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China's Nuclear Imports and Assistance From Abroad

Although international attention has generally focused on the export end of China's nuclear trade, China has also imported nuclear material, equipment, and technology from a number of countries, and received various other forms of nuclear-related assistance such as training. Because China is already a declared nuclear power, its nuclear imports are not generally a source of proliferation concern. Furthermore, China accepts International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards on civilian nuclear imports of technology and equipment from Japan and Western European countries. However, since nuclear technology is often dual-use, there have at times been concerns that certain peaceful nuclear-related transfers would be diverted to military applications or re-transferred to third countries. Also, some have argued that many of China's nuclear imports, though in and of themselves benign, may reflect nuclear technology trade relationships that may be a cause for deeper concern. In particular, this concern has been raised with regard to Russia.

For additional in-depth information on open-source reports of Chinese imports and assistance from abroad, please consult the CNS Nuclear Abstracts database.

CHINESE NUCLEAR IMPORTS AND ASSISTANCE
 

COUNTRY
REPORTED AREA OF NUCLEAR ASSISTANCE TO CHINA
ARGENTINA
  • Heavy water (D2O) (1996-1997) 

  • --Under 1985 bilateral peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement
CANADA
  • Power reactors: 

  • --Two CANDU-6 700 MWe heavy water reactors (to be built at Qinshan) (to be placed under IAEA safeguards)
    --Canadian companies involved: Atomic Energy of Canada (AECL)
FRANCE
  • Fuel fabrication technology (for Yibin Fuel Plant) 

  • --For the design and production of pressurized water reactor fuel assemblies to be used at Guangdong (1991-) 
  • Power reactors: 

  • --Two 985 MWe pressurized water reactors (PWR) at Guangdong (Lingao) power plant
  • Training 

  • --Components and equipment for Qinshan-2 and 3 reactors
    --French companies involved: Framatome
GERMANY
  • High-temperature Gas-cooled Reactor (HTGR) technology
  • Power reactor technology 

  • --Co-production of steam turbines (1995-)
  • ASDEX fusion facility (1996-) 

  • --For controlled nuclear fusion research for power generation
    --Dismantled in Germany; shipped to Physics Research Institute in Chengdu, China for reconstruction
    --To be renamed HL-2A facility
  • Siemens Hanau Fuel Element Factory - mixed oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication plant (Pending)
JAPAN
  • Power reactor technology

  • --Japanese companies involved: Hitachi, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries
  • Technical assistance with Chinese pilot reprocessing plant (1995-) 
RUSSIA
  • Computer simulation technology (for nuclear testing)  
  • Joint Sino-Russia- nuclear research facility in Harbin (1990-)  
  • Nuclear facility at Shenzhen (assistance in construction) (1995-): 

  • --Controlled thermonuclear fusion
    --Radioisotopes for medical and agricultural applications 
  • Permissive Action Links (PALs) 
  • Joint venture - China-Russia Nuclear Company, Shenzhen - established, November 1994.
  • Power reactors: 

  • --Four 1000 MWe VVER-1000 reactors for Lianyungang site
    --Russia expects a bid for phase 3, two additional reactors.
  • Research reactor: 

  • --Tokamak-7 reactor at Hefei
    --Assistance in installation 
  • Technical assistance with China's fast breeder reactor (FBR) project  
  • Uranium enrichment facility at Hanzhun, Shaanxi Province (1993-) (operated under IAEA safeguards): 

  • --Three-phase gas centrifuge plant 
    --The second phase will be completed in August 1998, and the third in January 2002
    --Will produce low enriched uranium (LEU) for Chinese PWRs 
    --Under Sino-Russian agreement, China cannot reexport Russian-supplied centrifuges or produce HEU at facility
SOUTH AFRICA
  • Fission Molybdenum 99 (1994)

  • --For nuclear medicine applications 
  • Uranium enrichment technology
  • Zirconium tubing production plant (as of March 1998, the Atomic Energy of South Africa Ltd.'s export permit was still pending approval by the South African government.)
SOUTH KOREA
  • Power reactors: 

  • --Two 1000 MWe reactors at Shandong Province site 
  • Power reactor technology 

  • --e.g. steam-generators, primary circuit equipment, pressure vessels, etc.
    --South Korean companies involved: Hanjung
SPAIN
UNITED STATES
  • Computer simulation technology (for nuclear testing) 

  • --Requested by China, but refused by US 
  • High-temperature furnace (pending) 

  • --To Northwest Institute and Shengyang Institute of Metals Research 
    --To be used for civilian metals research, but US intelligence fears it could be used to help build Chinese military arsenal
    --US companies involved: Consarc Corporation (New Jersey)
  • Nuclear weapons data 

  • --Not as specific as data shared with UK and France 
  • Permissive Action Links (PALs) 

  • --Proposed by US Defense Secretary Perry in October 1994, but has not occurred 
  • Power reactor technology: 

  • --AP-600 (Chinese visits to US to study reactor for one year) (1996-1997)
    --Turbine generator (1996)
    --US companies involved: Bechtel, Westinghouse
  • Supercomputers (some possibly diverted to military use) 

  • --Two supercomputers to the China Academy of Sciences (CAS) from Silicon Graphics, Inc. (1996)
    --One supercomputer to the the Computer Institute of the University of Science and Technology for National Defense in Changsha, Hunan, Province, from Sun Microsystems (1996)
    --46 supercomputers total since early 1996

[CHINA'S NUCLEAR EXPORTS]

[CHINA'S NUCLEAR COOPERATION AGREEMENTS]

[CHINA'S NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS]

[CHINA AND THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA)]

[CHINA'S MISSILE IMPORTS AND ASSISTANCE FROM ABROAD]


CNSThis material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by MIIS.

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