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MTCR-Related Statements and
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| 2003 | 2004 | LINKS |
This chronology includes statements and developments on issues related to China and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), including Chinese pledges to comply, allegations of Chinese non-compliance, imposition of MTCR-related sanctions against China, and Chinese positions on missile nonproliferation.
02/12/04: At the Plenary for the 2004 Session of the Conference of Disarmament, Ambassador Hu Xiaodi made a statement announcing China's intentions to join the MTCR and the start of discussions on China's membership in the MTCR. In the same announcement, Ambassador Hu stated that:
"Last September, Mr. Li Zhaoxing, Foreign Minister of China, sent a letter to the Chair of 'Missile and Its Technology Control Regime' (MTCR), in which he clearly stated that China is ready to positively consider applying for joining the MTCR. Two days ago, the first round of dialogue between China and the MTCR was held."
["China to Join Missile Technology Control Initiative," Kyodo World Service, 12 February 2004 in FBIS JPP20040212000139; Statement by Mr. Hu Xiaodi, Ambassador for Disarmament Affairs of China, at the Plenary of the 2004 Session of the Conference on Disarmament, 12 February 2004.]
2003
05/23/03: The U.S. imposed sanctions on North China Industries Corporation (Norinco) for allegedly supplying missile technology to Iran. The sanctions, which went into effect on 9 May, barred all exports to the US by Norinco or its subsidiaries, and forbade any contracts between the company and US government agencies. The measure was expected to have more of an impact than previous sanctions; in 2002, Norinco exported an estimated $100 million worth of products to the US. [Guy Dinmore, "US Imposes New Sanctions on China," Financial Times, 22 May 2003.]
08/25/02: Coinciding with a trip to Beijing by Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, Beijing released the Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Export Control of Missiles and Missile-related Items and Technologies and a corresponding control list. The regulations reinforced October 1997 regulations, while expanding the controls on a series of dual-use items. The new regulations contained a "catch-all" provisions and the control list corresponded closely with the MTCR Annex. The Chinese control list also followed the MTCR's "presumption of denial" approach.
According to Liu Jieyi, Director General of the MFA's Arms Control and Disarmament Department: "For China, the regulations and control lists are stricter than the MTCR because we included items relevant to China that are not in the MTCR." Additionally Liu stated that: "The promulgation of the Regulations and the Control List marks a milestone in China's legal framework for export controls. China will continue to improve its existing controls in light of need and also drawing on other countries' successful and applicable experiences." ["Briefing by Mr. Liu Jieyi on the Promulgation of Regulations on Export Control of Missiles and Missile-related Items and Technologies and the Control List," 27 August 2002, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/34245.html]
U.S. immediate reaction to the announcement was cautious. State Department spokesman Richard Boucher stated that: "It is an important part to have the regulations in place, it is an equally important part to see that they are enforced." ["China tightens missile export rules," BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/low/asia-pacific/2216361.stm]
11/30/01: Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Wang Guangya and US
Undersecretary of State for Arms Control John Bolton held "productive" talks on
arms control and nonproliferation. The US "reiterated its emphasis on (missile)
non-proliferation as a critical aspect of the war on terrorism." These
talks also included a review of the US plans for national missile defense.
No future date has been set for further talks. The issue of
counter-terrorism was the only issue to be agreed upon. Bolton stated, "We
agreed with the Chinese delegation on the need to expand our dialogue on
counter-terrorism issues and deepen our bilateral and multilateral cooperation
toward that end." These talks failed to make any progress on the alleged missile
technology transfers to Pakistan. The US imposed
sanctions
on China in September for allegedly transferring missile technology to Pakistan
in violation of a November 2000 commitment to control such transfers.
["US-China claim missile talks 'productive' amid sales row,"
Agence France-Presse, 1 December 2001]
09/01: According to a biannual CIA report on global proliferation developments, China during the last half of 2000 continued to provide Pakistan with technical assistance to its missile programs. The report stated:
"During the reporting period, Chinese entities provided Pakistan with missile-related technical assistance. Pakistan has been moving toward domestic serial production of solid-propellant SRBMs with Chinese help. Pakistan also needs continued Chinese assistance to support development of the two-stage Shaheen-II MRBM. In addition, firms in China have provided dual-use missile-related items, raw materials, and/or assistance to several other countries of proliferation concern—such as Iran, North Korea, and Libya." [Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July Through 31 December 2000.]09/05/01: The China Metallurgical Equipment Corporation issued a company statement denying involvement in illicit missile technology sales to Pakistan. The company stated:
On September 1, 2001, the US government imposed sanctions on China Metallurgical Equipment Corporation (MECC), accusing it of being involved in missile proliferation activities without any factual basis. MECC is astonished by this groundless accusation. It can not but express its indignation and condemnation on the decision by the US government. MECC hereby makes the following solemn statement:09/02/01: In a Washington Post article, a senior US official listed four conditions for the lifting of the missile sanctions imposed on China. Discussions in Beijing between the State Department and the Chinese Foreign Ministry in August 2001 failed to resolve these issues. The situation subsequently resulted in the imposition of sanctions. The four conditions for the lifting of sanctions are:
1. MECC is a corporation dealing in industrial products for civilian use. Since its establishment, it has been doing business within the scope as authorized by the government authorities, which mainly involves contracting of domestic and international engineering projects, and import and export of mechanical and electrical products and whole sets of equipment. After 30 years of development, MECC has gained a good reputation in the domestic and international metallurgical, mechanical and electrical industries. In its export business, MECC has always adhered to national export regulations and restrictions. It has never dealt in or exported any military equipment, arms or their parts or components to any country.
2. China and Pakistan are good neighbors. MECC has maintained sound and normal trade relations with its business partners in Pakistan. For more than a decade, MECC has exported to Pakistan products such as mining equipment, metallurgical equipment, mining vehicles, metallurgical industrial furnaces, cooling towers, machine tools, cranes, and metallurgical spare parts, steel, aluminum and other raw materials. MECC has also successfully completed large engineering projects of copper and gold mining in Pakistan. Transactions between MECC and Pakistan are appropriate and legal, and fully in accordance with Chinese laws and regulations as well as international trade norms and practice. The US government's allegation and sanctions against MECC are totally groundless and absolutely unacceptable.
3. The US government's baseless allegation and abuse of sanctions against MECC has severely damaged its business and reputation both domestically and internationally. MECC strongly demands that the US government lift the sanctions, clarify the truth and eliminate adverse effects. MECC reserves its right to further pursue this matter with regard to all losses arising there from.
1. China must first put a halt to sensitive exports from the China
Metallurgical Equipment Corporation.
2. China must also reaffirm its agreement last November with the United
States to refrain from helping other countries develop missiles capable of
delivering nuclear weapons.
3. China must drop its argument that missile contracts signed before
November are not covered by the accord.
4. As outlined in the November agreement, Beijing must establish a system of
export controls to regulate the transfer of sensitive technology in an organized
fashion.
[Alan Sipress, U.S. Lists Conditions for Lifting Sanctions,
The Washington Post, September 2, 2001.]
09/01/01: The US government imposed economic sanctions on a Chinese company for shipping missile technology to Pakistan in violation of a bilateral agreement in November 2000 in which China pledged to stop such transfer and to promulgate export control laws covering missile technology exports. The US government said that the China Metallurgical Equipment Corporation in late 2000 and early 2001 shipped missile technology to Pakistan that would assist its Shaheen 1 and Shaheen 2 programs. The sanctions, under the 1990 Missile Control Act, ban US companies from doing business with the Chinese entity for two years. The Bush administration has also invoked a ban on new licenses for U.S. companies to put their satellites on Chinese rockets or transfer satellite technology.
The Chinese government vociferously denied violating the November 2000 accord or that a Chinese company had shipped missile goods to Pakistan. The Foreign Ministry spokesman said:
Over a period of time, the US has repeatedly alleged that MECC was engaged in missile proliferation activities according to its so-called "intelligence information". In-depth investigations by the Chinese side indicate that MECC has never engaged in any activities as alleged by the United States and the US allegation is groundless. However, the US side is bent on making the erroneous decision based on its wrong intelligence information, in disregard of the constructive position and the investigation results of the Chinese side. Such a US move is totally groundless and irresponsible, which the Chinese side can never accept. [PRC FM Spokesman Opposes US Sanctions Against China, Xinhua, September 5, 2001.]The Foreign Ministry called for the US to immediately lift the sanctions. China threatened repercussions of the sanctions were not lifted. "China strongly urges the US side to immediately withdraw its wrong decision, so as to avoid any damage to Sino-US cooperation in non-proliferation. Otherwise, the US side should bear all the responsibilities for the consequences arising therefrom."
08/15/01: Following a trip to China, Senator Joseph Biden and Senator Fred Thompson urged the US government to impose sanctions on the PRC company who allegedly transferred missile components to Pakistan. Biden stated, "I think what we should do ... (is) identify those entities within the Chinese government that have transferred whatever technology meets the requirement of breaching the deal that they have made with us and sanction those companies from being able to do business." Thompson stated, "As far as proliferation was concerned, it was basic denial (by the PRC) even though we know what they are doing and we made it pretty clear that we did. Sometimes they just gave a flat denial" and other times they suggested "rogue companies" made the transfers without the government's knowledge. Thompson also said that the PRC officials stated, "as long as you (the United States) have a missile defense program and ... assist Taiwan, we're essentially going to continue doing what we want to do." Biden, however, said that there was a "maturing attitude" in the PRC on proliferation as shown by its declining involvement with Iran and its disinterest in allowing the DPRK to gain additional weapons capability. He said that working with the PRC on nonproliferation "is a process but that doesn't mean we should stand by and wait for the process to unfold." [Carol Giacomo, "SENATORS URGE NEW SANCTIONS ON CHINESE ENTITIES," Reuters, 08/15/01]
08/09/01: After consultations in China with Chinese President Jiang Zemin, Chairman of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Joseph Biden, said that Jiang had adamantly denied China had provided any assistance to North Korea to build ballistic missiles. Biden, who headed a delegation of senators in a four- day visit to urge China to end ballistic missile transfers to Pakistan, Iran, North Korea, and Libya, made it clear to President Zemin that Chinese missile proliferation would make the creation of the US missile defense shield more likely. ["AFP: Jiang Zemin Tell US Senator China Vows Not To Help DPRK Missile Program," Hong Kong AFP, 08/09/01 in FBIS CPP20010809000060.]
08/09/01: A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson refuted claims made by the Washington Times that a Chinese company exported missile components to Pakistan. The spokesperson reiterated China's commitment not to assist other countries in developing ballistic missiles and that reports to the contrary were "totally unfounded rumors... driven by ulterior motives". The spokesperson urged the US to implement in earnest the agreement they had reached with China in November 2000 and remove the "artificial barriers on satellite exports to China", so as to normalize cooperation in that area. ["PRC FM Spokesperson Refutes Article on Exports of Missile Components to Pakistan," Beijing Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 08/09/01 in FBIS CPP20010809000042.] [Full Text]
08/08/01: The China National Machinery and Equipment Import and Export Corporation released a statement denying that it exported missile parts to Pakistan. The statement refuted the report by the Washington Times that broke the story, calling it "totally fictitious". The company maintained that it, "has never provided any military equipment, weaponry, or weapon parts to Pakistan or any other country in the world". ["China Corporation Statement Denies Exporting Missile Parts to Pakistan," Xinhua, 08/08/01 in FBIS CPP20010808000184.] [Full Text]
08/06/01: According to a report in the Washington Times, a Chinese company has sent a shipments of missile components to Pakistan. This violated China's November 200 pledge to not provide any country with materials, technologies or equipment used in building nuclear capable missiles. The leaked intelligence information noted that the China National Machinery & Equipment Import & Export Corp., known as CMEC, reportedly supplied the missile components for Pakistan's Shaheen-1 and Shaheen-2 missile programs. A U.S. spy satellite detected the latest shipment as it arrived by truck at the mountainous Chinese-Pakistani border May 1. It was one of 12 missile component transfers sent by ship and truck detected by U.S. intelligence agencies since the beginning of the year.
In discussing this report, Senator Joe Biden stated, "The idea that entering into the World Trade Organization and continued economic expansion between the United States and China can continue in the face of a policy different than curtailing and eliminating proliferation is naive and will not happen. My message to China will be that, absent an iron-clad notion that proliferation is not a problem, every other aspect of this relationship is damaged -- every other aspect," he said. [Bill Gertz, Beijing Arms Pakistan, The Washington Times, 6 August 2001.]
07/28/01: U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell gave a press conference following a 2 day trip to China and meetings with top Chinese officials, including President Jiang Zemin. Powell, who came to China to pave the way for President Bush's visit later this year, was positive about the meeting-- saying that "I think we had a good exchange of views and we found a way to move forward". With respect to missile and weapons technology transfers, Powell expressed his concern to the Chinese delegation about problems with the November 2000 agreement, specific Chinese arms transfers, and the need for expert consultation on China's export control policies. Powell recognized that the remaining unresolved outstanding issues, "will be taken into account as we look at licensing some of the satellite sales that are on the table before us". ["Transcript: Secretary Powell Press Conference in Beijing July 28," Washington File, 28 July 2001][Full Text]
07/27/01: Before meetings with top Chinese officials in Beijing, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell stated that, "Since November, we have been following closely and discussing the [proliferation] issue with them, and the results are mixed. We'll discuss where we think there has been a satisfactory response and where we think more action is required. Yes, proliferation will com up, it will be discussed." Powell's visit comes after repeated formal protests by the U.S. over China's alleged assistance of Pakistan's ballistic missile program despite a November 2000 not to export ballistic missile components and technology restricted by the MTCR. [U.S. Protests Exports of Missiles by China," Washington Post, 07/27/01.]
02/23/01: According to a recent U.S. Central Intelligence Agency report, Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, Beijing's interpretation of Sino-US bilateral nonproliferation commitments continues to be very narrow. [Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions 1 January Through 30 June 2000.]
11/21/00: The State Department announced that it was waiving sanctions on Chinese entities for the past sales of missile technologies to entities in Iran and Pakistan. These exports, which date back to 1992, violated the 1990 Missile Control Act which calls for sanctions on entities engaged in export of MTCR-controlled items. The sanctions were for the export of both MTCR category I and category II items. The US also pledged to resume discussions with China as soon as possible on extending the 1995 US-China Agreement on International Trade in Commercial Launch Services. Under this accord, US companies can export satellites to China for launch on Chinese rocket boosters. However, the two main US companies involved in satellite trade with China, Hughes International and The Loral Corporation, are not able to engage in such trade because they are still under investigation for illegally providing China with controlled information that could have military applications. [State Department Statement on Chinese Missile Sanctions, November 2000]
In response to these actions, the Chinese Foreign Ministry issued its most stringent and specific policy statement on missile nonproliferation to date. China stated
"China is opposed to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction...China has no intention of assisting, in any way, any country in the development of ballistic missiles that can be used to deliver nuclear weapons (i.e., missiles capable of delivering a payload of at least 500 kg to a distance of at least 300 km.)" [Full Chinese Statement on Missile Nonproliferation, November 2000]This statement appears to build on China's past commitment in the 1998 US-China Joint Statement on South Asia not to provide missile technologies to Pakistan or India. As part of the recent commitment, the Chinese government importantly promised, for the first time, to issue export control laws covering missile technologies. In the past, Chinese officials have stated that its controls on missile exports were governed by internal documents and not public laws. The Chinese pledged that the new laws would include such regulations as license application and review, end-user certifications, and a "catch-all" clause. The Chinese statement did not, however, specifically reference the MTCR or its control list and the statement did not mention when China would issue the new export control law. Some experts argue that these latter elements represent a loop-hole in the accord. The Chinese government also denies that it engaged in illegitimate trade with either Iran or Pakistan. The China Daily reports Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman, Sun Yuxi refuting US allegations that China supplied Iran and Pakistan with missiles. Sun denounced the allegations as "rumors with ulterior motives." Sun said the PRC has exercised strict control on the export of missile technologies. ["Spokesman Refutes U.S. Allegations over Missiles," The China Daily, 24 November 2000, p.1; "US Welcomes PRC New Commitment," The People's Daily, 22 November 2000, p. 4.]
10/5/00: The Los Angeles Times reports the Clinton Administration has proposed a new arm control agreement to China. Under the agreement China would adopt its own export control laws on missile technology. Marc Thiessen, spokesman for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee reacted negatively to the proposed deal. Thiessen said, "Chinese domestic law isn't worth the paper it's written on or the blood it's written with." Thiessen remarked that the administration's efforts are merely "a fig leaf to cover up an eight-year failure by this administration in containing proliferation to rogue states." [Jim Mann, "U.S. Take New Tack on China Arms Exports," The Los Angeles Times, 5 October 2000, p.1.]
5/16/00: China Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Zhang Qiyue responding to the possible imposition of sanctions on China for the export of M-11 missiles to Pakistan said, "China has a very strict policy on preventing proliferation. According to the relevant policy on preventing proliferation, as well as the obligations stipulated by the relevant treaties and nuclear policies, China has always been extremely cautious on the question of missile exports and has also adopted a very responsible attitude. . . China has exercised effective and strict control over missile exports. If the relevant circles want to use this to impose sanctions on China, this is utterly unreasonable." ["Zhang Qiyue Says China Exercises Effective, Strict Control Over Missile Exports," Zhongguo Xinwen She, 16 May 2000, in FBIS CPP20000516000126, 16 May 2000.]
1/19/00: The LA Times reported that China was not willing to discuss renewing its commitment to the MTCR. China's ambassador for disarmament affairs and arms control, Sha Zukang, was quoted as saying, "'We are not in the mood to consider it now.' NATO's war against Yugoslavia last spring, he said, was 'an excellent advertisement for the use of missiles.'" [Jim Mann, "China Snarls Again at 'Paper Tiger', LA Times, 19 January 2000.
2/26/99: The Financial Times reported that China considers a deployment of a TMD system by the United States to be a violation of the MTCR. An unnamed Chinese official stated, "Since the US can lead the way in breaking this regime, other countries have an absolute right not to follow the rules of this regime and undertake co-operation on missiles and missile technology with third countries." [Kynge, James, "Threat of Missile Transfer," Financial Times (online), 26 February 1999.]
2/4/99: The Select Committee on US National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China's (aka The Cox/Dicks Committee) issued a report in which it recommended that "the United States should insist that the PRC adhere fully to, and abide by, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and all applicable guidelines. In response, the Clinton administration stated:
"The Administration supports this recommendation. The U.S. uses every appropriate opportunity to urge China to expand its commitment to include the current MTCR Annex. In June 1998, Chinese President Jiang announced that China will actively study joining the MTCR; joining the regime would require China to implement effective missile export controls fully consistent with MTCR guidelines and annex and cease activities inconsistent with the guidelines. On this basis, we will continue to seek Chinese membership in the MTCR."2/2/99: CIA director George Tenet, in a statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee, commented on China's possible membership in the MTCR stated:
"The China story is a mixed picture, Mr. Chairman. China's senior leaders are actively studying membership in the Missile Technology Control Regime and have pledged to prevent the export of materials or technology that could assist missile and nuclear programs in South Asia. Beijing has promulgated controls on dual-use nuclear technology and tightened chemical export controls."2/1/99: China's ambassador for arms control and disarmament, Sha Zukang, in a Defense News article commented on China's consideration of MTCR membership. He stated:"We cannot yet assure you, however, that the new export control mechanisms will be effective. Both the Chinese Government and Chinese firms have long-standing and deep relationships with proliferant countries, and we are not convinced that China's companies fully share the commitments undertaken by senior Chinese leaders. While all aspects of China's proliferation behavior bear continued watching, we see more signs of progress on nuclear matters than on missile assistance. Moreover, the restructuring of China's defense industrial bureaucracy - including entities charged with export oversight - holds the potential to create confusion and incentives that would impede the effectiveness of this system. In short, Mr. Chairman, our guard remains up on this question." [George J. Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence, Statement Before the Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing on Current and Projected National Security Threats, 2 February 1999]
- "Objectively speaking, MTCR has played certain positive roles in preventing
missile proliferation and, to some extent, helped retard the proliferation
of missile technology worldwide. However, it has failed to check
such proliferation. For example, the long- and medium-range missile
programs of some developing countries were launched after the establishment
of MTCR."
"Further, the effectiveness of MTCR is diminished by the regime's lack of objective criteria, and the double standard applied by certain MTCR members in implementing requirements of the regime. It is time for the international community to take a look at the missile proliferation issue, including MTCR, and explore better ways to combat this danger."
"China has undertaken not to export surface-to-surface missiles with a 300 kilometer [range]/500 kilogram [payload] inherent capability, an obligation which goes beyond what is actually provided for in MTCR. China also has, in recent years, made good contributions on the nonproliferation front, including restrictions [on cruise missiles to Iran] that are perfectly in compliance with every international law or protocol. Such efforts and contributions should be obvious."
"At this stage, China is actively studying MTCR. However, China's ultimate decision on the membership will be very much subject to the result of its study and consultations." [Opall-Rome, Barbara, "One On One," Defense News, 1 February 1999, p22.]
- "Before China takes a decision to join it, we need to convince our people at
home. MTCR has many inherent weaknesses. Its purpose is to delay
missile proliferation rather than provide a comprehensive solution to this
problem. And even this limited role is diminished by the regime's lack
of objective criteria and the double standard applied by certain MTCR
members in implementing requirements of the regime. MTCR is
exclusionary and smacks of discrimination. . . That's why we told the United
States that we are actively studying the issue, including more creative ways
to address the problems for which it was designed."[Barbara
Opall-Rome, "Chinese Official Urges Broader, Revised MTCR," Defense News,
25 January 1999.]
12/98: In response to US press reports about possible Chinese missile technology transfers to Iran, China's Foreign Ministry Spokesman Zhu Bangzao said "China's position on the export of missiles has proceeded always from being responsible for security in the region and has honored its commitment by adopting effective and strict controls, and there is no such issue of proliferation." [Associated Press, 12 December 1998]
11/11/98-11/12/98: US Undersecretary of State John Holum traveled to Beijing for two days of meetings about the missile proliferation and the MTCR. He met with his counterpart Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Deguang, Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan and CMC co-Chairman Zhang Wannian. During the negotiations the US side expressed its continuing concerns about China's missile technology exports to Iran and Pakistan. Holum said "We have concerns about possible technology transfers from Chinese entities to Iran and Pakistan. We continue to discuss those with China and believe they are taking steps to address these problems." The Washington Times reported that the US concerns were prompted by a late 1998 shipment to Iran of telemetry equipment that could be used to test-fire ballistic missiles. The technology shipped to Iran could be used to test either short-range or medium-range missiles. The story noted that China may also be helping Pakistan to develop the Shaheen missile. [Bill Gertz, "US Protests China Arms Move," The Washington Times, 7 December 1998, p. A8]
The US and Chinese delegations also discussed China's stated interest in becoming a full member of the MTCR. (During the 1998 summit meeting in Beijing, China stated that it would "actively study" MTCR membership.) According to Holum "we are working on a road map and a set of steps to take to" the Chinese. During the talks, the Chinese delegation submitted to the US a list of 26 technical questions about the MTCR and China's membership in the regime. According to US government officials, the list included questions such as: what does the MTCR prohibit China from exporting and what are the economic benefits of MTCR membership among others. The US is preparing answers to these questions and a follow-up meeting is planned for early Spring 1999. China reportedly did not repeatedly raise US arms sales to Taiwan a major obstacle to its membership in the MTCR, even though it has linked these issues in the past.
7/27/98: China provided an official explanation of its position on the MTCR in the July 1998 "white paper" called China's National Defense. The document noted:
"China has been consistently cautious and responsible regarding the transfer of missiles. China is not a member state of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and has not joined its formulation and revision, but, in accordance with China's consistent position on non-proliferation and its principles concerning arms exports, the Chinese government promised to observe the then guidelines and parameters of the MTCR in February 1992. In October 1994, China reaffirmed its promise and undertook the obligation of not exporting ground-to-ground missiles inherently capable of reaching a range of at least 300 kilometers with a payload of at least 500 kilograms. In line with the above policy, China has exercised strict and effective control over the export of missiles and related materials and has never done anything in violation of its commitments."6/27/98: During summit meetings in Beijing, Jiang Zemin stated that China "has begun to actively study joining the MTCR." A White House Fact Sheet on Achievements of the US-China Summit also noted that "the US and China will continue consultations on MTCR issues later" in 1998. In explaining the US understanding of China's position on the MTCR at a June 27 press conference, National Security Advisor Sandy Berger stated, "The Chinese in the past have said unilaterally that they would adhere to the MTCR guidelines. This is a kind of a general commitment and it does not necessarily include all of the technology and components that are part of the annex of the MTCR."
Also during the summit, China gave an additional pledge of missile nonproliferation. The US and China issued a Joint Statement on South Asia which said "our respective policies are to prevent the export of equipment, materials or technology that could in any way assist programs in India or Pakistan for nuclear weapons or for ballistic missiles capable of delivering such weapons, and that to this end, we will strengthen our national export control systems." This statement appears to remove all remaining uncertainty about China's commitment to halt further missile assistance to Pakistan and signals China's commitment to begin developing legally based export controls on MTCR controlled technologies.
4/29/98: The Washington Times reported that the Clinton Administration drafted a bilateral space cooperation agreement that was reportedly presented to Chinese officials during meetings with senior State Department officials in late March. A final version of the pact may be signed during the Sino-US Presidential summit in June 1998. The proposed scientific cooperation agreement would cover areas such as earth observation, climate change, and research on other space-related issues. The reported aim of the agreement is to offer China an incentive to improve its missile export practices. The pact would be part of a larger 1979 scientific and technology cooperation agreement and would be signed by NASA and China's State Science and Technology Commission of China (SSTCC). A State Department spokesman said the accord "is still under discussion" and that the pact has not been finalized.
The Washington Times report also noted that a proposal to include in this pact the liberalization of US export controls on MTCR-controlled technologies was dropped from this draft before being presented to China in March. [Bill Gertz, "Space Deal May Enhance China's Missile Program," The Washington Times, 29 April, 1998, p. A1.]
3/19/98: John Holum, the acting Undersecretary of State for International Security and Arms Control, would not comment on a leaked National Security Council proposal to expand US space cooperation with China in exchange for pledges by China to improve controls over missile exports. Holum, however, denied that the proposal included steps to loosen controls on US missile technology exports to China.
The State Department spokesman said: "We have been considering ways to encourage China to strengthen its controls of missile-related exports, but we are not proposing offers of access to our missile technology." [Bill Gertz, "Clinton Arms Official Cites Secrecy, Refuses Comment on Missile Deal," The Washington Times, 19 March 1998, p. A3.]
3/18/98: The Washington Times, quoting a leaked National Security Council document, reported the Clinton Administration is considering making a proposal to China that would offer expanded commercial and scientific space cooperation in exchange for three missile nonproliferation pledges by China. The proposal reportedly requires China to: (1) establish "effective MTCR export controls and catch-all controls on items destined for MTCR-class missile programs," (2) not to transfer "MTCR controlled equipment and technology at Category I missile programs in any non-MTCR country including Egypt, Indonesia, ran, Libya, Pakistan, Syria, Turkey, etc.", and (3) not to "assist ground-to-ground missile programs in Iran." If China agreed to implement these three steps then the US would support China's MTCR membership, increase the number of US commercial satellites that could be launched on Chinese rockets, and the US would "issue a blanket presidential waiver of the Tiananmen Square sanctions to cover all further commercial satellite launches"
The agreement is to be presented to China during meetings by senior State Department officials in late March 1998. The aim of the agreement is to provide China with political prestige, to ability to shape MTCR decisions, protection from future US missile sanctions, and expedite the consideration of MTCR-controlled exports to China. (However, it is unclear whether this proposal was ever presented to China.) ["US May Help China on Missiles but Beijing Must Halt Tech Exports," The Washington Times, 18 March 1998; Tm Weiner, "US Weighs Deal to Halt Missile-Gear Sales by China," The New York Times, 19 March 1998, p. A8; for a copy of the proposal see "Selling Missiles to China," The Washington Times, 23 March 1998, p. A19.]
9/10/97: During a press briefing, US State Department briefer James Foley stated:
- "As for China...I would only say that any missile-related cooperation with
Iran is of serious concern to the United States, and we continue to monitor
and evaluate reports of any transfer that could contribute to missile
programs of concern."
"In October of 1994, China agreed to ban all exports of MTCR Class ground-to-ground missiles. We have no evidence that China has conducted activities inconsistent with this commitment. We strongly oppose any missile cooperation with Iran and have raised these issues also with the government of China in the past, and we will continue to do so..."
"I would not say that our concerns have been allayed. Any missile cooperation with Iran is of serious and ongoing concern to the United States, and we keep these matters under intensive review. As you know, we have very clear legislation and law to apply on these matters, and we take our responsibility seriously. The threshold for applying sanctions in any of these cases is high. The law is very specific on when sanctions can be imposed. We have not made the determination, at this point, that any of the reports that we've seen are tantamount to sanctionable activity, have met the specific thresholds. The law is the law, and when we're able to make such a determination, if we are, we will apply the law." [US Department of State, daily press briefing, 10 September 1997.]
11/20/96: At a press conference after high-level talks with the Chinese, US Secretary of State Warren Christopher stated:
7/24/96: According to the Washington Times, the US State Department was investigating an alleged Chinese transfer of missile components to Syria in violation of the MTCR. The China Precision Machinery Import and Export Corporation (CPMIEC) allegedly sold missile-related components to the Scientific Studies and Research Center, a Syrian research institute involved developing a production capability for Scud-C ballistic missiles. US State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns said that "We are looking into it...Certainly, we've seen some of these allegations in the past...But the important thing is we haven't made a determination. And that would, of course, be very serious, indeed, were we to make a determination on this issue." [Bill Gertz, "State looks at Chinese missile-part exports," Washington Times, 24 July 1996.]
11/11/95: In a paper, Chinese arms control researcher Liu Huaqiu stated:
Late-10/94: Among the issues discussed during US Defense Secretary William Perry's visit to China are Beijing's alleged transfer of M-11 missile technology and components to Pakistan and prospects for Chinese membership in the MTCR. During the visit, China reportedly rejected a US offer to conclude a detargeting agreement. [Barbara Opall, "U.S. To Press Chinese On Nuclear Targeting," Defense News, 13 October 1996, p. 3; John Boatman, Jane's Defence Weekly, 12 November 1994, p. 18.]
10/4/94: Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen and US Secretary of State Warren Christopher signed the "Joint United States-People's Republic of China Statement on Missile Proliferation," in which China promised not to "export ground-to-ground missile featuring the primary parameters of the [MTCR]--that is, inherently capable of reaching a range of at least 300 km with a payload of at least 500 kg." The agreement also stated that "This Chinese commitment represents a global ban on exports, and goes beyond the requirements set forth in the MTCR, which calls for a 'strong presumption of denial' for such missile exports."
By signing the statement, China accepted the US argument that missiles are to be restricted if they have the "inherent capability" to be modified to a capability covered under MTCR guidelines, "regardless of its demonstrated or advertised combination of range and payload." China and the United States also agreed to "hold in-depth discussions" on the MTCR and the possibility of China's eventual membership in the regime. ["Joint United States-People's Republic Of China Statement On Missile Proliferation," 4 October 1994; Jon B. Wolfsthal, "US, China Reach New Accords On MTCR, Fissile Cutoff Issues," Arms Control Today, November 1994, p. 28; Robert Shuey and Shirley A. Kan, "Chinese Missile And Nuclear Proliferation: Issues For Congress," CRS Issue Brief, 16 November 1995, p. 12.]
3/11/94-3/14/94: The visit of US State Department officials to China failed to break the impasse in the negotiations to get China to sign the MTCR. The United States will lift the sanctions on China, which were imposed on 25 August 1993 for selling M-11 missiles to Pakistan, if China formally signs the MTCR and "comes to an understanding" concerning future Chinese missile and missile technology transfers to Pakistan. China wants the United States to remove the sanctions before it will sign the MTCR, and said that it already abides by the MTCR. In a subsequent statement, US Undersecretary of State for International Security Lynn Davis stated that the United States was closely watching China and was willing to impose stricter sanctions if China "steps out of line." [Inside the Pentagon, 24 March 1994. pp. 9-10; Defense Daily, 23 March 1994, p. 436; Arms Control Today, April 1994, p. 28.]
1/26/94-1/27/94: US Undersecretary of State Lynn Davis met with Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Liu Huaqiu about nonproliferation issues such as missile transfers and a comprehensive nuclear test ban. The United States proposed a binding accord under which China would stop selling missiles limited by the MTCR in return for a lifting of the US sanctions placed on China in August 1993. State Department Spokesman Mike McCurry stated that no progress has been made. [Jim Wolf, Reuters, 27 January 1994; Carol Giacomo, Reuters, 27 January 1994; Executive News Service, 31 January 1994.]
12/93: Li Daoyu, Chinese ambassador to the United States, wrote in an article that in August 1993:
9/24/93: Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen stated that China might formally join the MTCR, saying, "We are thinking about this." [UPI, 23 September 1993; International Herald Tribune, 24 September 1993.]
8/27/93: In response to US sanctions, China threatened to scrap its promises to abide by the MTCR.
8/26/93: The Chinese Embassy in Washington criticized the US missile sanctions against China as "a wrong judgment based on inaccurate intelligence...China has made clear on many occasions that it has not done anything in violation of its commitment" to the MTCR. Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Liu Huaqiu, in a protest to US Ambassador to China Stapleton Roy, said that "China has honored its commitments to act in accordance with the MTCR guidelines and parameters and has done nothing in contradiction of that commitment." China also threatened to "reconsider its commitment to MTCR." Liu referred to the sanctions as a "naked hegemonic act" contrary to the "basic norms governing international relations" that "puts Sino-US relations in serious jeopardy." according to Xinhua. ["The Credibility Of China's Nonproliferation Pledges And United States Sanctions: 1984-1996," compiled by the minority staff, Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, Summer 1996; Jeffrey Smith and Daniel Williams, Washington Post, 11 November 1993, pp. A39, A44.]
8/25/93: The United States imposed category 2 trade sanctions against China and Pakistan for selling M-11 missile technology to Pakistan. All of the subsidiaries, divisions, subunits, or successors of both Ministries were sanctioned, including eleven Chinese entities and one Pakistani entity. The sanctions denied export licenses for items covered by the MTCR Annex for two years and denied US government contracts related to such items. Further sanctions were imposed on Chinese government organizations involved in the development or production of electronics, space systems or equipment, and military aircraft. The sanctioned Chinese entities were: Chinese Ministry of Aerospace Industry (MAI); China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation (CPMIEC); China National Space Administration (CNSA); China Aerospace Corporation (CASC); China Great Wall Industry Corporation (CGWIC); Chinese Academy of Space Technology; Beijing Wan Yuan Industry Corporation (BWYIC); China Haiying Company; Shanghai Astronautics Industry Bureau; China Chang Feng Group. Three US satellites scheduled to be launched aboard Chinese launch vehicles were affected: a Hughes-manufactured Optus B3 and APStar 1 to be launched in 1994, and the Martin Marietta Astrospace Asiasat 2 to be launched in 1995.
8/24/93: US Under Secretary of State for International Security Affairs Lynn Davis determined that China's Ministry of Aerospace Industry (MAI) and Pakistan's Ministry of Defense conducted missile proliferation activities. China and Pakistan violating the MTCR guidelines, although Pakistan did admit to purchasing "a few" short-range ballistic missiles from China in the late 1980s. China denied violating the MTCR guidelines, but refused to clarify whether it was denying that any transfers took place or denying that the transfers violated the MTCR. [Risk Report, October 1995, p. 8.]
12/92: The Los Angeles Times reported that according to US intelligence sources, in late November 1992 China shipped about 24 M-11 missiles to Pakistan in clear violation of the MTCR to which China had agreed to abide in the spring 1991. According to the Los Angeles Times, Chinese missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads were unloaded at Pakistan's port of Karachi. The newspaper evidence was based on US intelligence reports which had photographs of the M-11s taken at the port of Karachi. The United States said if the allegation is proved true, economic sanctions would be placed against China, for breaking previous agreements. Chinese officials denied any violation since the contract for the missiles was finalized before China came under MTCR scrutiny. A US official stated that the sale may have been made in response to the US announcement that it would sell F-16 combat aircraft to Taiwan.
General Mirza Aslam Beg, former Pakistani Army chief of staff, commented, "As regards the M-11 missile system that Pakistan is acquiring from China, it is covered within the six-nation agreement on Missile Technology Control to which China is a signatory. The missile has a range of less than 300 km and is not capable of carrying a nuclear warhead. It is neither designed for it nor has the required degree of accuracy." [The News (Islamabad), 6 December 1992, p. 4; in Proliferation Issues, 18 December 1992, p. 17; UPI, 5 December 1992; in Executive News Service, 7 December 1992; Pakistan Times (Islamabad), 10 December 1992, pp. 1, 8; in Proliferation Issues, 23 December 1992, p. 10; Jim Mann, "China Said To Sell Pakistan Dangerous New Missiles," Los Angeles Times, 4 December 1992, pp. A1, A18.]
3/9/92: A US State Department spokesman stated that the United States planned to lift the missile sanctions on China. He said that "as a result, we expect China to announce its adherence to the guidelines and parameters of the MTCR...This in no way means we will slacken our efforts to monitor either missile transfers worldwide, or Chinese missile and missile technology export practices." ["The Credibility Of China's Nonproliferation Pledges And United States Sanctions: 1984-1996," compiled by the minority staff, Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, Summer 1996.]
2/26/92: The United States officially issued the waiver lifting missile-related sanctions on China. ["The Credibility Of China's Nonproliferation Pledges And United States Sanctions: 1984-1996," compiled by the minority staff, Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, Summer 1996.]
2/23/92: The Chinese government, in a letter to US President Bush dated 23 February 1992, agreed to abide by the MTCR guidelines. [Statement of Tom Lantos, Chairman, Subcommittee on International Security, International Organizations and Human Rights, 20 May 1993; Robert Shuey and Shirley A. Kan, "Chinese Missile And Nuclear Proliferation: Issues For Congress," CRS Issue Brief, 29 September 1995, p. 2.]
2/22/92: The Chinese Foreign Ministry stated that
First, these transfers should contribute to the capabilities of the countries concerned for legitimate self-defense.
Second, they must not undermine the peace, security or stability of the regions involved.
Third, arms trade should not be used as an instrument to interfere in the internal affairs of others." ["The Credibility Of China's Nonproliferation Pledges And United States Sanctions: 1984-1996," compiled by the minority staff, Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, Summer 1996; "China Responsible for its Arms Sales," Beijing Review, 2-8 March 1992, p. 33.]
2/1/92: The Bush administration received written assurances from China that it would comply with the MTCR guidelines. [Dianne E. Rennack, "China: US Economic Sanctions," CRS Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, 1 July 1996, p. 23.]
1/31/92: The Bush administration said it was willing to lift trade restrictions on "high technology items" to China if Beijing abides by the MTCR. The sanctions apply to the China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation (CPMIEC) and the China Great Wall Industry Corporation (CGWIC). [Bill Gertz and Warren Strobel, "US Set To Drop Sanction If China Obeys Missile Pact," Washington Times, 30 January 1992, pp. A1, A9.]
11/21/91: Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Wu Jianmin stated after discussions between US Secretary of State James Baker and Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen that
At a press conference following his talks with Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, US Secretary of State James Baker stated:
6/25/91: US Secretary of State James Baker officially determined that the China Great Wall Industry Corporation (CGWIC) and China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation (CPMIEC) had conducted missile technology sales requiring the imposition of US sanctions. ["The Credibility Of China's Nonproliferation Pledges And United States Sanctions: 1984-1996," compiled by the minority staff, Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, Summer 1996.]
6/20/91: In a press briefing, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Wu Jianmin stated:
6/19/91: Chinese officials informed US Undersecretary of State for International Security Affairs Reginald Bartholomew that Beijing was considering joining the MTCR and NPT. ["China Weighs Signing 2 Pacts," New York Times, 19 June 1991, p. A6.]
6/16/91: US State Department spokesperson Tutwiler announced that US President George Bush had imposed computer export sanctions on China and that he will not waive sanctions which prohibit the export of US technology for satellites launched on Chinese rockets. ["The Credibility Of China's Nonproliferation Pledges And United States Sanctions: 1984-1996," compiled by the minority staff, Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, Summer 1996.]
6/12/91: US Secretary of State James Baker stated during testimony that:
5/27/91: In response to Chinese M-11 sales to Pakistan, the Bush administration announced it would impose missile-related economic sanctions on China in three areas: (1) Prevention of the sale of 20 high-speed computers which can be used in missile flight analysis to Chinese arms export-related firms; (2) US firms were not allowed to participate in seven Chinese satellite launches; (3) US companies were not allowed to sell missile technology to CGWIC and CPMIEC because of their involvement in the M-11 sale. [Bingham Kennedy, Jr., "Curbing Chinese Missile Sales: From Imposing To Negotiating China's Adherence To The MTCR," Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, Spring 1996, p. 60; "The Credibility Of China's Nonproliferation Pledges And United States Sanctions: 1984-1996," compiled by the minority staff, Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, Summer 1996.]
5/7/91: Chinese ambassador to the United States Zhu Qichen stated at the World News Media Association in Washington, DC:
3/27/91: At a press conference following his speech to the Fourth Session of the Seventh National People's Congress (NPC), Qian Qichen stated:
[CHINA AND THE MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME (MTCR)]
[WHITE PAPER - CHINA'S NATIONAL DEFENSE]
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