 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
|
 |
 |
China's Nuclear Exports and Assistance
to Iran - Statements and
Developments
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
This chronology includes statements and developments related to China's nuclear-related exports and assistance to Iran, including allegations of assistance, and US, Chinese, and Iranian positions on the issue.
For more in-depth information on open-source reports of Chinese exports and assistance, please consult the CNS Nuclear Abstracts database.
11/27/2003: Speaking after the IAEA adopted a resolution over the nuclear activities of Iran, Chinese Permanent Representative to the UN Zhang Yan said that China supported further inspections in Iran by the IAEA within its authorization, and encouraged Iran to clarify its nuclear activities by cooperating with the IAEA. ["China says dialogue key to solution of Iran's nuclear issue," People's Daily Online 27 November 2003.]
11/21/03: The Associated Press reported that the U.N. atomic agency identified Russia, China and Pakistan as among the probable suppliers of equipment that Iran used to conduct suspected nuclear programs with weapons potential. Iran insisted that its nuclear program is peaceful and that traces of weapons-grade highly enriched uranium found by IAEA inspectors were trace amounts imported with materials purchased abroad. [George Jahn, "UN Agency pinpoints suppliers: Provided Iran with nuclear equipment," The Gazette (Quebec), 21 November 2003]
9/8/03: A follow up report by the IAEA to its June 16th release noted that Iran
7/3/03: The United States today imposed economic sanctions on five Chinese firms that it suspects of assisting Iran's weapons program. While it did not specify details of the suspect shipments, the announcement stated the shipments had "the potential to make a material contribution to weapons of mass destruction or missiles." [David E. Sanger, "U.S. Penalizes 6 Asian Firms For Helping Iran Arm Itself," New York Times, 3 July 2003.]
6/19/03: An IAEA report accused Iran of "failing to meet its obligations" by neglecting to report that it had imported 1.8 tons of natural uranium from China in 1991. The shipment of uranium hexaflouride gas is suspected of being used by Iran to test centrifuges at the Kalaye Electric facility in preparation for the operation of a larger pilot plant at Natanz. [Douglas Frantz, "Iran Closes in on Ability to Make Atomic Bomb," Los Angeles Times, 19 June 2003].
6/16/03: A report released today by the UN IAEA criticized Iran for concealing many of its nuclear activities but stopped short of declaring it in violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which it signed in 1970.
xx/2003: According to , China admitted privately that it had provided Iran with uranium ore and uranium hexaflouride
2002
09/01: According to a September 2001 biannual CIA report on global proliferation developments, Chinese nuclear cooperation with Iran may have moved in a worrisome direction in the last half of 2000. While cooperation aside from two small projects are supposed to have stopped based on a 1997 Chinese pledge, some nuclear exchanges may have restarted.
"In October 1997, China gave the United States assurances regarding its nuclear cooperation with Iran. China agreed to end cooperation with Iran on supply of a uranium conversion facility and undertake no new cooperation with Iran after completion of two existing projects—a zero-power reactor and a zirconium production plant. Although the Chinese appear to have lived up to these commitments, we are aware of some interactions between Chinese and Iranian entities that have raised questions about its "no new nuclear cooperation" pledge. According to the State Department, the Administration is seeking to address these questions with appropriate Chinese authorities." Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July Through 31 December 2000.]02/23/01: The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency will continue to monitor closely Chinese nuclear cooperation with Iran. China has stated that it will continue to assist Iran on two projects, a small research reactor and a zirconim production facility, until the projects are completed. [Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions 1 January Through 30 June 2000.]
2/2/00: The CIA issued a report entitled "Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January Through 30 June 1999," which stated, "China pledged in October 1997 not to engage in any new nuclear cooperation with Iran but said it would complete cooperation on two ongoing nuclear projects, a small research reactor and a zirconium production facility at Esfahan that Iran will use to produce cladding for reactor fuel. The pledge appears to be holding."
1/18/00: An intelligence report indicated that an Iranian official said his country had enough materials to build a nuclear bomb. Since the early 1990's Iran has been purchasing equipment that could be used in a peaceful or nuclear weapons program from Russia, China and other European countries. Currently, China is aiding Iran in four of their nuclear facilities. US intelligence analysts have believed since 1992 that Iran could achieve nuclear capability by 2000. [Walter Pincus, "CIA Not Ruling Out 'Possibility' Iran Can Build Nuclear Bomb," The Washington Post, 18 January 2000. p. A08.]
1/00: Assadollah Sabouri, deputy head of Iran's atomic energy organization confirmed that China is no longer working with Iran on nuclear projects. Sabouri stated, "The Chinese reached a conclusion to work on nuclear matters with other countries, not Iran. Our contract was canceled partly for political reasons."["Iran admits Chinese link severed," Nuclear Engineering International, January 2000, p.4]
4/29/99: In testimony before a Congressional committee, John Lauder - the head of the CIA's Nonproliferation Center, described the CIA's views on recent progress and continuing concerns about China's nuclear, chemical and missile proliferation activities. He stated:
"The China story is a mixed picture. China is actively studying membership in the Missile Technology Control Regime, has promulgated controls on dual-use nuclear technology, and tightened chemical export controls. We cannot yet be certain, however, that the new export control mechanisms will be effective, and worrisome contacts continue between Chinese entities and countries of concern.4/15/99: According to The Washington Times, a classified Pentagon report produced in March concluded that "the Chinese are proliferating on a consistent basis without technically breaking agreements with the United States." The Washington Times article also noted that separate intelligence reports revealed specific instances of cooperation between China and Iran. First, China and Iran have reportedly renewed negotiations on the construction of a graphite production facility that would enable Iran to produce 200 tons of nuclear-grade graphite a year. Second, China agreed to supply Iran with specialty steel, materials and components possibly used in building weapons of mass destruction. China reportedly concluded three contracts with Iran for "weapons goods" in 1999. One of the contracts, with help from North Korea, included the transfer of titanium-stabilized duplex steel to Iran. Furthermore, this news report said that 10 Iranian engineers are allegedly being trained on inertial guidance techniques in China. Finally, China is allegedly to supply telemetry equipment used in sending signals from test missiles in flight, to Iran in November.Both the Chinese Government and Chinese firms have long-standing and deep relationships with proliferant countries, and we are not convinced that China's companies fully share the commitments undertaken by senior Chinese leaders. While all aspects of China's proliferation behavior bear continued watching, we see more signs of progress on nuclear and chemical matters than on missile assistance." [Unclassified Statement for the Record by Special Assistant to the DCI for Nonproliferation John A. Lauder on the Worldwide WMD Threat to the Commission to Assess the Organization of the Federal Government to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (aka The Deutsch Commission), 29 April 1999.]
Contrary to these findings, a CIA report to Congress in December of 1998 indicated that China appears to be fully cooperating with the United States on limiting its nuclear cooperation with Iran and improving its nuclear export controls. [Bill Gertz, "China still shipping arms despite pledges", The Washington Times, April 15, 1999.]
2/9/99: An unclassified CIA report to Congress on global proliferation during the first half of 1998 stated:
- "During the reporting period, China continued to work on one of its two
remaining projects--to supply Iran's civil nuclear program with a zirconium
production facility. This facility will be used by Iran to produce
cladding for reactor fuel. As a party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty, Iran is required to apply IAEA safeguards to nuclear fuel, but
safeguards are not required for the zirconium plant or its products. During
the US-China October 1997 Summit, China pledged not to engage in any new
nuclear cooperation with Iran and to complete cooperation on two ongoing
nuclear projects in a relatively short time. This pledge appears to be
holding." [Unclassified
Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of
Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January Through 30
June 1998, Central Intelligence Agency, 9 February 1999.]
8/2/98: During meetings between Jiang Zemin and Israel's Defense Minister Yitzak Mordechai in Beijing, Mordechai requested that China curb its unconventional military exports to Iran. Jiang Zemin reportedly agreed to take such steps. Mordechai stated:
"I requested from him that China refrain as much as possible from giving technological assistance to countries that are still hostile to us...Jiang said China would not help Iran develop advanced technology that could be used to make non-conventional weapons. I was impressed by his honesty on this matter...be we will continue to monitor the spread on non-conventional weapons in every way we can." [The Iran Brief, 8 September, 1998, p.4]7/98: A July 1998 CIA report called "Proliferation-Related Acquisition in 1997" confirmed that China's nuclear related assistance to Iran is tapering off and that China is holding to the pledges it made during the 1997 summit to halt its most serious nuclear cooperation with Iran. The report said:
- "China also pledged in late 1997 not to engage in any new nuclear
cooperation with Iran and to complete work on two remaining nuclear projects
- a small research reactor and a zirconium production facility - in a
relatively short period of time. Beijing to date appears to be
implementing these pledges and has ceased cooperation with Iran on the
nuclear project of greatest concern, the supply of a uranium conversion
facility. The intelligence community will continue to monitor
carefully Chinese cooperation with Iran."
- "After receiving reports of the alleged transaction, we immediately
approached the authorities in Beijing. The Chinese responded by conducting
an investigation into the allegations, after which they assured us that
although contacts had been made, no transfer of such chemicals had taken
place or would be permitted to take place....I would like to make the point,
however, that this case is illustrative of how engagement with China enables
us to deal with new
challenges. Regular contacts and dialogue between the United States and China provide a mechanism for dealing with problems as they arise."
[Testimony of Stanley O. Roth, Asst. Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 14 May 1998.]
- "As with our dialogue on human rights, we similarly pressed the Chinese for
progress on non-proliferation. They have responded by taking concrete steps
towards strengthening their export control regimes, and in so doing have
contributed to regional and global stability. The Chinese have: committed to
phase out nuclear cooperation with Iran and to refrain from assisting
unsafeguarded nuclear facilities anywhere; implemented strict, nation-wide
nuclear export controls; issued a State Council directive controlling the
export of dual-use items with potential nuclear use; joined the Zangger NPT
exporters' committee; signed and ratified the chemical weapons convention
and adopted chemical export controls. These steps build upon the progress
that this and previous administrations have made in integrating China into
international control regimes and signify the PRC's growing acceptance that
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is not in its own
interests."
- "The baseless allegations in recent days by American newspapers and
officials is a repeat of the same propaganda. Their aim is to divert
public opinion from and cover up the Zionist regime's nuclear arsenal.
Iran's nuclear program and cooperation with other countries is entirely
peaceful, in accordance with international regulations and under the
supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency." [Infoseek:
The News Channel (online), 15 March 1998.]
01/28/98: The Director of Central Intelligence stated:
- "Conventional arm sales have lagged in recent years, encouraging Chinese
defense industries to look to WMD technology-related sales, primarily to
Pakistan and Iran, in order to recoup. There is no question that China has
contributed to WMD advances in these countries. On the positive side, there
have recently been some signs of improvement in China's proliferation
posture. China recently enacted its first comprehensive laws governing
nuclear technology exports. It also appears to have tightened down on its
most worrisome nuclear transfers, and it recently renewed its pledge to halt
sales of anti-ship cruise missiles to Iran. But China's relations with some
proliferant countries are long-standing and deep, Mr. Chairman. The jury is
still out on whether the recent changes are broad enough in scope and
whether they will hold over the longer term. As such, Chinese activities in
this area will require continued close watching."
[Director of Central Intelligence, "Hearing on Current and Projected
National Security Threats Before the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence," 28 January 1998.]
11/3/97: In a meeting in Jerusalem between Chinese Politburo member Wen Jiabao and Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, Wen said that China is not supplying Iran with any assistance in the nuclear field, according to the Prime Minister's office. [Hong Kong Standard(online), 4 November 1997.]
11/1/97: Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Shen Guofeng said "the question of assurance does not exist. China and Iran do not have any nuclear cooperation...On proliferation of nuclear weapons and related technology we have always been very strict. We do not sell nuclear weapons to any country or transfer related technology. This is our long-standing position, this policy is targeted at all countries". ["Beijing Says No Nuclear Cooperation With Iran," Inside China Today, 3 November 1997; "China says it has no nuclear cooperation with Iran," Reuter (Los Angeles), 2 November 1997.]
10/30/97: In a news briefing, US Defense Department spokesman Kenneth Bacon answered the following question:
- "Question:...What's the Pentagon's assessment of how advanced Iran's
nuclear program is, and how much of a difference will the, assuming the
Chinese make good on their pledge, denying them Chinese technology. How will
that hamper Iran's ability to develop a nuclear program?"
"Answer: It will certainly complicate their efforts to develop their program. We've been also working with other potential suppliers to discourage them from supporting Iran's programs. We think their ultimate goal is to develop weapons of mass destruction. We think that would be harmful to not only our interests but interests of many countries around the world."
"We don't believe that Iran has the indigenous scientific and industrial base necessary to support major nuclear programs now, so they have to import technology and some industrial products from abroad. To the extent that countries agree to stop supplying Iran with nuclear materials and technology it will slow their program." [Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, DOD Defense Briefing, 30 October 1997.]
10/29/97: In a background briefing, a senior administration official stated:
- "the Chinese have provided assurances with respect to nuclear cooperation
with Iran. What they have assured us is that they would not engage--that
they are not going to engage in new nuclear cooperation with Iran, and that
they will complete a few existing projects, and these are projects which are
not of proliferation concern. They will complete them within a relatively
short period of time. And in the course of our discussions with the Chinese
and even before that, they've taken steps to suspend of cancel certain areas
of cooperation that could have been of real proliferation concern. And there
are indications that they've turned down the Iranians in a number of their
requests in the nuclear field when they judged them to be of proliferation
concern."
- "The first project is called a "Zero Power Reactor." And as the name
suggests, it's a research instrument that doesn't have any power, so it
doesn't present a proliferation concern; it can't produce any significant
amount of plutonium. The Chinese have been working on that project for
several years. It is essentially completed. They're now just doing the final
checkout, and the Chinese have told us that they expect that project to be
finished, as far as they're concerned, by the end of this year. So that's
something that is virtually at the point of being completed."
"The second project is called a "Zirconium Tube Factory." And Zirconium is used as cladding for nuclear power reactor fuel. Of course, the Iranians don't have any nuclear power reactors, and they may never have any, but this part of their ambitious hope that they will eventually be able to develop the industrial infrastructure to build and support nuclear power...Technically, you can use it as cladding for any kind of reactor. You could technically use it as cladding for a research reactor. It's not typically done because it's sort of overdesigned for that purpose. Normally, for research reactors, you would use a different type of cladding."[The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, "Background Briefing by Senior Administration Officials," 29 October 1997.]
10/28-30/97 (not clear which day): During a press briefing, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Tang Guoqiang answered the following question:
- "Question: What kind of agreement may President Jiang sign with
President Bill Clinton concerning alleged Chinese nuclear cooperation with
Iran?"
"Answer: China has always been cautious on sales of nuclear arms and has never sold or transfered nuclear weapons and relevant technology. On the issue of preventing nuclear proliferation China has always stood against nuclear proliferation. It has not stood for, not encouraged and not engaged in nuclear proliferation. It does not help other countries to develop nuclear weapons."
"Meanwhile, China considers that the prevention of nuclear proliferation should not impact international cooperation in peaceful use of nuclear energy. This Chinese policy is clear to the US side." ["Foreign Ministry News Briefings," Beijing Review, 17-23 November 1997, p. 14.]
10/14/97: In a press briefing, US State Department briefer James Rubin stated:
"In other words, we want to close down any possibility, however permitted under the international guidelines, that Iran will gain knowledge in its pursuit of nuclear weapons. During these negotiations with the Chinese, we have made substantial progress towards meeting the standard that I have described--clear and unequivocal assurances--but we're not there yet. We need additional confidence that China's statements and actions will be sufficient for us to defend a certification of that kind...we want to be sure that we've done all we can to obtain the maximum level of cooperation from China on this subject." [US Department of State, Daily Press Briefing, 14 October 1997.]
8/24/97: Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu stated that Chinese Vice Premier Li Lanqing pledged to him that China would not sell nuclear reactors to Iran during a stop-over by Netanyahu in Beijing en route to Japan. Netanyahu stated: "I was told that China...reached an important decision not to provide the means for building an atomic reactor which Iran asked China to supply...We welcome this as something that is very important and hope it will serve as a guiding light to other countries in their contacts with Iran". Netanyahu stated that Li had assured him that "China has cancelled out on proposed plans to build an atomic reactor for Iran...One would hope that the specific pledge that I received in Beijing reflects a general Chinese decision to prevent the arming of Iran". [World Journal (in Chinese), 25 August 1997; "Israeli PM Lauds China For Cancelling Iran Reactor," Reuter, 26 August 1997; "Netanyahu Says Received China Assurances On Iran," Reuter, 24 August 1997.]
12/30/96: As of this date, China had not informed Iran that it had canceled its sale of a uranium conversion facility to Iran. [Mark Hibbs, "China Said Holding Advance Funds For Conversion Plant Sale To Iran," NuclearFuel, 30 December 1996, p. 2.]
12/96: Iran informed the IAEA that it planned to construct a uranium conversion facility with Chinese assistance, to be operational after 2000. [Mark Hibbs, "Iran Told IAEA It Will Build Chinese UF6 Plant At Isfahan," NuclearFuel, 16 December 1996, pp. 1, 10-11.]
12/96: An official in the Clinton administration said that "The Chinese have told us that based on their expectation that we would be able to build on our nuclear cooperation program, they will not execute this contract [with Iran]". [Jonathan S. Landay, "China to Halt Nuclear Deal With Iran, US Officials Say," Christian Science Monitor, 29 December 1996, p. 5.]
12/17/96: A US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) spokeswoman stated that ACDA Director John Holum did not officially state that China had cancelled its plans to sell a uranium conversion facility to Iran. The mistaken report was made by Nuclear Fuel on 16 December 1996, after receiving a wire report on a press briefing in early November 1996 by Holum. But according to both Nuclear Fuel and Nucleonics Week, top US officials did make such assertions in November 1996. [Nuclear Fuel, 30 December 1996; Nucleonics Week, 2 January 1997.]
11/22/96: US State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns stated that the United States has "not determined" whether China violated nonproliferation laws by selling missile equipment and technology to Iran. Burns said that "There is no question that there is trade between China and Iran, ...but we have not determined that China has violated the current commitments it has made to the United States or to other members of the international community...We are looking at the allegations, as we have done in the past." Burns further stated that "In the absence of any determination that China has violated the law, it is appropriate to go forward" with efforts to improve US-China relations. [Willis Witter, "US: No Proof Of Chinese Violations," Washington Times, 23 November 1996, p. A1.]
11/6/96: China recently indicated to the IAEA and US nuclear industry officials that it may be willing to cancel the proposed sale of a uranium conversion facility to Iran. China cited Iran's inability to pay for the facility as the main reason. Iran has stated that it wants the facility in order to manufacture fuel rods for its civilian nuclear program. Earlier in 1996, China told the IAEA that it planned to go ahead with the sale. Undersecretary of State Lynn Davis met with senior Chinese officials on 4 November 1996 and 5 November 1996 to push for the cancellation and to gain other Chinese assurances which could allow for the eventual implementation of the 1985 US-China nuclear cooperation agreement. Senior US officials reportedly have made the cancellation of the uranium conversion facility sale an informal condition of presidential certification which would allow for the cooperation agreement's implementation. [R. Jeffrey Smith, "China May Cancel Proposed Sale Of Nuclear Facility To Iran," Washington Post, 6 November 1996, p. 9.]
11/4/96-11/5/96: US Undersecretary of State Lynn Davis held talks on proliferation issues with Chinese officials in Beijing, following up the 11 May 1996 Chinese statement that it would not provide assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. Davis was also pushing for the cancellation of the proposed Chinese sale of a uranium conversion facility to Iran and for other Chinese assurances which could allow for the eventual implementation of the 1985 US-China nuclear cooperation agreement. Senior US officials reportedly have made the cancellation of the uranium conversion facility sale an informal condition of presidential certification which would allow for the cooperation agreement's implementation.
On 5 November 1996, Davis stated that she was encouraged by Beijing's movement to restrict nuclear assistance to unsafeguarded facilities, saying, "I am encouraged by the steps the Chinese are taking...We have already had some real success in the commitments that China has made in the areas of proliferation and their nuclear assistance to unsafeguarded facilities." But Davis also said that China needs to go further than its 11 May 1996 pledge. Davis also said the United States would like China to establish a "comprehensive and rigorous system so these commitments can be carried out".
China viewed Taiwan as the main topic of the talks. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Cui Tiankai told reporters, "The most sensitive and important issue is that the United States has violated the August 17 [1982] communique by exporting large numbers of advanced weapons to Taiwan," regarding US sales of Stinger missiles and launchers to Taiwan. [Scott Hillis, "US Officials Start Proliferation Talks In China," Reuters, 4 November 1996; Mure Dickie, "US Arms Official Encouraged By China Steps," Reuters, 5 November 1996; Sophie Roell, "US 'Encouraged' By China Nuclear Arms Sales Stance," Financial Times, 6 November 1996, p. 6; Carol Giacomo, "No Nuclear Know-how Yet For China-US Official," Reuters, 14 November 1996; R. Jeffrey Smith, "China May Cancel Proposed Sale Of Nuclear Facility To Iran," Washington Post, 6 November 1996, p. 9.]
8/2/96: In response to 1 August 1996 remarks by US Secretary of State Warren Christopher (below), Iranian President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani stated:
8/96: According to an Iranian military source, Iran made a formal request to China to send an observation team to the next Chinese nuclear test. Iran also asked to send a 10-person team of armed forces personnel to China to undergo training at China's nuclear weapons tests sites. The request reportedly came during negotiations in August 1996. The Iranian negotiating team consisted of Iranian Defense Minister Dr. Hassan Firouzandeh, Chief of the Armed Forces Joint Staff major General Hassan Firouzabadi, heads of the Revolutionary Guards ground forces, Brig. Mohammad Ali Jaafari, IRGC Air Force commander Brig. Gen. Mohammad Hossein Jalali, and the head of the IRGC Central Staff headquarters, Brig. Gen. Mohammad Baqr Zolqadr. [The Iran Brief, 1 October 1996, pp. 4-5.]
1/9/96: Iranian officials said Iran's deal with China to assist in the development of two 300 MW reactors is still being discussed, but Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Chen Jian said the deal has been halted. Chen said, however, that China will continue to cooperate with Iran on nuclear energy development within IAEA guidelines. [Reuters, 8 January 1996; in Executive News Service, 8 January 1996; Irna (Tehran), 9 January 1996; in FBIS-CHI-96-008, 9 January 1996.]
1/8/96: Chinese First Deputy Foreign Minister Tian Zengpei stated that "China will continue its cooperation with Iran on the peaceful use of nuclear energy within the framework of regulations set by the International Atomic Energy Agency, and considers this a principled and correct policy." The same day, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Chen Jian also stated that the bilateral agreement on the construction of 300 MW reactors in Iran is frozen for the moment, but that China plans to continue nuclear cooperation with Iran within the framework of IAEA guidelines. ["China To Continue Nuclear Cooperation With Iran," Reuters, 8 January 1996; Irna (Tehran), 9 January 1996; in "Foreign Ministry Holds Regular News Conferences," FBIS-CHI-96-008, 9 January 1996.]
Early 1996: China notified the IAEA that it planned to go ahead with the sale of a uranium conversion facility to Iran. [Bill Gertz, "'Progress' by China seen on arms control," Washington Times, 9 November 1996, p. A3.]
12/13/95: Iran is reportedly close to acquiring a uranium enrichment capability due to Chinese assistance. With Chinese help, Iran has reportedly built a cyclotron (calutron?) uranium enrichment facility in Karaj, 25 miles south of Tehran, according to information from the National Council of Resistance of Iran (the Iranian Mujahedin). China has told the Clinton administration that it is not providing nuclear assistance to Iran. Iran allegedly has 10 locations devoted to nuclear activities, and may be building an eleventh site south of Tabriz with Chinese help. [Stephen Green, Washington Times, 13 December 1995, p. A18.]
11/95: In its November 1995 white paper on arms control and disarmament, the Chinese government stated that it "has never exported sensitive technologies such as those for uranium enrichment, reprocessing and heavy water production." ["China: Arms Control And Disarmament," Information Office of the State Council of the Peoples Republic of China, November 1995, Beijing Review, 27 November - 3 December 1995, p. 18.]
10/6/95: Iraqi defector General Hussein Kamel said in an interview that Iran is building a nuclear weapon with assistance from China and Russia. Citing Iraqi intelligence service reports, Kamel estimated that Iran's atomic bomb may be complete by 1996 or 1997. [Jeanne Assouly and Chritian Hoche, Le Vif/L'Express (Brussels), 6 October 1995, pp. 69, 70, 73.]
10/5/95: Iranian sources denied that China had announced the cancellation of the sale of two 300 MW power reactors to Iran. They said the deal was temporarily put on hold because the two sides had not agreed on a site. Iran wanted the reactors to be built near the Bushehr site but the Chinese chose a site near Darkhovin. Iran considers the Darkhovin site unsuitable because of its close proximity to the border with Iraq. [Mark Hibbs, Nucleonics Week, 5 October 1995, pp. 1, 8-9; Intelligence Newsletter, 12 October 1995, p. 1; Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Tehran), 4 October 1995; in FBIS-NES-95-196, 4 October 1995; Irna (Tehran), 9 October 1995; in FBIS-NES-95-195, 9 October 1995.]
10/3/95: Responding to a report by the UK's Sunday Telegraph that China is supplying Iran with uranium enrichment technology, a Russian nuclear expert said it was unlikely that China would be able to provide such technology. China possesses gaseous diffusion technology, the oldest and least efficient method of uranium enrichment, and needs the fuel produced with this technology for its reactors. China is purchasing new enrichment technology from Russia, but the plant produces only 4 percent enriched uranium for use as reactor fuel. Also, as the gas centrifuge plant is still being built, there is nothing that China could have sold to Iran to help it enrich uranium. [Andrei Kabannikov, Komsomoloskaya Pravda, 3 October 1995, p. 7; Interfax (Moscow); in Reuters Insurance Briefing, 27 September 1995.]
9/29/95: It was reported that 15 Chinese nuclear experts are working at Iran's secret nuclear facility at Isfahan. [Con Coughlin, Sunday Telegraph (London), 1 October 1995.]
On the same day, US officials said the United States accepted China's word that it has backed out of a contract to supply two 300 MW power reactors to Iran. A US official said that during talks with US Secretary of State Christopher, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen stated that the deal had been "terminated." Qian later rejected the US statement that the reactor deal had been canceled, saying the deal had been "suspended for the time being" because of a disagreement between the two sides over the final site selection.
On the same day, Iranian diplomat Hossein Aminian Tossi said in Beijing that he had seen reports of the cancellation of the deal, but they had no been confirmed. Also the same day, Iran's Foreign Ministry stated that it had no knowledge of any change in the two countries' bilateral agreement on peaceful nuclear cooperation. [Carol Giacomo, Reuters (Washington), 29 September 1995; in Executive News Service, 28 September 1995; Washington Post, 30 September 1995, p. A9; Washington Post, 30 September 1995, p. A9; Jeffrey Parker, Reuters (Beijing), 29 September 1995; in Reuters Insurance Briefing, 29 September 1995; Arms Control Today, October 1995, p. 24; Irna (Tehran), 28 September 1995; in FBIS-NES-95-190, 28 September 1995; Nuclear Proliferation News, 12 October 1995, p. 14.]
9/27/95: Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen reportedly told US Secretary of State Warren Christopher that China would cancel the sale of two 300 MW nuclear power reactors to Iran. Qian said that the decision was made by China unilaterally. [Elaine Sciolino, New York Times, 28 September 1995, pp. A1, A3; John M. Goshko, Washington Post, 28 September 1995, p. A22; Amir Taheri, Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), 30 September 1995; in FBIS-NES-95-193, 30 September 1995; Robert Shuey and Shirley A. Kan, "Chinese Missile And Nuclear Proliferation: Issues For Congress," CRS Issue Brief, 16 November 1995, p. 10.]
9/27/95: Russian Atomic Energy Ministry officials reacted with skepticism to reports that China is exporting centrifuges to Iran for uranium enrichment. Russia insists that China does not have the technology to build the centrifuges. Russia exported first-generation centrifuges to China several decades ago. In 1993, Russia agreed to build a centrifuge plant in China to enrich uranium for use in a nuclear power plant. Under the term of this contract, China is not allowed to export the centrifuges to a third country or to use it to produce materials for nuclear weapons. ["Iran-Russian Nuclear Experts Deny Reports On Chinese Arms Supplies," Reuters Insurance Briefing, 27 September 1995.]
9/26/95: Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Chen Jian denied accusations that China is building a uranium enrichment plant in Iran. According to Chen, "there isn't any nuclear cooperation between China and Iran that is not under the safeguard of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)." Chen added that, "China has never exported any sensitive technology or equipment concerning reprocessing and enrichment of uranium and production of heavy water. The...report is groundless." [Xinhua (Beijing), 26 September 1995; in FBIS-CHI-95-186, 26 September 1995; "Nuclear Cooperation With Iran: A Confused Picture," Nuclear Proliferation News, 12 October 1995, p. 14.]
9/26/95: An Iranian official said that Tehran will use nuclear energy only for peaceful purposes and that it supports complete global nuclear disarmament. On 26 September 1995, Iran denied that China sold it uranium enrichment technology. On 2 October 1995, the Iranian press unfavorably assessed China's changing position and said China should have a more firm and clear position on its nuclear cooperation with Iran. ["Nuclear Cooperation With Iran: A Confused Picture," Nuclear Proliferation News, 12 October 1995, p. 14.]
9/25/95: According to unnamed sources, China agreed to supply Iran with a calutron uranium enrichment system to be installed at Karaj. [Con Coughlin, Washington Times, 25 September 1995, pp. A1, A8.]
9/24/95: The Chinese ambassador to Iran said the uranium enrichment and other nuclear technologies that China is supplying to Iran are intended for peaceful uses and are part of an agreement signed 10 years ago. [Martin Walker, Guardian (London), 25 September 1995.]
9/12/95: Chinese Ambassador to Iran Hua Liming acknowledged that in 1992, China and Iran signed an agreement regarding the supply of two 300 MW nuclear power reactors and that "commercial negotiations" are ongoing. Due to disagreements over site location and handling of spent fuel, as well as financial and technical difficulties, it is uncertain whether the transaction will actually take place. [Resalat (Tehran), 12 September 1995; in FBIS-TAC-95-005, 12 September 1995; David Albright, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July - August 1995, pp. 21-26.]
9/95: Western intelligence sources say Iran has obtained gas centrifuge design data and is now seeking component technology that will enable its military to enrich uranium for a nuclear weapons program. Particularly worrying, say senior US officials, is a deal pending between China and Iran which would see the transfer of a turnkey facility to convert uranium to uranium hexafluoride (UF6) gas. [The Risk Report, September 1995, pp. 1, 3, 4.]
7/95: A high US official said that in addition to supplying uranium-processing facilities, China has assisted Iran in developing uranium mining, fuel fabrication, and zirconium tube production, and may provide uranium metal and uranium hexafluoride (UF6) manufacturing (uranium conversion) plants in the near future. [David Albright, Bulletin of the AtomicScientists, July - August 1995, pp. 21-26.]
5/16/95: China finalized a 1992 agreement to provide Iran with two 300 MW nuclear reactors. The reactors, estimated at $800-900 million are likely to be located at Darkhovin. [Foreign Report, 25 May 1995; Iran Brief, June 1995, pp. 10-11.]
5/95: Iranian exiles residing in Europe said Iran has tunneled into a mountain close to the city of Chalus on the Caspian Sea to create a clandestine nuclear weapons development site. The exiles claim Iran is employing technicians from China, North Korea, and the former Soviet Union at the site. [US News & World Report, 1 May 1995, p. 24.]
5/1/95: Chinese Disarmament Ambassador Sha Zukang said that China has never sold uranium enrichment, reprocessing, or heavy water production technologies abroad, and that all of China's nuclear exports are reported to the IAEA. [Xinhua (Beijing), 18 April 1995; in FBIS-CHI-95-075, 18 April 1995. Li Jianxiong, Xinhua (Beijing), 2 May 1995; in FBIS-CHI-95-086, 2 May 1995.]
4/20/95: Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Chen Jian said that US concerns about Chinese exports were unfounded. Chen said, "Both China and Iran are signatories to the NPT, and their cooperation is fully under the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency." ["Foreign Ministry Holds Weekly News Conference," FBIS-CHI-95-076, 20 April 1995.]
4/19/95: The US State Department announced that the United States would attempt to persuade China not to sell nuclear technology to Iran. ["Foreign Ministry Holds Weekly News Conference," FBIS-CHI-95-076, 20 April 1995.]
4/19/95: Israeli Labor Party Secretary-General Nisim Zvili stated that during a meeting in Beijing, he and Knesset member Ori Or failed to convince the Chinese President to terminate a deal to provide nuclear power plants to Iraq. [It is likely that the reference to the PRC-Iraq nuclear power plant sale is actually the PRC-Iran power reactor deal.] [Qol Yisra'el (Jerusalem), 19 April 1995; in FBIS-NES-95-076, 19 April 1995.]
4/18/95: It is reported that China is assisting Iran in the construction of uranium purification and conversion (UF6) facilities. ["China Rejects US Plea Not to Sell Iran 2 Reactors," International Herald Tribune, 18 April 1995, pp. 1, 7; David Albright, "An Iranian Bomb?" Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July - August 1995, p. 25.]
4/17/95: Concerning Chinese nuclear assistance to Iran, US Secretary of State Warren Christopher stated at a press conference that Iran "is simply too dangerous with its intentions and its motives and its designs to justify nuclear cooperation of an allegedly peaceful character." Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen later publicly disagreed with Christopher's assertion, saying "there is no international law or international regulation or international agreement that prohibits such cooperation on the peaceful use of nuclear energy." [Shirley A. Kan, "Chinese Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Current Policy Issues," CRS Issue Brief, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, 17 October 1996, p. 5.]
4/10/95-4/17/95: US Secretary of State Warren Christopher met with Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen and failed to convince him that China should not sell two 300 MW pressurized water reactors (PWR) to Iran. Qian consented to further US-Chinese expert-level talks on the Iranian issue, but did not say that China will cancel nuclear exports to Iran.
During the week of 10 April 1995, the US State Department shared an intelligence report with Chinese officials that contained evidence of Iran's attempts to purchase enriched uranium in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), its imports of nuclear equipment from Europe, and its use of smuggling methods similar to those of Iraq and for a nuclear weapons program. Qian, however, stated that China's nuclear cooperation with Iran is legal and "peaceful" and said that all transactions with Iran will be subject to IAEA safeguards. According to US officials, the possible transfer of nuclear reactors and associated technology from China to Iran will include equipment to manufacture nuclear fuel rods. A reactor transfer from China will not include all of the necessary technology, which Iran will have to seek from other countries such as Japan and Germany. However, both Germany and Japan have agreed to withhold transfers of nuclear technology to Iran. [Elaine Sciolino, New York Times, 18 April 1995, pp. A1, A6; R. Jeffrey Smith, Washington Post, 18 April 1995, p. A13; Gao Jian, Xinhua (Beijing), 17 April 1995; in FBIS-CHI-95-075, 18 April 1995.]
4/1/95: In addition to trying to prevent Russia from aiding Iran in what the Clinton administration has called a "crash effort" to obtain nuclear weapons, the United States is also addressing reported Chinese plans to sell Iran two 300 MW reactors. The potential deal has received less publicity in Washington than the Russian-Iranian agreement because it is not yet complete. US officials also doubt that China will be able to deliver on its promise to complete the reactors because similar construction projects in China have required imports from Germany and Japan.
Despite the probability that the deal will be permissible under the terms of the NPT, US Secretary of State Warren Christopher is expected to raise objections with Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen while both are in New York for the NPT Review and Extension Conference. In the past, China has sold Iran a research reactor and small-scale uranium enrichment technology, and offered uranium mining advice. Christopher is likely to argue that any further assistance, regardless of its legality, would assist Iran's secret nuclear weapons program. A senior US official said that the United States was prepared to use the implementation of a recent US-China nuclear cooperation agreement as leverage to gain Chinese cooperation.
Qian defended the agreement, saying that the reactors will be subject to international safeguards and that, "There is no international law, or international regulation, or international agreement that prohibits such cooperation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy." [R. Jeffrey Smith, "China-Iran Talks Spark US Worry," Washington Post, 17 April 1995, p. A1; "China Rejects US Plea Not To Sell Iran 2 Reactors," International Herald Tribune, 18 April 1995.]
2/17/95: Iran informed China's CAS Institute of Plasma Physics that the HT-6B Tokamak nuclear fusion research reactor at Azad (Ahjad) University in Tehran successfully produced an electromagnetic discharge with a duration of approximately 20 milliseconds. It was achieved after Chinese technical teams made two visits in 1994 to assist the Iranians with installation, fine-tuning, and testing of the facility. The HT-6B reactor was transferred from the Chinese institute to Iran's Azad university under a February 1993 agreement. The agreement provided two teams of Chinese scientists and engineers to Iran to help install and debug the facility. China and Iran are expected to proceed with cooperative research in nuclear fusion technology. [Cheng Yan, Zhongguo Kexue Bao (Beijing), 8 March 1995, p. 1; in JPRS-CST-95-006, 8 March 1995; "'Transfer' Of Nuclear Device To Iran Cited," FBIS-CHI-95-078, 21 April 1995.]
11/17/94: China's ambassador to Iran said that the two 300 MW power reactors that China is building for Iran are intended for non-military uses only. [UPI, 17 November 1994; in Executive News Service, 17 November 1994.]
11/94: Iran and China signed a contract for the supply of two 300 MW power reactors from CNNC. [The Risk Report, November 1995, p. 5.]
10/5/94: It was reported that US officials believe that China is providing Iran and Algeria with "potential nuclear weapons technology." [Bill Gertz, Washington Times, 5 October 1994, p. A3.]
6/94: Chinese experts are assisting with the construction of uranium enrichment plants at Rudan and Shiraz. Iranian Interior Minister Ali Beshariti stated that a Chinese nuclear technician who had been kidnapped had been employed to work at the Rudan uranium plant "located near the town of Fasa in the Shiraz region." According to US officials, Fasa is the site of a Chinese-constructed uranium hexafluoride (UF6) plant. [Intelligence Newsletter, 23 June 1994, p. 5; The Iran Brief, 1 June 1995, p. 11.]
Mid-6/94: Iran's Interior Minister Ali Beshariti acknowledged the kidnapping of a Chinese nuclear engineer working with a group of Chinese experts for the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization (IAEO). Beshariti later stated that IAEO had employed the Chinese technician to work at the Rudan uranium plant "located near the town of Fasa in the Shiraz region." The Chinese experts are assisting with the construction of uranium enrichment plants at Rudan and Shiraz. [Intelligence Newsletter, 23 June 1994, p. 5; The Iran Brief, 1 June 1995, p. 11.]
6/94: According to US officials, Fasa is the site of a Chinese-constructed uranium hexafluoride (UF6) plant. [Intelligence Newsletter, 23 June 1994, p. 5; The Iran Brief, 1 June 1995, p. 11.]
3/20/94: The China Daily reported that China is holding discussions regarding a potential deal in which it would supply two 300 MW nuclear power reactors to Iran. [Reuters, 20 March 1994; in Executive News Service, 19 March 1994.]
3/6/94: Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, after meeting with Iranian President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati, and other Iranian leaders, said that their discussions did not cover China's 1993 agreement to construct a 300 MW nuclear power plant in Iran. Qian added that the agreement "is in the preparatory stage," and that the power plant will be under full IAEA supervision. [Sharif Imam-Jomeh, Reuters, 6 March 1994; in Executive News Service, 6 March 1994.]
2/94: A US Department of Defense official said Iran is currently negotiating with China and Russia for the purchase of commercial nuclear reactors that could be used for military purposes. [Philip Finnegan and Theresa Hitchens, Defense News, 28 February - 6 March 1994, p. 6; Alan Elsner, Reuters, 3 February 1994; in Executive News Service, 3 February 1994.]
2/24/93: During testimony before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, CIA Director R. James Woolsey stated: "As Iran's principal nuclear supplier, China has supplied research reactors and other technology, consistent with the NPT but of concern, nonetheless, given Iran's pursuit of a weapons capability." [Hearing Before Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs (Senate Hearing 103-208), 103rd Congress, 24 February 1993; in Zachary S. Davis, "China's Non-proliferation And Export Control Policies: Boom Or Bust For The NPT Regime?" Asian Survey, June 1995.]
2/93: China and Iran signed an agreement for Beijing to provide Tehran with the Tokamak nuclear fusion research reactor. [Cheng Yan, Zhongguo Kexue Bao (Beijing), 8 March 1995, p. 1; in JPRS-CST-95-006, 8 March 1995; "'Transfer' Of Nuclear Device To Iran Cited," FBIS-CHI-95-078, 21 April 1995.]
10/92: Due to US intervention, China canceled its deal to supply Iran with the 20 MW research reactor, which Iran has been requesting for over a year. Liu Xuehong, deputy director general of the Ministry of Energy and Bureau of International Cooperation at the China National Nuclear Corporation, said China could not supply the reactor for "technical reasons." [Weixing Hu, "China's Nuclear Export Controls: Policy And Regulations," The NonproliferationReview, Winter 1994, p. 6.] The proposed reactor would have a thermal rating about 50 percent higher that the reactor China supplied to Algeria.
In the late 1980s, China supplied Algeria with a heavy water-moderated, low-enriched uranium fuel reactor on a turnkey basis. Western sources believe China is holding back on the Iranian sale as leverage to retain MFN status with the United States. A senior Iranian official refused to comment on whether Iran was indeed seeking a nuclear reactor. US sources say that since mid-1991, Iran has been seeking a 25-30 MW heavy water moderated natural uranium-fueled reactor. Given that Iran planned to purchase fuel cycle and heavy water production facilities from Argentina, the United States is now convinced that Iran has non-peaceful nuclear objectives. Western officials doubt that China is really unable to supply the Iranian reactor. The Chinese reactor in Algeria is rated at 10-15 MW, but is believed to be capable of being upgraded to 40MW. Liu said that the reactor sought by Iran is too small to pose a proliferation threat. However, US experts speculate the reactor could be capable of producing 6 kg of plutonium per year. Although the IAEA does not consider such an amount to be significant, it is enough to produce a nuclear bomb. The United States has pressed China not to export the reactor. In a second China-Iranian deal, Beijing has announced its intention to build two turnkey 300 MW PWRs for Iran. They are set for completion after the year 2000. The United States is reportedly displeased with this development as well. [Mark Hibbs, "Sensitive Iran Reactor Deal May Hinge On MFN For China, Nucleonics Week, 1 October 1992, pp. 5-6.]
10/1/92: According to a senior Chinese official, China will require up to ten years to complete two 300 MW PWRs in Iran (Karun). China claims that within this time schedule it will be able to supply all the needed parts through its own indigenous production. Western officials doubt China's ability to produce such critical components as reactor vessels and primary pumps, and thereby question China's ability to supply the project. China imported these and other components for its 300 MW Qinshan plant. Due to proliferation concerns, the foreign suppliers of the Qinshan parts will not sell parts for China's projects in Pakistan or Iran.
9/23/92: Deputy director of China's Ministry of Energy and Bureau of International Cooperation at the Chinese National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) Liu Xuehong, said China is developing the needed production capabilities to produce the two 300 MW reactors for Iran and other projects. After Japan, Sweden, France, and Germany sold China a pressure vessel, steam generator tubing, instrumentation and control systems and primary circuit pumps, respectively, in the early 1980s, China began to accelerate its development of domestic production capabilities. Liu expected the pressure vessels for the Pakistani and Iranian projects to be Chinese built. But, Liu added, the instrumentation and control systems and the primary pumps will be more difficult for China to supply. Some I and C equipment may have to be supplied by foreign contractors. China will also need to manufacture sophisticated alloy tubing for its steam generators.
9/10/92: China and Iran announced that China will build Iran's first nuclear power plant. The agreement was disclosed during Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani's visit to Beijing. Iran has agreed to allow IAEA inspections of the proposed plant, according to the Chinese. Rafsanjani expressed his desire for the two countries to continue expanding bilateral cooperation. The nuclear plant project could involve dispatching hundreds of Chinese nuclear experts to Iran. Both governments have stressed the peaceful purposes and motives behind all cooperation. A 1992 IAEA inspection of Iranian nuclear installations uncovered no evidence of nuclear weapons research. However, many Western countries, including the United States, insist Iran is developing nuclear weapons with Chinese technology. In February 1992, CIA Director Robert Gates told Congress Iran was looking to China for important nuclear technology as part of an effort to develop military capabilities. The Bush Administration opposed nations helping Iran develop its nuclear program and specifically urged China to end its nuclear support. Iran is actively shopping for nuclear-related technology, including computers and fuses, and has attempted to contract foreign nuclear scientists. Earlier, Iran tried to purchase enriched uranium from Argentina, but the United States persuaded Argentina to cancel the deal. In September 1992, the Russian news agency Itar-Tass reported that Russia was willing to sell Iran two to four 440 MW nuclear power plants. [Elaine Sciolino, "China To Built Nuclear Plant For Iran," New York Times, 11 September 1992, p. A3.]
9/10/92: China is currently building a research reactor at Isfahan and has already completed delivery of a mini-calutron, similar but smaller than the type of machine Iraq used in its nuclear weapons program. [Elaine Sciolino, "China To Built Nuclear Plant For Iran," New York Times, 11 September 1992, p. A3.]
9/92: During Iranian President Ali Akbar Rafsanjani's visit to Beijing, the two countries reached agreement on the technical terms of supply of two 300 MW reactors but not on the commercial terms, according to Ms. Liu. Reza Amrollahi, president of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), confirmed that China will supply most of the reactor equipment but some will come from other sources. [Mark Hibbs and Margaret L. Ryan, "Official Says China Developing Ability to Supply Entire PWRs," Nucleonics Week, 1 October 1992, pp. 4-5.]
6/92: Lin Zhen, China's ambassador to Israel, denied reports that China exports nuclear weapons to the Middle East or any other countries. ["PRC Envoy Denies Sale Of N-Weapons To Mideast," Proliferation Issues, 19 June 1992, p. 18.]
11/4/91: A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman stated:
"Chinese and Iranian companies signed commercial contracts respectively in 1989 and 1991 according to which China would provide the Iranian side with an electromagnetic separator for producing isotopes and a minitype reactor both of which were to be used only for peaceful purposes."
"These facilities are used for medical diagnosis and nuclear physics research, isotope production, education, and personnel training. Guided by internationally observed regulations, China had requested the IAEA to enforce safeguards before these facilities were shipped." [Xinhua, 4 November 1991; in FBIS Special Memorandum, 18 December 1991.]
10/21/91: In response to a report alleging that China Nuclear Energy Industry Corporation (CNEIC) experts were constructing a research reactor in Iran as part of a clandestine nuclear weapons program, the Chinese Foreign Ministry stated the report was "groundless." [Zachary S. Davis, "Theory And Practice Of China's Export Controls," in Gary K. Bertsch, Richard T. Cupitt, and Takehiko Yamamoto, eds., US and Japanese Nonproliferation Export Controls: Theory, Description and Analysis (Lanham: University Press of America, 1996), p. 225.]
7/10/91: According to Iranian exile sources, an Iranian scientific and technical delegation visited China and North Korea on 10 July 1991 to discuss expanding deliveries of nuclear and ballistic missile technologies. ["Unmask Saddam's Lies," Wall Street Journal, 24 July 1991, p. A10.]
7/2/91: In a letter to the Washington Post, Chen Guoqing, press counselor of the Chinese Embassy in Washington, stated:
"China is a responsible member of the international community and does not advocate or encourage nuclear proliferation. Nor does it help other countries develop nuclear weapons."
"China supports the effort to turn the Middle East into a nuclear weapons-free zone and a zone free from weapons of mass destruction." [Xinhua, 2 July 1991; in FBIS Special Memorandum, 18 December 1991.]
12/17/85: China and Iran signed an agreement for the supply of three nuclear facilities. [Al-Majallah (London), 17 December 1995, pp. 50-54; in FBIS-TAC-96-004, 17 December 1995.]
1985-90: China began training Iranian nuclear technicians in China under a secret nuclear cooperation agreement. [Robert Shuey and Shirley A. Kan, "Chinese Missile And Nuclear Proliferation: Issues For Congress," CRS Issue Brief, 29 September 1995, p. 11; Gary Milhollin and Gerard White, "Bombs From Beijing: A Report On China's Nuclear And Missile Exports," May 1991, pp. 10-11, 16; James L. Tyson, "Chinese Nuclear Sales Flout Western Embargoes," The Christian Science Monitor, 10 March 1992, pp. 1-3.]
[CHINA'S NUCLEAR EXPORTS AND ASSISTANCE TO IRAN]
This
material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin
Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of
International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the
opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or
its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by
MIIS.
