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China's Missile Exports and
Assistance to Pakistan -
Statements and Developments
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This chronology includes statements and developments related to China's missile-related exports and assistance to Pakistan, including allegations of assistance, and US, Chinese, and Pakistani positions on the issue.
Also see Map of Chinese Nuclear and Missile Assistance to Pakistan.
For additional information on open-source reports of Chinese exports and assistance, please consult the CNS Missile Abstracts database.
02/11/03: In his annual testimony to the Senate Intelligence Committee, CIA Director George Tenet remarked that despite new missile related export controls and Beijing's vows to refrain assisting countries pursuing nuclear capable ballistic missiles, "Chinese firms remain key suppliers of ballistic-and cruise missile-related technologies to Pakistan, Iran, and several other countries." [George Tenet, "DCI's Worldwide Threat Briefing for Testimony to the Senate Intelligence Committee", 11 February 2003, http://usinfo.state.gov/cgi-bin/washfile/display.pl?p=/products/washfile/ latest&f=03021101.plt&t=/ products/washfile/newsitem.shtml]
11/30/01: Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Wang Guangya and US
Undersecretary of State for Arms Control John Bolton held "productive" talks on
arms control and nonproliferation. The US "reiterated its emphasis on (missile)
non-proliferation as a critical aspect of the war on terrorism." These
talks also included a review of the US plans for national missile defense.
No future date has been set for further talks. The issue of
counter-terrorism was the only issue to be agreed upon. Bolton stated, "We
agreed with the Chinese delegation on the need to expand our dialogue on
counter-terrorism issues and deepen our bilateral and multilateral cooperation
toward that end." These talks failed to make any progress on the alleged missile
technology transfers to Pakistan. The US imposed
sanctions
on China in September for allegedly transferring missile technology to Pakistan
in violation of a November 2000 commitment to control such transfers.
["US-China claim missile talks 'productive' amid sales row,"
Agence France-Presse, 1 December 2001]
09/01: According to a biannual CIA report on global proliferation developments, China during the last half of 2000 continued to provide Pakistan with technical assistance to its missile programs. The report stated:
"During the reporting period, Chinese entities provided Pakistan with missile-related technical assistance. Pakistan has been moving toward domestic serial production of solid-propellant SRBMs with Chinese help. Pakistan also needs continued Chinese assistance to support development of the two-stage Shaheen-II MRBM. In addition, firms in China have provided dual-use missile-related items, raw materials, and/or assistance to several other countries of proliferation concern—such as Iran, North Korea, and Libya." [Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July Through 31 December 2000.]09/05/01: The China Metallurgical Equipment Corporation issued a company statement denying involvement in illicit missile technology sales to Pakistan. The company stated:
On September 1, 2001, the US government imposed sanctions on China Metallurgical Equipment Corporation (MECC), accusing it of being involved in missile proliferation activities without any factual basis. MECC is astonished by this groundless accusation. It can not but express its indignation and condemnation on the decision by the US government. MECC hereby makes the following solemn statement:09/02/01: In a Washington Post article, a senior US official listed four conditions for the lifting of the missile sanctions imposed on China. Discussions in Beijing between the State Department and the Chinese Foreign Ministry in August 2001 failed to resolve these issues. The situation subsequently resulted in the imposition of sanctions. The four conditions for the lifting of sanctions are:
1. MECC is a corporation dealing in industrial products for civilian use. Since its establishment, it has been doing business within the scope as authorized by the government authorities, which mainly involves contracting of domestic and international engineering projects, and import and export of mechanical and electrical products and whole sets of equipment. After 30 years of development, MECC has gained a good reputation in the domestic and international metallurgical, mechanical and electrical industries. In its export business, MECC has always adhered to national export regulations and restrictions. It has never dealt in or exported any military equipment, arms or their parts or components to any country.
2. China and Pakistan are good neighbors. MECC has maintained sound and normal trade relations with its business partners in Pakistan. For more than a decade, MECC has exported to Pakistan products such as mining equipment, metallurgical equipment, mining vehicles, metallurgical industrial furnaces, cooling towers, machine tools, cranes, and metallurgical spare parts, steel, aluminum and other raw materials. MECC has also successfully completed large engineering projects of copper and gold mining in Pakistan. Transactions between MECC and Pakistan are appropriate and legal, and fully in accordance with Chinese laws and regulations as well as international trade norms and practice. The US government's allegation and sanctions against MECC are totally groundless and absolutely unacceptable.
3. The US government's baseless allegation and abuse of sanctions against MECC has severely damaged its business and reputation both domestically and internationally. MECC strongly demands that the US government lift the sanctions, clarify the truth and eliminate adverse effects. MECC reserves its right to further pursue this matter with regard to all losses arising therefrom.
1. China must first put a halt to sensitive exports from the China
Metallurgical Equipment Corporation.
2. China must also reaffirm its agreement last November with the United
States to refrain from helping other countries develop missiles capable of
delivering nuclear weapons.
3. China must drop its argument that missile contracts signed before
November are not covered by the accord.
4. As outlined in the November agreement, Beijing must establish a system of
export controls to regulate the transfer of sensitive technology in an organized
fashion.
[Alan Sipress, U.S. Lists Conditions for Lifting Sanctions,
The Washington Post, September 2, 2001.]
09/01/01: The US government imposed economic sanctions on a Chinese company for shipping missile technology to Pakistan in violation of a bilateral agreement in November 2000 in which China pledged to stop such transfer and to promulgate export control laws covering missile technology exports. The US government said that the China Metallurgical Equipment Corporation in late 2000 and early 2001 shipped missile technology to Pakistan that would assist its Shaheen 1 and Shaheen 2 programs. The sanctions, under the 1990 Missile Control Act, ban US companies from doing business with the Chinese entity for two years. The Bush administration has also invoked a ban on new licenses for U.S. companies to put their satellites on Chinese rockets or transfer satellite technology.
The Chinese government vociferously denied violating the November 2000 accord or that a Chinese company had shipped missile goods to Pakistan. The Foreign Ministry spokesman said:
Over a period of time, the US has repeatedly alleged that MECC was engaged in missile proliferation activities according to its so-called "intelligence information". In-depth investigations by the Chinese side indicate that MECC has never engaged in any activities as alleged by the United States and the US allegation is groundless. However, the US side is bent on making the erroneous decision based on its wrong intelligence information, in disregard of the constructive position and the investigation results of the Chinese side. Such a US move is totally groundless and irresponsible, which the Chinese side can never accept. [PRC FM Spokesman Opposes US Sanctions Against China, Xinhua, September 5, 2001.]The Foreign Ministry called for the US to immediately lift the sanctions. China threatened repercussions of the sanctions were not lifted. "China strongly urges the US side to immediately withdraw its wrong decision, so as to avoid any damage to Sino-US cooperation in non-proliferation. Otherwise, the US side should bear all the responsibilities for the consequences arising therefrom."
08/15/01: Following a trip to China, Senator Joseph Biden and Senator Fred Thompson urged the US government to impose sanctions on the PRC company who allegedly transferred missile components to Pakistan. Biden stated, "I think what we should do ... (is) identify those entities within the Chinese government that have transferred whatever technology meets the requirement of breaching the deal that they have made with us and sanction those companies from being able to do business." Thompson stated, "As far as proliferation was concerned, it was basic denial (by the PRC) even though we know what they are doing and we made it pretty clear that we did. Sometimes they just gave a flat denial" and other times they suggested "rogue companies" made the transfers without the government's knowledge. Thompson also said that the PRC officials stated, "as long as you (the United States) have a missile defense program and ... assist Taiwan, we're essentially going to continue doing what we want to do." Biden, however, said that there was a "maturing attitude" in the PRC on proliferation as shown by its declining involvement with Iran and its disinterest in allowing the DPRK to gain additional weapons capability. He said that working with the PRC on nonproliferation "is a process but that doesn't mean we should stand by and wait for the process to unfold." [Carol Giacomo, "SENATORS URGE NEW SANCTIONS ON CHINESE ENTITIES," Reuters, 08/15/01]
08/09/01: A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson refuted claims made by the Washington Times that a Chinese company exported missile components to Pakistan. The spokesperson reiterated China's commitment not to assist other countries in developing ballistic missiles and that reports to the contrary were "totally unfounded rumors... driven by ulterior motives". The spokesperson urged the US to implement in earnest the agreement they had reached with China in November 2000 and remove the "artificial barriers on satellite exports to China", so as to normalize cooperation in that area. ["PRC FM Spokesperson Refutes Article on Exports of Missile Components to Pakistan," Beijing Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 08/09/01 in FBIS CPP20010809000042.] [Full Text]
08/08/01: The China National Machinery and Equipment Import and Export Corporation released a statement denying that it exported missile parts to Pakistan. The statement refuted the report by the Washington Times that broke the story, calling it "totally fictitious". The company maintained that it, "has never provided any military equipment, weaponry, or weapon parts to Pakistan or any other country in the world". ["China Corporation Statement Denies Exporting Missile Parts to Pakistan," Xinhua, 08/08/01 in FBIS CPP20010808000184.] [Full Text]
08/06/01: According to a report in the Washington Times, a Chinese company has sent a shipments of missile components to Pakistan. This violated China's November 200 pledge to not provide any country with materials, technologies or equipment used in building nuclear capable missiles. The leaked intelligence information noted that the China National Machinery & Equipment Import & Export Corp., known as CMEC, reportedly supplied the missile components for Pakistan's Shaheen-1 and Shaheen-2 missile programs. A U.S. spy satellite detected the latest shipment as it arrived by truck at the mountainous Chinese-Pakistani border May 1. It was one of 12 missile component transfers sent by ship and truck detected by U.S. intelligence agencies since the beginning of the year.
In discussing this report, Senator Joe Biden stated, "The idea that entering into the World Trade Organization and continued economic expansion between the United States and China can continue in the face of a policy different than curtailing and eliminating proliferation is naive and will not happen. My message to China will be that, absent an iron-clad notion that proliferation is not a problem, every other aspect of this relationship is damaged -- every other aspect," he said. [Bill Gertz, Beijing Arms Pakistan, The Washington Times, 6 August 2001.]
07/28/01: U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell gave a press conference following a 2 day trip to China and meetings with top Chinese officials, including President Jiang Zemin. Powell, who came to China to pave the way for President Bush's visit later this year, was positive about the meeting-- saying that "I think we had a good exchange of views and we found a way to move forward". With respect to missile and weapons technology transfers, Powell expressed his concern to the Chinese delegation about problems with the November 2000 agreement, specific Chinese arms transfers, and the need for expert consultation on China's export control policies. Powell recognized that the remaining unresolved outstanding issues, "will be taken into account as we look at licensing some of the satellite sales that are on the table before us". ["Transcript: Secretary Powell Press Conference in Beijing July 28," Washington File, 28 July 2001][Full Text]
07/27/01: Before meetings with top Chinese officials in Beijing, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell stated that, "Since November, we have been following closely and discussing the [proliferation] issue with them, and the results are mixed. We'll discuss where we think there has been a satisfactory response and where we think more action is required. Yes, proliferation will come up, it will be discussed." Powell's visit comes after repeated formal protests by the U.S. over China's alleged assistance of Pakistan's ballistic missile program despite a November 2000 not to export ballistic missile components and technology restricted by the MTCR. [U.S. Protests Exports of Missiles by China," Washington Post, 07/27/01.]
03/08/01: During Question Hour in the Indian Rajya Sabha, External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh quoted Li Peng as having said that the military assistance program and whatever assistance Beijing provided to Islamabad were well within international norms and covered by international obligations. ["India: Foreign Minister Says Nuclear Issue Discussed with China Directly," PTI News Agency, 8 March 2001, in BBC World Monitoring.]
02/23/01: The Central Intelligence Agency's Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions reports continued Chinese technical assistance on serial production of solid-propellant motors to Pakistan. The Shaheen-II will continue to require assistance from China. [Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions,7 February 2001.]
11/21/00: The State Department announced that it was waiving sanctions on Chinese entities for the past sales of missile technologies to entities in Iran and Pakistan. These exports, which date back to 1992, violated the 1990 Missile Control Act which calls for sanctions on entities engaged in export of MTCR-controlled items. The sanctions were for the export of both MTCR category I and category II items. The US also pledged to resume discussions with China as soon as possible on extending the 1995 US-China Agreement on International Trade in Commercial Launch Services. Under this accord, US companies can export satellites to China for launch on Chinese rocket boosters. However, the two main US companies involved in satellite trade with China, Hughes International and The Loral Corporation, are not able to engage in such trade because they are still under investigation for illegally providing China with controlled information that could have military applications. [State Department Statement on Chinese Missile Sanctions, November 2000]
In response to these actions, the Chinese Foreign Ministry issued its most stringent and specific policy statement on missile nonproliferation to date. China stated
"China is opposed to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction...China has no intention of assisting, in any way, any country in the development of ballistic missiles that can be used to deliver nuclear weapons (i.e., missiles capable of delivering a payload of at least 500 kg to a distance of at least 300 km.)" [Full Chinese Statement on Missile Nonproliferation, November 2000]This statement appears to build on China's past commitment in the 1998 US-China Joint Statement on South Asia not to provide missile technologies to Pakistan or India. As part of the recent commitment, the Chinese government importantly promised, for the first time, to issue export control laws covering missile technologies. In the past, Chinese officials have stated that its controls on missile exports were governed by internal documents and not public laws. The Chinese pledged that the new laws would include such regulations as license application and review, end-user certifications, and a "catch-all" clause. The Chinese statement did not, however, specifically reference the MTCR or its control list and the statement did not mention when China would issue the new export control law. Some experts argue that these latter elements represent a loop-hole in the accord. The Chinese government also denies that it engaged in illegitimate trade with either Iran or Pakistan. The China Daily reports Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman, Sun Yuxi refuting US allegations that China supplied Iran and Pakistan with missiles. Sun denounced the allegations as "rumors with ulterior motives." Sun said the PRC has exercised strict control on the export of missile technologies. ["Spokesman Refutes U.S. Allegations over Missiles," The China Daily, 24 November 2000, p.1; "US Welcomes PRC New Commitment," The People's Daily, 22 November 2000, p. 4.]
10/5/00: The Los Angeles Times reports the Clinton Administration has proposed a new arm control agreement to China. Under the agreement China would adopt its own export control laws on missile technology. The proposed deal is aimed at curtailing China's missile exports to Pakistan, Iran and other countries of concern. Marc Thiessen, spokesman for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee reacted negatively to the proposed deal. Thiessen said, "Chinese domestic law isn't worth the paper it's written on or the blood it's written with." Thiessen remarked that the administration's efforts are merely "a fig leaf to cover up an eight-year failure by this administration in containing proliferation to rogue states." [Jim Mann, "U.S. Take New Tack on China Arms Exports," The Los Angeles Times, 5 October 2000, p.1.]
08/10/00: In an interview with Kyodo News, Pakistani Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar admitted that cooperation on missile technology exists between China and Pakistan. Abdul is quoted as saying, "There is no international regime that prohibits cooperation within MTCR. I simply want to say that cooperation within MTCR is permissible by international law." "Finally, does China cooperat with Pakistan in this field?" he asked himself before answering that in the 1990's China supplied "a small number of tactical missiles, which means short-range missiles." This is the first time senior Pakistani officials have admitted to cooperation between the two countries.[Shahid-ur-Rehman Khan, "Sattar Says Pakistan, China Cooperate on Missile," Tokyo Kyodo in English 1116 GMT 10 August 2000, in FBIS JPP20000810000074.]
08/10/00: The spokesman for the Pakistan Foreign Office, Riaz Mohammed Khan, responds to allegations over possible missile assistance and cooperation from China by saying, "Pakistan and China do not have cooperation in building long-range missiles...The same situation applies with North Korea as far as we are concerned." Riaz added, "Pakistan has not received anything from China that is inconsistent with China's international commitments or obligations, including the guidelines that they voluntarily follow relating to the MTCR, Missile Technology Control Regime." [NBC'S Robert Windrem and contributions from Reuters, "Pakistan Denies China Missile Link," MSNBC (http://www.msnbc.com/news/444091.asp).]
08/09/00: The latest unclassified semiannual CIA report to Congress on arms proliferation concludes, "Chinese missile-related technical assistance to Pakistan increased during this reporting period." The report also indicated that assistance from Chinese firms were on the rise. The report went on to state that "we cannot preclude" that contact with Pakistani nuclear weapons officials were on ongoing. [Bill Gertz, "Pakistan Gets More Chinese Weapons," The Washington Times, 9 August 2000, p. 1.]
7/2/00: A New York Times article reports that China has continued to provide Pakistan with assistance in its long-range missile program. Citing classifed briefings on Capitol Hill by US intelligence agencies, the Times article revealed China's reported shipment of specialty steels, guidance systems and technical expertise to Pakistan, as well as assistance to its newest missile factory. Both China and Pakistan have rejected this allegation. However, this newest charge could impede efforts to mend Sino-US bilateral relations in the aftermath of last May's bombing of the Chinese embassy in Yugoslavia and will most likely be the focus of the China-US arms control dialogue being held in Beijing 7-8 July. [David E. Sanger and Eric Schmitt, "Reports Say China is Aiding Pakistan on Missile Project," The New York Times, 2 July 2000; The Associated Press, "China Denies Missile Charges," 4 July 2000; AFP, "Strong US delegation, long list of concerns at US-China talks," 6 July 2000.]
6/28/00: The Pakistan Embassy rejected reports that China was providing assistance to Pakistan in the construction of a new missile plant. "The Embassy of Pakistan categorically rejects the recent media reports." "These reports are completely baseless. It is also regrettable that these false reports have been used to mislead the U.S. Senate and criticize Pakistan."["Pakistan Rejects Reports of Chinese Missile Plant," Inside China Today on-line (www.insidechina.com) 29 June 2000.]
6/26/00: U.S. officials and some members of Congress insist China violated previous pledges to end proliferation of missile technologies during the Clinton Administration's efforts to convince the Senate to ratify China's Permanent Normal Trade Relations status. Specific allegations pertain to missile assistance to Iranian and Pakistani programs.["China Not Expected to Reduce Missile Aid," Middle East Newsline, vol. 2, no. 242, 26 June 2000.]
6/22/00: The Washington Times reported that Madeleine Albright's trip to China to discuss North and South Korea issues is a cover. At the heart of the discussion will be China's recent missile assistance to Pakistan. The Washington Times further asserts that China's military companies provided Pakistan a complete strategic weapons cycle.[Edward Timperlate and William C. Triplett II, "Carrying Gore's Water to Beijing," The Washington Times, 22 June 2000.]
6/11/00: Robert Einhorn, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation, and a small U.S. delegation visited Beijing secretly to secure a commitment from China not to export missile components or technology to Iran or Pakistan. A recent U.S. intelligence report indicates China has begun construction of a missile plant in Pakistan. ["Secretive U.S. Visit to Beijing," Far Eastern Economic Review (internet edition), 22 June 2000.]
5/18/00: The Far Eastern Economic Review reported that US Senator Jesse Helms and the Clinton Administration reached a compromise in which Helms agreed to approve the appointment of Robert Einhorn to be Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation Affairs in exchange for the formation of a task force to determine whether the US should impose sanctions on China for its 1992 sale of 34 M-11 missiles to Pakistan. The task force has a six month deadline and is expected to end in late May or June 2000. The Review also reported that the US and China have been holding meetings to reach a compromise to avoid sanctions. [Nyan Chanda and Susan V. Lawrence, "US-China Relations: Final Deadline," Far Eastern Economic Review (internet edition), 18 May 2000.]
5/18/00: The Far Eastern Economic Review reported that Deng Xiaoping authorized the sale of 34 M-11 missiles to Pakistan in retaliation for the sale of 150 F-16 fighters to Taiwan. [Susan Lawrence, "China's Fury," Far Eastern Economic Review (internet edition), 18 May 2000.]
5/16/00: In response to possible US sanctions on China for the 1992 sale of 34 M-11 missiles, China Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Zhang Qiyue said, "China has a very strict policy on preventing proliferation. According to the relevant policy on preventing proliferation, as well as the obligations stipulated by the relevant treaties and nuclear policies, China has always been extremely cautious on the question of missile exports and has also adopted a very responsible attitude. . . China has exercised effective and strict control over missile exports. If the relevant circles want to use this to impose sanctions on China, this is utterly unreasonable." ["Zhang Qiyue Says China Exercises Effective, Strict Control Over Missile Exports," Zhongguo Xinwen She, 16 May 2000, in FBIS, CPP20000516000126, 16 May 2000.]
2/2/00: In what may be a violation of China's 1994 promise to halt missile-related sales to Pakistan, a report recently issued by the CIA entitled "Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January Through 30 June 1999," stated, "China has provided extensive support in the past to Pakistan's WMD and ballistic missile programs, and some ballistic missile assistance continues." It also stated that "such assistance is critical for Islamabad's efforts to produce ballistic missiles."
2/2/00: According to a statement by the Director of Central Intelligence, George J. Tenet, "the development of missiles and weapons of mass destruction in South Asia has led to more advanced systems, and both sides [India and Pakistan] have begun to establish the doctrine and tactics to use these weapons." [Statement by George J. Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence, " The Worldwide Threat in 2000: Global Realities of Our National Security," Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 2 February 2000.]
12/16/99: Indian officials stated that Pakistan's missile program is supported by fuel, components, and technology from China and North Korea. Minister of External Affairs, Jaswant Singh, added, "it is assessed that external assistance to Pakistan's missile program is continuing." ["China and North Korea said to Arm Pakistan," The Boston Globe, 16 December 1999. p. A56.]
12/15/99: The Brownback Amendment to the Defense Appropriations Bill, signed by the president the fall of 1999, gives the president authority to waive all of the Glenn Amendment sanctions imposed on India and Pakistan after last year's nuclear tests. It also allows the president to waive Symington and Pressler amendment sanctions, which previously have been used to bar US economic and military assistance to Pakistan because of their nuclear weapons program. The amendment also urges the US to apply export controls only to those agencies and companies that make "direct and material contributions" to dangerous weapons and missile programs. With these steps, Congress has condemned rigorous steps to prevent the transfer of sensitive technology that could be used in India and Pakistan's nuclear and missile programs. This represents a reversal in US policy toward these two countries, while at the same time, Congress is still inflamed over the illegal transfer to China that might have boosted their missile program. [Robert M. Hathaway, "Fresh Start or Shameful Retreat on South Asia?" Christian Science Monitor, 15 December 1999. p. 9]
9/14/99: Following the release of a National Intelligence Council report which formally acknowledged China's M-11 missiles sales to Pakistan, US State Department briefer James Foley reiterated the State Department's continued reluctance to confront this issue.
"It is important, though, to make a distinction between a judgment by the intelligence committee, in other words an intelligence judgment, which obviously is important to informing policy and making policy determinations and judgments and the matter of a legal determination as required under the law. The intelligence committee has reached an analytic judgment that China transferred complete M-11 missiles to Pakistan. Such judgments are very important in evaluating whether legal determinations of sanctionability are warranted under the US sanctions law in particular situations. In other words, such a judgment must be taken into account and will be taken into account as we in the US government make the legal determination based on a variety of factors concerning the sanctionability. But an intelligence judgment is not in and of itself necessarily a sufficient basis for a sanctionability determination under US law. It depends to a large extent on the nature of the evidence underlying that judgment and before the law can be triggered all the various elements of the missile sanctions law must be satisfied.""We have traditionally required a high standard of evidence in making a sanctions determination given the potentially serious consequences and implications of imposing sanctions, particularly in the areas of national security, foreign policy and economic relations. In the M-11 case we have not reached a conclusion that the requirements for a category one finding of sanctionablity have been met."
"As I indicated, we will be taking the intelligence community's judgment into effect, number one; number two, we have applied sanctions on entities previously for category two sanctions on M-11 related transfers; and we're going to be continuing to look at this very closely - it's very serious - and if we believe that the case can be made within the law on such a violation we will impose sanctions." [US Department of State Daily Press Briefing, 14 September 1999.]
9/99: In a National Intelligence Council report called
"Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United
States Through 2015," it was stated that "Pakistan has Chinese supplied M-11
short-range ballistic missiles..." This is the first time in a public document
that the Clinton Administration has verified that China actually supplied
Pakistan with these missiles. This statement in the NIC report raises the issue
of whether the Clinton Administration will have to impose sanctions on China
under the Missile Control Act. For many years, dating back to 1993, the Clifton
Administration maintained that there was not sufficient intelligence information
about these missiles to conclusively determine that they had been shipped to
Pakistan and thus to sanction China.
7/17/99: China is continuing to supply missile know-how to Pakistan according to a CIA report to Congress. China, according to intelligence reports, has also supplied equipment and materials for Libya's missile program. A separate US intelligence report has said the China sold Syria a special aluminum alloy that can by used in missiles. [Bill Gertz, "Rouge Nations Rely on China for Arms Parts," The Washington Times, 17 July 1999. p.1.]
5/99: Indian defense analysts claim that while North Korea supplied Pakistan with the Ghuari II but that the guidance systems for both the Ghauri I and II originated in China. In addition, due to the short length of its serial production before the launch, the Shaheen missile appears to have been based on a proven design, most likely the Chinese M-9. The Shaheen may be produced in the factory near Rawalpindi which was reportedly designed and equipped by China. ["Pakistan tests Chinese/North Korean-based missiles", Jane's Intelligence Review, 5/99, p. 3.]
4/29/99: In testimony before a Congressional committee, John Lauder - the head of the CIA's Nonproliferation Center, described the CIA's views on recent progress and continuing concerns about China's nuclear, chemical and missile proliferation activities. He stated:
"The China story is a mixed picture. China is actively studying membership in the Missile Technology Control Regime, has promulgated controls on dual-use nuclear technology, and tightened chemical export controls. We cannot yet be certain, however, that the new export control mechanisms will be effective, and worrisome contacts continue between Chinese entities and countries of concern.2/26/99: China's Ambassador to India Zhou Gang speaking at a Sino-Indian relations seminar in New Delhi stated, " Non-existent is the issue of China's nuclear and missile proliferation to Pakistan." He noted that China was aware of India's concerns with these issues and that China had taken "a positive, flexible and pragmatic approach and made proper readjustment of certain policies concerned." ["PRC Envoy: China Hopes To Develop Good Bilateral Ties," The Hindustan Times, 26 February 1999 in FBIS 26 February 1999.]Both the Chinese Government and Chinese firms have long-standing and deep relationships with proliferant countries, and we are not convinced that China's companies fully share the commitments undertaken by senior Chinese leaders. While all aspects of China's proliferation behavior bear continued watching, we see more signs of progress on nuclear and chemical matters than on missile assistance." [Unclassified Statement for the Record by Special Assistant to the DCI for Nonproliferation John A. Lauder on the Worldwide WMD Threat to the Commission to Assess the Organization of the Federal Government to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (aka The Deutsch Commission), 29 April 1999.]
2/99: An unclassified CIA report to Congress on global proliferation during the first half of 1998 stated:
- "Chinese and North Korean entities continued to provide assistance to
Pakistan's ballistic missile program during the first half of 1998.
Such assistance is critical for Islamabad's efforts to produce ballistic
missiles. . . China's involvement with Pakistan will continue to be
monitored closely. [Unclassified
Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of
Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, Central Intelligence
Agency, 2 February 1999.]
6/27/98: Following summit meetings in Beijing, the US and China issued a Joint Statement on South Asia which said "our respective policies are to prevent the export of equipment, materials or technology that could in any way assist programs in India or Pakistan for nuclear weapons or for ballistic missiles capable of delivering such weapons, and that to this end, we will strengthen our national export control systems." This statement appears to remove all remaining uncertainty about China's commitment to halt all further missile assistance to Pakistan (including MTCR Category II technologies) and signals China's commitment to begin developing legally based export controls on MTCR controlled technologies.
6/11/98: In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Dr. Gordon Oehler - the former Director of the CIA's Nonproliferation Center - revealed several interesting details about China's M-11 missile exports to Pakistan. Many of the details Dr. Oehler provided have not before been released in the public realm.
- In discussing the first instance of M-11 cooperation, Dr. Oehler stated: "But in the early 1990s, the Chinese began an effort to provide Pakistan with nuclear-capable ballistic missile technologies, and even complete missiles. In 1990, the intelligence community detected the transfer to Pakistan of a training M-11 ballistic missile and associated transporter erector launcher, indicating that operational missiles were not far behind...With this information, the U.S. imposed Category II sanctions against China and Pakistan in 1991..."
- In discussing the second instance of M-11 cooperation, Dr. Oehler stated: "However, in November 1992, less than eight months later [and after the US had lifted the MTCR-related sanctions], the Chinese delivered 34 M-11's to Pakistan, despite their earlier pledge. This led to a second sanctions action -- not for Category I sanctions that would be required for complete missile transfers, but for Category II, M-11 related transfers, a lesser offense."
- In terms of more recent cooperation, Dr. Oehler stated: "Since late 1992 China has not transferred complete MTCR-covered missiles to any country. Instead it has concentrated on transferring production technologies and components. Production technologies and components are also covered under the MTCR, but they are easier to hide, or can be claimed to be for non-MTCR-related systems."
- In response to a question from Senator Brownback about whether there was sufficient evidence to conclude that the M-11s had been transferred by China, Dr. Oehler responded: "There is no question in my mind whatsoever...The evidence comes from many sources, very good sources...I think that all of the intelligence agencies felt, as I mentioned, very quickly that in fact the transfers had taken place....the State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research took a little longer to come to the judgment that they -- there is a high likelihood" the M-11 transfers took place.
6/04/98: US intelligence agencies were reported to be monitoring a Chinese ship carrying special metals and electronics destined for Pakistan's A.Q. Khan Research Laboratories. These arms materials are used in the production of Chinese-designed anti-tank missiles. Pakistan's Baktar Shikhan is virtually identical to China's Red Arrow 8 guided missile. According to an unnamed US official: "This is part of continuing Chinese military assistance to the Pakistanis and is for long-term use of indigenous weapons production." [Bill Gertz, "US Has Detected Metals, Electronics on the Way to Nuclear Weapons Lab," The Washington Times, 4 June 1998, p.A1.]
4/10/98: The State Department announced it was investigating any role China may have had in the development of Pakistan's "Ghauri" missile in violation of China's commitment to abide by the MTCR guidelines. John Holum, Director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, said: "It's a matter that we are, in fact, actively reviewing." [Bill Gertz, "China's Purported Missile Technology Transfer Under Scrutiny," The Washington Times, 10 April 1998, p.A15.]
4/07/98: China denied any involvement in the development of Pakistan's "Ghauri" missile. Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesman Zhu Bangzao stated: "As for whether China helped Pakistan, I can say that there is no connection whatsoever. As for the United States investigating this issue, I believe that is unreasonable and groundless." ["Beijing Denies Involvement in Pakistan Missile Project," Inside China Today, 7 April 1998.]
4/06/98: Pakistan successfully tested a new medium-range surface-to-surface "Ghauri" missile with a range of 1,500 kilometers.
1/28/98: The Director of Central Intelligence stated:
- "Conventional arm sales have lagged in recent years, encouraging Chinese
defense industries to look to WMD technology-related sales, primarily to
Pakistan and Iran, in order to recoup. There is no question that China has
contributed to WMD advances in these countries. On the positive side, there
have recently been some signs of improvement in China's proliferation
posture. China recently enacted its first comprehensive laws governing
nuclear technology exports. It also appears to have tightened down on its
most worrisome nuclear transfers, and it recently renewed its pledge to halt
sales of anti-ship cruise missiles to Iran. But China's relations with some
proliferant countries are long-standing and deep, Mr. Chairman. The jury is
still out on whether the recent changes are broad enough in scope and
whether they will hold over the longer term. As such, Chinese activities in
this area will require continued close watching."
[Director of Central Intelligence, "Hearing on Current and Projected
National Security Threats Before the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence," 28 January 1998.]
12/19/97: During a visit to India, a visiting member of the standing committee of the Political Bureau of China Wei Jianxing assured Indian Prime Minister I.K. Gujral that China is not selling M-11 missiles to Pakistan. After the meeting, a spokesman for India's Ministry of External Affairs stated:
- "The Chinese side maintained that they are not supplying M-11 missiles to
Pakistan. We have also full sensitized the Chinese side on our concerns. The
issue was discussed in the context of destabilization of peace in the
region."
12/6/96: The court case resumed for a Hong Kong shipping agent allegedly responsible for handling 10 tons of ammonium perchlorate without a license. The rocket fuel was seized by Hong Kong customs officials while en route to Pakistan from China. [Jane's Intelligence Review, 2 October 1996, p. 16.]
9/19/96: Pakistan said that one of its organizations had imported a small amount of rocket fuel for scientific research, but denied reports of a large seizure of fuel by Hong Kong customs. A Foreign Office spokesman stated that Pakistan's Space and Upper-Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO) conducted research in launching rockets to the upper atmosphere and had purchased rocket fuel for research purposes. Hong Kong's AFP reported that SUPARCO was caught attempting to import 10 tons (200 boxes) of ammonium percholate for rocket fuel from Xi'an in China. COSCO Container Line Agency, a subsidiary of the COSCO Hong Kong Group, reportedly attempted to ship the fuel aboard the ship Hinghe, owned by Guangzhou Ocean Shipping Company. The shipment was raided by Hong Kong customs officers on 29 April 1996. [The News (Islamabad), 20 September 1996; in FBIS-NES-96-185, 20 September 1996.]
8/26/96: US State Department spokesman Glyn Davies stated regarding reports of a Pakistani missile production factory being constructed with Chinese assistance:
- "The question of Chinese transfers of missile technology and other
technologies to Pakistan is one that the United States has long been
concerned about. We've raised it in the past with both countries, both China
and Pakistan. We will continue to do that."
"We will continue, in a larger sense, to monitor Chinese compliance with its commitments, including possible transfers of weapons technology, to Pakistan. As far as these reports that there's been some conclusions reached, we've not come to any conclusions at this stage that would warrant sanctions." [US Department of State, daily press briefing, 26 August 1996.]
8/27/96: Asian Age reported that China was assisting Pakistan in the construction of a ballistic missile production facility using pre-fabricated sheds in the Kala Chata mountain range near Fatehgunj, 40 km west of Islamabad, called the National Defense Complex. In the article, it stated that the China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation (CPMIEC) provided Pakistan with gyroscopes, accelerometers, on-board computers, and other missile-related equipment, based on the M-11 missile. [Asian Age (Dehli), 27 August 1996; in FBIS-NES-96-168, 27 August 1996.]
8/25/96: Regarding the alleged Chinese assistance with a Pakistani missile factory, in an appearance on This Week with David Brinkley, US Vice-President Al Gore stated: "We have a very active, vigorous program of monitoring all exchanges of technology from China or any other country that might violate the international treaties and laws that are relvant to this. And we are watching very, very carefully, and we have an active, ongoing dialogue with the Chinese on this very point." [National Public Radio, 27 August 1996.]
8/25/96: It was reported that US intelligence sources suspect Chinese assistance in the construction of a factory to build medium-range ballistic missiles near Islamabad. China supplied blueprints and equipment for the factory's construction. The factory will reportedly be able to manufacture most of the key missile components of a missile based on the M-11 within two years. According to some officials, the factory may produce exact duplicates of the M-11, but there is some disagreement within the intelligence community about that. The assistance may be the result of a secret agreement made between China and Pakistan a decade ago for the factory and a number of missiles. Some US analysts claim the factory is a "turn-key" facility to build complete M-11 copies with two stages, rocket motors, solid fuel propellants, and guidance systems, while others argue that the factory will only be able to produce some of the necessary components. Zamir Akram, deputy chief of mission at the Pakistani embassy, stated: "we have no knowledge of such a factory." Construction of the facility allegedly began in 1995 in the city of Rawalpindi and will be operation within two years. (Al Gore expressed concern about the plant on August 25, 1996. The November 1997 DOD Report called Proliferation: Threat and Response confirmed construction of the facility.)
Pakistan's Foreign Minister Sardar Asif also denied the report, stating "It is another figment of the unlimited imagination of the [Washington Post]. It is another addition to the false stories carried by the Post against Pakistan in the past." But Sardar added, "Pakistan reserves the right to develop anything for its defense with its own resources." Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Shen Guofang stated: "I think that the US media should be responsible for its accuracy in its report. And as for the US government, I think that they should not make policy based on the groundless report." A Chinese embassy official stated that "We consider this matter completely closed...There never was any such cooperation. This was discussed when we signed the 1994 agreement [with the United States]." [R. Jeffrey Smith, "China Linked To Pakistani Missile Plant," The Washington Post, 25 August 1996, pp. A1, A25; Tim Weiner, "US Suspects China Is Giving Pakistan Help With Missiles," New York Times, 26 August 1996, p. A4; Quoted in Shirley A. Kan, "China and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Toward a Credible US Strategy," Conference of Asian Studies on the Pacific Coast, Pacific Grove, California, 26-29 June 1997, p. 5; National Public Radio, 27 August 1996; Dawn (Karachi), 27 August 1996, in FBIS-TAC-96-009, 27 August 1996.]
6/20/96: US Representatives Curt Weldon and Floyd Spence confirmed the presence of complete M-11 ballistic missiles in Pakistan. Weldon said, "In fact, the missiles are there--our intelligence community has affirmed this beyond a reasonable doubt--and for the purposes of US law it is irrelevant whether the missiles have become operational...the missiles are in place and if they are not operational, they will be soon." [Bill Gertz, "2 lawmakers say Pakistan has missiles," Washington Times, 21 June 1996.]
6/14/96: US State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns stated regarding reports of Chinese M-11 transfers to Pakistan::
- "We have seen reports that this kind of activity might have taken place. As
I said the other day, we're concerned by those reports. We are following up
with all the resources at our disposal in this government to check those
reports."
"We will apply American law should that be necessary. But at the present time, two very important things have not happened. There has been no recommendation to the policy-making community from the intelligence side of the house on this issue--number one."
"I need to go public and correct that misperception and kind of cross--let me take one step over the line that I never like to cross and tell you that because I think there was a misleading part of some of the articles on that."
"And, secondly, the people who make these decisions--namely, people here in the State Department--have not determined that there's been a violation. So those two things have to happen before the United States takes any kind of action on this issue..."
"...We've not made any determination on this issue...No determination has been made that there's been a violation of China's MTCR commitments or of United States sanctions law, which are both relevant in this case." [US Department of State, daily press briefing, 14 June 1996.]
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Shen Guofang stated that reports of Chinese M-11 sales to Pakistan were untrue. Shen stated: "Those reports on the so-called Chinese export of M-11 missiles to Pakistan are entirely groundless." Shen added: "In the past China has never exported such missiles to Pakistan nor will China do so in the future." [Wen Wei Po (Hong Kong), 14 June 1996; in FBIS-CHI-96-116, 14 June 1996; AFP (Hong Kong), 13 June 1996; in FBIS-CHI-96-115, 13 June 1996; "China denies M-11 missile sales to Pakistan," UPI, 13 June 1996.]
6/12/96: According to US intelligence agencies, Pakistan has deployed the M-11 missiles it received from China in 1993. Whether or not the missiles are operational is the topic of ongoing debate between various US agencies drafting an intelligence report. In a 13 June 1996 Washington Post article, CIA and Defense Department intelligence officials argue that Pakistan's M-11 missiles should be considered operational because they have been assigned to an army unit trained by Chinese technicians to operate the missiles. The State Department disagreed with the assessment, saying that the missiles are not operational until they are assembled and are used in training by the military. [Bill Gertz, "Pakistan Deploys Chinese Missiles," Washington Times, 12 June 1996, pp. A1, A14.]
In response to the reports, US State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns stated:
- "we've seen these charges. We've not made a determination. The United States
has not made a determination that China has conducted activities
inconsistent with its October 1994 commitments to Secretary of State
Christopher."
"We have not made a determination that either China or Pakistan have engaged in activity that would be sanctionable through the transfer of missiles from China to Pakistan. That's our position..."
"I can assure you that if we determine that there has been a violation of the law, we'll act accordingly. We take our responsibilities to adhere to the law and to fulfill it very seriously. We know what our responsibilities are. We know what the guidelines are." [US Department of State, daily press briefing, 12 June 1996.]
10/4/95: US Undersecretary of State Lynn Davis said the United States would not impose new sanctions against China unless it acquired undeniable proof that China, in violation of Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) guidelines, sold M-11 missiles to Pakistan. According to Davis, the transaction in question may have occurred before China announced its intention to adhere to the MTCR in September 1994. [Bill Gertz, Washington Times, 5 October 1995, p. A10.]
10/95: According to a new US law, Washington can wait up to six months to impose sanctions on China for suspected exports of M-11 missiles to Pakistan. The United States can impose trade sanctions for two years on China for either conspiring or actually transferring the M-11s to Pakistan. [The Risk Report, October 1995, pp. 3-8; C. Raja Mohan, Hindu (Madras), 30 October 1995, p. 13; in FBIS-NES-95-212, 30 Ocotber 1995.]
7/3/95: US intelligence officials said that by November 1992, China had exported over 30 complete M-11 MRBMs to Pakistan; this view is contrary to earlier reports that only missile components had been sent. The officials say storage crates at Pakistan's Sargodha air force base west of Lahore contain the M-11 missiles. Since obtaining the M-11s, Pakistan has built storage sheds, mobile launchers, and related maintenance facilities and housing. With the aid of Chinese experts, Pakistan has also been conducting practice launches. [R. Jeffrey Smith and David B. Ottaway, Washington Post, 3 July 1995, p. 1; The Risk Report, October 1995, pp. 3-8.]
6/22/95: Pakistan said that it has not received any shipments of M-11 missile components from China and that the United States had not produced any evidence to the contrary. Pakistan also denied that it has violated the MTCR. [Xinhua (Beijing), 22 June 1995; in FBIS-CHI-95-121, 22 June 1995.]
6/95: A CIA report indicated that China has recently transferred missile components to Iran and Pakistan in possible violation of the MTCR. If a violation occurred, the US may be required to impose sanctions, said US officials. The CIA report stated that over the past 12 months China has delivered dozens, if not hundreds, of computerized machine tools and missile guidance systems, giving Iran the capability to increase its North Korean Scud missile accuracy and to build its own Scud-type missiles. Since March 1995, China is also believed to have transferred parts to Pakistan that could be used in M-11 missiles. A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman said China was abiding by its commitment to the MTCR and that the CIA report was "groundless." [Elaine Sciolino, New York Times, 22 June 1995, pp. A1, A7.]
4/95: US reconnaissance satellites reportedly took photographs of missile canisters at a Pakistani facility in Sargodha. [Bill Gertz, "Pakistan Deploys Chinese Missiles," Washington Times, 12 June 1996, pp. A1, A14.]
3/95: US State Department official Robert Einhorn said the United States may have no choice but to impose Category 1 sanctions against China if enough evidence is gathered to prove that it sold M-11 missiles to Pakistan. [Pushpindar Singh, Asian Defence Journal, May 1995, p. 83.]
1/4/95: A US defense official, commenting on whether China has transferred M-11 missiles to Pakistan, stated, "There are different levels of knowing things. Definitive proof is not there." [Charles Aldinger, Reuters, 4 January 1995; in Executive News Service, 6 January 1995.]
12/5/94: Pakistan's President Farooq Leghari asserted, "As far as the M-11 is concerned both Pakistan and China have very clearly told the entire world time and time again that we have not acquired M-11 missiles from China and neither have they sold us M-11 missiles." Leghari added, however, that Pakistan had procured some missiles from China, but that they were within MTCR regulations. Leghari and Pakistan Defense Minister Aftab Shabaan Mirani were in Beijing to hold defense-related and other discussions with Chinese officials. [Jane Macartney, Reuters, 5 December 1994; in Executive News Service, 5 December 1994.]
10/4/94: Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen and US Secretary of State Warren Christopher signed the "Joint United States-People's Republic of China Statement on Missile Proliferation," in which China promised not to "export ground-to-ground missile featuring the primary parameters of the [MTCR]--that is, inherently capable of reaching a range of at least 300 km with a payload of at least 500 kg." The agreement also stated that "This Chinese commitment represents a global ban on exports, and goes beyond the requirements set forth in the MTCR, which calls for a 'strong presumption of denial' for such missile exports."
By signing the statement, China accepted the US argument that missiles are to be restricted if they have the "inherent capability" to be modified to a capability covered under MTCR guidelines, "regardless of its demonstrated or advertised combination of range and payload." China and the United States also agreed to "hold in-depth discussions" on the MTCR and the possibility of China's eventual membership in the regime. ["Joint United States-People's Republic Of China Statement On Missile Proliferation," 4 October 1994; Jon B. Wolfsthal, "US, China Reach New Accords On MTCR, Fissile Cutoff Issues," Arms Control Today, November 1994, p. 28; Robert Shuey and Shirley A. Kan, "Chinese Missile And Nuclear Proliferation: Issues For Congress," CRS Issue Brief, 16 November 1995, p. 12.]
9/94: Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Liu Huaqiu and US Ambassador J. Stapleton Roy met to resolve the dispute regarding China's missile technology sales to Pakistan. These preliminary negotiations will set the stage for meetings between Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen and US President Bill Clifton and Secretary of State Warren Christopher in November 1994. [Patrick E. Tyler, New York Times, 27 September 1994, p. A7.]
Mid-9/94: According to US officials, Chinese technicians checked M-11 missile components for serviceability, and trained Pakistani soldiers in the missile's use at a facility under construction near Sargodha. US State Department spokesman Michael McCurry stated, "It's our understanding that some Chinese engineers and technicians did go to Pakistan. Their purpose is not entirely known to us." US intelligence agencies have "strong evidence" that M-11 missiles are being sequestered at a number of military bases in Pakistan. The CIA stated in a secret report that Pakistan paid $15 million to the China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation (CPMIEC), the producer of the M-11. According to Admiral Richard Macke, the commander of the US Pacific Command, the M-11s have not yet been "operationalized." Macke added that US-PRC military contacts will be conditioned on China not assisting Pakistan to "make their M-11's operational." [Bill Gertz, Washington Times, 4 October 1994, p. A8; Barbara Starr, Jane's Defence Weekly, 15 October 1994, p. 6.]
9/94: For the first time, Pakistan conceded that it purchased M-11 missiles from China. Pakistan Embassy political counselor Zamir Akram said in Washington, DC that his country had made no secret of the purchases. Pakistan stated that sanctions should not be levied due to the purchase because the range of the M-11 missile falls below the required 300 km minimum range set by the MTCR. Other Pakistani officials continue to deny that Pakistan has made the purchase. [R. Jeffrey Smith and Thomas W. Lippman, Washington Post, 8 September 1994, p. A32; Asian Age, 9 September 1994; in International Security Digest, September 1994, p. 94.]
9/94: It was reported that a leaked US intelligence report said that Chinese technicians will soon travel to Pakistan to assist in activating the Chinese-supplied M-11 missiles. US officials claim that the Chinese missile technicians are due to arrive at Sargodha, Pakistan to train the Pakistan military in using the M-11. Another Chinese team will unpack and assemble the missiles after completion of the Sargodha missile facility. [Wall Street Journal, 14 September 1994, p. A18; Washington Times, 7 September 1994, p. A1, A18.]
9/94: US intelligence agencies found new evidence that Pakistan was pursuing its deal with China to buy M-11 missiles. In September 1994, according to US Defense Department and intelligence officials, Chinese missile technicians are due to arrive in Sargodha, Pakistan to train the Pakistani military in using the M-11. The transfer of M-11 missiles might violate the MTCR and gives rise to concerns that Pakistan will use the missiles to deliver nuclear weapons. In late August 1994, the former prime minister of Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif, announced that Pakistan possesses a nuclear bomb, thereby confirming old suspicions about Islamabad's nuclear weapons program.
8/22/94: According to US officials, Pakistan agreed to pay China $15 million as a partial payment on its 1988 contract with the state-owned China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation (CPMIEC) for an undetermined number of M-11 missiles, launchers, and support equipment. China and Pakistan have denied that M-11s or components have been or will be exported to Pakistan. [Washington Times, 7 September 1994, pp. A1, A18; R. Jeffrey Smith and Thomas W. Lippman, Washington Post, 8 September 1994, p. A32.]
3/23/94: Chinese Ambassador to the United States Li Daoyu refuted charges that China is a "key proliferator of destabilizing weapons and technology" to the Middle East, and said that China is not supplying M-11 ballistic missile technology to Pakistan or M-9 ballistic missile technology to Iran. Li also stated that China is not supplying Iran with "chemical weapons precursors." [Security Affairs, April 1994, p. 3.]
3/11/94-3/14/94: A US State Department visit to China failed to break the impasse in the negotiations to get China to sign the MTCR. The United States will lift the sanctions on China, which were imposed on 25 August 1993 for selling M-11 missiles to Pakistan, if China formally signs the MTCR and "comes to an understanding" concerning future Chinese missile and missile technology transfers to Pakistan. China wants the United States to remove its sanctions before it will sign the MTCR. China says that it already abides by the MTCR. In a subsequent statement, US Undersecretary of State for International Security Lynn Davis stated that the United States is closely watching China and is willing to impose stricter sanctions is China "steps out of line." [Inside the Pentagon, 24 March 1994, pp. 9-10; Defense Daily, 23 March 1994, p. 436; Arms Control Today, April 1994, p. 28.]
12/29/93: While visiting Beijing, Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto stated that Pakistan purchased M-11 missiles from China because of the threat from Afghani Scuds and the Indian missile buildup. [Jeffrey Parker, Reuters, 29 December 1993.]
12/20/93: The Director of the Department of Asian Affairs of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, Wang Yinfang, and Japan's Asian Affairs Bureau Director General Tadashi Ikeda held talks on mutual security concerns in which Wang revealed that China "refused sales" of M-11 missile technology to Pakistan. [Kyodo (Tokyo), 20 December 1993; in JPRS-TND-94-002, 18 January 1994, p. 42.]
12/93: Li Daoyu, Chinese ambassador to the United States, wrote in an article that in August 1993, "the US government decided to impose new sanctions against China, based on the unfounded accusation that China had made an M-11 missile-related transfer to Pakistan. In strongly protesting the US decision to resume sanctions, the Chinese Foreign Ministry has stated it is left with no alternative but to reconsider its commitment to MTCR." [Li Daoyu, "Foreign Policy And Arms Control: The View From China," Arms Control Today, December 1993, p. 11.]
11/18/93: US officials announced the sale of a Cray Research Inc. supercomputer to China in an effort to improve relations with China, despite evidence that China violated the MTCR by selling M-11 missile components to Pakistan. Cray Research Inc. spokesman Frank Parisi stated that a sophisticated set of safeguards has been established so that there is no way that China can use the supercomputer for "pernicious applications." US officials stated that the approval to sell the supercomputer to China did not conflict with the US sanctions imposed on China in August 1993, which affect only missile-related goods. In return for lifting the sanctions, the Clifton administration wanted China to "make more public and binding assurances" which would include an agreement that the M-11 missile is covered by the MTCR. Although China says that the MTCR does not cover the M-11 because it has only a 280 km range and carries an 800 kg payload, the US says the payload can be reduced giving the missile a greater, MTCR-restricted range. [Gene Gibbons, Reuters, 19 November 1993; Jim Mann, Los Angeles Times, 29 November 1993, pp. A1, A9; Export Control News, 30 November 1993; Jon B. Wolfsthal, Arms Control Today, December 1993, p. 18.]
11/13/93: US Assistant Secretary of Defense Charles W. Freeman Jr. held talks with Chinese Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) Gen. Liu Huaqing concerning proliferation issues and China's sale of missiles to Pakistan. [Lena Sun, Washington Post, 3 November 1993, p. A12.]
10/12/93: The United States offered to ease the sanctions on China if Beijing would renew and strengthen its commitment to the MTCR guidelines. A senior US official stated that China is showing no interest in negotiating an end to the sanctions imposed on it by the United States after China sold M-11 missiles to Pakistan. The official stated, "Sanctions are not an end in themselves. They are designed to encourage non-proliferation but (obtaining a waiver) requires serious negotiations by the Chinese and so far they've given no indication that they are willing to do this." [Reuters, 12 October 1993.]
10/93: The executive director of the Chinese Poly Group Corp., Xie Datong, denied the company's involvement in the sale of (DF-3) CSS-2 intermediate range ballistic missiles to Saudi Arabia in 1987 or the sale of M-11 missiles to Pakistan. Xie stated that his company, the Chinese military's chief arms trading company, cannot export strategic weapons without the approval of the PLA General Staff Department (GSD) and that the company does not have missiles to sell. [Tai Ming Cheung, Far Eastern Economic Review, 14 October 1993, p. 68.]
9/93: A Pakistani government official denied that Pakistan received M-11 missiles from China. Pakistan did admit to having procured "ordinary" missiles in the 1980s when it faced Soviet Scud attacks from Afghanistan. [Jang (Lahore), 27 August 1993, p. 5; in JPRS-TND-93-030, 27 September 1993, p. 15.]
8/27/93: In response to US sanctions, China threatened to scrap its promises to abide by the MTCR.
8/26/93: The Chinese Embassy in Washington criticized the US missile sanctions against China as "a wrong judgment based on inaccurate intelligence...China has made clear on many occasions that it has not done anything in violation of its commitment" to the MTCR. Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Liu Huaqiu, in a protest to US Ambassador to China Stapleton Roy, said that "China has honored its commitments to act in accordance with the MTCR guidelines and parameters and has done nothing in contradiction of that commitment." China also threatened to "reconsider its commitment to MTCR." Liu referred to the sanctions as a "naked hegemonic act" contrary to the "basic norms governing international relations" that "puts Sino-US relations in serious jeopardy." according to Xinhua. ["The Credibility Of China's Nonproliferation Pledges And United States Sanctions: 1984-1996," compiled by the minority staff, Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, Summer 1996; Jeffrey Smith and Daniel Williams, Washington Post, 11 November 1993, pp. A39, A44.]
8/25/93: The United States imposed category 2 trade sanctions against China and Pakistan for selling M-11 missiles to Pakistan. All of the subsidiaries, divisions, subunits, or successors of both Ministries were sanctioned, including eleven Chinese entities and one Pakistani entity. The sanctions denied export licenses for items covered by the MTCR Annex for two years and denied US government contracts related to such items. Further sanctions were imposed on Chinese government organizations involved in the development or production of electronics, space systems or equipment, and military aircraft. The sanctioned Chinese entities were: Chinese Ministry of Aerospace Industry (MAI); China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation (CPMIEC); China National Space Administration (CNSA); China Aerospace Corporation (CASC); China Great Wall Industry Corporation (CGWIC); Chinese Academy of Space Technology; Beijing Wan Yuan Industry Corporation (BWYIC); China Haiying Company; Shanghai Astronautics Industry Bureau; China Chang Feng Group. Three US satellites scheduled to be launched aboard Chinese launch vehicles were affected: a Hughes-manufactured Optus B3 and APStar 1 to be launched in 1994, and the Martin Marietta Astrospace Asiasat 2 to be launched in 1995.
The US imposed sanctions against the based on strong evidence that China shipped the M-11s to Pakistan in 1992, even though spy satellites have not been able to confirm their presence in Pakistan.
According to officials who spoke on the condition of anonymity, a team of Chinese technicians will travel to Pakistan after completion of the Sargodha missile facility later this year to help unpack and assemble the M-11s. The officials said that Pakistan has delayed the team's arrival due to concerns that the missiles would be detected by spy satellites. According to some intelligence reports, M-11s are being stored at Sargodha, but no operational missiles have been detected. Photographs taken by spy satellites in Spring 1994, showed canisters at the Sargodha facility which were identical to those seen at the Chinese M-11 production facility. Analysts believe the Pakistani canisters were mock-ups used for training purposes, even though Pentagon officials think the real missiles are somewhere in the country. ["Pakistan-China Deal For Missiles Exposed," Washington Times, 7 September 1994, p. A1, A18.]
8/24/93: US Under Secretary of State for International Security Affairs Lynn Davis determined that China's Ministry of Aerospace Industry (MAI) and Pakistan's Ministry of Defense conducted missile proliferation activities. China and Pakistan denied violating the MTCR guidelines, although Pakistan did admit to purchasing "a few" short-range ballistic missiles from China in the late 1980s. China denied violating the MTCR guidelines, but refused to clarify whether it was denying that any transfers took place or denying that the transfers violated the MTCR. [The Risk Report, October 1995, p. 8.]
5/93: Akram Zaki, Secretary-General of the Pakistani Foreign Ministry, flatly denied that Pakistan had received M-11 missiles from China. Zaki added that although Pakistan is closely allied to China, missile transfers from China are not possible, as China is committed to observing the MTCR guidelines. This charge was also refuted by China. Zaki also said that Pakistan wants to clear the region of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction. [The Frontier Post (Peshawar), 22 May 1993, pp. 1,4; in JPRS-TND-93-016, 1 June 1993, pp. 13-14; AFP (Hong Kong) 21 May 1993; in JPRS-TND-93-015, 24 May 1993, p. 23; "Pakistan Denies It Got Chinese Missiles," Washington Times, 22 May 1993, p. A2.]
12/92: Chinese Major General Yang Guo Ping led a five member military delegation to Pakistan in order to discuss matters of mutual interests with senior Pakistani army officials, and to visit training institutions at Rawalpindi, Abbotabad, Peshawar and Lahore. This visit to further military ties between the two nations, follows China's controversial sale of M-11 missiles to Pakistan. [AFP (Hong Kong), 6 December 1992; in Proliferation Issues, 18 December 1992, p. 16.]
12/7/92: China's Foreign Ministry denied US intelligence allegations that it delivered 24 M-11 missiles to Pakistan within the past two week period.
The US reports have affected China's most-favored-nation (MFN) status with the United States and are blocking a US supercomputer sale to China. China pledged in November 1992 not to export M-9 or M-11s resulting in the US lifting sanctions on sales of satellites and high speed computers. [UPI, 7 December 1992; in Nuclear Nonproliferation Network News, 7 December 1992.]
12/6/92: Responding to a Voice of America report that Pakistan had purchased Chinese missiles, Pakistan's Defense Minister Glaus Ali Shah stated that he was in no position to challenge the report. Shah added Pakistan had a full right to defend its borders and noted India's program to acquire sophisticated nuclear missiles for the past few years. [The Nation (Islamabad), 7 December 1992, p. 12; in Proliferation Issues, 18 December 1992, p. 16.]
12/92: The Los Angeles Times reported that according to US intelligence sources, in late November 1992 China shipped about 24 M-11 missiles to Pakistan in clear violation of the MTCR to which China had agreed to abide in the spring 1991. According to the Los Angeles Times, Chinese missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads were unloaded at Pakistan's port of Karachi. The newspaper evidence was based on US intelligence reports which had photographs of the M-11s taken at the port of Karachi. The United States said if the allegation is proved true, economic sanctions would be placed against China, for breaking previous agreements. Chinese officials denied any violation since the contract for the missiles was finalized before China came under MTCR scrutiny. A US official stated that the sale may have been made in response to the US announcement that it would sell F-16 combat aircraft to Taiwan.
General Mirza Aslam Beg, former Pakistani Army chief of staff, commented, "As regards the M-11 missile system that Pakistan is acquiring from China, it is covered within the six-nation agreement on Missile Technology Control to which China is a signatory. The missile has a range of less than 300 km and is not capable of carrying a nuclear warhead. It is neither designed for it nor has the required degree of accuracy." [The News (Islamabad), 6 December 1992, p. 4; in Proliferation Issues, 18 December 1992, p. 17; UPI, 5 December 1992; in Executive News Service, 7 December 1992; Pakistan Times (Islamabad), 10 December 1992, pp. 1, 8; in Proliferation Issues, 23 December 1992, p. 10; Jim Mann, "China Said To Sell Pakistan Dangerous New Missiles," Los Angeles Times, 4 December 1992, pp. A1, A18.]
12/92: According to Gordon Jacobs and Tim McCarthy, "it is clear that the Beijing-Islamabad missile deal actually involves license or co-production of the system in Pakistan, presumably to begin after suitable training. [Gordon Jacobs and Tim McCarthy, "China's Missile Sales--Few Changes For The Future," Jane's Intelligence Review, December 1992, p. 560.]
11/92: 30 M-11 missiles reportedly were stored at Pakistan's Sargodha air force base since November 1992. [Hindu (Madras), 15 June 1996; in FBIS-TAC-96-008, 15 June 1996.]
10/92: A "senior Pentagon Asian specialist" said there are "indications" that China is violating the MTCR by discussing possible M-9 and M-11 missile exports with Pakistan and Syria, and that the Pentagon is "also concerned" that China may be discussing further "nuclear missile" exports with Iran. Of the possible Syrian and Pakistani exports, the official says, "We are watching very closely." [Jane's Defence Weekly, 10 October 1992, p. 18.]
Late 1992: Pakistan reportedly paid $83 million to China when China delivered M-11 components, and perhaps actual missiles, to Pakistan. ["Pakistan-China Deal For Missiles Exposed," Washington Times, 7 September 1994, p. A1, A18.]
2/12/92: The United States lifted the missile-related sanctions on China.
1/31/92: The Bush administration is willing to lift trade restrictions on "high technology items" to China if Beijing abides by the MTCR. The sanctions apply to the China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation (CPMIEC) and the China Great Wall Industry Corporation (CGWIC). [Bill Gertz and Warren Strobel, "US Set To Drop Sanction If China Obeys Missile Pact," Washington Times, 30 January 1992, pp. A1, A9.]
1/31/92: US intelligence reports indicated that China delivered guidance units to Pakistan that could be used as flight-control in M-11 ballistic missiles. The sales were important because the United States is planning to lift sanctions on the sale of US high-speed computers that were established in the spring of 1992, when the United States discovered that China delivered M-11 launchers to Pakistan. During US Secretary of State James Baker's visit to China in November 1991, Chinese officials promised to abide by the MTCR if sanctions were lifted. ["China Said To Sell Parts For Missiles," New York Times, 31 January 1992, pp. A1, A2.]
11/17/91: US Secretary of State James Baker's 15-17 November 1991 trip to Beijing resulted in limited eleventh-hour Chinese concessions on missile sales. Baker met with Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, President Yang Shangkun, Prime Minister Li Peng and party chief Jiang Zemin and obtained a verbal commitment from the Chinese not to export M-9s to Syria, and M-11s to Pakistan and other countries. The Chinese also told him they intend to "observe the guidelines and parameters" of the MTCR. China had previously argued that the range of the M-11 is too short to qualify for MTCR control. China has already reportedly delivered launchers and M-11s with dummy warheads to Pakistan, and is suspected of having contracted to deliver M-9s to Syria.
The Chinese concessions came on the condition that the US end trade sanctions against two Chinese firms implicated in missile deals with Syria and Pakistan. The sanctions, imposed on 16 June 1991, barred China from launching American satellites, or receiving licensing of high-speed computer technology. ["Baker's China Trip Fails To Produce Pledge On Rights," New York Times, 18 November 1991, p. A1, A5.]
6/25/91: US Secretary of State James Baker officially determined that the China Great Wall Industry Corporation (CGWIC) and China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation (CPMIEC) had conducted missile technology sales requiring the imposition of US sanctions. ["The Credibility Of China's Nonproliferation Pledges And United States Sanctions: 1984-1996," compiled by the minority staff, Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, Summer 1996.]
6/20/91: In a press briefing, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Wu Jianmin stated:
6/91: Chinese ambassador to the United States Zhu Qizhen stated that "we have sold some conventional weapons to Pakistan, including a tiny amount of short-range tactical missiles. I think here you call it M-11. We don't call it M-11, but since you say M-11, let's say M-11." Zhu added, "We don't use the name M-11. It is a United States code name, M-11...Let's say if it is M-11 this is within the range of the MTCR; that is, the range is only a little more than 200 kilometers." Zhu was clearly confused about China's missile systems. [Hua Di, "China's Case: Ballistic Missile Proliferation," in William C. Potter and Harlan W. Jencks, eds., The International Missile Bazaar: The New Suppliers' Network (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994, p. 169.]
5/27/91: In response to Chinese M-11 sales to Pakistan, the Bush administration announced it would impose missile-related economic sanctions on China in three areas: (1) Prevention of the sale of 20 high-speed computers which can be used in missile flight analysis to Chinese arms export-related firms; (2) US firms were not allowed to participate in seven Chinese satellite launches; (3) US companies were not allowed to sell missile technology to CGWIC and CPMIEC because of their involvement in the M-11 sale. [Bingham Kennedy, Jr., "Curbing Chinese Missile Sales: From Imposing To Negotiating China's Adherence To The MTCR," Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, Spring 1996, p. 60; "The Credibility Of China's Nonproliferation Pledges And United States Sanctions: 1984-1996," compiled by the minority staff, Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, Summer 1996.]
5/91: China admitted the sale of a "small number" of M-11 missiles to US officials, but stated that the transfer had not yet taken place. [Gordon Jacobs and Tim McCarthy, "China's Missile Sales--Few Changes For The Future," Jane's Intelligence Review, December 1992, p. 560.]
4/25/91: In a press briefing, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Wu Jianmin stated: "The report claiming that China provides medium-range missiles for Pakistan is absolutely groundless. China does not stand for; encourage, or engage itself in nuclear proliferation and does not aid other countries in developing nuclear weapons." [Zhongguo Xinwen She, 25 April 1991; in FBIS Special Memorandum, 18 December 1991.]
3/91: The US Defense Department reported that China had delivered M-11 missiles to Pakistan, together with inert (dummy) warheads for missile handling and launch training. [Gordon Jacobs and Tim McCarthy, "China's Missile Sales--Few Changes For The Future," Jane's Intelligence Review, December 1992, p. 560.]
2/91: By this month, China had begun delivering M-11 transporter-erector-launchers (TELs) to Pakistan. [Gordon Jacobs and Tim McCarthy, "China's Missile Sales--Few Changes For The Future," Jane's Intelligence Review, December 1992, p. 560.]
1989: China was reportedly assisting Pakistan with its 400km range Hatf-2 ballistic missile. The extent of Chinese assistance is not clear. [Gordon Jacobs and Tim McCarthy, "China's Missile Sales--Few Changes For The Future," Jane's Intelligence Review, December 1992, p. 560.]
1988: China and Pakistan signed the contract for the M-11 sale.
1987-88: Reports of Sino-Pakistani missile cooperation began. The initial reports revolved around possible M-9 or M-11 sales to Pakistan. [Gordon Jacobs and Tim McCarthy, "China's Missile Sales--Few Changes For The Future," Jane's Intelligence Review, December 1992, p. 560.]
[CHINA'S MISSILE EXPORTS AND ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN]
This
material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin
Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of
International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the
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