China's Nuclear Exports and Assistance to Pakistan

China's Nuclear Exports and Assistance to Pakistan

Overview	Background	Policy Issues
New Developments	Scope of Activities	Chinese Nuclear and Missile Assistance to Pakistan

Overview
Chinese nuclear exports and assistance to Pakistan were a major proliferation concern for many years. Recently these concerns have been sidelined somewhat, in light of the new strategic importance of Pakistan to the U.S. and progress in Chinese export controls. In general, most of China's nuclear exports and cooperative projects have been for non-weapons purposes (though concerns still exist, given Chinese refusal to accept full-scope safeguards and the dual-use nature of much nuclear technology). China allegedly provided direct assistance to Pakistan's nuclear weapons program in the past, including supplying Pakistan with warhead designs and enough HEU (highly enriched uranium) for at least two nuclear bombs. China also provided assistance and transferred dual-use materials that could be applied in the development of nuclear weapons. Beijing insisted that China's assistance involved the provisions of peaceful technical information rather than weapons-related technologies or materials. China publicly adopted responsible nuclear export policies after joining the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1984, and furthered its commitment by acceding to the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1992. Beijing has formally enunciated three principles governing its nuclear exports: (1) acceptance of IAEA safeguards; (2) peaceful use only; and (3) no re-transfers to a third country without China's prior consent. In recent years, China has also promulgated domestic laws regulating nuclear and dual-use exports.

Sino-US controversy over Chinese nuclear trade and cooperation with Pakistan in the 1980s and 1990s stemmed from differences in Beijing and Washington's strategic, nonproliferation, and foreign policy considerations at the time. Prior to the test firing of a nuclear device in 1998, US policy was aimed at preventing Pakistan from achieving nuclear weapons capability. The US introduced specific legislation aimed at dissuading Pakistan from continuing its nuclear weapons programs by threatening to cut off economic and military aid and imposing sanctions. From China's perspective, Pakistan had long been a useful ally in its South Asia strategic calculations and Sino-Pak defense cooperation underlines this close relationship. The US had been concerned about the impact of South Asian nuclear weapons programs on the international nonproliferation regime; China, on the other hand, did not want to commit itself beyond its legal obligation to the NPT. At the same time, Beijing always insisted on the legitimate peaceful use of nuclear energy and opposed restrictions on nuclear transfers and assistance under the name of nonproliferation. While China made a formal pledge in May 1996 not to provide assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, the fact that China has not adopted IAEA full-scope safeguards contributed to US concerns about the potential of indirect Chinese transfers and assistance to Pakistan's nuclear weapons programs. Recent revelations in Libya seem to support this concern.

As China's participation in nonproliferation regimes increased, Beijing assistance to Pakistan appeared to decrease-- at least with regards to direct transfers, although dual-use items continued to be transferred. China's commitment to backing away from assisting Pakistan's program appeared to increase after the 1998 nuclear tests in South Asia, and improved export controls were released which coincided with Zangger Committee and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) control lists and guidelines. In 2004 China reversed its position and applied to join the NSG, meaning that it would need to come in line with "full-scope safeguards," potentially barring Chinese companies from continuing to do business with Pakistan's civilian nuclear industry. However, Beijing may still insist that nuclear cooperation agreements, including those to build nuclear power plants in Pakistan, made prior to China's application to the NSG should continue to be honored.

Background

In the 1980s and 1990s, Chinese nuclear exports were driven by economic considerations. The reform in defense industries that began in the early 1980s called for conversion to production of more civilian consumer goods. While other defense industrial sectors (e.g., defense electronics) registered marked progress in converting a significant bulk of their production into civilian consumer goods, the nuclear industry lagged behind and ranked the lowest. At the same time, transforming the industry from its originally defense-focused and nuclear-weapons-oriented R&D and production to one that could meet increasing energy demands required the importation of advanced Western technology and know-how, which in turn had to be funded using hard currency. It was not surprising, then, that the industry increasingly looked for foreign customers to generate the necessary funds.

China-Pakistan nuclear cooperation began in the early 1980s. The United States government and many Western analysts believe that China assisted Pakistan in developing nuclear explosives prior to its accession to the NPT in 1992. In 1983, US intelligence agencies reported that China had transferred a complete nuclear weapon design to Pakistan, along with enough weapons-grade uranium for two nuclear weapons. China also reportedly helped Pakistan operate its Kahuta uranium-enrichment plant.¹ US concerns at this time were summarized in a 1985 declassified State Department assessment of Sino-Pak nuclear cooperation. In 1986, China concluded a comprehensive nuclear cooperation agreement with Pakistan. That same year, Chinese scientists began assisting Pakistan with the enrichment of weapons-grade uranium, and China also reportedly transferred tritium gas to Pakistan that could be used achieve fusion in hydrogen bombs and boost the yield of atomic bombs. According to media reports the amount transferred was enough for making 10 nuclear weapons.² After that, China supplied Pakistan with a variety of nuclear products and services, ranging from uranium enrichment technology to research and power reactors. China allegedly involved Pakistani scientists in a nuclear test at its Lop Nur test site in 1989. On December 31, 1991, China signed a contract to build the Chashma 300-MW nuclear power reactor for Pakistan.³ As China pledged to only transfer materials to safeguarded facilities, Pakistan signed an IAEA safeguards (limited-scope) agreement for the reactor at Chashma.

China insisted that "the cooperation between China and Pakistan in the sphere of nuclear energy is entirely for peaceful purposes. The relevant agreements signed between the two countries contain specific provisions guaranteeing safety. Allegations that China has assisted Pakistan in the field of nuclear weapons -- allegations made by newspapers and journals of India and other countries have time and again -- are completely groundless and have ulterior motives." In 1993 China and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) signed an agreement to apply IAEA safeguards to a Chinese nuclear power station sold to Pakistan (INFCIRC/418). In 1994, China reportedly turned down a Pakistani request to "correct" Pakistan's nuclear weapons and to use the Chinese Lop Nur testing range.⁴ Despite these developments the United States expressed concerns that China was still providing equipment and technology that could contribute to the Pakistani nuclear weapons program, including Chinese assistance in the construction of a 40 MW reactor at Khushab that US officials feared could provide Pakistan with plutonium for its weapons program.⁵

A major proliferation controversy regarding Chinese nuclear trade with Pakistan includes the late-1995 export of about 5,000 specially designed ring magnets from the China Nuclear Energy Industry Corporation (CNEIC) to an unsafeguarded Pakistani nuclear laboratory, which was allegedly involved in nuclear weapons work. China initially denied that the sale had taken place; a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman called the reports "groundless" and warned the United States not to impose sanctions based on "rumors." Pakistan also denied that any transfer of sensitive nuclear technology had taken place.⁶ However, in talks with US officials, China eventually privately admitted that the sale had taken place, but argued that China should not be penalized for two reasons. First, China insisted that CNEIC had arranged the sale without the knowledge or consent of the central government. Second, China argued that the ring magnets were not magnetized, and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) Trigger List only covers ring magnets magnetized at a specific tolerance. Throughout the controversy, China publicly denied the sale and declared that it was a responsible state and did not support or encourage the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The resolution of the conflict came on 10 May 1996, when the US State Department announced that it would not impose sanctions on China in exchange for a Chinese pledge not to provide nuclear assistance to unsafeguarded facilities, its reaffirmation of nonproliferation commitments, and its agreement to consult with the United States on export control and proliferation issues. On 11 May, China publicly made this pledge, and informally confirmed that its pledge covered the future transfer of ring magnets. However, the resolution of the ring magnet controversy did not end US concerns regarding the Sino-Pakistani nuclear connection. Concerns remain about Chinese assistance in the construction of the Khushab reactor, and in August-September 1996 it was further reported that China had agreed to sell a special industrial furnace and high-technology diagnostic equipment to a Pakistani nuclear facility, equipment which reportedly can be used in the construction of nuclear bombs.⁷ China denounced reports of the sale as "groundless," and US officials indicated that they were satisfied that China was making a real effort to comply with its 11 May 1996 pledge, and that there was not enough evidence to establish that China was in violation of that commitment.

A 1997 report by the Director of Central Intelligence stated that China "was the primary source of nuclear-related equipment and technology to Pakistan" during the second half of 1996. Since then, the United States has urged China to end its nuclear cooperation with Pakistan entirely. The US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), in its 1997 and 1998 annual report on arms control compliance, stated that based on Beijing's long standing nuclear ties with Islamabad, it was unclear whether Beijing had broken off its contacts with elements associated with Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. China and Pakistan have continued to argue that their nuclear cooperation is entirely legitimate and for peaceful purposes. Nevertheless, US concerns about Sino-Pakistani nuclear cooperation have persisted throughout 1998 and into the new millennium.

New insights into the level of Chinese assistance to Pakistan came about in early 2004 as a result of on-site investigations into Libya's nuclear weapons program, following Mu`ammar al-Qadhdhafi's dramatic reversal on WMD programs in late 2003. As part of disarmament inspections, early Chinese nuclear weapons designs were handed over to IAEA inspectors by Libyan scientists, wrapped in plastic bags bearing an address in Islamabad. The possession by a third party of complete step-by-step instructions for a workable implosion-type bomb raised anew concerns over China's proliferation history with Pakistan, as notes included in the package of documents reportedly suggested that China continued to mentor Pakistani scientists on the finer points of bomb-building over several years following the technology transfers. Both China and Pakistan have refused to admit any knowledge of the transfer.

Policy Issues

Chinese nuclear exports and assistance to Pakistan was a contentious issue in Sino-US relations over the years. There were significant differences between Washington and Beijing regarding nuclear nonproliferation and peaceful use of nuclear energy. US post-Cold War foreign policy has focused on proliferation of WMD as a major threat to US interests and regional/global security and has undertaken specific measures, including strengthening the international nuclear nonproliferation regime and threatening/applying sanctions to punish/deter proliferation behavior. While China supported the principles of nuclear nonproliferation, it had also emphasized the importance of promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy. China criticized the policies of industrialized countries that restrict and deny the legitimate demands of developing countries for peaceful use of nuclear energy and technology transfers for economic development under the pretext of preventing nuclear proliferation.

Following the India and Pakistani nuclear tests in 1998, new signs emerged that China had permanently curtailed its military nuclear cooperation with Pakistan. In remarks to a seminar in New Delhi on Sino-Indian relations, China's ambassador to India Zhou Gang reiterated that China had not assisted Pakistan's nuclear program, stating "non-existent is the issue of China's nuclear and missile proliferation to Pakistan" and that "all cooperation between China and Pakistan in the field of nuclear energy is under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards." Zhou acknowledged that China was aware of India's concerns regarding China's nuclear assistance to Pakistan and that Beijing had taken "a positive, flexible and pragmatic approach and made proper readjustment of certain policies concerned."⁸

Concerns remain over China's ability to enforce their nuclear commitments. China's refusal to adopt IAEA FSS has meant that the potential remains for transferred items to end up in unsafeguarded facilities. The 5,000 ring magnets episode also raises the issue of Chinese central government knowledge and ability to oversee activities of state-run companies with regard to effective export controls. Over the last few years, a number of decrees and regulations on nuclear and dual-use exports have been promulgated. Although most analysts agree that China has taken great steps recently in controlling the flow of sensitive nuclear materials, the implementation and effectiveness of these enforcement measures are still developing, and weaknesses are still present.

Since the terrorist attacks of 2001, and the subsequent war in Afghanistan, Pakistan has been viewed by the United States as a strategic ally in the region. Most of China's current assistance to Pakistan appears to only cover civilian facilities that are under IAEA safeguards. Since 2001 and the change in U.S. - Pakistan relations, reactions in Washington of China's assistance to Islamabad have been muted-- although the discovery of Chinese nuclear weapons designs in Libya in 2004 cast an embarrassing shadow on the administration's selective nonproliferation efforts.

New Developments

Pakistan's Chashma Nuclear Power Plant, which Chinese firms built, was commissioned began fuel loading in November 1999. The 300 MW power plant, modeled on the Chinese-design Qinshan-1, was the result of a 31 December 1991 agreement with China and is expected to be connected to the national power grid in the summer of 2000. Construction was begun in 1992 and will require annual shipments of one ton of low enriched uranium.⁹ On 27 September 2000, China National Nuclear Corporation formally handed over the Chashma nuclear power plant to the Pakistan Energy Commission. In March of 2003, China and Pakistan signed an MOU to construct phase 2 of the Chashma facility - a second 300 MW power plant.¹⁰ As of November 2003, the deal for this construction had not been finalized.

Notes:

1. Robert Shuey and Shirley A. Kan, "Chinese Missile And Nuclear Proliferation: Issues For Congress," CRS Issue Brief, 29 September 1995, p. 9.

2. "Incidental Intelligence: China Emerging As Third World Weapons Supplier," Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter, September 1991, p. 19; Gary Milhollin and Gerard White, "Bombs From Beijing: A Report On China's Nuclear And Missile Exports," May 1991, p. 17; The Risk Report, May 1995, p. 8; Gary Milhollin and Gerard White, "A New China Syndrome: Beijing's Atomic Bazaar," Washington Post, 12 May 1991, pp. C1, C4.

3. "Pakistan Gets Confirmation on Chinese Reactor," Nuclear Engineering International, March 1992, p. 7; Robert Shuey and Shirley A. Kan,"Chinese Missile and Nuclear Proliferation: Issues for Congress," CRS Issue Brief, 29 September 1995, p. 9.

4. Aleksandr Sychev, Izvestiya (Moscow), 20 August 1994, p. 3; in FBIS-SOV-94-162, 22 August 1994, p.16.

5. R. Jeffrey Smith and Thomas W. Lippman, Washington Post, 8 April 1995, p. A20

6. Ta Kung Pao (Hong Kong), 9 February 1996; in "PRC: Spokesman Denies Nuclear Technology Transfer To Pakistan," FBIS-CHI-96-028, 9 February 1996; Chen, Kathy, "Beijing Admits to Sale of Ring Magnets to Pakistan in Bid to Clear U.S. Tension," Wall Street Journal, 15 April 1996, p. B6.

7. Bill Gertz, "Beijing Flouts Nuke-Sales Ban," Washington Times, 9 October 1996, pp. A1, A9; R. Jeffrey Smith, "China Sold Nuclear Items Before Vow," Washington Post, 10 October 1996, p. A38.

8. "PRC Envoy: China Hopes To Develop Good Bilateral Ties," The Hindustan Times, 26 February 1999 in FBIS 26 February 1999; and "Chinese Envoy: China Not 'Threat' to India," Deccan Herald, 27 February 1999.

9. "Chasma Nuclear Power Plant," Pakistan In Urdu, 25 November 1999, p. 4. in FBIS, "Daily hails Commissioning of Chashma Nuclear Power Plant," 28 November 1999, FTS19991128000184; Abdul Rauf Siddiqi, "Pakistan's Chashma Loads Fuel, Plans Operation Early in 2000," Nucleonics Week, 2 December 1999. p. 5.

10. "China Hands Over Chashma Nuclear Power Plant to Pakistan," Islamabad Radio Pakistan in English, 27 September 2000, in FBIS SAP20000927000020.

Scope of Activities

China's Nuclear Exports and Assistance to Pakistan

Nuclear Technology/ Facility	Possible Relevance to Nuclear Weapons Program	Areas of Reported Chinese Assistance to Pakistan
Nuclear Technology
Ring magnets	Useful in gas centrifuges that can make weapons-grade enriched uranium The destination of the magnets, the A.Q. Kahn Research Lab at Kahuta, is not subject to IAEA safeguards and is believed to be involved with Pakistan's nuclear weapons program	5000 ring magnets sold by China Nuclear Energy Industry Corporation (CNEIC) to A.Q. Kahn Research Lab at Kahuta (1994-1995) [1]
Tritium	Used to achieve fusion in hydrogen bombs and boost the yield of atomic bombs	Reportedly sold by China to Pakistan (1986) [2]
Heavy water (D2O)	Needed to operate certain reactors, some of which may be used to produce plutonium for nuclear weapons	China has routinely supplied Pakistan with heavy water, but has insisted on providing it only to safeguarded facilities; specifically, China has expressly stated that the heavy water is for use at the safeguarded Kanupp facility, not to the unsafeguarded Khushab facility [3]
Special industrial furnace	Can be used to melt plutonium or enriched uranium into the shape of a nuclear bomb core, but also has civilian applications	Sold by China to Pakistan, apparently for the Khushab facility (1996) [4] Chinese scientists reportedly in Pakistan helping to install the furnace (1996) [5]
High-tech diagnostic equipment	Could have applications to civilian or military nuclear projects	Sold by China to Pakistan, apparently for the Khushab facility (1996) [6]
Nuclear weapon design	Complete design of 25 kT nuclear bomb; possibly a Chic-4 design	Supplied to Pakistan by China (1983) [7]
Highly enriched uranium	Weapons grade uranium can fuel nuclear weapons	China reportedly supplied Pakistan with enough HEU for one or two nuclear weapons (1983) [8]
Nuclear Facility
Kahuta lab	Unsafeguarded Believed to be a center of Pakistani nuclear weapons research Production facility for weapons-grade fissile material	5000 ring magnets sold by Chinese firm to A.Q. Kahn Research Lab at Kahuta (1994-1995) [9] Chinese scientists assisted with the production of weapons-grade uranium at Kahuta (1986) [10]
Kanupp pressurized heavy water reactor (PHWR)	Under IAEA safeguards; no known connection to weapons program	China reportedly reached a deal to supply heavy water to the Kanupp facility, but the deal was delayed by concerns that the heavy water might be diverted to the nearby unsafeguarded Khushab facility (1996) [11]
Khushab reactor (40-100 MW [?])	Unsafeguarded Could possibly produce weapons grade plutonium Reactor has reportedly gone critical but cannot yet produce power because it lacks the heavy water needed to moderate the chain reaction	Reportedly built with Chinese assistance (1994-1996) [12] China reportedly reached a deal to supply heavy water to nearby safeguarded Kanupp facility, but the deal was delayed by concerns that the heavy water might be diverted to the Khushab facility (1996) [13] Khushab was apparently the destination of the furnace and diagnostic equipment sold in 1996 [see below] [14]
Chashma pressurized water reactor (300 MW) [A.K.A. Chanupp]	Under IAEA safeguards, fueled by low-enriched uranium; no known connection to weapons program Under construction; scheduled to go on-line in 1998 Agreement for second 300 MW under negotiation (MOU signed in March 2003)	Sold by China to Pakistan and built with Chinese assistance (1991) [15] Discussions for Chinese sale of a second facility for the Chashma site; delayed over financing arrangements (1995-1996) [16] China supplied auxiliary equipment, including heaters, condensers, and water tanks (1996) [17] China exported a power plant computer system (1997) [18]
Chashma plutonium reprocessing facility	Unsafeguarded Can extract weapons-grade plutonium from spent fuel Under construction; reportedly near completion	China reportedly provided assistance to the construction of the reprocessing facility (1990s) [19]
PARR-2 research reactor (27 kW) at Rawalpindi	Under IAEA safeguards; no known connection to weapons program	Built and designed with Chinese assistance (1989) [20]

Table Notes:
[1] Chen, Kathy, "Beijing Admits to Sale of Ring Magnets to Pakistan in Bid to Clear U.S. Tension," Wall Street Journal, 15 April 1996, p. B6.

[2] "Incidental Intelligence: China Emerging as Third World Weapons Supplier," Asia-PacificDefense Reporter, September 1991, p. 19; Gary Milhollin andGerard White, "Bombs from Beijing: A Report on China's Nuclear and Missile Exports," Washington D.C; Wisconson Project on Nuclear Arms Control, May 1991, p. 17; The Risk Report, May 1995, p. 8; Gary Millhollin and Gerard White, "A New China Syndrome: Beijing's Atomic Bazaar," TheWashington Post, 12 May 1991, p. C1, C4.

[3] Mark Hibbs, "Khusab Reactor said Started, but Lacks Heavy Water Supply," Nucleonics Week, 19 June 1997, p. 15.

[4] Barry Schwied, "CIA Chief Visits China to Discuss Arms, Terror," The Washington Times, 22 October 1996, p. A11; Jeffrey Smith, "China Sold Nuclear Items Before Vow," The Washington Post, 10 October 1996, p. A38.

[5] Barry Schwied, "CIA Chief Visits China to Discuss Arms, Terror," The Washington Times, 22 October 1996, p. A11.

[6] Bill Gertz, "Beijing Flouts Nuke-Sales Ban," The Washington Times, 9 October 1996, p. A1; Warren P. Strobel and Bill Gertz, "Chinese General Hits Arms Reports," The Washington Times, 10 December 1996, p. A1.

[7] Robert Shuey and Shirley A. Kan, "Chinese Missile and Nuclear Proliferation: Issues for Congress,"CRS Issue Brief, 29 September 1995, p. 9; Gary Milhollin and Gerard White, "Bombs from Beijing: A Report on China's Nuclear and Missile Exports," Washington D.C; Wisconson Project on Nuclear Arms Control, May 1991, p. 17; Leonard S. Spector and Jacqueline R. Smith, Nuclear Ambitions, p. 101-102; Gary Millhollin and Gerard White, "A New China Syndrome: Beijing's Atomic Bazaar," The Washington Post, 12 May 1991, p. C1, C4.

[8] Robert Shuey and Shirley A. Kan, "Chinese Missile and Nuclear Proliferation: Issues for Congress,"CRS Issue Brief, 29 September 1995, p. 9; Gary Milhollin and Gerard White, "Bombs from Beijing: A Report on China's Nuclear and Missile Exports," Washington D.C; Wisconson Project on Nuclear Arms Control, May 1991, p. 17; Leonard S. Spector and Jacqueline R. Smith, Nuclear Ambitions, p. 101-102; Gary Millhollin and Gerard White, "A New China Syndrome: Beijing's Atomic Bazaar,"The Washington Post, 12 May 1991, p. C1, C4.

[9] Kathy Chen, "Beijing Admits to Sale of Ring Magnets to Pakistan in Bid to Clear U.S. Tension," The Wall Street Journal, 15 April 1996 p. B6.

[10] Robert Shuey and Shirley A. Kan,"Chinese Missile and Nuclear Proliferation: Issues for Congress," CRS Issue Brief, 29 September 1995, p. 9; "China to Help Set Up Another N-Power Plant at Chashma," Asia Pulse, 26 March 2003.

[11] Mark Hibbs, "Khusab Reactor said Started, but Lacks Heavy Water Supply," Nucleonics Week, 19 June 1997, p. 15.

[12] PTI News Agency (New Dehli), 21 May 1996; in BBC Monitoring Service, 23 May 1996.

[13] Mark Hibbs, "Khusab Reactor said Started, but Lacks Heavy Water Supply," Nucleonics Week, 19 June 1997, p. 15.

[14] Barry Schwied, "CIA Chief Visits China to Discuss Arms, Terror," The Washington Times, 22 October 1996, p. A11; Jeffrey Smith, "China Sold Nuclear Items Before Vow," The Washington Post, 10 October 1996, p. A38.

[15] "Pakistan Gets Confirmation on Chinese Reactor," Nuclear Engineering International, March 1992, p. 7; Robert Shuey and Shirley A. Kan,"Chinese Missile and Nuclear Proliferation: Issues for Congress,"CRS Issue Brief, 29 September 1995, p. 9.

[16] "A Second Chinese Unit for Chashma is Under Discussion," Nuclear News, February 1995, p. 63; Shahid-ur Rehman, "Financing Isn't Set, but China will Sell Pakistan a Second PWR," Nucleonics Week, 12 December 1996, p. 10; "China May Build Another PWR at Pakistan's Chashma Station," Nucleonics Week, 26 February 1998, p. 1; "China/Pakistan: Nuclear Power Plant Proceeding Toward Operational Readiness," S&T Perspectives, 15 September 1995, p. 8.

[17] "PRC: China Sends Nuclear Power Equipment to Pakistan," FBIS-CHI-96-028, 7 February 1996.

[18] Cao Min, "Nuclear Plant System Sold," China Daily, http://www.chinadaily.co.cn/cndy/history/d5-397.h21.html, 21 August 1997; "China/Pakistan: Chinese Computer System Set for Chashma," Nucleonics Week, 28 August 1997, p. 18.

[19] Bill Gertz, "China Aids Pakistani Plutonium Plant; Facility may Boost Missile Efforts," The Washington Times, 3 April 1996, p. A4.

[20] Nucleonics Week, 9 August 1990, p. 4.

For more in-depth information on open-source reports of Chinese exports and assistance, please consult the CNS Nuclear Abstracts database. For background, see Robert Shuey and Shirley A. Kan, Chinese Missile and Nuclear Proliferation: Issues for Congress. CRS Issue Brief (updated from time to time); chapter on China in Rodney W. Jones and Mark G. McDonough, Tracking Nuclear Proliferation: A Guide in Maps and Charts, 1998 (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1998), pp.49-67; Michael Brenner, “The People's Republic of China,” in William C. Potter, ed., International Nuclear Trade and Nonproliferation: The Challenge of the Emerging Suppliers (Lexington: Lexington Book, 1990); Gary Milhollin and Gerald White, Bomb From Beijing: A Report on China's Nuclear and Missile Exports (Washington, DC: The Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, May 1991). For further reading, see the Selected Bibliograph on Chinese Nuclear Exports and Assistance to Pakistan.

[CHINA'S NUCLEAR EXPORTS AND ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN - STATEMENTS AND DEVELOPMENTS]

[CHINA'S NUCLEAR EXPORTS AND ASSISTANCE TO SOUTH ASIA]

[CHINA'S EXPORT CONTROLS]

[CHINA'S 11 MAY 1996 PLEDGE]

[CHINA AND THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA)]

[CHINA AND THE NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GROUP (NSG)]

[CHINA AND THE NONPROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT)]

[CHINA'S MISSILE EXPORTS AND ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN]

Updated: 11/14/2003

This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by MIIS.