks would lead to a "package solution based on the principle of simultaneous actions." North Korea has previously stated that those actions must include economic and humanitarian aid, diplomatic ties and a nonaggression treaty. "We want to hold this round of six-party talks as soon as possible," Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zhang Qiyue said at a news briefing in Beijing. [Anthony Faiola, "N. Korea Agrees to Resume Nuclear Talks; U.S. Reacts Coolly to Demand For 'Simultaneous Actions'," Washington Post, 31 October 2003]
10/30/2003: Wu Bangguo, China's top legislator, visited Pyongyang, the highest-level visit to North Korea by a Chinese leader in more than two years. Wu said China "hoped to strengthen its traditional friendship with North Korea... as well as have both sides make a contribution to peace and stability in the Korean Peninsula," according to a China Central Television newscast. [Associated Press, "China's No. 2 on N. Korean Mission: Nuclear Squabble. Wu Urges Another Round of Multilateral Talks," The Gazette (Quebec), 30 October 2003]
10/25/2003: North Korea's official news agency issued a carefully worded response to the American proposal, quoting an unidentified Foreign Ministry spokesperson. "We are ready to consider Bush's remarks on the written assurances of nonaggression if they are based on the intention to coexist," the statement read. The statement did not include any specific commitment to continue the six-party talks hosted by Beijing. [James Brooke and David Sanger, "North Koreans, In Shift, to Mull Security Offer," New York Times, 26 October 2003]
10/23/2003: During a six nation Asian tour, U.S. President Bush was quoted as saying, "Kim Jong Il is used to being able to deal bilaterally with the United States, but the change of policy now is, is that he must deal with other nations, most notably China... Now he's got his big neighbor to the right on his border, he's got a neighbor to the south, he's got Japan, he's got another neighbor, Russia, all saying the same thing." [Mike Allen, "Bush: Pressure is Building on N. Korea; After Indonesia Stopover, President Engages Reporters En Route to Australia," Washington Post, 23 October 2003]
10/21/2003: Chinese President Hu Jintao commented that his country would "continue to strengthen our communication and consultations with various parties concerned, and we will continue to work to promote the Beijing six-party talks process so as to strive for a peaceful resolution of this issue." [Mike Allen and Glenn Kessler, "Questions Linger on Plan for N. Korea; Bush Seeks Support For Security Pledge," Washington Post, 21 October 2003]
10/20/2003: U.S. President Bush presented an American plan for a five-nation security guarantee to Chinese president Hu Jintao, a guarantee that would include North Korea if it dismantles its nuclear weapons programs. "We think there's an opportunity to move the process forward and we're going to discuss it with our partners," Bush said to reporters in Bangkok, during the Asian Economic Summit. This was perceived as a subtle but important shift in U.S. policy, which has repeatedly rejected North Korea's demand for a nonaggression treaty that would legally restrict the U.S. from attacking the North. [David E. Sanger, "Bush Proposes North Korea Security Plan to China," New York Times, 20 October 2003]
10/2/2003: China's official news agency quoted North Korea's Vice Foreign Minister Choi Su Hon as saying the North had "already processed 8,000 fuel rods" and "changed the purpose of these rods." The rods would provide plutonium to be used for nuclear weapon development. "One thing we can tell you is that we are in possession of nuclear deterrence and we're continuing to strengthen that deterrence." Speaking at the North's mission to the UN in New York, he further commented: "We have no intention of transferring any means of that nuclear deterrence to other countries." [Reuters, "North Korea Says Nuclear Rods Processed," New York Times, 2 October 2003]
09/19/2003: The IAEA General Conference adopted a resolution urging North Korea to accept comprehensive IAEA safeguards and to cooperate in their implementation. However, Zhang Yan, China's permanent representative to the UN in Vienna, conveyed China's reservations about the resolution, which it considered unbalanced:
"One of the most significant consensuses reached at the Beijing six-party talks is to take into consideration and find solutions to the DPRK's reasonable security concerns while seeking denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula; and these two points also constitute the two key aspects of a sound solution to the DPRK nuclear issue. Any move to overstress one aspect at the neglect of the other will prove unfavorable to current efforts towards a peaceful settlement of the DPRK nuclear issue. The Chinese side expresses regret at the fact that the resolution fails to give a comprehensive expression to the aforementioned consensus reached at the six-party talks."
["States Call Upon North Korea to Dismantle Nuclear Weapons Programme, Accept Safeguards," IAEA General Conference, 19 September 2003, "PRC UN Ambassador 19 Sep Regrets IAEA Resolution on DPRK Nuclear Issue," Beijing Xinhua Domestic Service in English, 19 September 2003].
09/02/2003: During a regular news conference Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Kong Quan provided the following statement regarding the outcome of the six-way talks on North Korea's nuclear program:
"The most important significance of the six-party talks this time is that the six parties sit together for the first time to have consultations on relevant questions. Secondly various parties were able to know each other's concerns through the talks which was conducive to laying a foundation for reducing difference and expanding consensus in the future. The Chinese side is fully aware of the complexity of the question and the difficulties and twists in-between. But it is believed that with the consensus among the six parties, the dialogue process will continue to reduce mutual doubts with the enhancement of mutual understanding and further develop and expand the already existing consensus so as to lead to the final solution to the question." ["Foreign Ministry Spokesperson's Press Conference on September 2, 2003," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2 September 2003].
08/29/2003: Multilateral talks concluded in Beijing without producing a written joint statement. However, the delegations did adopt a six-point agreement. Through this agreement, which was announced by Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister Wang Yi, the six countries confirmed their consensus on the following points: "to resolve the nuclear issue through peaceful means and dialogue; while a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula should be realized, the security concerns of the DPRK should also be taken into consideration; to explore an overall plan to resolve the nuclear issue in a just and reasonable manner and in a simultaneous and incremental way; in the process of negotiations any action or word that may aggravate the situation should be avoided; dialogue should continue to establish trust, reduce differences and broaden common ground; the six-party talks should continue and the specific date and venue should be decided through diplomatic channels as soon as possible." ["Vice FM Wang Yi, Head of Chinese Delegation to the Six-party Talks Gives a Press Conference," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China website, 30 August 2003].
08/27/2003: 6-way talks began in Beijing to discuss North Korea's nuclear weapons program, attended by delegates from North Korea, South Korea, Japan, China, the U.S., and Russia. The U.S. and North Korea began by stating their respective positions: U.S. delegate James Kelly demanded that North Korea unconditionally abandon its nuclear program, while North Korean delegate Kim Yong Il stated that the DPRK would continue to develop a nuclear deterrent unless the U.S. agreed to a non-aggression treaty. The delegates were seated around a large hexagonal table, with the U.S. and North Korean delegations adjacent to one another. [John Pomfret, "U.S., North Korea Don't Bend on Arms; No Movement at Nuclear Talks in Beijing," Washington Post Foreign Service, 27 August 2003].
07/28/2003: U.S. Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton opened meetings with Chinese officials to discuss the North Korean nuclear issue. He lauded Chinese efforts to resolve the situation peacefully and said that the U.S. intends to end the situation in a “complete, verifiable, and irreversible way.” He also discussed the U.S. desire for broad participation in any negotiations, stating that the United States is “very flexible” on the format of the talks, as long as they are multilateral. He also made the case for Russia’s inclusion in such talks, as well as suggesting that any of the five Nuclear Weapons States (as designated by the NPT) could be “useful.” [“AFP: More on Envoy Bolton Says US Wants Broad Participation on DPRK Issue,” Agence France-Presse, 28 July 2003 in FBIS CPP20030728000144].
07/24/2003: China Daily reported that North Korea intends to declare itself a nuclear weapons state unless the United States responds positively to its proposals by September 9, the anniversary of North Korea’s founding. Such a declaration would open the way for nuclear tests and weapons sales, as well as escalating the situation. [“DPRK Sets Sept 9 As Deadline,” China Daily, 24 July 2003, http://www3.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2003-07/24/content_248133.htm].
07/19/2003: Tokyo Kyodo reported that Russia had offered in June to host multilateral talks on the North Korea issue, but opposition from China and the United States blocked the proposal. The Russian offer was intended to help convince Pyongyang to enter into multilateral negotiations but sating North Korea’s desire to have Russia involved in the process. According to the Russian sources that gave this information, China opposed Russia’s suggestion out of a desire to maintain its leading role in the issue. [“U.S., China Opposition Kills Moscow Offer On North Korea Talks,” Tokyo Kyodo, 18 July 2003 in FBIS JPP20030718000139].
07/17/2003: Two days after his return from Pyongyang, Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Dai Bingguo traveled to the United States to brief U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell on the his meeting with North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il. Dai was also believed to have carried a letter from Chinese President Hu Jintao for U.S. President George W. Bush. [Shane Green, “N Korea On Missile Path, Says Beijing,” Sydney Morning Herald, 19 July 2003].
07/16/2003: U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Randy Schriver urged Beijing to do more to help North Korean refugees who cross the border into China. He suggested Chinese permit NGOs and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees to operate in the area to help alleviate the issue. Estimates put the number of refugees in China at 300,000, most of whom China refuses to grant asylum and many of whom it repatriates to brutal punishment in North Korea. “Our great hope is that the Chinese will do more to address the refugee situation in northern China across the border from North Korea,” Schriver said. [“AFP: US Official Urges China To Do More To Help North Korean Refugees,” Agence France-Presse, 16 July 2003 in FBIS CPP20030716000037].
07/16/2003: Xinhua reported Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing and U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell discussed North Korea on the telephone. The two “agreed to keep contact and exert efforts to further Sino-US constructive and cooperative relationship,” according to the report, which provided no further detail. [“Xinhua: Colin Powell, PRC FM Li Zhaoxing Discusses DPRK Nuclear Issue Over Phone,” Beijing Xinhua, 16 July 2003 in FBIS CPP20030716000020].
07/16/2003: Korean Central Broadcasting Station reported that the Chinese government had decided to provide North Korea with diesel fuel, free of charge. It was not reported how much fuel would be provided or when this was likely to occur. [“DPRK Radio Reports China To Provide DPRK With 'Free' Diesel Fuel,” Korean Central Broadcasting Station, 16 July 2003 in FBIS KPP20030716000086].
07/15/2003: Tokyo Sankei Shimbun reported that China, since the 1980s, has been calling for a review and possible revision of the treaty it signed with North Korea in 1961. The treaty is so strong as to virtually form a military alliance and also forces China to support North Korean activities it might otherwise condemn. Beijing also suspects that Pyongyang has been utilizing its unrestricted access to China to smuggle drugs and other items. The treaty pays no tangible benefits to China, and Beijing in February rejected a North Korean request for weapons and assistance to counter a U.S. military threat. [“Japan: China Demands New Treaty To Replace 1961 China-DPRK Friendship Pact,” Tokyo Sankei Shimbun, 15 July 2003 in FBIS JPP20030715000020].
07/15/2003: Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Dai Bingguo met with North Korean leader Kim Jong-il and personally delivered a letter from Chinese President Hu Jintao. Reportedly, this letter contained a proposal for multilateral talks in which bilateral negotiations between North Korea and the United States would occur on the side. Foreign Ministry spokesman Kong Quan told a press briefing, “Right now it is critical to continue the process of the talks.” [Joseph Kahn, “As U.S. And North Korea Glower, China Pushes For Talks,” New York Times, 16 July 2003].
07/14/2003: The Chinese Foreign Ministry released a statement urging all parties involved in the North Korean nuclear crisis to refrain from making any escalatory moves, in response to reports that North Korea had reprocessed 8,000 spent fuel rods. “We hope the relevant sides can keep calm, exercise restraint, resolve mutual concerns through dialogue and negotiation and avoid any actions that will exacerbate the situation,” the Ministry said. [“China Urges Calm In North Korea Nuclear Flap,” Reuters, 14 July 2003].
07/11/2003: A reception was held in Beijing to commemorate the 42nd anniversary of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between China and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Gu Xiulian, vice-chairwoman of the Chinese National People's Congress Standing Committee, and DPRK Ambassador to China Choe Jin Su spoke of the friendly and valuable bilateral ties the two possessed. It is not clear if any mention was made of the current nuclear crisis. [“China: Official Reception In Beijing Marks 42nd Anniversary Of Sino-DPRK Treaty,” Beijing Xinhua, 11 July 2003 in FBIS CPP20030711000144].
07/07/2003: Chinese President Hu Jintao and South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun met in Beijing to discuss North Korea. The two affirmed their desires to pursue multilateral negotiations and to resolve the issue peacefully and diplomatically. Roh, at a press conference afterwards, said, “I agreed with President Hu that in order to fully and satisfactorily resolve the North Korean nuclear issue, we must open up channels between all concerned parties as soon as possible and in order to reach a consensus all sides need to make relentless efforts.” Hu stated, “the Chinese side all along has stood for peace and stability on the Korean peninsula. We support dialogue to peacefully resolve the problem on the peninsula. At the same time we think we must earnestly consider and resolve the security concerns of North Korea. This is our principled position." [“South Korea And China Vow To Bring N Korea To Multilateral Table,” Agence France-Presse, 08 July 2003].
07/04/2003: Russian and Chinese representatives blocked a proposed UN Security Council resolution condemning North Korea’s nuclear program and withdrawal from the NPT, believing that such a resolution would only provoke North Korea unnecessarily. North Korea has declared in the past that any UNSC action would be an act of war, forcing retaliation. China and Russia remain committed to resolving the current conflict through diplomatic channels. [“US UN Security Council Resolution Condemning DPRK Nuclear Program Not Passed,” Moscow Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 04 July 2003 in FBIS CEP20030704000070.
07/01-07/04/2003: Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited Washington to discuss the North Korean nuclear issue and urge the resumption of talks, while Deputy Foreign Minister Dai Bingguo traveled to Moscow to discuss the same subject. [Simon Pollock, “China Plunges Into Diplomatic Scramble Over N. Korea,” Tokyo Kyodo, 03 July 2003 in FBIS JPP20030703000153].
06/30/2003: Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing, after meeting with officials from the European Union while in Greece, told reporters that “China hopes to see a nuclear weapons-free Korean peninsula which enjoys lasting peace and stability.” He also stated, “It is important to address the security concerns of a certain country but should there be disagreements or even conflicts between certain countries the only way to solve them is through dialogue in a peaceful manner.” Li, while in Lisbon a few days earlier, had said that he had received no confirmation of a North Korean nuclear program from Pyongyang. [Karolos Grohmann, "China Wants Nuclear Weapons-Free Koreas," Reuters, 30 June 2003, and “AFP: Chinese FM Calls For Negotiations To Solve N. Korean Nuclear Crisis,” Agence France-Presse, 27 June 2003 in FBIS CPP20030628000042].
06/24/2003: Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Kong Quan, during a press conference, fielded a question asking about the North Korean nuclear situation. He responded:
We proposed to host the tripartite talks in Beijing in April, which the international community believes to be a sound start in solving the nuclear question peacefully through diplomacy. China is still working on that so that various parties can continue the process of Beijing talks.
With respect to the number of participants, we have noted on many occasions that China doesn't have any selfish interest on the matter. We are open to the formality of the talks. The key is the result, which should help to ensure a nuclear-free, peaceful and stable Peninsula.
He also stated that preparations for a July visit to China by South Korean president Roh Moo-hyun are underway. [“Transcript of PRC FM Spokesman Press Conference 24 Jun 03,” Beijing Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 24 June 2003 in FBIS CPP20030626000084].
06/20/2003: Chinese President Hu Jintao and Chyung Dai-chul, chairman of South Korea’s ruling Millennium Democratic Party, met in Beijing to discuss a peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear crisis. Chyung urged Hu to meet with North Korean leadership and attempt to persuade them to accept multilateral negotiations. Hu stated, "China and South Korea should make active, concerted efforts to solve the North Korean nuclear standoff." He also made it clear that "China opposes the recurrence of a war on the Korean Peninsula, while North Korea should be guaranteed security." [“ROK's MDP Chairman, PRC President Discuss DPRK Nuclear Issue,” Seoul Yonhap, 20 June 2003 in FBIS KPP20030620000083].
06/20/2003: Tokyo Kyodo reported that the United States told Japan in March that North Korea already possessed nuclear warheads capable of fitting on ballistic missiles. It was unclear how the United States had confirmed this or how reliable such intelligence could be given the reclusive nature of North Korea. This report led to increased calls for missile defense in Japan. [“U.S. Told Japan N. Korea Has Nuke Warheads For Missiles: Paper,” Tokyo Kyodo, 19 June 2003 in FBIS JPP20030619000149].
06/19/2003: The United States circulated a draft statement in the United Nations Security Council calling upon North Korea "to immediately and completely dismantle its nuclear weapons program in a verifiable and irreversible manner.” The five permanent members of the UNSC received drafts. In early April, China and Russia had blocked the adoption of a resolution condemning North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT. [Irwin Arieff, "U.S. Offers UN Text On North Korea Nuclear Crisis," Reuters, 19 June 2003].
06/18/2003: U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell and North Korean Ambassador-at-Large Ho Jong talked briefly at an ASEAN forum meeting, in a chance encounter. Powell reiterated the U.S. position that a multilateral format is the only way to diffuse the current crisis. It was not reported how Ho replied. The meeting came after Powell had told the forum that “keeping pressure on North Korea is absolutely necessary if we are to achieve the goal all of us seek: a diplomatic solution that leaves the peninsula, the region and the world safer.” [George Gedda, “Powell Has Chance Encounter With North Korean, Outlines Views On Nuclear Standoff,” Associated Press, 18 June 2003].
06/18/2003: North Korea’s official news agency quoted a Foreign Ministry spokesman as rejecting multilateral talks as a basis for resolution of the nuclear impasse on the Korean Peninsula. After describing the U.S. push for multilateral talks as "camouflage used to cover isolationist and repressive policy" and a “smoke screen to cover a war without gunfire," the spokesman declared, "the situation has come to the point where we unavoidably can't pin hopes on any multilateral talks." North Korea also reiterated its resolve to obtain a nuclear deterrent capable of assuring its security. [“N. Korea Sees No Hope For Multilateral Talks On Nuke Dispute,” Tokyo Kyodo World Service, 18 June 2003].
06/17/2003: Foreign Ministers from Japan, China, and South Korea began trilateral talks with the North Korean nuclear crisis high on the agenda. The three agreed that five-party talks were necessary to resolve the crisis, the first time that China had agreed to that multilateral format. They also endorsed a policy similar to the “dialogue and pressure” upon which Japan, the US and South Korea already agreed. [“Japan, China, S. Korea Begin Meeting, Focus On N. Korea," Tokyo Kyodo World Service, 17 June 2003; Gwon Gywong-bok, “Beijing Gives Nod To 5-Way Talks,” Digital Chosunilbo, 17 June 2003].
06/10/2003: The Chinese Foreign Ministry called on the United States and North Korea to avoid escalation of the current crisis. After Pyongyang's declaration of the need for a nuclear deterrent, Washington quickly countered that the DPRK's best route to improving the lives of its people was to eliminate its nuclear program. Beijing reminded the two countries of the danger of such rash and impetuous moves. "We resolutely support the 'denuclearization' of the Korean Peninsula and at the same time stress the importance of protecting the peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula," said Foreign Ministry spokesperson Kong Quan. [“China Calls On N. Korea, US To Keep Cool,” Tokyo Kyodo World Service, 10 June 2003].
06/10/2003: U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage said that he expected the five-power talks will take place within the next two months. These talks, which would include the DPRK, the United States, South Korea, China, and Japan, have been favored by all parties except North Korea. However, North Korean opposition to such talks has reportedly weakened. ["Armitage: Multilateral N.Korea Talks Likely By Aug.," Reuters, 09 June 2003].
06/09/2003: Pyongyang’s official news agency, KCNA, announced that “the DPRK has no intention to have a nuclear force without any reason.” The announcement indicated that North Korea would be willing to discuss its nuclear program if the United States were to drop its hostile attitude towards the DPRK. KCNA also stated that “The DPRK’s intention to build up a nuclear deterrent force is not aimed to threaten and blackmail others but reduce conventional weapons under a long-term plan and channel manpower resources and funds into economic construction and the betterment of people’s living.” The pronouncement also claimed that North Korea, having withdrawn from the NPT, has the same legal status as the United States and other countries possessing nuclear weapons not bound to international law.” [“DPRK ‘Nuclear Deterrent Force' To Be Built If US Maintains ‘Hostile Policy,’” Pyongyang KCNA (in English), 9 June 2003, in FBIS-KPP20030609000047].
06/05/2003: Pentagon officials announced that the 37,000 troops stationed in the Demilitarized Zone will soon withdraw to positions at least 75 miles south of the DMZ and vacate a base in downtown Seoul. The move will not reduce the number of troops deployed in the Republic of Korea, and was decided upon after "taking careful account of the political, economic and security situation on the peninsula and in Northeast Asia." ROK officials asked for a delay until the current confrontation with the DPRK had been resolved. After negotiating terms and details of the withdrawal, the United States announced it would spend an additional $11 billion over the next three years in new equipment and defense systems for the ROK. [Doug Struck, "US Pulling Troops From Korean DMZ, Forces To Move 75 Miles From Border, Abandoning Large Base In Seoul," Associated Press, 05 June 2003].
06/03/2003: The bipartisan Congressional delegation headed by Representative Curt Weldon (R-PA) reported that North Korea is “ready to deal” over its nuclear weapons. Moreover, the group claimed the response to a plan they presented was encouraging. Weldon said the group met with North Korean Foreign Minister Paek Nam-Sum and that “his response was, ‘It’s very positive. It’s exactly what we are looking for.” The six Representatives felt they succeeded in helping to achieve their goal “to put the human face on the US.” [Maxim Kniazkov, “US Lawmakers Say North Korea ‘Ready To Deal’ Over Nuclear Arms,” Agence France-Presse, 3 June 2003].
05/31/2003: U.S. Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, in a speech at an Asian security conference in Singapore, urged North Korea to follow the path of reformation that China took under Deng Xiaoping. "Twenty-five years ago, under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, China pointed the way to how a failed communist system can undertake a process of reform without collapsing. That is the course North Korea needs to pursue if it is to avoid the kind of collapse that is viewed with apprehension throughout the region," said Secretary Wolfowitz. "The task is to persuade the leadership that the only way to avoid regime change brought about by internal collapse is to have the kind of fundamental policy change that Deng Xiaoping led in China.” He continued by affirming Washington’s desire for a multilateral resolution. [“Wolfowitz Urges N. Korea To Follow China’s Reform Path,” Tokyo Kyodo World Service, 31 May 2003].
05/24/2003: U.S. President George Bush met with Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi in Crawford, Texas. The two stressed a united stance against any North Korean nuclear capability, with President Bush stating, “The prime minister and I see the problem exactly the same way.” Prime Minister Koizumi stressed that “Japan will crack down more rigorously in illegal activities,” and the two warned North Korea of the “tougher measures” that would result from escalation, a veiled reference to economic sanctions. [Yoichi Kosukegawa, “Focus: Koizumi-Bush Texas Ranch Meeting Double Edged,” Tokyo Kyodo World Service, 24 May 2003].
05/14/2003: U.S. President George W. Bush and South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun held a summit meeting at the White House. A joint statement they issued noted that “increased threats to peace and stability on the peninsula would require consideration of further steps.” It also stated that, “Escalatory moves by North Korea will only lead to its greater isolation and a more desperate situation in the North.” [“Bush, Roh Urge Nuke-Free Korean Peninsula,” The New York Times, 15 May 2003].
05/13/2003: On the eve of a summit between U.S. President George Bush and his counterpart from the Republic of Korea, Roh Moo-hyun, the DPRK’s official news agency Korean Central News Agency declared the 1992 North-South pact on denuclearization a “dead document.” This was the last legal obstacle to Northern nuclearization after its withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the 1994 Agreed Framework. "The Bush administration has systematically and completely torpedoed the process of denuclearization on the Korean peninsula," KCNA said. "The inter-Korean declaration on denuclearization of the Korean peninsula was thus reduced to a dead document." [Charles Whelan, “North Korea Declares Nuclear Accord With South Korea 'Dead Document,'" Agence France-Presse, 13 May 2003].
05/09/2003: Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxin urged U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell to continue to pursue a diplomatic solution to the crisis on the Korean Peninsula. In communication over the telephone, Li stated, “China is willing to promote the peaceful resolution of the nuclear issue at an early date with joint efforts of all sides," and explained that the talks in April were a good start and that “the process should continue.” [“China Willing To Help End The North Korea Nuke Crisis," Reuters, 9 May 2003].
04/28/2003-05/09/2003: The Second Session of Preparatory Committee for the 2005 NPT Review Conference was held in Geneva. North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT, the first since the treaty took effect, prompted much comment. Due to the continuing ambiguity of the situation, most delegations contented themselves with expressing their regrets at the DPRK’s withdrawal and their wishes for a peaceful resolution. The head of the U.S. delegation, Assistant Secretary of State John S. Wolf, stated that the United States was determined to “end North Korea’s threat through peaceful, diplomatic means.” Chinese Ambassador Hu Xiaodi stressed that all parties involved should “exercise restraint and demonstrate sincerity and flexibility.” [Fiona Simpson, “NPT 2003 PrepCom Report,” BASIC website, 21 May 2003, Statement by Ambassador Hu Xiaodi to NPT PrepCom, 9 May 2003, Statement by Assistant Secretary Wolf to NPT PrepCom, 28 April 2003].
05/08/2003: An official from the Republic of Korea reported that U.S. officials had given the ROK a photograph showing smoke coming from a DPRK nuclear facility. This is a potential sign that reprocessing has begun at Yongbyon, but the official said that none of the heat or chemical signatures of reprocessing had been detected. [Daniel Cooney, "Official: US Photo Shows North Korea Nukes," Associated Press, 08 May 2003].
04/30/2003: In a Foreign Ministry statement, the North Korean government hinted publicly at possessing an indigenous nuclear capability. The statement claimed "the reality requires the DPRK to deter the escalating U.S. moves to stifle the DPRK with a physical force, compels it to opt for possessing a necessary deterrent force and put it into practice." The Korean Central News Agency, in a separate release, stated that “The U.S., which possesses the biggest number of nuclear weapons in the world and poses a constant threat to other sovereign countries with them, should scrap its nuclear program before such a small country as the DPRK does.” KCNA also reported a position on economic sanctions, saying that if the US were to seek them from the UN, the DPRK would “take self-defensive measures, regarding it as a green light to war.” ["North Korea Admits Nukes, Warns US," CNN News, 30 April 2003, "North Korea Hints Publicly It Has Nuclear Weapons," Agence France-Presse 30 April 2003, and Jae-Suk Yoo, "North Korea: Sanction Move Could Trigger War," Associated Press, 30 April 2003].
04/28/2003: U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell confirmed that North Korea had offered a plan to eliminate its nuclear and missile capabilities, but said that the DPRK delegation had asked for “something considerable" in return. News sources from the Republic of Korea reported that the DPRK has offered to eradicate its capabilities, not just suspend them. As Secretary Powell told reporters, “The North Koreans acknowledged a number of things that they were doing and, in effect, said that these are now up for further discussion." He proceeded to say, "We are studying that plan.” ["North Korea Offers Plan To Eliminate Nuclear Weapons: Powell," Agence France-Presse, 29 April 2003].
04/25/2003: Trilateral talks in Beijing ended early with reciprocal recriminations. U.S. officials reported that the DPRK delegation had claimed to have nuclear weapons and threatened to test, export, or use them. North Korean officials maintained they presented a new proposal that was ignored by U.S. negotiators. According to PRC Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing, “Both of [the United States and North Korea] expressed that the issue should be resolved in a peaceful way,” and both parties agreed to meet again. Shi Yinhong, a scholar at Beijing's People's University, described the talks as "a major slap in the face to China," and went on to indicate that China may be forced to leave its neutral mediator role and apply more pressure to the DPRK. [Paul Eckert and Brian Rhoads, "Talks End After North Korea Claims To Have Nuclear Bomb," Reuters, 25 April 2003, William Foreman, "Nuclear Talks End In Apparent Impasse," Associated Press, 25 April 2003, Glenn Kessler, "North Korea Says It Has Nuclear Arms At Talks With US, Pyongyang Threatens ‘Demonstration’ Or Export Of Weapon," Washington Post, 25 April 2003, and Joseph Kahn, "China Seeks To Put Positive Spin On Talks With North Korea," The New York Times, 25 April 2003].
04/24/2003: North Korean negotiator Li Gun reportedly told U.S. officials that North Korea possessed nuclear weapons. This is the first DPRK admission of nuclear capability, following recent declarations it was “at the point” of reprocessing. Talks for the day were bilateral, with US-PRC and PRC-DPRK meetings. U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell warned the North Koreans they should not leave “with the slightest impression that the US and its partners and the nations in the region will be intimidated by bellicose statements or by threats or actions they think might get them more attention or might force us to make a concession that we would not otherwise make.” [George Gedda, "N. Korea Warns US It Has Nuclear Arms," Associated Press, 24 April 2003, and "North Korea Owns Up To Bomb As Crisis Talks End Early," Agence France-Presse, 24 April 2003].
04/23/2003: Diplomatic negotiations between North Korea, the United States, and China opened. American expectations for the three day talks did not include any agreement. One Western diplomat told the New York Times, "I can't see anything firmer than an agreement to meet again." Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly refused to comment on the progress of the negotiations. [Joseph Kahn, "US Envoys Arrive In China For Talks With North Korea," The New York Times, 23 April 2003 and Christopher Bodeen, "US, North Korean Envoys Meet In Beijing," Associated Press, 23 April 2003].
04/22/2003: According to Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Liu Jianchao, China hoped that the up-coming trilateral talks would "help the parties to understand each other's positions more clearly and ease the current tension.'' According to Liu, the Chinese delegation would be headed by Fu Ying, director of the MFA Department of Asian Affairs. The head of the U.S. delegation, Assistant Secretary of State for Asia and Pacific Affairs, James Kelly had just arrived in Beijing. The DPRK delegation was believed to be headed by Li Gun, Deputy Director of U.S. Affairs at the DPRK Foreign Ministry. ["FM confirms 3-party Korean talks," China Daily (Internet edition), 23 April 2003, http://www1.chinadaily.com.cn/news/2003-04-23/113086.html]
04/18/2003: In North Korea's first official acknowledgement of the upcoming talks scheduled to be held in Beijing, a DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesperson described China's role as solely the "host", while "the essential issues related to the settlement of the nuclear issue will be discussed between the DPRK and the U.S." [CNS North Korea Special Collection, "Factsheet on North Korean Nuclear Reprocessing Statement," 18 April 2003.]
04/17/2003: Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing confirmed that the China would host trilateral talks with the DPRK and the United States in Beijing to be held the week of 20 April. According to various unofficial reports, in mid-March Beijing sent a senior diplomat to North Korea to press Pyongyang to agree to the trilateral talks. An unconfirmed report in the Japanese newspaper Sankei Shimbun claimed that former Foreign Minister and Vice Premier Qian Qichen was the official sent to persuade North Korea. [Tadashi Ito, "Sankei Report PRC Not Optimistic About Upcoming Nuclear Talks with US, DPRK," Sankei Shimbum, 18 April 2003 on FBIS JPP20030418000011]
04/16/2003: At a press briefing, a White House Spokesperson confirmed earlier reports regarding the Chinese brokered talks to be held in Beijing. The spokesperson stated that:
"It was at [U.S.] urging that the Chinese at very senior levels pressed the North Koreans to agree to multilateral talks. South Korea and Japan did so, as well. The North Koreans, as you are aware, were insisting on bilateral talks with the United States only. But agreed when the Chinese finally counter-proposed talks with its full participation, along with the United States. So the initial talks will be trilateral with the Chinese, North Korea and the United States. And we're very pleased with the involvement of the Chinese. The Chinese agree fully with the United States that the Korean Peninsula must be free of nuclear weapons, as do all of North Korea's neighbors, and that's important. [Office of the White House Press Secretary, "Press Gaggle with [Deputy White House Spokesperson] Scott McClellan" 16 April 2003]
04/16/2003: China's Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) announced that it had temporarily added Tributyl Phosphate (TBP) to its "Nuclear Dual-Use Items and Related Technologies Export Control List.". It stated that the move was made in accordance with Article 17 of the 1998 "Regulations on the Control of Nuclear Dual-use Items and Related Technologies Export," which allows China to "temporarily decide to exercise export control on specific nuclear dual-use items and related technologies other than those outlined in the Control List." On 17 December 2002, The Washington Times reported that China had sold 20 tons of TBP to North Korea. China dismissed the charge as groundless. [Ministry of Commerce press release, 16 April 2003, Bill Gertz, "China Ships North Korea Ingredient for Nuclear Arms," The Washington Times, 17 December 2002.]
04/15/2003: According to a New York Times report Beijing successfully brokered an agreement to host trilateral talks between the United States, North Korea and China. The report noted that this agreement could be seen as a concession by both the United States and North Korea. Pyongyang had previously insisted that it would only talk with Washington directly on the nuclear issue, whereas Washington insisted that the problem was a regional one and therefore required a multilateral forum. [David E. Sanger, "North Koreans and U.S. Plan Talks in Beijing," The New York Times, 15 April 2003, p.1.]
04/12/2003: In an apparent reversal from earlier North Korean demands, a DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesman stated that: "If the U.S. is ready to make a bold switchover in its Korea policy for a settlement of the nuclear issue, the DPRK will not stick to any particular dialogue format." In an initial reaction to the statement, a U.S. official said that North Korea may be in reaction to diplomatic pressure from Russian and China. ["Spokesman for DPRK Foreign Ministry on peaceful solution to nuclear issue," Website of the Korean Central News Agency of the DPRK, 12 April 2003, http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm; James Brooke, "North Korea Shifts Stance on Discussing Arms," The New York Times, (Late Edition), 13 April 2003 p. 4]
04/10/2003: South Korean Foreign Minister Yoon Young-Kwan traveled to Beijing to hold meetings with his Chinese counterpart Li Zhaoxing and Premier Wen Jiabao. According to The Korean Herald, during his meetings, Yoon "called on China to increase its diplomatic efforts in persuading the North to accept a multilateral forum over the nuclear issue." [Seo Hyun-jin, "Seoul, Beijing hope to include N. Korea in talks," The Korean Herald, 11 April 2003; "ROK Foreign Minister Arrives in China for Talks on DPRK Nuclear Crisis," AFP (Hong Kong), 10 April 2003 on FBIS CPP20030410000130]
04/09/2003: The United Nation's Security Council met to discuss the nuclear crisis in North Korea, but ended the meeting without agreeing to a common statement on the issue. While the U.S., U.K. and France wanted a statement that showed strong opposition to North Korea's nuclear activities, their withdrawal from the NPT and a warning against further actions, China and the Russian Federation argued that this type of move would only aggravate the situation. After the meeting the United States Ambassador to the U.N., John Negroponte stated that "We hope and believe a diplomatic solution is within the realms of possibility, but I think we'll will have to see how things play out." ["UN meeting on North Korea crisis fizzles out," AFP, 9 April 2003.]
04/08/2003: On the eve of a UN Security Council meeting on the North Korean nuclear issue, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson said that: "We believe that the involvement of the Security Council at the moment will not be conducive to the settlement of the issue. No party should take any move that might complicate the situation." ["Foreign Ministry Spokesperson’s Press Conference on April 8, 2003," China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs Website]
03/26/2003: The Japanese newspaper Sankei Shimbun reported that North Korea had requested an emergency supply of weapons from China in February 2003. According to the this report, Beijing rejected the request. According to a Chinese source quoted in this article the request was a result of "North Korea's sense of danger after the Iraqi war." In response to the Japanese report, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson said that the claim that North Korea had requested arms from China was "absolutely untrue, irresponsible and [had] ulterior motives." ["DPRK Requested 'Emergency' Arms Supply from PRC in February," Sankei Shimbun (Internet version), 26 March 2003 in FBIS JPP20030326000043; "PRC Foreign Ministry Spokesman Terms Sankei Shibun Report on DPRK Arms Request 'Irresponsible'," Xinhua, 28 March 2003 on FBIS CPP20030328000186]
03/04/2003: In response to a question an incident involving the interception of a US spy plane by four North Korean jets, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Kong Quan stated that "all parties should keep calm and restrained so as to facilitate the true preservation of peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and in northeast Asia." ["Foreign Ministry Spokesman Answers Journalists' Questions at News Conference on 4 March 2003," Website for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China in Chinese (FBIS translated text) on FBIS CPP20030304000159]
02/13/2003: During a regular press conference, the spokesperson for the Chinese Foreign Ministry remarked that the UN Security Counsel should not intervene to resolve the current crisis on the Korean Peninsula. This statement came a day after China voted for a resolution in front of the IAEA Board of Governors which accused North Korea of violating the NPT and referred the matter to the UN Security Counsel. The spokesperson stated:
"This resolution only reported the relevant situation to the Security Council but did not ask the Security Council to examine it. Regarding what action the Security Council will subsequently take, the Chinese side holds that it is inappropriate for the Security Council to get involved in the DPRK nuclear issue." ["China Reiterates its Support for a Political Solution to the DPRK Nuclear Issue" Zhongguo Xinwen She, 13 February 2003, on FBIS CPP20030213000117]
01/15/2003: As the North Korean nuclear crisis unfolded, differing views of the situation appeared among editorials by prominent PRC scholars. Professor Shi Yinhong, director of Renmin University's Center for American Studies, offered the following commentary:
"Even though the strategic principles and trend of the Bush Administration following the "11 September" incident and the US policy towards the DPRK may partly constitute the reason for the DPRK nuclear crisis, the DPRK Government is undoubtedly the originator, and it should be held responsible for the DPRK nuclear crisis and the potential devastating impact to security in East Asia. In terms of either mitigating the crisis or striving for prolonged peace in the Korean peninsula and Northeast Asia, the US-DPRK "Geneva Nuclear Framework Agreement" in 1994 was absolutely necessary. On the whole, it is a reasonable and just agreement, which practically reflected the concerted efforts and common will of the ROK, China, Japan, and Russia, in addition to the United States and the DPRK -- the major powers who are concerned about the situation on the Korean peninsula. Moreover, the UN International Atomic Energy Agency officially participated in the implementation process of the agreement. However, while accepting the supply of heavy oil and the building of the light water reactors as prescribed in the agreement, the DPRK went so far as to secretly carry out its enriched uranium project aimed at developing nuclear weapons." [Shi Yinhong, "How to Understand and Deal With the DPRK Nuclear Crisis, Hong Kong Ta Kung Pao, 15 January, 2003]
Zhang Liangui, Deputy Director of the International Politics Office at the Central Party School, placed more of the blame on U.S. policy:
"What the world does not understand now is, why has the DPRK openly admitted carrying out a nuclear program. My view is: Since taking office, the Bush Administration has consistently pursued a hardline policy toward the DPRK, first designating it as being in the "axis of evil," and then as "a target for a nuclear strike." Although the Bush Administration expressed willingness last June [2001] to negotiate with the DPRK, it set down a whole series of harsh conditions. For instance, it ruled that the topics for discussion were the nuclear issue, the missile issue, the question of disarmament of conventional forces, and the question of military withdrawal from the 38th parallel. All of these were unacceptable to the DPRK. As a result, there has been no progress in US-DPRK relations." [Zhang Liangui, "DPRK: Nuclear Program Makes Big Waves," Beijing Shijie Zhishi in Chinese, 16 December, 2002]
01/15/2003: China offered to host talks between the U.S. and North Korea, the Washington Post reported. "We hope the United States and North Korea can resume dialogue swiftly because we think that talks are the most effective channel for resolving this problem," said Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Zhang Qiyue, "If the relevant sides are willing to hold dialogue in Beijing, I think we would have no difficulties with that." The offer came as Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly arrived for talks with Chinese officials concerning the North Korean nuclear crisis. [John Pomfret, "China Offers to Host U.S. Talks with North Korea," Washington Post Foreign Service, 15 January 2003]
01/10/2003: Chinese President Jiang Zemin and U.S. President George W. Bush spoke by phone on January 10, exchanging views on North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT. Bush reportedly said that the DPRK's decision to withdraw from the NPT was not in its own interests, and would undermine peace and stability in the region. Jiang Zemin reportedly said that China was not in favor of the withdrawal of the DPRK from the NPT, adding that China "stands for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula." He reiterated China's stance that dialogue is the "most effective way to solve the nuclear question of the DPRK." He also stated China's willingness to work together with the "relevant parties" to seek a solution. [President Jiang Had a Phone Conversation with President Bush, 10 January, 2003, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China]
01/10/2003: A Foreign Ministry spokesperson commented on the withdrawal of the DPRK from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty:
"China is concerned about the declaration of the DPRK to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the possible consequences as a result of it. The NPT is of major importance for preventing the nuclear proliferation and promoting peace and security of the international community. We hope to continue to safeguard the universality of the NPT and will continue to work for the peaceful solution of the nuclear question of the DPRK." [Spokesperson on the Withdrawal of the DPRK from the NPT, 10 January 2003, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China]
01/10/2003: The North Korean government (DPRK) announced an immediate withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT):
"As it has become clear once again that the United States persistently seeks to stifle the DPRK at any cost and the IAEA is used as a tool for executing the US hostile policy toward the DPRK, we can no longer remain bound to the NPT, allowing the country's security and the dignity of our nation to be infringed upon."
"The DPRK government declares an automatic and immediate effectuation of its withdrawal from the NPT, on which "it unilaterally announced a moratorium as long as it deemed necessary " according to the June 11, 1993 DPRK-US joint statement, now that the United States has unilaterally abandoned its commitments to stopping nuclear threat and renouncing hostility towards the DPRK in line with the same statement."
"Though we pull out of the NPT, we have no intention to produce nuclear weapons and our nuclear activities at this stage will be confined only to peaceful purposes such as the production of electricity."
"If the United States drops its hostile policy to stifle the DPRK and stops its nuclear threat to it, the DPRK may prove through a separate verification between the DPRK and the United States that it does not make any nuclear weapons." ["Major Excerpts of DPRK Statement on NPT Withdrawal," Beijing Xinhua in English, 10 January, 2003]
01/09/2003: China's official Xinhua news agency reported that Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan and U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell spoke by phone on the morning of 9 January, exchanging views on the nuclear situation in North Korea. Powell said that the United States harbors no hostility towards North Korea, and that it "hopes to hold constructive dialogues with the DPRK" in order to resolve the nuclear crisis and achieve a nuclear-free Korean peninsula. Tang expressed China's appreciation for the U.S.'s openness to dialogue, but added that China "hopes the United States will adopt flexible methods in its dialogues with the DPRK." ["PRC FM Tang Jiaxuan, Colin Powell Discuss DPRK Nuke Issue, Sino-US Ties," Beijing Xinhua Domestic Service in English, 9 January 2003.]
01/07/2003: Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zhang Qiyue fielded questions concerning North Korea's nuclear weapons program. When asked whether China planned to put forward any new initiatives to persuade the DPRK to give up its nuclear plan, Zhang said:
"China has made positive efforts to push for the settlement of the question. We have held frequent contact with various parties and played a constructive role. Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan made phone calls with some of his counterparts before the new year. On 3 January he had a phone conversation with British Foreign Secretary Straw. China has made consultation and coordination with relevant countries through a number of different ways. We hope to see the relaxation of the tension on the peninsula through dialog between relevant parties." [Foreign Ministry Spokesperson's Press Conference on January 7, 2003, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China]
12/19/2002: China dismissed allegations that it sold tributyl phosphate (TBP) to North Korea. Foreign Ministry Spokesman Liu Jianchao said: "From time to time The Washington Times publishes some irresponsible and groundless reports out of ulterior motives. In our view, the story does not worth (sic) a comment." [Foreign Ministry Spokesperson's Press Conference on December 19, 2002, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China] However, in April of 2003, China's Ministry of Commerce announced that TBP would be place on its control list temporarily. [Ministry of Commerce press release, 16 April 2003.]
12/17/2002: The Washington Times reported that China sold to North Korea 20 tons of tributyl phosphate (TBP), a chemical used to extract fissile material from spent nuclear fuel. Although TBP can be used in commercial processes, such as the production of ink, plastics, and paint, U.S. intelligence officials reportedly believe that North Korea will use the chemical in its plutonium-based nuclear-weapons program. [Bill Gertz, "China Ships North Korea Ingredient for Nuclear Arms," The Washington Times, 17 December 2002]
12/03/2002: Chinese President Jiang Zemin and Russian President Vladimir Putin released a joint statement in which they called on North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons program:
"The sides consider it important for the destiny of the world and security in Northeast Asia to preserve the non-nuclear status of the Korean peninsula and the regime of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction." [Jiang, Putin Take Aim at North Korean Nukes, CNN.com, 3 December, 2002]
12/12/2002: Spanish forces boarded a North Korean freighter carrying 15 Scud missiles, 15 conventional warheads, and 23 tanks of rocket propellant. The ship, which was bound for Yemen, was eventually released and allowed to complete its voyage. "There is no provision under international law prohibiting Yemen from accepting delivery of missiles from North Korea," said White House spokesman Ari Fleischer. "In this instance there is no clear authority to seize the shipment of Scud missiles from North Korea to Yemen so therefore the merchant vessel is being released." [Suzanne Goldenberg, John Gittings, and Brian Whittaker, "Sailing on, the ship with a hold full of Scud missiles: US forced to let North Korean arms go free," The Guardian, 12 December 2002]
11/19/2002: At a Foreign Press Center briefing James Kelly, American Assistant Sec. of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, clarified the content of his exchange with North Korean officials on October 3rd and 4th. At those meetings, he told the North Korean officials the US knew about their covert uranium enrichment program and that it must be dismantled for mutually beneficial activities to proceed. A Korean official immediately denied Kelly's assertion; however, in their last meeting First Vice Foreign Minister Kang Suk-joo acknowledged that North Korea was proceeding with a uranium enrichment program, and he asserted that it was entitled to a nuclear weapons program, and stated that North Korea viewed the Agreed Framework as nullified due to US misbehavior.
Kelly said the US has made no demands on China to confront North Korea and China has made no promises, though he hoped China would be helpful.
While the US had made no final statements regarding nullification of the Agreed Framework, Kelly said, the DPRK has said it is nullified, and the current shipment of oil will be the last one for which there are funds. [Official transcript, Foreign Press Center Briefing, US State Department, Washington, DC, 19 Nov, 2002]
10/27/2002: The London Sunday Times reported that the Chinese have warned the United States that North Korea may have between three and five functioning nuclear weapons, more than the CIA estimate. Unnamed diplomatic sources said the Chinese told American officials that confronting Kim Jong-il would be a ruinous decision. [Michael Sheridan, "Koreans May Have Five Nuclear Missiles," London Sunday Times, 27 October, 2002.]
10/25/2002: A PRC scholar of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Institute of American Studies produced a detailed analysis of N. Korea's decision to admit its nuclear weapons endeavors. According to his analysis, under pressure from the "Axis of Evil" labeling by President Bush, and seeing Bush's readiness to preemptively strike Iraq, N. Korea saw an opportunity to put its possible nuclear capability on the table to deter American strikes. The announcement was timed to take back stage while America was focused on the Iraq issue. Also, N. Korea's recent diplomatic efforts with Russia and Japan have reinforced the opposition to any military approach to resolving this issue. [FBIS Translated Text, Zhang Guoqing, "The DPRK throws out a 'nuclear' feeler," Guangzhou Nanfang Zhoumo, 25 October 2002.]
10/25/2002: Meeting with President Bush, President Jiang Zemin pledged to work, along with the US, to peacefully resolve the issue of North Korea's possible nuclear weapons program. [FBIS Transcribed Text, "Bush, Jiang vow to resolve N. Korea nuke peacefully," Tokyo Kyodo, 25 October 2002.]
10/22/2002: A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman stated that China has always held that "dialogue and negotiation are the most effective way[s] to settle the North Korean nuclear issue." He expressed hope that the issue would be resolved peacefully, and emphasized the continued importance of the Agreed Framework in maintaining stability and peace on the Korean Peninsula. China supports the peninsula being nuclear-free, he said. ["Foreign Ministry Spokesman's Press Conference on October 22, 2002," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China]
10/18/2002: American intelligence officials reportedly concluded that Pakistan was a critical supplier for North Korea's nuclear weapons program, while China and Russia's roles were less important. [David E. Sanger and James Dao, "A Nuclear North Korea: Intelligence; US Says Pakistan Gave Technology to North Korea," New York Times, 18 October 2002.]
10/17/2002: After North Korea's reported admission to American officials that it had been pursuing a clandestine nuclear weapons development program, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman asserted that the suspicion of China's possible provision of nuclear materials to North Korea was totally groundless. She said China opposes the proliferation of any WMD, and never supports or encourages other countries to develop WMD. ["Foreign Ministry Spokesperson's Press Conference on October 17, 2002," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China]
3/14/2002: In response to Washington’s latest Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), North Korea has declared that it will re-examine all nuclear agreements with the U.S. “In case of the US plan…turns out to be true, the DPRK will have no option but to take a substantial countermeasure against it, not bound to any DPRK-US agreement,” the North Korean Foreign Ministry stated. [Choe Sang-hun, “N. Korea May Rescind Nuclear Promise – AP,” JoongAng llbo, 15 March 2002.]
12/18/2001: South Korea released a 225-page report cataloguing North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction program. The defense ministry document believes that North Korea has “extracted 22 to 26 pounds of weapons-grade plutonium from its Soviet-designed nuclear reactors before shutting them down under a 1994 deal with the United States.” The report also stated that North Korea carried out up to 70 nuclear related test of high explosives between 1983 and 1993. Furthermore, the report confirmed that even though North Korea may be capable of constructing a “crude nuclear explosion devise…it will be still low dependability and it will take the North at least several years to turn the system into a weapon.” [Sang-Hun Choe, “South Korea Releases Nukes Report,” Associated Press, 18 December 2001.]
12/11/2001: The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has reportedly notified North Korea of its inspection strategy for North Korea’s nuclear facilities. The IAEA will divide North Korea’s nuclear facilities into three categories: 1) operations that can continue; 2) operations that need to be frozen; and 3) “others.” The facilities where operations can continue are the IRT-2000 reactor and its sub-facilities imported from the Soviet Union. “Facilities that need to be frozen are the 50-megawatt and 200-megawatt reactors that are under construction and reprocessing facilities.” Nuclear waste facilities and uranium facilities were placed in the “other” category. A South Korea official added that the “international agency will focus its inspections on the 8,000 used fuel rods from the 5-megawatt reactor and reprocessing facilities that could show whether North Korea has developed nuclear weapons.” [Oh Young-hwan, “3-step Nuclear Inspections,” JoonAng llbo, 11 December 2001.]
06/21/2001: The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) acknowledged that it cannot verify the report submitted by Pyongyang that there has not been any "diversion of nuclear material." ["IAEA Clueless on N. Korean, Iraqi Nuke Programs," World Tribune, 21 June 2001.]
5/30/2000: The Chinese newspaper Renmin Ribao criticized a report of the US Army Space and Missile Defense Command entitled "The Threat to the United States from the Foreign Countries' Missile Development and Ballistic Missile During the First 15 Years of the 21st Century," which stated that over the next 15 years the United States is most likely to face a threat from the intercontinental ballistic missiles of Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, and some other countries. With regard to the missile threat from North Korea and other countries, the newspaper blamed the United States for exaggerating the threat deliberately to implement its NMD and TMD, stating :
"Over the past few years, the United States has deliberately played up the so-called 'threat' from North Korea, Iran, Iraq, and some other countries. As a matter of fact, the countries mentioned above are still at the primary stage of missile development. By loudly shouting out the 'threat theory', the report hoped to whip up opinion for the United States to implement its NMD and TMD programs and to build a so-called defense shield, which would give it unilateral and absolute superiority in its security and in attacking other countries."
["Analyzing and Refuting US-Made 'Threat Theory,'" Renmin Ribao(online), 30 May 2000 in FBIS CPP 20000530000060, 30 May 2000]
2/2/2000: The CIA issued a report entitled "Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January Through 30 June 1999," which formally stated for the first time that China is supplying missile technology and equipment to North Korea. The report stated, "During the reporting period, North Korea obtained raw materials for its ballistic missile programs from various sources, especially from firms in China."
2/25/1999: China's Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zhang Qiyue, responding to a 23 February 1999 Washington Times article alleging Chinese assistance to North Korea's satellite program, stated:
"China has always adopted a serious and earnest attitude on the issue of nuclear nonproliferation and has imposed strict export controls. The report in the 23 February edition of the US-based Washington Times claiming that China supplies satellite and missile-launching technology to the DPRK is absolutely baseless."["Spokeswoman Denies Satellite Cooperation With DPRK," Beijing Xinhua Hong Kong Service in Chinese, 25 February 1999 in FBIS FTS19990225000391, 25 February 1999.]
2/23/1999: The Washington Times reported that, according to US government officials, in August or early September 1998 China sent scientists from the Chinese Academy of Launch Technology (CALT) to assist North Korea in its development of satellite technology. The report noted that US intelligence agencies have not been able to link the assistance to North Korea's missile program.[ Bill Gertz, "China Assists North Korea in Space Launches," The Washington Times (online), 23 February 1999.]
2/1/1999: China's chief arms control negotiator, Sha Zukang, commenting on the North Korea situation, said:
"Dialogue and consultation is the best way to reach consensus on problem matters. In the case of North Korea, which is a very proud country, sanctions can only prove counterproductive. We should recognize that North Korea has legitimate security concerns. We need to continue the dialogue and practice more patience."
"We are very supportive and encouraging of the four-party talks [involving the United States, South Korea, China and North Korea]. We must do all we can to help the two Koreas talk to each other and bridge the differences separating north and south."
"But as for initiatives on the part of China, we can't go into the kitchen and do the cooking when we don't know how to cook." [Barbara Opall-Rome, "One On One," Defense News, 1 February 1999, p. 22.]
1/15/1999: The official Chinese news agency, Xinhua, criticized the US for demanding access to North Korea's suspected underground nuclear weapons complex, stating:
"It seems rather unjustified and ridiculous that the US should demand that it can monitor another country's activities simply because it merely suspects that country is up to no good." ["China Media Blasts US Demands on North Korea," Reuters, 15 January 1999.]
1/12/1999: China's Foreign Ministry spokesman, Sun Yuxi, discounted a North Korean editorial that threatened to scrap the 1994 nuclear agreement with the United States and stated that China would continue to play a "positive and constructive role" at the meetings. Sun also stated:
"It is our hope that whether it is the implementation of the greater framework or the establishment of permanent peace, we can work on the basis of achievements we have already made."["China Urges Peace as N. Korea Assails Nuke Pact," Reuters, 12 January 1999.]
1/7/1999: China's ambassador to South Korea, Wu Dawei, said in an interview with the Korea Herald that China had no hard evidence that North Korea was constructing an underground nuclear complex and that the US has no right to demand inspection of the site. Wu stated, "No country in the international community is entitled, or authorized to have such a right." Wu also stated that, " It is not fair for only the United States, not other countries like North Korea, to be allowed to launch a rocket for the purpose of putting a satellite into orbit." ["Chinese South Korea Envoy: US Has No Right to Inspect North Korea," The Associated Press, 7 January 1999.]
5/15/1998: Voicing China's concern over recent threats by the DPRK to reopen its Yongbyon nuclear power reactor and to halt the canning of spent fuel rods previously removed from the reactor, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhu Bangzao urged the United States and the DPRK to continue to engage in constructive dialogue and consultations to resolve the nuclear issue in North Korea. ["China Urges DPRK-Washington Dialogue on Nuclear Reactors," Itar-Tass, 15 May 1998.]
6/13-15/1995: During a news briefing, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Shen Guofang stated, regarding the US-DPRK Agreed Framework:
"We welcome the agreement reached between the two sides, and hope the relevant parties will continue their efforts for the final resolution of this issue. China is not a directly interested party to the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula, but we hope the parties concerned will seek a settlement of the issue through negotiations." ["News Briefing by Chinese Foreign Ministry," Beijing Review, 3-9 July 1995, p. 29.]
5/4/1995: During a news briefing, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Shen Guofang answered the following question:
Question: "What role will China play in the resettlement of the nuclear issue of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and negotiations between the DPRK and Japan on the establishment of diplomatic relations?"
Answer: "We encourage all the parties concerned to resolve the issue through equal dialogue. We hope that the parties concerned will adopt a restrained attitude toward resolution of the DPRK nuclear issue with a view to promoting peace and stability there. We did so in the past; we will continue to do so in the future." ["News Briefing by Chinese Foreign Ministry," Beijing Review, 22-28 May 1995, p. 21.]
5/3/1995: Japanese Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama asked Chinese Premier Li Peng for support in successfully concluding negotiations between the United States and the DPRK on the provision of light water reactors (LWRs) to North Korea. [Kyodo News Service (Tokyo), 19 April 1995; in FBIS-EAS-95-075, 19 April 1995; Kyodo News Service (Tokyo), 3 May 1995; in FBIS-CHI-95-085, 3 May 1995; Nihon Keizai Shimbun (Tokyo), Morning Edition, 28 April 1995, p. 2; in FBIS-EAS-95-084, 28 April 1995.]
4/25/1995: South Korean sources reported that China has cautioned North Korea that if it resumes its nuclear program, China will not veto UN Security Council sanctions that could be invoked as a result. [Tong-A Ilbo (Seoul), 26 April 1995, p. 1; in FBIS-EAS-95-080, 26 April 1995.]
3/23/1995: China was unsuccessful in its efforts to persuade North Korean officials to accept South Korean-type LWRs when requested by the United States and South Korea to influence North Korea. [Mun Il-hyon, Chungang Ilbo (Seoul), 23 March 1995, p. 5; in FBIS-EAS-95-101.]
2/17/1995: An unidentified Chinese arms control expert said China could only play a marginal role in the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) since China was not one of the organization's main partners. [Reuters, 17 February 1995; in Executive News Service, 20 February 1995.]
12/15/1994: During a news briefing, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Chen Jian stated, regarding China's role in the US-DPRK Agreed Framework:
"China is not a party involved in the issue of nuclear weapons of the DPRK. However, it has taken a clear position on this issue. We resolutely safeguard peace, stability and denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula. We have taken them as a basic target and starting point. The way of settling this issue is through negotiation conducted by the relevant parties. We have always persisted in this principle." ["News Briefing by Chinese Foreign Ministry," Beijing Review, 26 December 1994-1 January 1995, p. 25.]
11/10/1994: During a news briefing, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Shen Guofang answered the following question:
Question: "What role will China play in dealing with spent rods and providing funds for light-water reactor in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) after the DPRK and the United States reached a framework agreement on DPRK's nuclear issue?"
Answer: "China will, as always, make efforts to safeguard peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and promote denuclearization there within its power. China hopes that the framework agreement between the DPRK and the United States will be successfully implemented. China considers the concrete issues from the viewpoint of most effectively promoting a proper resettlement of the DPRK's nuclear issue." ["News Briefing by Chinese Foreign Ministry," Beijing Review, 21-27 November 1994, p. 23.]
10/20/1994: During a news briefing, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Chen Jian stated, regarding the recently concluded US-DPRK Agreed Framework:
"China welcomes the agreement by the DPRK and the United States through bilateral talks. It is believed that the implementation of the agreement will be conducive to the realization of denuclearization in the Korean Peninsula and the maintenance of peace and stability there." ["News Briefing by Chinese Foreign Ministry," Beijing Review, 31 October-6 November 1994, p. 23.]
9/25/1994: South Korea's Ministry of Foreign Affairs reported to its National Assembly that China has indicated that it would be willing to store North Korea's spent fuel rods if the process is financed by a source other than China. China had previously rejected a US proposal of this nature. [KBS-1 Radio Network (Seoul), 25 September 1994; in FBIS-EAS-94-1865, 25 September 1994.]
8/17/1994: It was reported that US State Department official Robert Galucci would go to the capitals of South Korea, China, Russia and Japan to raise $4 billion needed to pay for the construction of light water reactors in North Korea, provided North Korea allows inspections of two undeclared nuclear facilities. South Korean officials said that the United States will not contribute to the cost of building the light water reactors because US law prohibits financial exchanges with countries categorized as "hostile." [Yonhap (Seoul); Washington Times, 18 August 1994, p. A13; Washington Times, 19 August 1994, p. A16.]
6/16/1994: During a news briefing, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Shen Guofang answered the following question:
Question: "On the nuclear issue of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the United States has worked out a draft resolution to impose sanctions on the country and passed this draft among the member states of the UN Security Council. What's China's view on it?"
Answer: "China does not favor in principle the involvement of the UN Security Council in the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula and the resolution of this issue through sanctions. The Chinese government believes that the only way for a proper settlement of this issue is for all the parties concerned to directly conduct negotiations." ["News Briefing by the Foreign Ministry," Beijing Review, 27 June-3 July 1994, p. 23.]
6/13/1994: Chinese Central Military Commission (CMC) Vice-Chairman Liu Huaqing told North Korean Army Chief of Staff