Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)

Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)

Formal Title: TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Summary:

The Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) is designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons; to provide assurances that the peaceful nuclear activities of states which decide not to develop nuclear weapons will not be diverted to making such weapons; to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and make available the potential benefits of any peaceful application of nuclear explosion technology to non-nuclear states; and to express the determination of the parties that the NPT should lead to further progress in comprehensive nuclear arms control and disarmament.

The NPT was opened for signature on 1 July 1968, and was signed on that date by the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and 59 other countries. France and China did not sign the treaty at the time, though France stated it "would behave in the future in this field exactly as the States adhering to the Treaty." The NPT entered into force with the deposit of US ratification on 5 March 1970. Currently, 187 countries are party to the NPT.

The NPT specified that a review conference is to be held five years after entry into force. Six such review conferences have been held. In accordance with the terms of the NPT, a review and extension conference was held in 1995 to decide whether the NPT should continue in force indefinitely or be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. On 11 May, more than 170 countries attending the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference in New York decided to extend the NPT indefinitely and without conditions. The most recent Review Conference was held from 14 April to 19 May 2000 in New York City.

For additional in-depth information, please consult the Inventory of Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes, which can be found on the CNS website at: http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/.

China and the NPT:

Initially, China did not sign the NPT in 1968 and denounced the treaty as a "conspiracy concocted by the USSR and the US to maintain their nuclear monopoly." China viewed the NPT as a way for the nuclear powers, mainly the US and Soviet Union, to perpetuate their power by limiting the military capabilities of other countries. China maintained that it stood for the complete abolition of nuclear weapons and did not advocate or encourage nuclear proliferation, but that the nuclear superpowers had no right to prevent non-nuclear weapons states from acquiring nuclear weapons until the nuclear superpowers committed themselves to complete disarmament.

In the 1980s, China's position on nuclear proliferation started to change. Beijing continued to criticize the NPT as an imbalanced, discriminatory treaty, but also indicated that it accepted in principle the norm of nuclear nonproliferation. In 1984, China became a member of the IAEA and agreed to place all of its exports under international safeguards; that same year a senior Chinese official during a trip to the US provided the US with oral assurances that China did not advocate or encourage nuclear proliferation. In 1990, though still not a member of the NPT, China attended the fourth NPT review conference and, though China criticized the treaty for not banning the deployment of nuclear weapons outside national territories and for not including concrete provisions for general nuclear disarmament, China also stated that the treaty had had a positive impact and had contributed to the maintenance of world peace and stability. In August 1991, shortly after France acceded to the NPT, China also declared its intention to join, though it again expressed its reservations about the treaty's discriminatory nature.

China formally acceded to the Treaty in March 1992 as a nuclear weapon state--the last nuclear weapon state to do so. In its statement of accession, China called on all nuclear powers to issue unconditional no-first-use pledges, to issue negative and positive security assurances to the non-nuclear weapon states, to support the development of nuclear weapons free zones, to withdraw all nuclear weapons deployed outside national territories, and to halt the arms race in outer space.

Since its accession, China has praised the NPT's role in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and China supported the decision to indefinitely extend the NPT at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. However, China has continued to state that it views nonproliferation not as an end in itself, but rather as a means to the ultimate objective of the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons.

Chinese compliance with the NPT:

There have been some concerns raised regarding China's compliance with its NPT obligations, particularly with regard to alleged nuclear technology transfers to Iran and Pakistan. In the case of Pakistan, US intelligence agencies believe that China's nuclear assistance to unsafeguarded facilities in Pakistan may have helped it to make nuclear material such as plutonium or HEU that could be used in building more nuclear weapons. China promised in 1996 to stop all assistance to unsafeguarded facilities. As part of this 1996 pledge, China has also adopted a series of export controls on internationally controlled nuclear items, including dual-use nuclear items, which have helped the government to stem the flow of illicit nuclear goods out of China. US officials continue to have concerns, however, that technical exchanges between Chinese and Pakistani weapons scientists are continuing even though technology transfers may have stopped. In the case of Iran, the US opposes nuclear cooperation with Tehran because any assistance could help its secret effort to build nuclear weapons. In 1997 during the Clinton-Jiang summit in the US, China promised to halt all future nuclear cooperation with Iran and agreed to cancel the sale of two power reactors and a uranium hexaflouride plant to Iran which could assist Iran's covert nuclear weapon program. According to the CIA, China appears to be adhering to these pledges.

In its annual report on compliance with arms control treaties, the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) stated:

May 11, 1996

["Adherence to and Compliance With Arms Control Treaties," US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1997.]

2000 NPT Review Conference

The sixth NPT Review Conference was held in New York City from 14 April to 19 May 2000. A Chinese delegate, calling the review conference a success, stated:

"In spite of the different views held by particpating parties, agreement has been achieved on many issues; consensus has been reached on the need to preserve the effectiveness and universality of the treaty. It reflects the common desire of the participating parties to safeguard the treaty and to promote the three principal objectives. However, the final document does not fully reflect the current international situation, nor does it call for the removal of fundamental obstacles to nuclear disarmament." [Jiang Zhuqing, "Agreement on NPT Hailed," China Daily (online version), 1 June 2000.]

In his opening statement, China's Ambassador for Arms Control and Disarmament, Sha Zukang, spoke on the three broad themes of nuclear nonproliferation, nuclear disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In a surprising move, the five nuclear weapons states were able to agree on language for a joint statement. Considering the divisiveness of such issues as missile defenses, a fissile material cutoff treaty and a ban on outer space weapons, most observers had thought that a joint statement would not have been possible. Reportedly, in order for the statement to be issued, the US agreed to China's demand to link a fissile material ban with a program of work on the "prevention of an arms race in outer space" at the Conference on Disarmament. China had previously linked negotiations on a fissile material cutoff treaty with the establishment of an ad hoc committee on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, a move the US opposed because of its plans to develop and deploy missile defenses. However, the reported agreement now paves the way for these negotiations. For its part of the bargain, China agreed not to push the missile defense issue too hard at the Review Conference. [Rebecca Johnson, "Successful Conference: Now Words Into Actions," Acronym Institute, 20 May 2000.]

In negotiations on safeguards, China stated its objection to language in a draft final document restating the NPT's commitment to full-scope safeguards. China objected to the language as it wishes to continue selling nuclear technology to Pakistan using item-specific safeguards. However, China dropped its opposition to the language after "members of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), in particular Egypt, objected that China was the only NPT state not accepting FSS as a trade principle." [Mark Hibbs, "NPT Review Conference Rejects Ambitious Safeguards-Trade Link," NuclearFuel (online version), Vol. 25, No. 11, 29 May 2000.]

2002 Preparatory Committee (PrepCom)

On 8-19 April, 2002, at the First Session of the PrepCom for the 2005 NPT Review Conference, parties exchanged views and clarified their positions. China concurred with others that, in light of September 11th, combating nuclear proliferation and terrorism had become more urgent. Chinese Ambassador Hu Xiaodi asserted that "some important provisions about nuclear disarmament and regional non-proliferation in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference have not been carried out and some have even been breached." He stated, "Nuclear-weapon states should continue their moratoria on nuclear explosive tests, persevere with CTBT ratification and entry into force, refrain from the development of new types of nuclear weapons, and provide negative security assurances to non-nuclear weapon states unconditionally." He also announced that China had completed the domestic procedures for entry into force of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA. In three working papers China made several recommendations for maintaining and strengthening the global nonproliferation regimes, and emphasized its standard views on the roles of the various international compacts and agencies.

2003 PrepCom

The second session of the PrepCom for the 2005 NPT RevCon was held in Geneva from 28 April to 9 May 2003. The variety of subjects addressed in the Chinese Delegation's statements reflect some of the areas of heightened tensions existing in the international arena during the PreCom session. For instance, Hu Xiaodi, head of the Chinese Delegation, acknowledged in his opening statement the "severe challenges" currently confronting international arms control and disarmament efforts. In the Chinese delegation's statement on "Reduction of the Dangers of Nuclear War," America's policies set forth in the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review and National Security Strategy were singled out for critique. For instance, one statement argued pointedly that "nuclear weapons should not be aimed at any country, nor should any state be listed as nuclear strike target." Additionally, as one of many measures to reduce the risks of nuclear war, "No State should research and develop low-yield and more-likely-used nuclear weapons."

Addressing the problems of North Korea's nuclear intentions, China's statements reiterated support "for maintaining the nuclear-weapon-free status of the Korean Peninsular, safeguarding peace and stability on the peninsular [sic] and resolving the DPRK nuclear issue peacefully through negotiation. China is not in favour of DPRK’s withdrawal from NPT and meanwhile believes that the legitimate security concerns of DPRK should be addressed." Regarding the Middle East, China also reiterated its support for the establishment of a full nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region, and, specifically, "Israel’s accession to the NPT and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards are very important to realize the goal of universal adherence to the NPT in the Middle East."

In other statements China described its multiple contributions to the international nuclear nonproliferation regime, including measures on export controls, reactor safeguards, and many more. It rejected double standards regarding nonproliferation norms, and emphasized that "international disputes should be settled through political means instead of resorting to the wanton use or threat of force."

Key Documents Related to China and the NPT:

2003 Second Session of Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) for 2005 Review Conference (RevCon) Documents:
2002 First Session of Preparatory Committee (PrepCom)for 2005 NPT Review Conferences (RevCon) Documents:
- Ambassador Hu Xiaodi, Statement to 2002 PrepCom for 2005 NPT RevCon, 8 April, 2002 [Chinese Text] [English Text]
- Working Paper #1, submitted by China at 2002 PrepCom for 2005 NPT RevCom (April 2002) [Chinese Text] [English Text]
- Working Paper #2, submitted by China at 2002 PrepCom for 2005 NPT RevCom (April 2002) [Chinese Text] [English Text]
- Working Paper #3, submitted by China at 2002 PrepCom for 2005 NPT RevCom (April 2002) [Chinese Text] [English Text]

2000 NPT Review Conference (RevCon) Documents:

Ambassador Sha Zukang, Statement at the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

24 April 2000

[Chinese Text]

Collective Statement by the UN Permanent Five Nuclear Weapon States, The 2000 NPT Review Conference (RevCon), 14 April - 19 May

2000, New York

Chinese Proposals in the Report of the Third Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 10-21 May 1999

For more on China and the NPT, see:

[TEXT OF THE NPT]

[CHRONOLOGY OF NPT-RELATED STATEMENTS AND DEVELOPMENTS]

For more on China's nuclear exports and nuclear nonproliferation policy, see:

[CHINA'S NUCLEAR EXPORTS]

[CHINA AND THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA)]

[CHINA'S EXPORT CONTROLS]

For other issues related to China's position on the NPT, see:

[CHINA AND NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT/ARMS CONTROL]

[CHINA AND NO-FIRST-USE (NFU)]

[CHINA AND SECURITY ASSURANCES]

Other relevant international agreements, organizations, and regimes:

[CHINA AND NUCLEAR WEAPON FREE ZONES (NWFZ)]

[CHINA AND THE NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GROUP (NSG)]

[CHINA AND THE ZANGGER COMMITTEE (ZAC)]

[CHINA AND THE COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY (CTBT)]

[FISSILE MATERIAL CUTOFF TREATY (FMCT)]

[CHINA'S POSITION ON OUTER SPACE WEAPONS]

Updated 02/21/2003

This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by MIIS.