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China's Nuclear Exports and Assistance to Pakistan - Statements and Developments
This chronology includes statements and developments related to China's nuclear-related exports and assistance to Pakistan, including allegations of assistance, and US, Chinese, and Pakistani positions on the issue.
Also see Map of Chinese Nuclear and Missile Assistance to Pakistan.
For additional in-depth information on open source reports of Chinese exports and assistance, please consult the CNS Nuclear Abstracts database.
5/5/04: China and Pakistan have finalized a deal for the construction of the 300-megawatt Chashma nuclear power plant. This plant will be the second unit in the Chashma Nuclear Power Plant Complex (280 kilometers south of Islamabad) which already houses a 300-megawatt reactor. In order to facilitate the deal, China is providing a concessional loan including $200 million and $150 million Preferential Suppliers Credit from the Export-Import Bank of China for the construction of the project. The signing of the deal comes at a convenient time for the People's Republic of China, which will not become a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group until May 28th. The new plant will be under IAEA safeguards and both China and Pakistan insist the plant is only for peaceful purposes. ["Pakistan-China Deal for Chashma-2 Signed." Asia Pulse, 5 May 2004. "China to Give US$350 MLN Loan for Pakistan Nuclear Plant." Asia Pulse, 6 May 2004.]
2/15/04: On-site investigations following Libya's dramatic reversal on nuclear weapons development revealed Chinese nuclear weapons designs, most likely the result of earlier Pakistani proliferation. While the designs were described by weapons experts as "very, very old," the possession of complete step-by-step instructions for a workable implosion-type bomb raised anew concerns over China's proliferation history in the 1980's. "It was just what you'd have on the factory floor. It tells you what torque to use on the bolts and what glue to use on the parts," one weapons expert who had reviewed the blueprints said in an interview. Even more intriguing, notes included in the package of documents suggest that China continued to mentor Pakistani scientists on bomb-building for several years following the technology transfers.
The discovery of these documents focused increased attention on the Pakistani proliferation network responsible for the transfer, and raised concern about what other states or groups may have benefited from Pakistani assistance. "This design would be highly useful to countries such as Iran and North Korea," said noted security specialist David Albright. "It appears deliverable by North Korea's Nodong missile, Iran's Shahab-3 missile and ballistic missiles Iraq was pursuing just prior to the 1991 Persian Gulf War." Another European expert noted that the relatively simple design of the device would make it very appealing for terrorist groups seeking a truck-deliverable device. However, experts noted that a few key parts to the design appeared to be missing, leading some to speculate that the missing papers could have been withheld pending additional payment. Others suggested that the drawings were simply thrown in as a bonus with the purchase of uranium-enrichment equipment.
Despite the compelling line of transfer, both China and Pakistan have refused to admit any knowledge of the transfer. While it is questionable whether the Pakistani transfers could have been conducted without government knowledge, experts also note that the presence of a middleman is apparent. [Joby Warrick and Peter Slevin, "Libyan Arms Designs Traced Back to China; Pakistanis Resold Chinese-Provided Plans," Washington Post, 15 February 2004.]
11/22/03: Pakistan announced it has decided to end its dependence on foreign assistance for its nuclear power program and instead will start fabricating its own units indigenously. "We have the capability to build nuclear power plants locally and if France can manufacture and export such plants why not Pakistan, as there cannot be two yardsticks in this behalf," said Dr. Attaur Rehman, minister in charge for science and technology. ["Pakistan to build nuclear power plants: minister," Karachi Dawn (FBIS Transcribed Text), 22 November 2003.]
11/18/03: In a press conference, the Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson was asked about a CIA report that said China was suspected of conducting nuclear weapon cooperation with Pakistan, under the cover of nuclear power generation. The Spokesperson commented,
"China is a party state to the NPT and it is resolutely opposed to nuclear weapon proliferation of any form and supports the peaceful use of nuclear power under the strict IAEA safeguards. The cooperation between China and Pakistan in nuclear power generation is purely for peaceful purpose. It does not violate any international non-proliferation obligations and China's export control rules and it is also open to IAEA safeguards." [Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson's Press Conference on 18 November, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 18 Nov 2003.]
11/13/03: The Times reported that Iran has told the International Atomic Energy Agency that it received crucial help from Pakistan with its nuclear program, especially in relationship to components and advice used to make centrifuges for the production of Highly Enriched Uranium. Pakistan has denied the report, stating "No country has been named in [Mohamed ElBaradei's] report. As far as Pakistan is concerned, it is a responsible nuclear power which has scrupulously observed its nonproliferation obligations." [Bronwen Maddox, "Iran admits Pakistan gave key nuclear help," The Times (London), 13 November 2003.]
11/04/03: During a visit to China by General Pervez Musharraf, President of Pakistan, the two countries issued the Joint Declaration on Directions of Bilateral Cooperation. The declaration, signed by Musharraf and Chinese President Hu Jintao included commitments for increased bilateral military exchanges and cooperation at multiple levels and fields. The declaration stated:
"The two parties attach great importance to the role of the China-Pakistan Defense and Security Consultation Mechanism in promoting military-to-military exchanges and cooperation. To develop defense cooperation, the two parties should, on the basis of equality and mutual benefit, continue to actively conduct exchanges and cooperation at all levels and in all fields, including exchange of visits, personnel training, armed forces training, culture and sports. In this regard, the efforts of the Sino-Pakistan Joint Committee on Cooperation in Defense Technology and Industry shall be supported to enhance defense industrial cooperation." ["China-Pakistan Joint Declaration on Directions of Bilateral Cooperation," quoted in Xinhua, 04 November 2003.]
Despite this declaration, Pakistan and China did not finalize the anticipated agreement on nuclear assistance. A statement by the Chinese Foreign Ministry indicated that there was a "consensus" between the two sides over the building of a second reactor at Pakistan's Chashma nuclear facility. However earlier reports indicated that discussions of financial and technical aspects of the deal were continuing. ["No Pakistan-China Nuclear Deal," BBC News (Internet edition), 5 November 2003; Shahid-ur-Rehman, "Japan: Official Sources Say China-Pakistan Nuclear Power Plant Deal Delayed," Tokyo Kyodo World Service, 03 November 2003.]
11/02/03: China reportedly agreed to extend financial and technical help to Pakistan for a second 300-megawatt reactor at the Chashma nuclear facility. Pakistani leader General Musharraf hoped to sign a formal agreement during his upcoming visit to Beijing. The original memorandum of understanding (MOU) on the Chashma reactor was signed in March 2003. [Martin Parry, "Chinese, Pakistani Presidents in First Summit Talks," Agence France Presse, 03 November 2003.]
09/11/03: According to the Associated Press (AP), Wang Lequan, member of the CPC Central Committee Political Bureau and secretary of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Regional Party Committee, was quoted as saying that separatists in the northwestern Xinjiang region were receiving help from international terrorist organizations, including training camps in Pakistan. "We are fighting hostile forces that are trying to undermine stability in China," Wang said at a news conference for visiting foreign reporters. "They have several training camps in Pakistan." This open statement naming Pakistan could signal a shift in Chinese policy towards assistance there, perhaps increasingly hinging on anti-terrorism support. ["China: Separatists in Muslim Region Trained Abroad," Associated Press, 11 September 2003.]
05/28/03: Pakistani Defense Minister Rao Sikandar Iqbal affirmed in a press briefing that "Pakistan will never try to curtail its nuclear power," The answer was in response to a question related to balance of power tactics with rival India. ["Pakistan Not To Curtail Nuclear Power: Defense minister," Xinhua, 28 May 2003.]
04/2003: In its bi-annual report on the state of foreign WMD development, the CIA noted that although China apparently abided by its 1996 pledge not to provide assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities,
"Pakistan's ballistic missile program continued to benefit from significant Chinese entity assistance... With Chinese assistance, Pakistan continues to move toward serial production of solid-propellant SRBM's, such as the Shaheen-I, Abdali, and Ghaznavi... Successful development of the two-stage Shaheen-II MRBM will require continued assistance from Chinese entities or other potential sources." [Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January Through 31 June 2002.]
03/26/03: Chinese Premier Wen Jaibao and Pakistan's Prime Minister Mir
Zafarullah Khan Jamali signed a memorandum of understanding, (MOU) in which
China would assist Pakistan in constructing a second 300-megawatt reactor at the
Chashma nuclear power facility. ["China to Help Set Up Another
N-Power Plant at Chashma,"
Asia Pulse, 26 March 2003.]
10/18/02: The New York Times reported that Pakistan supplied North Korea with equipment designed to build its nuclear arsenal. The Pakistani Embassy denied the claim, saying "We have never had an accident or leak or any export of fissile material or nuclear technology or knowledge." ["A Nuclear North Korea: Intelligence; U.S. Says Pakistan Gave Technology to North Korea," New York Times, 18 October 2001, p. A1.]
03/02: Gen Guangkai, PLA Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, reportedly visited Pakistan in March 2002 following heightened tension along the Indian-Pakistani border. Senior Chinese General Zhang Wannian, was quoted as saying "For many years the militaries of our two nations have maintained exchanges and cooperation at the highest levels and in every field." This was interpreted by some to be an acknowledgement of ongoing Chinese cooperation with Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. [G. Parthasarathy, Former Envoy to Pakistan, "China: An Axis to Grind," New Delhi Pioneer, 28 August 2003.]
01/03/02: Pakistan's Rawalpindi Nawa-i-Waqt reported that Pakistan completed preparations to build a third nuclear powerhouse under the supervision of the Atomic Energy Commission. The new facility would be named Chashma-II. ["Pakistan to Build Third Nuclear Powerhouse," Rawalpindi Nawa-i-Waqt, 03 January 2002.]
11/06/01: According to the Associated Press (AP), a Chinese spokesperson dismissed a report by British newspaper The Sunday Times that Pakistan is considering moving its nuclear weapons to China for safekeeping. "I think this sort of report is totally without basis," Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zhu Bangzao said. The report indicated that Pakistani generals feared a pre-emptive strike by the United States, India or Israel. ["Beijing Dismisses Report that Pakistan Mulling Moving Nukes to China," Associated Press, 06 November 2001.]
09/01: According to a biannual CIA report on global proliferation developments, while most of China's nuclear related contacts with Pakistan have stopped, there may still be some undetected activities ongoing. The report stated:
"With respect to Pakistan, Chinese entities in the past provided extensive support to unsafeguarded as well as safeguarded nuclear facilities, which enhanced substantially Pakistan’s nuclear weapons capability. We cannot rule out some continued contacts between Chinese entities and entities associated with Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program subsequent to Beijing’s 1996 pledge and during this reporting period." [Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July Through 31 December 2000.]
09/04/01: China rejected U.S. charges of missile technology assistance to Pakistan. "We were angry, we were stunned. This is not the way to do business between states," said a senior Chinese diplomat. The charges of Chinese assistance was a perceived violation of the November 2000 agreement. ["China Denies Violating Nuclear Agreement" Washington Times September 6, 2001.]
09/01/01: Bush administration announced U.S. sanctions imposed on Chinese arms manufacturers for allegedly selling missile technology to Pakistan, in violation of China's November 2000 pledge. Lynn Davis, Undersecretary of State for International Security Affairs, met with the ambassadors of China and Pakistan and told them the U.S. had determined "that certain Chinese and Pakistani entities had engaged in missile-related transfers that required the imposition of sanctions under U.S. law." The transfer was believed to take place in November of 1992 from the China Metallurgical Equipment Company. [Alan Sipress: "Chinese Arms Firm Faces U.S. Sanctions" Washington Post, 1 September 2001, Pg. A01]
03/29/01: AFP reported General Pervez Musharraf saying before the Pakistani Cabinet, "China is keen to extend cooperation and assistance in the nation-building process of Pakistan." Pervez continued by saying, "We must make every effort to take advantage of Chinese cooperation and assistance in the development of infrastructural facilities." ["Pakistan, China Move Closer as Nuclear Plant Opens," Agence France Presse, 29 March 2001.]
03/29/01: A delegation of 23 Chinese nuclear scientists, led by Liu Jibin, Minister in charge of the Commission Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND), arrived for week-long talks with officials of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, Service Chiefs and other senior officials. The delegation will participate in the inauguration of the Chasman Power Plant and visit POF Wah, PAC Kamara and other nuclear and defense installations. ["Twenty-three Chinese nuclear scientists arrive in Pakistan" Islamabad Pakistan Observer, 29 March 2001 in FBIS SAP20010327000008.]
03/17/01: The Rawalpindi Nawa-i-Waqt reported China and Pakistan signed a memorandum of understanding on future nuclear assistance. The MOU called for a second 300 megawatt nuclear power plant to be constructed at Chashma. Furthermore, China agreed to supply Pakistan with nuclear fuel for the power plants at Chashma over a fifteen year period. [Suhail Abdun Nasir, "Pakistan Building Nuclear Power Plant with Chinese Assistance," The Rawalpindi Nawa-i-Waqt, 17 March 2001 in FBIS SAP20010320000012.]
02/23/01: In a report to Congress, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency stated that the Agency could not rule out continued Chinese contacts with Pakistani entities involved with Islamabad's nuclear weapons program. [Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions 1 January Through 30 June 2000.]
01/10/01: In a report by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, strategic interests and domestic economic pressures are cited as possible driving forces for Beijing's continued nuclear assistance to Pakistan. [Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, 10 January 2001.]
11/21/00: U.S. and China reached an agreement in which China pledged not to assist states in developing "ballistic missiles that can be used to deliver nuclear weapons," defined as those that can deliver a 500-kilogram payload 300 kilometers.
10/5/00: Mohamad Ahmed from the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission's Applied Systems Analysis informed Nucleonic Week that there will be no power reactor construction through 2025, citing financial constraints and export control restrictions. That includes any new reactors from China. Furthermore, the Kanupp power reactor will be decommissioned between 2010 and 2015. This will lower Pakistan's capacity to less than 0.5% of Pakistan's generating capacity of 71, 935 MW in 2025. ["Pakistan Not Counting on More Chinese PWR Imports, PAEC Says," Nucleonics Week, Vol. 41, No. 40, 5 October 2000.]
5/6/00: The Karachi Dawn reported that the Chashma Nuclear Power Plant would be ready for connection to the national power grid in a couple of weeks. ["Chashma Power Plant," Karachi Dawn, 6 May 2000 in FBIS, SAP20000506000012, 6 May 2000.]
2/2/00: According to an unclassified CIA Report to Congress, "China has provided extensive support in the past to Pakistan's WMD and ballistic missile programs, and some ballistic missile assistance continues. In May 1996, Beijing promised to stop assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, but we cannot preclude ongoing contacts." [Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions: 1 January Through 30 June 1999]
In another statement in front of Congress, the Director of Central Intelligence, George J. Tenet, stated that "the development of missiles and weapons of mass destruction in South Asia has led to more advanced systems, and both sides have begun to establish the doctrine and tactics to use these weapons." [Statement by George J. Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence. "The Worldwide Threat in 2000: Global Realities of Our National Security," 2 February 2000.]
12/15/99: The Brownback Amendment to the Defense Appropriations Bill, signed by the president the fall of 1999, gives the president authority to waive all of the Glenn Amendment sanctions imposed on India and Pakistan after last year's nuclear tests. It also allows the president to waive Symington and Pressler Amendment sanctions, which previously have been used to bar US economic and military assistance to Pakistan because of their nuclear weapons program. The amendment also urges the US to apply export controls only to those agencies and companies that make "direct and material contributions" to dangerous weapons and missile programs. With these steps, Congress has condemned rigorous steps to prevent the transfer of sensitive technology that could be used in India and Pakistan's nuclear and missile programs. This represents a reversal in US policy toward these two countries, while at the same time, Congress is still inflamed over the illegal transfer to China that might have boosted their missile program. [Robert M. Hathaway, "Fresh Start or Shameful Retreat on South Asia?" Christian Science Monitor, 15 December 1999. p. 9]
12/2/99: Fuel loading at Pakistan's second nuclear plant, the 300-MW Chashma plant, began Nov. 25. Work on this plant began in 1992 and was modeled on the Chinese-design Qinshan-1. [Abdul Rauf Siddiqi, "Pakistan's Chashma Loads Fuel, Plans Operation Early in 2000," Nucleonics Week, 2 December 1999. p. 5]
11/24/99: Pakistan's Chasma Nuclear Power Plant, which Chinese firms built, was commissioned. The 300 MW power plant was the result of a 31 December 1991 agreement with China. Construction was begun in 1992 and will require annual shipments of one ton. ["Chasma Nuclear Power Plant," Pakistan In Urdu, 25 November 1999, p. 4. in FBIS, "Daily hails Commissioning of Chashma Nuclear Power Plant," 28 November 1999, FTS19991128000184.]
6/99: Li Peng, while on a visit to Pakistan, told reporters April 10th that "the nuclear devices Pakistan exploded were the results of Pakistan's own scientific research, and our cooperation in the nuclear field with Pakistan is limited to the peaceful use of nuclear energy." ["China/Pakistan: No weapons aid", Nucleonics Week, 15 April 1999]
4/29/99: In testimony before a Congressional committee, John Lauder - the head of the CIA's Nonproliferation Center, described the CIA's views on recent progress and continuing concerns about China's nuclear, chemical and missile proliferation activities. He stated:
"The China story is a mixed picture. China is actively studying membership in the Missile Technology Control Regime, has promulgated controls on dual-use nuclear technology, and tightened chemical export controls. We cannot yet be certain, however, that the new export control mechanisms will be effective, and worrisome contacts continue between Chinese entities and countries of concern.
Both the Chinese Government and Chinese firms have long-standing and deep relationships with proliferant countries, and we are not convinced that China's companies fully share the commitments undertaken by senior Chinese leaders. While all aspects of China's proliferation behavior bear continued watching, we see more signs of progress on nuclear and chemical matters than on missile assistance." [Unclassified Statement for the Record by Special Assistant to the DCI for Nonproliferation John A. Lauder on the Worldwide WMD Threat to the Commission to Assess the Organization of the Federal Government to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (aka The Deutsch Commission), 29 April 1999.]
4/15/99: According to The Washington Times, a classified Pentagon report produced in March concluded that "the Chinese are proliferating on a consistent basis without technically breaking agreements with the United States." China Poly Venture Co. disguised the shipment of U.S. metal working presses and a special furnace to Pakistan's National Development Center as "Masada Cookware." [Bill Gertz, "China still shipping arms despite pledges", The Washington Times, April 15, 1999]
2/26/99: Following the India and Pakistani nuclear tests, however, new signs emerged that China had permanently curtailed its military nuclear cooperation with Pakistan. In remarks to a seminar in New Delhi on Sino-Indian relations, China's ambassador to India Zhou Gang reiterated that China had not assisted Pakistan's nuclear program, stating "non-existent is the issue of China's nuclear and missile proliferation to Pakistan" and that "all cooperation between China and Pakistan in the field of nuclear energy is under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards." Zhou acknowledged that China was aware of India's concerns regarding China's nuclear assistance to Pakistan and that Beijing had taken "a positive, flexible and pragmatic approach and made proper readjustment of certain policies concerned." ["PRC Envoy: China Hopes To Develop Good Bilateral Ties," The Hindustan Times, 26 February 1999 in FBIS 26 February 1999; and "Chinese Envoy: China Not 'Threat' to India," Deccan Herald, 27 February 1999.]
1/99-6/99: According to an unclassified report to Congress, China, which has provided extensive support in the past to Islamabad's WMD programs, promised to stop assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities in May 1996. But Chinese along with North Korean entities continued to provide assistance to Pakistan's ballistic missile program during the first half of 1999. ["Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced conventional Munitions," Nonproliferation Center; Director of Central Intelligence, 1 January - 30 June 1999, www.cia.gov/cia/publications/bian/bian_feb_2000.html]
11/4/98: In an interview with Janes's Defense Weekly, Dr. A. Q. Kahn, the father of Pakistan's nuclear weapon, denied that China aided Pakistan in developing its nuclear weapons. He said, "I can tell you with full authority and very honestly that we have had no access to any Chinese data. If we produce a hamburger, the West will say that it has been copied by McDonald's." [Robert Karniol, Jane's Defense Weekly," 4 November 1998, p. 21-22]
2/26/98: In a meeting between Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and Chinese Premier Li Peng, the subject of Chinese assistance in the construction of a second nuclear power unit at Chashma was reportedly raised. Prime Minister Sharif said that the sides discussed "expansion" of the Chashma plant by building "new auxiliary power units," but added that "detailed discussion will have to take place before any final decision is made in this regard." ["China May Build Another PWR at Pakistan's Chashma Station," Nucleonics Week, 26 February 1998, p.1.]
01/28/98: The Director of Central Intelligence stated:
"Conventional arm sales have lagged in recent years, encouraging Chinese defense industries to look to WMD technology-related sales, primarily to Pakistan and Iran, in order to recoup. There is no question that China has contributed to WMD advances in these countries. On the positive side, there have recently been some signs of improvement in China's proliferation posture. China recently enacted its first comprehensive laws governing nuclear technology exports. It also appears to have tightened down on its most worrisome nuclear transfers, and it recently renewed its pledge to halt sales of anti-ship cruise missiles to Iran. But China's relations with some proliferant countries are long-standing and deep, Mr. Chairman. The jury is still out on whether the recent changes are broad enough in scope and whether they will hold over the longer term. As such, Chinese activities in this area will require continued close watching." [Director of Central Intelligence, "Hearing on Current and Projected National Security Threats Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence," 28 January 1998.]
06/97: The Director of Central Intelligence stated that China "was the primary source of nuclear-related equipment and technology to Pakistan" during the second half of 1996. [Director of Central Intelligence, The Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions--July-December 1996, June 1997.]
12/5/96: Pakistan stated that China agreed in principle to sell a second nuclear power plant to Pakistan. A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman stated, "In principle, the Chinese are willing to do so. The question of financing has yet to be resolved." [Tahir Ikram, "China Said Ready to Provide N-Plant To Pakistan," Reuters, 5 December 1996.]
12/3/96: Pakistan objected to the US urging that China end its nuclear cooperation with Pakistan. A Pakistani Foreign Ministry spokesman stated that "No international convention or law has been violated...No country should object to this." He added that "If the United States has objections, it is their opinion...There can be no objection to this [nuclear cooperation] under international law." [Reuters, 3 December 1996; in Executive News Service, 3 December 1996; Tahir Ikram, "China Said Ready To Provide N-Plant To Pakistan," Reuters, 5 December 1996.]
12/2/96: The United States urged China to end its nuclear cooperation with Pakistan. State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns stated: "We think it's best that China refrain from any type of nuclear cooperation with Pakistan...We don't think it's wise...even to engage in peaceful nuclear cooperation with safeguarded nuclear facilities." Burns added that "the United States does not participate in or encourage in any way any kind of nuclear trade or nuclear cooperation, even with safeguarded facilities, in Pakistan." Burns said he was not surprised with China's insistence that it would continue such cooperation, stating, "we don't always see eye-to-eye with the Chinese on this particular issue." [Refet Kaplan, "US Eases Pressure On China Over Nuke Deal With Pakistan," Washington Times, 3 December 1996, p. 11; Reuters, 2 December 1996.]
12/1/96: During a visit by Chinese President Jiang Zemin to Pakistan, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Shen Guofang said: "China and Pakistan enjoy good cooperation in the utilization of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes...and our cooperation in this regard will continue." In response to allegations that China sells sensitive military and nuclear technology to Pakistan, Shen said, "This situation does not exist...so there is no need to discuss it." The 1 December Sino-Pakistani meetings were apparently intended to assure Pakistan that China did not plan to discontinue its nuclear assistance to Islamabad. ["Chinese To Ignore US Nuke Concerns," Washington Times, 2 December 1996, p. A11; Associated Press, 2 December 1996; News (Islamabad), 2 December 1996, in FBIS-NES-96-232, 2 December 1996.]
11/29/96: Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Shen Guofang stated during a press conference in New Delhi: "The Chinese government does not, did not, and will not sell or transfer any nuclear weapon or technology to any country." Shen also stated: "We have some cooperation on peaceful utilization of nuclear energy with Pakistan, but that is strictly supervised by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)." [Clarence Fernandez, Reuters, 29 November 1996.]
10/9/96: US State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns stated that "Senior-level people in this government have looked at these specific charges and, based on the information available to use, we do not conclude that China has violated the commitments it made in its 11 May statement." We've looked at this question, at this matter, very closely in great detail." Burns did not comment, however, on whether or not the transfer violated the NPT or U.S domestic laws. Burns also did not deny the authenticity of the 14 September 1996 CIA report, criticizing "another leak of a highly classified intelligence report." A senior State Department official, in response to a question of whether the transfer occurred or not, said: "I can't confirm that, but that's a possibility." [R. Jeffrey Smith, "China Sold Nuclear Items Before Vow," Washington Post, 10 October 1996, p. A38; Shirley A. Kan, "Chinese Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Current Policy Issues," CRS Issue Brief, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, 17 October 1996, p. 3; Patrick Worsnip, Reuters, 9 October 1996; Reuters, 10 October 1996.]
9/96: China reportedly recently sold a special industrial furnace and high technology diagnostic equipment to unsafeguarded facilities in Pakistan, apparently a violation of its 5/11/96 pledge not to provide assistance to unsafeguarded facilities, according to a 14 September 1996 CIA report quoted in The Washington Times. The equipment reportedly is of a dual-use nature and could be applied to either civilian or military applications. The report also said that Chinese technicians were in Pakistan in September 1996 to install the equipment. The China Nuclear Energy Industry Corporation (CNEIC) reportedly may have arranged the transfer. According to the CIA report, "In the aftermath of CNEIC's ring-magnet sale to Pakistan and China's 11 May commitment not to provide assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, senior-level government approval probably was needed for this most recent assistance." The report also alleged that China planned to submit false documentation on the equipment's final destination. High-temperature furnaces (also called vacuum or "skull" furnaces) can reportedly be used to mold uranium or plutonium into bomb cores for use in nuclear weapons, and mold titanium for missile nose cones and other key components. The equipment may have been headed for Pakistan's Khushab heavy water reactor.
A Pakistani embassy spokesman denied that Pakistan had received any illegal shipments of nuclear technology from China. A Pakistani Foreign Ministry spokesman said that "We deny that there was any nuclear weapons-related transfer to Pakistan...I regret to say that we seem to be becoming the victims of a series of leaks, some of which are...simply motivated or inspired by the electoral fever in the United States and by their own internal shadow-boxing among themselves. This unfortunate trend gives chances to those lobbies which are motivated against Pakistan to raise these issues. But as happened in earlier cases, I think this also will fade away."
Chinese embassy spokesman Yu Shuning dismissed the Washington Times report "groundless" and "irresponsible." After concluding an internal investigation of the sale, the Chinese government told the United States that the sale took place in late 1995 and early 1996, before its 11 May 1996 pledge.
A senior US official stated, "We are satisfied, without just taking their word for it, that the Chinese are making a real effort to comply with their commitment in May...We are also pleased that they conducted a real investigation to get to the bottom of this matter." A senior administration official, under condition of anonymity, said that "This [CIA] report is not true. The allegation is not true, there has been no violation of the pledge." [Bill Gertz, "Beijing Flouts Nuke-Sales Ban," Washington Times, 9 October 1996, pp. A1, A9; R. Jeffrey Smith, "China Sold Nuclear Items Before Vow," Washington Post, 10 October 1996, p. A38; Shirley A. Kan, "Chinese Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Current Policy Issues," CRS Issue Brief, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, 17 October 1996, p. 3; Reuters, 10 October 1996; UPI, 9 October 1996; in Executive News Service, 9 October 1996.]
8/30/96: The US State Department issued a diplomatic note (demarche) to Beijing, protesting China's reported sale of a special industrial furnace and high-technology diagnostic equipment to a Pakistani nuclear facility, according to a 14 September 1996 CIA report. [Bill Gertz, "Beijing Flouts Nuke-Sales Ban," Washington Times, 9 October 1996, p. A1; Warren P. Strobel and Bill Gertz, "Chinese General Hits Arms Reports," Washington Times, 10 December 1996.]
8/96: In its annual report entitled, "Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control Agreements," the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) stated:
"Prior to China's NPT accession, the United States concluded that China had assisted Pakistan in developing nuclear explosives. Since China's accession to the NPT, it appears that China may have continued to assist Pakistan's unsafeguarded nuclear program and may have continued contacts with elements associated with Pakistan's nuclear weapons related program." [US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, "Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control Agreements," released 7 August 1996.]
8/6/96: In written responses to questions from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the State Department wrote: "We have concerns about China's nuclear cooperation with Pakistan beyond the ring-magnet transfer, including concerns related to both weapons development and production of unsafeguarded nuclear materials." [Bill Gertz, "Beijing Flouts Nuke-Sales Ban," Washington Times, 9 October 1996, p. A9.]
5/21/96: Chinese specialists and firms are reportedly assisting Pakistan with the construction of the Khushab reactor. [PTI news agency (New Dehli), 21 May 1996; in BBC Monitoring Service, 23 May 1996.]
5/11/96: Xinhua released a public statement by the Chinese Foreign Ministry following talks with the United States. The statement read as follows:
"Beijing, May 11. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman here today answered a question raised by a reporter on the decision of the US Government not to impose sanctions on China.
Question: It is reported that the US Government has announced that it has decided not to impose sanctions on China and decided to resume normal operations of US Eximbank in China. What is your comment on this?
Answer: We have taken note of the above report. As a state party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, China strictly observes its obligations under the treaty, and is against the proliferation of nuclear weapons. China pursues the policy of not endorsing, encouraging or engaging in the proliferation of nuclear weapons, or assisting other countries in developing such weapons...The nuclear cooperation between China and the countries concerned is exclusively for peaceful purposes. China will not provide assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. China stands for the strengthening of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, including the strengthening of safeguards and export control measures." [US Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, "Statement By Nicholas Burns, Spokesman," 10 May 1996; "A Chronology: The Credibility Of China's Nonproliferation Pledges And United States Sanctions: 1984-1996," Minority Staff, Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, Summer 1996; Carol Giacomo, Reuters, 14 May 1996; in Executive News Service, 14 May 1996; R. Jeffrey Smith, "China Silent On Nuclear Export Plans," The Washington Post, 14 May 1996, p. A9.]
5/11/96: The Chinese Foreign Ministry, in a public statement following talks with the United States, stated that "China pursues the policy of not endorsing, encouraging or engaging in the proliferation of nuclear weapons, or assisting other countries in developing such weapons...The nuclear cooperation between China and the countries concerned is exclusively for peaceful purposes. China will not provide assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities."
5/10/96: US Secretary of State Warren Christopher announced that the United States would not impose imposing sanctions on China or Pakistan for the Chinese transfer of ring magnets to Pakistan. The State Department stated that this decision was due to China's pledge not to provide assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, its reaffirmation of its nuclear nonproliferation commitments, and its agreement to conduct consultations with the United States on export control and proliferation issues. The State Department also said that there was no evidence that the central Chinese government had "willfully aided or abetted" Pakistan's nuclear weapon program with the ring magnet transfer. [Shirley A. Kan, "Chinese Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Current Policy Issues," CRS Issue Brief, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, 17 October 1996, pp. 3, 6.]
According to the 10 May 1996 US State Department public statement, the Chinese confirmed that this pledge covers the future transfer of ring magnets and other nuclear-related items to unsafeguarded facilities. State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns stated, "These were not winks and nods and smiles. These were express, clear assurances at the senior-most level of the Chinese government to the secretary of state." Burns said the assurances consisted of "oral commitments made to us by the government of China (and also) commitments that were conveyed through cable traffic...There is a written record of this that the historians here...will be able to talk about in ten years time or so." Burns further stated that "We and the Chinese were very clear that this general pledge the Chinese made in their written statements specifically includes ring magnets...Moreover, the United States and China together have agreed to follow up consultations at the expert level to build on these assurances." Further, "there is going to be verification of this agreement. And there's going to be a big American spotlight on some of the Chinese companies that have engaged in these practices in the past. The Chinese understand that." According to one US official, "We would have preferred greater specificity and public clarity and all of that...I cannot promise you that their definition of assistance is the same as ours, but it is clearly more extensive [than what China had maintained previously,] and it clearly includes ring magnets." [US Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, "Statement By Nicholas Burns, Spokesman," 10 May 1996; "A Chronology: The Credibility Of China's Nonproliferation Pledges And United States Sanctions: 1984-1996," Minority Staff, Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, Summer 1996; Carol Giacomo, Reuter, 14 May 1996; in Executive News Service, 14 May 1996; R. Jeffrey Smith, "China Silent On Nuclear Export Plans," The Washington Post, 14 May 1996, p. A9.]
4/21/96: Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen stated that China would not violate the NPT, saying, "The Chinese position is clear...We signed a treaty on the (non) proliferation of nuclear weapons, and never will we attempt it (proliferation)." This statement came in response to US pressure over its nuclear-related sales to Pakistan. [Reuters, 21 April 1996.]
4/15/96: It was reported that a vice-president of the China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) admitted that its subsidiary China Nuclear Energy Industry Corporation (CNEIC) sold 5,000 ring magnets to Pakistan for between $50,000-70,000. A CNEIC official stated he had no knowledge of the transaction.
Chinese officials reportedly argue that China should not be punished for two reasons:
(1) the ring magnets were not magnetized, and the NSG trigger list only bans ring magnets magnetized at a specific tolerance;
(2) the sale was not approved at a high Chinese governmental level. [Kathy Chen, "Beijing Admits To Sale Of Ring Magnets To Pakistan In Bid To Clear US Tension," Wall Street Journal, 15 April 1996, p. B6.]
4/12/96: A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman denied accusations that China has re-transferred sensitive nuclear materials to other countries, stating that "Technologies and equipment imported by China...are subject to the strict control and supervision of the Chinese government. No Chinese company has ever violated its commitment...Chinese companies...have always acted in accordance with international practices," which include a "promise not to transfer the product to any third country." ["China Rejects Allegations Of Nuclear Exports," Reuters, 12 April 1996.]
4/5/96: During US-Chinese talks, China claimed that the nuclear technologies it sold to Pakistan could not be used to develop or produce nuclear weapons, and that China strictly adheres to international legal norms in its nuclear cooperation with other countries. ["China Again Denies Selling Nuclear Technologies...," Itar-Tass, 5 April 1996.]
4/4/96: Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Shen Guofang denied that CNNC sold nuclear technology to Pakistan, stating that "China is a responsible state" that "has never and will never transfer any equipment or technology that could be viable for the production of nuclear weapons." Shen stated that as an NPT signatory, China "strictly abides by its commitments" and "does not advocate, encourage or carry out nuclear proliferation." Shen also stated that "Corporations in China are not eligible to make any kind of transactions that violate China's export policies...Sanctions based on rumors are ill-advised." ["China Denies Nuclear Technology Sale To Pakistan, "United Press International, 4 April 1996; AFP (Hong Kong), 4 April 1996; in "PRC: Spokesman Warns On Imposing Sanctions Over Nuclear Row," FBIS-CHI-96-066, 4 April 1996.]
4/96: It was reported that an unidentified China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) official told Hong Kong's South China Morning Post that a CNNC subsidiary sold ring magnets to Pakistan in 1995, but he insisted they were not sophisticated enough for the production of weapons-grade uranium. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Shen Guofang denied that CNNC sold nuclear technology to Pakistan, stating that "Corporations in China are not eligible to make any kind of transactions that violate China's export policies." ["China Denies Nuclear Technology Sale To Pakistan," UPI, 4 April 1996.]
3/27/96: US officials stated that the sale of ring magnets by China to Pakistan may have taken place without the knowledge of China's central government. During a meeting between US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Robert Einhorn and Chinese officials, China stated that the sale was conducted by an office within the state-run organization responsible for nuclear affairs, without the knowledge of the central government. At one point, China claimed that the ring magnets were to be used in automobile windshield wipers. [Sid Balman, Jr., "US Unsure China Knew Of Nuclear Sale," UPI, 27 March 1996.]
3/26/96: In response to reports that China transferred ring magnets to Pakistan, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Shen Guofang stated that "China has never transferred or sold technology or equipment for the production of nuclear weapons to Pakistan." [Itar-Tass (Moscow), 26 March 1996; in "China Denies Reports On Nuke Technology For Pakistan," NNN News, 26 March 1996.]
3/20/96: Syed Rifaat Hussain, Pakistan's Minister for Press and Information, stated that "We categorically deny the claim...that China sold sensitive nuclear and missile technology to Pakistan last year. No such transaction ever took place. Contrary to your story, Sino-Pakistan nuclear cooperation is purely for peaceful purposes and in accord with non-proliferation treaties." ["Pakistan Denies Nuclear Transaction," Wall Street Journal, 20 March 1996, p. A17.]
3/19/96: US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Robert Einhorn held talks with Chinese officials in Beijing regarding US concerns of Chinese nuclear cooperation with unsafeguarded facilities. The United States is reportedly concerned with a "pattern of nuclear cooperation," not only specific cases of assistance. Einhorn reportedly is seeking a "common understanding" with the Chinese on what compliance with the NPT means. [Carol Giacomo, Reuters, 18 March 1996.]
2/21/96: Lu Wenxiang, First Secretary of the Chinese embassy in Washington, DC, stated that China "does not advocate, encourage or engage in nuclear proliferation, nor does it help other countries develop nuclear weapons...the accusation of China's sale of nuclear weapon technology components to Pakistan is false." ["China, Pakistan And The Bomb," Washington Post, 21 February 1996, p. A18.]
2/15/96: Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Shen Guofang, in response to a report that the CIA had evidence that China transferred ring magnets to Pakistan, stated:
"China, a responsible state, has never transferred equipment or technology for producing nuclear weapons to any other country, nor will China do so in the future."
"China, as a signatory state of the NPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty), has international legal obligations for nuclear non-proliferation, and it does not advocate, encourage, or engage in nuclear proliferation."
"While China conducted some co-operation programs in the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy with other countries, it strictly observes the three principles guiding China's nuclear export and accepts the safeguard of the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency)."
"Sino-US relationship is showing a momentum of gradual improvement, which is not easy to come by. A healthy, stable bilateral relationship serves the fundamental interests of the two countries."
"If the US side imposes unjustifiable sanctions against China, that would lead to serious harm in Sino-US relationships. China hopes the US side will not use rumors as the basis for making decisions." [Newsletter: Embassy of the People's Republic of China, 22 February 1996, pp. 3-4.]
2/8/96: Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Shen Guofang denied the reports that China transferred ring magnets to Pakistan as "groundless." China argued that the ring magnets are not on the agreed list of nuclear-related items subject to NPT controls. China also argued that the sale was conducted by the China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC)'s subsidiary, China Nuclear Energy Industry Corporation (CNEIC), and did not represent a central government decision. China also reportedly claimed the ring magnets were for automobile windshield wipers. Shen further stated that: "China has always adopted an attitude of prudence and responsibility as far as the export of nuclear energy is concerned" and that "China has conducted normal international cooperation on the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy with Pakistan and some other countries." Shen added, "In the past the US accused China of transferring either nuclear technology or weapons to other countries, but in the end these allegations were proved false." [Reuters, 8 February 1996; in "China Defends Right To Peaceful Nuclear Exports," Executive News Service, 8 February 1996; Ta Kung Pao (Hong Kong), 9 February 1996; in "PRC: Spokesman Denies Nuclear Technology Transfer To Pakistan," FBIS-CHI-96-028, 9 February 1996; Kyodo (Tokyo), 8 February 1996; in "PRC: Spokesman Denies 'Sensitive' Nuclear Exports To Pakistan," FBIS-CHI-96-028, 8 February 1996.]
2/96: China has stated that it only conducts "normal international cooperation on the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy with Pakistan." [Evan S. Medeiros, "US Considers Sanctions On China For Weapons, Technology Transfers," Arms Control Today, February 1996, p. 21.]
2/96: Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing did not deny the ring magnet sale, but stated that the sale was within the context of China's "peaceful nuclear cooperation" with Pakistan and that China has always fulfilled its obligations to the NPT.
1/96: US officials stated that Chinese firms are helping Pakistan's unsafeguarded uranium enrichment program, according to new intelligence information. China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) officials told US diplomats that they "could not confirm" that Chinese firms are aiding in Pakistan's fissile material production efforts. [Mark Hibbs, "China Said Aiding Kahuta Project; US Credits, NPT Status On Line," Nucleonics Week, 8 February 1996, pp. 1, 12.]
Late 1995: the CIA told the State Department that a China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) subsidiary, the China Nuclear Energy Industry Corporation (CNEIC), had supplied Pakistan's unsafeguarded state-run A.Q. Khan Research Laboratory in Kahuta, a reported nuclear weapons laboratory, with 5,000 specialized ring magnets for the top suspension bearing of high-speed gas centrifuges to be installed at the facility. The deal was valued at between $50,000-70,000.
9/95: It was reported that Pakistan is negotiating with China for a second nuclear power reactor. ["China/Pakistan: Nuclear Power Plant Proceeding Toward Operational Readiness," S&T Perspectives, 15 September 1995, p. 8.]
6/4/95: Citing US intelligence officials, Leonard Spector of the Carnegie Foundation said China is helping Pakistan construct a research plutonium facility at Khushab which could provide Pakistan with plutonium for nuclear weapons. Spector said Pakistan can already construct nuclear weapons in "hours" by using highly-enriched uranium (HEU). The aid is also alarming because, according to Spector, "It means the Pakistanis have not frozen their nuclear weapons program as had been believed." [Asian Recorder, 4-10 June 1995, p. 24.]
5/30/95: In its annual report entitled, "Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control Agreements," the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) stated:
"Prior to China's NPT accession, the United States concluded that China had assisted Pakistan in developing nuclear explosives. Based on Beijing's longstanding nuclear links with Islamabad, it is unclear whether Beijing has broken off its contact with elements associated with Pakistan's nuclear weapons program."
ACDA added that "The United States Government has continuing concerns regarding possible continuation of China's past nuclear weapons assistance to Pakistan and Beijing's compliance with its NPT obligations." [US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, "Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control Agreements," 30 May 1995, pp. 20-21.]
5/95: It was reported that China plans to supply Pakistan with a second 300 MW nuclear power reactor. [Risk Report, May 1995, p. 9.]
4/8/95: Pakistan's construction of a 40 MW reactor at Khushab has raised concern among Clinton administration officials, who believe it would result in giving Pakistan to large amounts of plutonium. Clinton administration officials have attempted to dissuade China and other countries from becoming involved in the Khushab project. However, Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto states that the Khushab plant is "tied into our nuclear power plant from China." US further note that a partially-built reprocessing plant near the Chinese-supplied reactor at Chashma would be completed within several years and, as an indigenously-produced facility, the heavy water reactor at Khushab would be exempt from international inspections. [R. Jeffrey Smith and Thomas W. Lippman, Washington Post, 8 April 1995, p. A20.]
2/95: It was reported the discussions are underway regarding a second PWR. The China Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) and the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) agreed in principle to build a 300 MW reactor at the Chashma power station. ["Late News In Brief," Nuclear News, February 1995, p. 63.]
6/94: China reportedly denied a Pakistani request for Chinese scientists to "correct" Pakistan's nuclear weapons program and denied a Pakistani request to use China's Lop Nur test range. [Aleksandr Sychev, Izvestiya (Moscow), 20 August 1994, p. 3; in FBIS-SOV-94-162, 22 August 1994, p.16.]
9/93: It was announced that more than half of $47 million in loans that the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China will give to 18 nuclear power equipment companies in Shanghai will finance the production of essential equipment for the 300 MW nuclear power plant under construction by CNNC in Pakistan. [Xinhua (Beijing), 15 September 1993; in JPRS-TND-93-030, 27 September 1993; China Daily; in ENS NucNet, 23 September 1993.]
8/1/93: Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) President Ishfaq Ahmad and China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) President Jiang Xinxiong participated in ceremonies marking the pouring of the first concrete at Pakistan's 300 MW Chashma power plant. [Nuclear News, September 1993, p. 69; Nuclear Engineering International, November 1993, p. 7.]
2/24/93: China and the IAEA signed the "Agreement of 24 February 1993 Between the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Supply of a Nuclear Power Station from the People's Republic of China (INFCIRC/418)." The agreement entered into force on the same day. The agreement was approved by the IAEA Board of Governors on 19 June 1992. ["Agreement of 24 February 1993 Between the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Supply of a Nuclear Power Station from the People's Republic of China," INFCIRC/418, March 1993.]
1/93: The Bush administration issued an arms control compliance report which concluded that before China joined the NPT, it "had assisted Pakistan in developing nuclear explosives," and asserted that the "United States has continuing concern regarding such assistance since China's accession" to the NPT. [John Glenn, Washington Post, 3 December 1993, p. A29.]
2/92: China and Pakistan signed two agreements supplementing the first agreement. The first contract was confirmed by Pakistan's first down payment. ["International Briefs," Nuclear News, April 1992, p. 68; "International Briefs," Nuclear News, February 1993, p. 52.]
12/31/91: Jiang Xinxiong, General Manager of the China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) and Ishfaq Ahmad, Chair of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC), signed a contract on 31 December 1991 under which China will export a 300 MW nuclear power plant to Pakistan. Chinese Premier Li Peng was present at the signing ceremony in Beijing. According to a CNNC official, the two countries' Prime Ministers agreed in principle to the deal in November 1989. The 23rd meeting of the Seventh National People's Congress (NPC) Standing Committee ratified the decision calling for China to join the NPT, according to Premier Li Peng. Li and Pakistan's Minister of State A.G.H. Qazi also said the Sino-Pakistan agreement is completely for "peaceful purposes," and both sides stated that the 300 MW plant will be built and operated under IAEA safeguards. ["Pakistan Gets Confirmation On Chinese Reactor," Nuclear Engineering International, March 1992, p. 7; Robert Shuey and Shirley A. Kan, "Chinese Missile And Nuclear Proliferation: Issues For Congress," CRS Issue Brief, 29 September 1995, p. 9; "More On Qinshan, Daya Bay," Proliferation Issues, 13 March 1992, pp. 4-5; "Nuclear Cooperation Accord Signed With Pakistan," ProliferationIssues, 16 January 1992, p. 2; "Deal Closed With China For 300-MWe PWR Import," Nuclear News, February 1992, p. 40.]
9/10/91: A Pakistan-IAEA agreement on applying safeguards to the miniature neutron source reactor (MNSR) provided by China to Pakistan was signed and entered into force. The IAEA's Board of Governors approved the deal on 20 February 1990. [IAEA Information Circular, October 1991.]
9/91: US officials have alleged that China provided Pakistan with enough weapons-grade uranium for two nuclear weapons, and that Pakistan now has a "workable bomb" weighing 180 kg. German officials say China sold Pakistan enough Tritium in 1986 for ten nuclear weapons. Pakistan has been testing nuclear weapons parts of Chinese design with the aid of Chinese scientists at a clandestine nuclear project in Kahuta. ["Incidental Intelligence: China Emerging As Third World Weapons Supplier," Asia-Pacific Defense Reporter, September 1991, p. 19.]
1/24/91: It was reported that China was assisting Pakistan in fuel fabrication for Pakistan's Parr-1 research reactor. [Robert Shuey and Shirley A. Kan, "Chinese Missile And Nuclear Proliferation: Issues For Congress," CRS Issue Brief, 29 September 1995, p. 9.]
12/3/90: Pakistan and the IAEA signed a safeguards agreement for the Chinese-supplied Parr-2 reactor. ["Pakistan Safeguards," Nuclear Engineering International, February 1991, p. 3.]
2/20/90: The IAEA's Board of Governors approved the agreement between the IAEA and Pakistan on applying safeguards to the miniature neutron source reactor (MNSR) provided by China to Pakistan. [IAEA Information Circular, October 1991.]
11/16/89: Chinese Premier Li Peng announced that China would provide Pakistan with a 300 MW nuclear power reactor. The same month, China and Pakistan agreed in principle to China's supplying to Pakistan of a 300 MW power reactor. [Leonard S. Spector with Jacqueline R. Smith, Nuclear Ambitions, p. 109; "Nuclear Cooperation Accord Signed With Pakistan," Proliferation Issues, 16 January 1992, p. 2; "China To Supply PWR In 300-Mwe Range," Nuclear News, January 1990, p. 73.]
5/4/89: In response to a reporter's question regarding China's testing of a nuclear bomb for Pakistan, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman stated:
"As everyone knows, China does not advocate nor encourage nuclear proliferation. China also does not engage in developing or assisting other countries to develop nuclear weapons. The report on China's plan to test a nuclear bomb for Pakistan is sheer fabrication." [Beijing radio, 4 May 1989; in FBIS Special Memorandum, 18 December 1991.]
1989: China reportedly arranged and conducted a Pakistani test at Lop Nur. [James L. Tyson, "Chinese Nuclear Sales Flout Western Embargoes," Christian Science Monitor, 10 March 1992, pp. 1-3; Gary Milhollin and Gerard White, "Bombs From Beijing: A Report On China's Nuclear And Missile Exports," May 1991, p. 17.]
1/19/89: During a weekly press briefing, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Li Zhaoxing stated:
"The cooperation between China and Pakistan in the sphere of nuclear energy is entirely for peaceful purposes. The relevant agreements signed between the two countries consist of specific provisions guaranteeing safety. The allegations that China has been assisting Pakistan in the field of nuclear weapons-allegations which newspapers and journals of India and other countries have time and again made-are completely groundless and have ulterior motives." [Beijing radio, 19 January 1989; in FBIS Special Memorandum, 18 December 1991.]
1989: China reportedly sold magnets to Pakistan used to stabilize gas centrifuges at Pakistan's Kahuta enrichment facility. [Gary Milhollin and Gerard White, "Bombs From Beijing: A Report On China's Nuclear And Missile Exports," May 1991, p. 17.]
1986: China reportedly transferred tritium gas to Pakistan. According to German officials, China sold Pakistan enough Tritium in 1986 for ten nuclear weapons. ["Incidental Intelligence: China Emerging As Third World Weapons Supplier," Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter, September 1991, p. 19; Gary Milhollin and Gerard White, "Bombs From Beijing: A Report On China's Nuclear And Missile Exports," May 1991, p. 17; The Risk Report, May 1995, p. 8; Gary Milhollin and Gerard White, "A New China Syndrome: Beijing's Atomic Bazaar," Washington Post, 12 May 1991, pp. C1, C4.]
1986: Chinese scientists had begun working at Pakistan's Kahuta facility, assisting Pakistan in the enrichment of weapons-grade uranium. [Robert Shuey and Shirley A. Kan, "Chinese Missile And Nuclear Proliferation: Issues For Congress," CRS Issue Brief, 29 September 1995, p. 9; Milhollin and White, p. 174; The Risk Report, May 1995, p. 8.]
1986: China concluded a comprehensive nuclear cooperation agreement with Pakistan.
10/19/85: A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman denied that Pakistan will conduct a nuclear test in China, as alleged by the chief of the Indian army staff:
"This is totally untrue. It is unbelievable that people in a responsible position should have delivered such irresponsible remarks. This does not accord with the Sino-Indian friendly relations". ["A-bomb Test Charge Refuted," Beijing Review, 28 October 1995, p. 10.]
1983: US intelligence agencies reportedly determined that China transferred to Pakistan a complete nuclear weapon design and enough weapons-grade uranium for two devices. The design was reportedly for a 20-25 kT solid-core implosion device weighing less than 400 lbs. Pakistan reportedly has been able to make and test nuclear weapon components separately and test the whole design with a dummy nuclear core. [Robert Shuey and Shirley A. Kan, "Chinese Missile And Nuclear Proliferation: Issues For Congress," CRS Issue Brief, 29 September 1995, p. 9; Gary Milhollin and Gerard White, "Bombs From Beijing: A Report On China's Nuclear And Missile Exports," May 1991, p. 17; The Risk Report, May 1995, pp. 4, 9; Zachary S. Davis, "China's Non-proliferation And Export Control Policies," Strategic Digest, November 1995, p. 1682; Leonard S. Spector with Jacqueline R. Smith, Nuclear Ambitions, pp. 101-102; The Risk Report, November 1995, p. 4; Gary Milhollin and Gerard White, "A New China Syndrome: Beijing's Atomic Bazaar," Washington Post, 12 May 1991, pp. C1, C4; Aleksandr Chudodeyev, Novoye Vremya (Moscow), 19 October 1993, pp. 18-22; in JPRS-TND-93-037, 8 December 1993, pp. 6-7.]
Early-mid 1980s: China reportedly stole information on a neutron bomb design from the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) and provided it to Pakistan. [Robert Shuey and Shirley A. Kan, "Chinese Missile And Nuclear Proliferation: Issues For Congress," CRS Issue Brief, 29 September 1995, p. 9.]
[CHINA'S NUCLEAR EXPORTS AND ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN]
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