 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
|
 |
 |
Introduction
China's policy on the North Korean nuclear issue has been caught between Beijing's uneasy alliance with the DPRK and a desire for peace and stability on the Korean peninsula. As one of North Korea's few friends during the Cold War, China traditionally supported the North in its persistent confrontations with South Korea, Japan and the United States. The relationship between China and North Korea could not be described as smooth, however, and Pyongyang often played the Soviet Union and China against each other. The PRC-DPRK relationship also experienced difficulties in the early 1990's as Beijing and Seoul opened up diplomatic relations, and Sino-Japanese relations improved. In the last two decades, South Korea and Japan have become important trading partners with China, as well as large sources of foreign investment. While these economic ties are vital to China's development, Beijing also has a significant interest in the economic recovery and overall stability of North Korea. Beijing's support for the North Korean government for maintaining the DPRK as a buffer between China and U.S. forces in Asia. Equally vital to Beijing's security interest is ensuring that it can avoid the massive flows of refugees predicted if the North Korean government were to crumble. China has already experienced the impact of refugees illegally coming into China from North Korea. This has strengthened Beijing's opposition to tactics, such as sanctions or military coercion, that could threaten the viability of the DPRK government.
China is North Korea's primary source of food and energy supplies. In spite of this position, China's influence over North Korea is often vague. For its part, Beijing has attempted to expose North Korea to the benefits of economic reform, evident in the visit to China of Kim Jong-il in 2001 which included a tour of the Shanghai stock exchange. However, the Chinese leadership has found dealing with North Korea on both economic and security related issues a challenge. (In 2002, Beijing and Pyongyang had a serious diplomatic falling out over China's arrest Chinese-born businessman hand-picked by Kim Jong-il to administer a new economic zone near the China-North Korea border.)
China's leadership has shown increasing reluctance to come to North Korea's aid when Pyongyang challenges international norms, particularly on the issue of nuclear development. China's growing reluctance to stick its neck out for Pyongyang is based not only on Beijing's desire to be perceived as a responsible international power, but also on the growing importance China attaches to good relations with the United States, South Korea, as well as Japan. Beijing also recognizes the negative impact that a nuclear armed North Korea would have for China's national security interests. Uncertainties about North Korean nuclear intentions could lead other regional actors, such as South Korea, Japan and Taiwan, to reconsider their own nuclear weapons capabilities. Beijing may also be concerned that a more threatening North Korea would intensify efforts by the United States and its allies to develop missile defenses in the region.
In the most recent nuclear stand-off that began in October 2002, Beijing articulated early on that its priorities were to maintain peace and stability in the region and a nuclear-free Korean peninsula, and to assure that the dispute be resolved through diplomatic and political channels. Actions by the U.S. and North Korea viewed by China's leadership as unconstructive has frustrated Beijing and led the Chinese leadership to take a more active lead in resolving this crisis compared to previous years. While initially attempting to play a limited arbiter role, China gradually recognized that passive policies of the past were not contributing to rectifying the current crisis. With North Korea and the United States in a stand-off, Beijing realized that only pro-active diplomacy would resolve the potentially destructive crisis. [also see Jing-Dong Yuan, "China and the North Korean Nuclear Crisis" North Korea Special Collection, CNS Website, posted 22 January 2003.]
For more detailed information about North
Korean nuclear issues see NTI's
North Korea
Nuclear Profile
1993 - 1994 Crisis and the Agreed Framework
In 1993, a tension increased on the Korean Peninsule when North Korea refused to allow International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections of its reactors and moved to withdraw from the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). During this crisis, China was reluctant to get involved with multi-party negotiations (although ultimately Beijing did play an important role.) China opposed the use of sanctions or other coercive measures to bring North Korea back in line with its NPT obligations and indicated at the time that it would veto sanctions if proposed in the UN Security Council. Beijing called instead for a resolution of the issue through patience and negotiation. In March 1994, then Premier Li Peng explained that: "If pressure is applied on this issue, that can only complicate the situation on the Korean peninsula, and it will add to the tension there." [Steven Greenhouse, "Christopher Says U.S. Stays Firm on Korea, but Pledges Diplomacy," New York Times, 23 March 1994 p. A12.]
By 1994, U.S. pressure, combined with Beijing's own displeasure with North Korea's provocative activities, led the Chinese leadership to ultimately revise its position. While not embracing Washington's approach, Beijing did indicate that it had moved to a softer stance in which China "would not support" sanctions. This was meant as a signal to Pyongyang that Beijing would instead abstain from any UN Security Council Resolution against North Korea rather than use its veto power to protect the DPRK. This shift is widely believed to have been instrumental in convincing North Korea to accept the 1994 U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework.
According to the Agreed Framework, North Korea would suspend its nuclear program, shut down its graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities, allow IAEA inspections, and abide by the NPT in exchange for light water reactors and heavy fuel oil from the United States, South Korea, and Japan. North Korea was not pleased with China's role in the negotiations, and was angered that Beijing would receive any credit for assisting with the resolution of the conflict. North Korea's displeasure was evident when Pyongyang's Worker's Daily pointedly remarked that the DPRK had "held talks independently with the United States on an independent footing, not relying on someone else's sympathy or advice." [Samuel S. Kim, "The Making of China's Korea Policy in the Era of Reform," in David M. Lampton ed., The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy, (Stanford University Press: Stanford, 2001) p. 394]
Despite Pyongyang's assertions that no outside actor influenced the final agreement with the U.S., China's assistance was considered fundamental in resolving the 1993-1994 crisis. Although Beijing played a crucial role in getting this agreement, it also intentionally limited its involvement in the negotiated outcome. For instance, China was not directly involved in the Agreed Framework, nor was it a member of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), the multilateral body created to implement the Agreed Framework. China has however continued to state its support for resolving tension on the Korean peninsula through dialogue, and did participated in the four-party peace talks between North Korea, South Korea, China, and the United States.
Developments in the Late 1990's
In 1998 North Korea threatened to reopen its Yongbyon nuclear power reactor and to halt the canning of spent fuel rods previously removed from the reactor, thus effectively suspending the Agreed Framework. The DPRK's excuse for threatening such actions was dissatisfaction with heavy fuel oil delivery and nuclear plant construction delays. DPRK officials also charged that economic sanctions against North Korea were crippling the economy and therefore the United States was effectively reneging on its commitment in the Agreed Framework to normalize economic relations. In response to this crisis, China urged the United States and the DPRK to continue to engage in constructive dialogue and consultations to resolve the nuclear issue in North Korea. ["China Urges DPRK-Washington Dialogue on Nuclear Reactors," Itar-Tass, 15 May 1998.]
While concerned about Pyongyang's provocative activities, China also criticized U.S. actions perceived as alienating North Korea. Similar to policies of the early 1990's, Beijing continued to oppose tactics meant to strong-arm North Korea. For example, during a 1998 dispute, Beijing argued that the U.S. had no right to force North Korea to submit to the inspections of a suspected underground nuclear complex. China's Foreign Ministry spokesperson stated at the time that “although new problems have arisen, the Chinese side stresses that the peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula serves the fundamental interests of all sides,” adding “that the relevant sides can treasure the achievements already gained and continue to work through peaceful consultations to properly settle the problems.” Ultimately this impasse was resolved when North Korea agreed to allow U.S. inspectors for compensation in the form of food aid. [see the "North Korea Nuclear Chronology 1998" in NTI's North Korea Country Profiles]
Throughout the late 1990's, Chinese government supported continued dialogue between the U.S. and North Korea, but Beijing was publicly reluctant to become too actively involved in the Four-Party Talks, which were meant to facilitate discussions through a series of multilateral and bilateral talks. In a 1999 interview, China's ambassador for Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs, Sha Zukang, stated:
"Dialogue and consultation is the best way to reach consensus on problem matters. In the case of North Korea, which is a very proud country, sanctions can only prove counterproductive. We should recognize that North Korea has legitimate security concerns. We need to continue the dialogue and practice more patience. . . But as for initiatives on the part of China, we can't go into the kitchen and do the cooking when we don't know how to cook." [Barbara Opall-Rome, "One On One," Defense News, 1 February 1999, p. 22.]
Current Crisis
A new crisis on the Korean peninsula emerge in October 2002 with the North Korean acknowledgement of a clandestine uranium enrichment program, and increased in intensity in January 2003 with the North Korean announcement of its withdrawal from the NPT. While concerned about the security repercussions of a nuclear North Korea, China regarded the developing nuclear crisis as primarily a bilateral issue between the U.S. and the DPRK, and once again called for both sides to "remain calm" and exercise flexibility. However, as the situation seemed to deteriorate in the latter part of 2002 and the beginning of 2003, China grew increasingly frustrated with the DPRK's brinkmanship, as well as the perceived inflexibility in Washington. Despite calls from the Bush administration, Beijing refused to pressure Pyongyang publicly, and instead remained intent on following a path of "quiet diplomacy." In December 2002, then Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan paid an unexpected visit to the DPRK Embassy in Beijing, ostensibly to express New Years greetings. However reports afterwards indicated that Tang's visit was intended to express the Chinese leadership's concern with the U.S - North Korean stand-off. In an apparent rebuke of China's efforts, North Korea issued a statement two days later noting that if "other countries" were concerned about nuclear activities, then they should pressure Washington to talk to Pyongyang. [Philip P. Pan, "China Treads Carefully Around North Korea," Washington Post (Foreign Service), 10 January 2003, p. A14.]
As the dispute over North Korean nuclear activities intensified, the Bush administration openly expressed displeasure that Beijing was not applying more pressure on Pyongyang. In early February, George W. Bush pointedly reminded Chinese leader Jiang Zemin in a telephone conversation of the importance of the multilateral approach with regards to North Korea as well as China's promise to support the maintenance of the nuclear free Korean peninsula. While Washington publicly articulated its displeasure with China's inactivity on the North Korea issue, Beijing's frustration with Washington's actions and policies grew. As in 1994, Beijing argued that following Washington's approach would isolate Pyongyang and only aggravate an already tense situation. In a response to Washington's pressure, China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs reiterated that Chinese diplomats and leaders remained in constant contact with both Pyongyang and Washington about the issue, that the Chinese government was willing to work to assist the two sides sort out their differences, and that China's priority was for dialogue to be resumed. Analysts both inside and outside of China pointed out that while Beijing could to exert some influence on North Korea, Pyongyang has never proven easy to pressure, and the Chinese leadership's attempts in the past to press the North Korean leadership has often resulted in a diplomatic "brush-off."
Beijing's displeasure with Kim Jong-il's government became increasingly evident, especially after North Korea's test firing of cruise missiles and statements from Pyongyang claiming to have an existing nuclear capability. Although still unhappy with the U.S. administration's approach, China began in February and March of 2003 to indicate a willingness to increase pressure on the North Korean government aimed at ending their nuclear brinkmanship. Media reports indicated that in February 2003 two separate high-level DPRK delegations visiting Beijing were treated coldly by their hosts, and that "the Chinese told the visitors bluntly to stop provoking the Americans, hinting that if Pyongyang ignored the advice, China would not be able to maintain its long-standing opposition to sanctions." [Leslie Fong, "China washes hands of N. Korea's antics," The Straits Times, 5 April 2003.] In a move seen by many as an attempt to further drive the message home to Pyongyang, China closed its oil pipeline to North Korea for three days in late February. Beijing also reportedly sent a high level delegation to North Korea to further pressure Pyongyang to agree to multi-party talks. China's leadership however stopped short of full acceptance of Washington's strong-armed approach and continued to avoid actions aimed at isolating North Korea. Within the UN Security Council, China (along with the Russian Federation) initially prevented discussion of the North Korean issue. Later, after it had been agreed to discuss North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT, Beijing's representatives blocked consensus on a common statement condemning Pyongyang.
China's increased diplomatic activity produced positive results in April 2003 when both the U.S. and North Korea agreed to hold a trilateral meeting in Beijing. These talks, held on 23 and 24 April, were a direct result of Chinese efforts to broker a deal with both Pyongyang and Washington aimed at starting a process which would bring about a peaceful settlement of the North Korean nuclear issue. One of the key stumbling blocks for solving the nuclear stand-off had been the disagreement on the format for discussions between the relevant parties. The U.S., along with South Korea and Japan, had insisted that, since this issue was important to regional and international security, any discussions should be in a multilateral forum. North Korea however insisted that this was strictly a bilateral issue, and therefore would only agree to discussions between itself and the United States. Although brokering these talks was a significant achievement for China, the country's leadership was wary of putting too much importance in these initial discussions. China's main purpose for brokering talks was clearly to alleviate the tensions between the U.S. and North Korea. As stated by a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson, China's hope was that the talks would help Washington and Pyongyang "understand each other's position more clearly and ease the current tense situation." ["FM confirms 3-party Korean talks," China Daily (Internet edition), 23 April 2003, http://www1.chinadaily.com.cn/news/2003-04-23/113086.html]
The Beijing talks in April 2003 ended a day early after the North Korean delegation informed the U.S. delegation that the DPRK already possessed nuclear weapons (a claim that U.S. intelligence reports had been making for years.) According to U.S. reports from the meeting, North Korean delegation head Li Gun made this statement to Assistant Secretary James Kelly informally during a break. This admission was seen widely as a slap in the face to the Chinese hosts. As a result, Beijing has been more open to dealing with the issue of North Korea in a multilateral forum and has moved closer to the United States, and its allies in the region, South Korea and Japan, on formulating a policy to defuse the crisis. In mid-June 2003, Foreign Ministers from Japan, China, and South Korea held trilateral talks which included on its agenda the North Korean nuclear. At this meeting, the three states agreed that multi-party talks were necessary to resolve the crisis, the first time that China had agreed to this type of multilateral format. [“Japan, China, S. Korea Begin Meeting, Focus On N. Korea," Tokyo Kyodo World Service, 17 June 2003; Gwon Gywong-bok, “Beijing Gives Nod To 5-Way Talks,” Digital Chosunilbo, 17 June 2003].
For information on China and the North Korean nuclear issue, see:
[CHINA AND THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR ISSUE - STATEMENTS AND DEVELOPMENTS]
For information on North Korea's nuclear program, see:
[THE U.S.-DPRK AGREED FRAMEWORK AND THE KOREAN PENINSULA ENERGY DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION]
Other related information:
[CHINA AND THE NONPROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT)]
[CHINA AND THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA)]
Updated 09/23/2003
This
material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin
Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of
International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the
opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or
its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by
MIIS.
