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China's Nuclear Exports and Assistance to
Iran
| Overview | Background | Policy Issues |
Overview
Chinese nuclear exports and assistance to Iran have been a major issue of
controversy in Sino-US relations. While Beijing regards its nuclear cooperation
programs with Tehran as legitimate and in compliance with International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards provisions, Washington has tended to view such
activities as contributing to Iran's covert nuclear weapons program. The US
considers Iran to be a rogue state and has used various incentives and pressure
tactics to dissuade China from continuing its nuclear deals with Iran. The
debates on this question raise serious question not only about the criteria for
international nuclear nonproliferation enforcement but also the nature and
extent of US unilateralism from many other countries, which want to maintain and
develop peaceful nuclear cooperation programs with non-nuclear weapons states,
including Iran, if the latter follow IAEA safeguards and other relevant norms
and practices. The US positions differ.
Since the mid-1990s, China has suspended its pending nuclear deals with Iran, including the planned sale of two 300MW nuclear reactors. There have been various explanations. Some suggest that Beijing bent under US pressure while others argue the deals fell through due to disagreement between China and Iran over terms of payment. In any case, the cancellation of the nuclear deals to some extent met US demands. However, this by no means ends all aspects of Sino-Iranian nuclear cooperation. Indeed, if anything, assistance continues, which remains a serious concern for the United States.
Background
China has had an extensive and controversial nuclear trade and cooperation
relationship with Iran. This relationship has led to several disputes with
Western countries, particularly the United States, with regard to China's
alleged contribution to nuclear proliferation in so-called rogue states.
Sino-Iranian nuclear cooperation dates back to the mid-1980s, when China began
training Iranian nuclear technicians in China under a secret
nuclear cooperation agreement, assisted in the construction of Iran's
primary research facility, located at Isfahan, and also agreed to supply Iran
with subcritical or zero yield nuclear reactors--all under
IAEA safeguards.1 China has played an active
role in Iran's civil nuclear program since 1985. Western analysts suspected that
some of this cooperation was intended to aid Iran's clandestine nuclear weapons
program. In the early 1990s, China called US reports of these agreements
"groundless" and "preposterous," declaring that China had "struck no nuclear
deals with Iran."
However, in 1991, China and Iran announced China's agreement to supply Iran's first nuclear reactor, a 20 MW research reactor.2 Both China and Iran stressed that the reactor was intended solely for peaceful purposes, and Iran agreed to allow International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Nonetheless, US officials objected to the deal because of continuing suspicions that Iran was in fact pursuing a secret nuclear weapons program, and relying heavily on Chinese technology in this effort. In September 1992, China and Iran signed a nuclear cooperation agreement and China announced its intent to supply two 300 MW pressurized water reactors to Iran, to be completed in ten years time.3 The United States was also displeased with this development, though Western sources doubted that China will be able to produce indigenously all the necessary technology to complete the reactors and therefore questioned China's ability to complete the project. In October 1992, China canceled the deal to supply Iran with the 20 MW reactor. China officially canceled the deal for "technical reasons," but many suspected that the cancellation had come in response to US pressure.
The cancellation of this deal, however, by no means ended Sino-Iranian nuclear cooperation. Throughout the 1990s, China continued to discuss the proposed sale of two 300 MW reactors and also assisted with the construction of Iranian uranium enrichment and conversion facilities. Although the proposed 300 MW reactor sale would technically be permissible under the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the United States continued to object to the proposed transfer, and urged China to cancel the sale. In May 1995, the deal was reportedly finalized, but in September 1995, China indicated that "commercial negotiations" were still ongoing even though an agreement had already been signed.4 Later that month, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen reportedly told US Secretary of State Christopher that China canceled the 300 MW reactor sale.5 Iranian sources, however, subsequently denied that the sale had been canceled. By early 1996, Iran continued to state that the deal was still being discussed, even though Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman stated that it had been frozen. It is unclear how much of a role US pressure played in China's decision to cancel the sale. While China and Iran reportedly had numerous disagreements over technical, financial, and location issues, some sources indicate that US pressure -- in particular, making cancellation of the 300 megawatt reactor deal an informal condition of certifying the 1985 US-China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement (NCA), which would allow the export of US nuclear technology and equipment to China -- may also have been a key factor.
In the late 1990's the United States objected to China's assistance in the construction of Iranian uranium enrichment and conversion facilities, particularly a uranium hexaflouride (UF6) plant allegedly being constructed in Iran by China. Both Iran and China denied that any such transfer had taken place, and Russian officials stated their skepticism that China had the necessary technology. Nonetheless, Western sources reportedly had indications that Iran was close to acquiring a uranium enrichment capability, largely due to Chinese assistance, and the United States continued to press China to cancel the UF6 facility deal.6 In early November 1996, it was reported that the United States had made cancellation of the UF6 agreement an informal condition for granting China the necessary presidential certification to allow implementation of the 1985 US-China NCA.
On 30 October 1997, it was reported that Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, in a confidential letter to US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, pledged that China will provide no new nuclear assistance to Iran. China will complete two existing areas of cooperation: the construction of a zero power research reactor and a zirconium cladding production factory. All other nuclear cooperation such as the construction of the uranium conversion facility will stop. According to US officials, "there would be no fuel cycle-related goods or materials exported to Iran [by China]."7 In a 29 October 1997 press briefing, US national security advisor Sandy Berger stated: "We have received assurances from the Chinese that they will not engage in any new nuclear cooperation with Iran and that the existing cooperation--there are two projects in particular--will end. That is the assurance we have received."8 The CIA verified in a 1998 report to Congress that in 1997 China had halted all cooperation with Iran related to building a uranium conversion facility.
Despite these assurances, Beijing is having difficulty halting all Sino-Iranian Nuclear Cooperation. In late 1998, the National Security Agency (NSA) intercepted communications between Iranian officials at the Isfahan Nuclear Research Center and mid-level officials in Beijing concerning the purchase of hundreds of tons of anhydrous hydrogen fluoride (AHF), a chemical used to enrich uranium. U.S. officials waited until February 2000 before confronting China about the possible transaction. Chinese officials agreed to stop the proposed sale but argued that AHF is not on the list of nuclear controlled substances. The extent of official government involvement in this deal is unclear.
A combination of factors has led to China's suspension of its nuclear reactor
deal with Iran. While some suggest that consistent US pressure has persuaded
China to stop the project, others point out this may be the result of Iranian
inability to finance it or due to Russian competition. In addition, while China
is not a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG),
it has recently promulgated domestic nuclear export control decrees and
regulations and published a control list identical to that maintained by the
NSG. This development has allayed but not completely removed US concerns.
Chinese suspension of the sale and China's renewed pledge not to provide new
nuclear assistance enabled the Clinton administration to certify China's
compliance with US nonproliferation laws and paved the way for the activation of
the 1985 US-China agreement for nuclear cooperation. However, it is not clear
that China has completely terminated all its nuclear assistance programs with
Iran.
Policy
Issues
The United States has long led an international campaign to prevent Iran
from getting nuclear and nuclear-related materials and technology. This campaign
has further intensified under the Bush administration. Even though Iran is an
NPT member state and has placed all its nuclear facilities under IAEA
inspection, the US continues to exert pressure on China and other potential
suppliers to halt nuclear cooperation programs with Iran. US legislation (the
1992 Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act,
amended in 1996) mandates imposition of sanctions on any person or foreign
government that "transfers or retransfers goods or technology so as to
contribute knowingly and materially to the efforts by Iran or Iraq to acquire
chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons." Consequently, differences have arisen
between China and the US over Chinese nuclear exports and assistance to Iran.
There are a number of political, commercial, and bilateral relational issues
involved.
Politically, China has sought to establish and improve its relationship with Iran since the 1980s. China provided huge amounts of weaponry to Iran during the Iran-Iraq in the 1980s. In recent years Beijing has intended to strengthen its ties with Tehran given the growing importance of the oil-rich Persian Gulf, as China's reliance on Middle East/Persian Gulf oil increases. Maintenance and expansion of Sino-Iranian relations naturally constitutes an important component of Chinese strategy in extending its influence to the region. China wants to maintain and improve its relationship with Iran, especially when there is no persuasive evidence that Iran has used these programs for nuclear weapons development. Conversely, the US regards Iran as a rogue state that sponsors international terrorism (including support for terrorists targeting the United States) and seeks to subvert US allies in the region. The US fears Iran's efforts to build nuclear weapons could help give Iran the capability of cutting off the oil from the Persian Gulf.
Related to the different perspectives on Iran, there are also disagreement
between the US and China on nuclear transfers and nuclear nonproliferation.
China insists that its nuclear cooperation agreements (NCA) with Iran are for
peaceful purposes only and that China has pledged to cease all nuclear transfers
and/or assistance to foreign nuclear facilities not subject to IAEA inspection.
In addition, since all known Iranian nuclear facilities are under IAEA
monitoring, Beijing views US demands that China suspend all its nuclear
cooperation programs with Iran as unreasonable and contrary to Article IV of the
NPT. However, the US is concerned with the indirect
assistance Iran could receive and is concerned that it is probably covertly
seeking the construction of uranium conversion and enrichment facilities, other
technical know-how, and technicians.
Recent
Developments
While China continues to adhere to its pledge to end all nuclear cooperation
with Iran, recent media reports citing intelligence sources reveal some
continued Sino-Iranian nuclear cooperation activities. Specifically, China
reportedly has renewed negotiations on the construction of a graphite production
facility, agreed to supply Iran with specialty steel, including the transfer of
titanium-stabilized duplex steel, that can be used in the development of weapons
of mass destruction. An unclassified CIA report to Congress released in February
2000 suggests that China's October 1997 pledge not to engage in any new nuclear
cooperation with Iran "appears to be holding." In 1998, Beijing indicated it
would continue work on two nuclear related projects in Iran, a small research
reactor and a zirconium production facility. Work will continue until the
projects are completed.9 In June 2003, an IAEA
report cited Iran for failing to report 1.8 tons of natural uranium it imported
from China in 1991.10
Notes:
1. "An Iranian Nuclear Chronology, 1987-1992," Mednews, July 1992; Michael Eisenstadt, Iranian Military Power.
2. Mark Hibbs, "Sensitive Iran Reactor Deal May Hinge on MFN for China," Nucleonics Week, 1 October 1992, p. 5-6. However, under US pressure, China later cancelled the deal.
3. Shirley A. Kan, "Chinese Missile and Nuclear Proliferation: Issues for Congress," Congressional Research Issue Brief, 24 August 1992, p. 1-13; Shirley A. Kan, "Chinese Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Current Policy Issues," CRS Issue Brief, 17 October 1996, p. 4-5; Shirley A. Kan, "Chinese Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Current Policy Issues," CRS Issue Brief, 9 June 1997, p. 5.
4. Resalat (Tehran), 12 September 1995; in FBIS-TAC-95-005, 12 September 1995; David Albright, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July - August 1995, p. 21-26.
5. Elaine Sciolino, New York Times, 28 September 1995, pp. A1, A3.
6. "Iran's Uranium Programs," Iran Brief, 1 June 1995, p. 11; "China Agrees to End Nuclear Trade with Iran when Two Projects Completed," Nuclear Fuel, 3 November 1997, p. 3.
7. R. Jeffrey Smith, "China's Pledge to End Iran Nuclear Aid Yields U.S. Help," Washington Post, 30 October 1997, p. 1; Mark Hibbs and Michael Knapik, "China Agrees to End Nuclear Trade with Iran When Two Projects Completed," Nuclear Fuel, 3 November 1997, pp. 3, 4.
8. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, "Press Briefing by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and National Security Advisor Sandy Berger," 29 October 1997.
9.Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions 1 January Through 30 June 2000.
10. Douglas Frantz, "Iran Closes in on Ability to Make Atomic Bomb," Los Angeles Times, 19 June 2003.
| Nuclear Technology/ Activity |
Relevance to Nuclear Weapons Program | Reported Area of Chinese Assistance to Iran |
| Isfahan nuclear complex (1984-) |
Training of Iranian nuclear scientists General nuclear research Site of other nuclear activities of concern |
Possible Chinese assistance with construction and operation of the
Isfahan site (mid-1980s) [1] Chinese training of Isfahan nuclear engineers (1988-1992) [2] Provision of nuclear technology used at the Isfahan site (see other entries) [3] |
| Miniature (27 kW) subcritical neutron source reactor, located at Isfahan site | General nuclear research and training; no known direct connection to nuclear weapons program | Supplied by China to Iran (1990) [4] |
| Heavy water zero-yield training reactor, located as Isfahan site | General nuclear research and training; no known direct connection to nuclear weapons program | Supplied by China to Iran (1990) [5] |
| Small calutron, located at Isfahan site | Calutrons can be used to enrich uranium for weapons fuel, but the IAEA found that the Isfahan calutron was too small to enrich uranium and did not appear to be part of a weapons program | Supplied by China to Iran (l987, 1992) [6] |
| 20 MW research reactor, to be located at Isfahan site |
Possible use for the production of nuclear weapons fuel material The IAEA found that the 20 megawatt reactor would be too small to pose a proliferation threat US experts disagreed, saying the facility could produce 6 kilograms of plutonium per year, enough for one bomb |
China agreed to provide the reactor to Iran (1991), but China canceled the deal, apparently due to US pressure (1992) [7] |
| HT-6B Tokamak nuclear fusion reactor, located at Azan University | No known direct connection to weapons program | Facility built and tested in cooperation with China (1993) [8] |
| 300 MW pressurized water power reactors (PWR) (2), to be located in southern Iran | Reactors and associated technology could be used to produce fuel rods, which can be used to make fissile material for weapons |
China agreed to provide the first reactor to Iran (1992-1993), but
negotiations stalled and the deal was eventually frozen in 1995, apparently due
to some combination of technical and financial difficulties, disagreements over
the final site, and US pressure [9] China promised in October 1997 to cancel the reactor deal and all future nuclear cooperation with Iran in exchange for the implementation of the US-China nuclear cooperation agreement [10] |
| Uranium hexaflouride (UF6) conversion plant, to be
located at Fasa
(Possibly two plants - one to convert ore into gas, another to convert gas back into metal. The second plant may be located in Shiraz.) |
Conversion of milled uranium ore into UF6 gas is a key step in the
uranium enrichment process; after the ore is converted into gas, the gas can be
converted back into metal and shaped into bomb cores Considered an especially likely signal that Iran is pursuing a weapons program, since enriched uranium for civilian reactors can be purchased on the international market at a lower cost |
In 1994, China agreed to supply Iran with the UF6 plant
[11] The deal lapsed temporarily under US pressure in 1995 and was finally canceled after the October 1997 summit. The cancellation of the project facilitated the US nonproliferation certifications which were necessary for the US-China nuclear cooperation agreement to be implemented [12] The CIA verified the cancellation of this project in a July 1998 report to Congress [13] |
| Calutron, located at Karaj | Could be used to enrich uranium for weapons fuel | Supplied by China to Iran (1992) [14] |
| Assistance at other stages of the nuclear fuel
cycle, including:
--Uranium mining
|
Development of indigenous fuel cycle facilities enhances Iran's
ability to indigenously produce weapons-grade nuclear material Many of these activities also have civilian or commercial applications |
China has reportedly provided technical assistance to Iran in all these areas [15] |
Table Notes:
[1] "An Iranian Nuclear Chronology, 1987-1992,"
Mednews, July 1992.
[2] Shirley A. Kan, "Chinese Missile and Nuclear Proliferation: Issues for Congress," Congressional Research Issue Brief, 24 August 1992, p. 1-13.
[3] Elaine Sciolino, "China to Build Nuclear Plant for Iran," New York Times, 11 September 1992, p. A3.
[4] Michael Eisenstadt, Iranian Military Power
[5] Michael Eisenstadt, Iranian Military Power
[6] "An Iranian Nuclear Chronology, 1987-1992," Mednews, July 1992.
[7] Mark Hibbs, "Sensitive Iran Reactor Deal May Hinge on MFN for China," Nucleonics Week, 1 October 1992, p. 5-6.
[8] "Transfer of Nuclear Device to Iran Cited," FBIS-CHI-95-078, 21 April 1995, (Zhongguo Tongxun She (Hong Kong), 21 April 1995)
[9] Shirley A. Kan, "Chinese Missile and Nuclear Proliferation: Issues for Congress," Congressional Research Issue Brief, 24 August 1992, p. 1-13; Shirley A. Kan, "Chinese Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Current Policy Issues," CRS Issue Brief, 17 October 1996, p. 4-5; Shirley A. Kan, "Chinese Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Current Policy Issues," CRS Issue Brief, 9 June 1997, p. 5; Resalat (Tehran), 12 September 1995; in FBIS-TAC-95-005, 12 September 1995; David Albright, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July - August 1995, p. 21-26.
[10] "Israeli PM lauds China for Canceling Iran Reactor," Reuters, 26 August 1997; "China Agrees to End Nuclear Trade with Iran when Two Projects Completed," Nuclear Fuel, 3 November 1997, p. 3.
[11] "Iran's Uranium Programs," Iran Brief, 1 June 1995, p. 11.
[12] "China Agrees to End Nuclear Trade with Iran when Two Projects Completed," Nuclear Fuel, 3 November 1997, p. 3.
[13] "China Exports Technology to Iran, CIA Says," Rocky Mountain News, 23 July 1998; "Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions," Nonproliferation Center, Director of Central Intelligence, 1 January 1998-30 June 1998. [http://www.odci.gov.cia/publications]; Con Coughlin, "Chinese Help Iran Join the Nuke Club." Washington Times, 25 September 1995, p. A1, A8.
[14] Het Belang Van Limburg, (Hasselet), 12 February 1992, loc. cit. FIS Report, op. cit.
[15] David Albright, Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists, July-August 1995: 21-26; Mark Hibbs, "Sharif University
Activity Continues Despite IAEA Visit, Bonn Agency Says," Nuclear Fuel, 28 March
1994, p. 10-11; "Iran's Uranium Programs." Iran Brief, 1 June 1995,
p. 11.
For additional in-depth information on open-source reports of Chinese exports and assistance, please consult the CNS Nuclear Abstracts database.
[CHINA'S NUCLEAR EXPORTS AND ASSISTANCE TO IRAN - STATEMENTS AND DEVELOPMENTS]
[CHINA'S NUCLEAR EXPORTS AND ASSISTANCE TO THE MIDDLE EAST]
[CHINA AND THE NONPROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT)]
[CHINA AND THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA)]
[THE 1985 US-CHINA NUCLEAR COOPERATION AGREEMENT (NCA)]
[CHINA'S MISSILE EXPORTS AND ASSISTANCE TO IRAN]
Updated 09/23/2003
This
material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin
Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of
International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the
opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or
its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by
MIIS.
