China's Nuclear Imports and Assistance From Abroad
Although international attention has generally focused on the export end of China's nuclear trade, China has also imported nuclear material, equipment, and technology from a number of countries, and received various other forms of nuclear-related assistance such as training. Because China is already a declared nuclear power, its nuclear imports are not generally a source of proliferation concern. Furthermore, China accepts International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards on civilian nuclear imports of technology and equipment from Japan and Western European countries. However, since nuclear technology is often dual-use, there have at times been concerns that certain peaceful nuclear-related transfers would be diverted to military applications or re-transferred to third countries. Also, some have argued that many of China's nuclear imports, though in and of themselves benign, may reflect nuclear technology trade relationships that may be a cause for deeper concern. In particular, this concern has been raised with regard to Russia.
For additional in-depth information on open-source reports of Chinese imports and assistance from abroad, please consult the CNS Nuclear Abstracts database.
CHINESE NUCLEAR IMPORTS AND ASSISTANCE
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| ARGENTINA |
--Under 1985 bilateral peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement |
| CANADA |
--Two CANDU-6 700 MWe heavy water reactors (to be built at Qinshan) (to be placed under IAEA safeguards) --Canadian companies involved: Atomic Energy of Canada (AECL) |
| FRANCE |
--For the design and production of pressurized water reactor fuel assemblies to be used at Guangdong (1991-) --Two 985 MWe pressurized water reactors (PWR) at Guangdong (Lingao) power plant --Components and equipment for Qinshan-2 and 3 reactors --French companies involved: Framatome |
| GERMANY |
--Co-production of steam turbines (1995-) --For controlled nuclear fusion research for power generation --Dismantled in Germany; shipped to Physics Research Institute in Chengdu, China for reconstruction --To be renamed HL-2A facility |
| JAPAN |
--Japanese companies involved: Hitachi, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries |
| RUSSIA |
--Controlled thermonuclear fusion --Radioisotopes for medical and agricultural applications --Four 1000 MWe VVER-1000 reactors for Lianyungang site --Russia expects a bid for phase 3, two additional reactors. --Tokamak-7 reactor at Hefei --Assistance in installation --Three-phase gas centrifuge plant --The second phase will be completed in August 1998, and the third in January 2002 --Will produce low enriched uranium (LEU) for Chinese PWRs --Under Sino-Russian agreement, China cannot reexport Russian-supplied centrifuges or produce HEU at facility |
| SOUTH AFRICA |
--For nuclear medicine applications |
| SOUTH KOREA |
--Two 1000 MWe reactors at Shandong Province site --e.g. steam-generators, primary circuit equipment, pressure vessels, etc. --South Korean companies involved: Hanjung |
| SPAIN |
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| UNITED STATES |
--Requested by China, but refused by US --To Northwest Institute and Shengyang Institute of Metals Research --To be used for civilian metals research, but US intelligence fears it could be used to help build Chinese military arsenal --US companies involved: Consarc Corporation (New Jersey) --Not as specific as data shared with UK and France --Proposed by US Defense Secretary Perry in October 1994, but has not occurred --AP-600 (Chinese visits to US to study reactor for one year) (1996-1997) --Turbine generator (1996) --US companies involved: Bechtel, Westinghouse --Two supercomputers to the China Academy of Sciences (CAS) from Silicon Graphics, Inc. (1996) --One supercomputer to the the Computer Institute of the University of Science and Technology for National Defense in Changsha, Hunan, Province, from Sun Microsystems (1996) --46 supercomputers total since early 1996 |
[CHINA'S NUCLEAR COOPERATION AGREEMENTS]
[CHINA'S NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS]
[CHINA AND THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA)]
[CHINA'S MISSILE IMPORTS AND ASSISTANCE FROM ABROAD]
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This
material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin
Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of
International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the
opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or
its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by
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