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Nuclear Weapons Declaratory Policy
Since its first nuclear weapons test on 16 October 1964, China has declared a policy of unconditional no-first-use (NFU) of nuclear weapons and provides negative security assurances (NSAs) against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWSs) and nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs).
On 11 April 1995, in UN Security Council Resolution 984, China, along with the other four declared nuclear weapon states (United States, Russia, United Kingdom, and France), provided legally-binding positive security assurances (PSAs) to come to the aid of NNWSs in the event of a nuclear attack against them.
In addition, China signed nuclear non-targeting agreements with the USA in 1998 and with Russia in 1994, and keeps its nuclear weapons at a very low level of alert. The Chinese government has released limited information regarding the quality of its nuclear weapons, but has not released information concerning the number of weapons it possesses, its nuclear activities, nor advancements in missile programs. All of China’s bilateral nuclear cooperation with other states has been put under IAEA safeguards.
Official Chinese Statements
According to official policy on security assurances
posted on China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs website:
China fully understands the request of the non-nuclear-weapon states to be given security assurances. China has undertaken unconditionally not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones. China urges all nuclear-weapon states to make the same commitment and conclude a binding international legal instrument so as to enhance the security of all non-nuclear-weapon states.
Similarly, China's July 1998 White Paper on National Defense explains:
From the first day it possessed nuclear weapons, China has solemnly declared its determination not to be the first to use such weapons at any time and in any circumstances, and later undertook unconditionally not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones."
The next white paper, China’s National Defense, 2000, explained that China’s nuclear forces would be kept at a small size and the forces are developed solely for deterrence purposes. China's National Defense, 2002 reaffirmed China’s commitment to its no-first-use policy and further noted:
China has always exercised utmost restraint on the development of nuclear weapons, and its nuclear arsenal is kept at the lowest level necessary for self-defense only. China holds that countries having the largest nuclear arsenals bear a special and primary responsibility toward nuclear disarmament, and that they should take the lead in drastically reducing their nuclear arsenals and destroy the reduced nuclear weapons. China welcomes the new treaty signed by the US and Russia on the reduction of their offensive strategic weapons, and hopes that these two countries will adopt effective measures to en-sure the “verifiability” and “irreversibility” of nuclear disarmament, and continue to further the process of nuclear disarmament, so as to genuinely promote world peace and stability.
Concerns about the Credibility of China’s Security Assurances
China continues to emphasize its no-first-use policy, negative security
assurances, and support for complete elimination of all nuclear weapons. Despite
these public affirmations of China’s existing declared policies, some foreign
scholars question China’s commitment to these principles.
China Scholars Bates Gill, James Mulvenon, and Mark Stokes point out that:
“In adhering to its NSA and PSAs, China’s deployments and targeting would presumably be focused only on nuclear weapon states and possibly other states not party to the NPT or similar arrangements (such as India, for example). However, several questions arise about China’s commitments, particularly with regard to NSAs. For example, like the NFU pledge, China’s NSAs are not verifiable or enforceable. Also, the pledge would not apply to states such as India, Israel, or Pakistan, which are not members of the NPT. Even if they joined, the question arises whether China’s NSA would apply to a country such as India, which while not officially recognized by China as a nuclear weapon state, certainly has attained such de facto status.” [Bates Gill, James Mulvenon, Mark Stokes. “The Chinese Second Artillery Corps: Transition to Credible Deterrence,” in The People’s Liberation Army as an Organization: Reference Volume v1.0.” Ed: James C. Mulvenon, Andrew N.D. Yang. 2001. Page 516.]
Gill, Mulvenon, and Stokes further analyze the credibility of Chinese security assurances:
“First, these traditional [declaratory] principles are generally consistent with a “defensive” posture and a qualitatively and quantitatively limited nuclear arsenal. Given the reality of Chinese nuclear forces, therefore, these pledges come at little to no real “cost” in terms of reductions, disarmament, or dramatic alterations to Chinese nuclear posture overall. Second, with the possible exception of some deployments, such as the DF-21 series ballistic missile, the nuclear principles noted here are consistent with a posture largely concerned with the other major nuclear weapons states (especially the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia), as well as India. Third, nothing in these principles necessarily precludes China’s nuclear weapons modernization program, but might place political limits on targeting and use options. Finally, while these principles may give us an overall understanding about China’s formally stated views about when it would not use nuclear weapons, they provide no details about when they would.” [Bates Gill, James Mulvenon, Mark Stokes. “The Chinese Second Artillery Corps: Transition to Credible Deterrence,” in The People’s Liberation Army as an Organization: Reference Volume v1.0.” Ed: James C. Mulvenon, Andrew N.D. Yang. 2001. Page 516.]
[NO-FIRST-USE (NFU)]
[NEGATIVE AND POSITIVE SECURITY ASSURANCES]
[CHRONOLOGY OF DECLARATORY POLICY STATEMENTS AND DEVELOPMENTS]
[CHINA'S ATTITUDE TOWARD NUCLEAR DETERRENCE]
Updated: 06/26/2003
This
material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin
Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of
International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the
opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or
its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by
MIIS.
