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Proposals for inclusion in the Report of the Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons working paper submitted by China
Permanent Mission of the PRC to the UN Office at Geneva
New York, 10-21 May 1999
The Chinese delegation hereby submits the following proposals for inclusion
into the recommendation section of the report of the third, session of the
Preparatory Committee for the 2000 NPT Review Conference:
Ⅰ.Implementation of the Provisions of NPT Relating to Nonproliferation of
Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Disarmament and Security Assurances
1. To promote the smooth development of the disarmament process and safeguard
world peace and security, all States Parties commit themselves to cultivate a
new security concept in line with the need of the times. The core of such
concept should be mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and cooperation.
2. To ensure real progress in nuclear disarmament and reach the goal of a
nuclear-weapon-free world as early as possible, all States parties should strive
to establish a just and fair new international political and economic order,
renounce cold war mentality, firmly oppose and do away with hegemonism, power
politics and the pursuit of absolute military superiority. All States Parties
reaffirm to respect one anther's sovereignty and territorial integrity, abide by
the Charter of the United Nations and the norms governing international
relations, oppose the use or threat of military force against other countries
under any pretext, and never resort to military force in the international
relations without the authorization from the United Nations Security Council.
3. To promote the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives, it is
imperative to adhere to the principle of maintaining global strategic stability
and the principle of undiminished security for every country, as well as
ensuring an international environment of peace, security, stability and trust
favorable for the continued progress in nuclear disarmament.
4. All States Parties should refrain from engaging in the research or
development of missile defense system, which could upset global and regional
strategic stability and balance or trigger off a new round of arms race. All
States Parties should also refrain from transferring missile defense technology
and equipment to other countries, so as to prevent the proliferation of missile
and missile technology that could deliver weapons of mass destruction. No State
Party should use missile defense program to interfere in the internal affairs of
other countries, impair their sovereignty or threaten their security.
5. The prevention of nuclear weapon proliferation and the complete elimination
of nuclear weapons are mutually complimentary and promotive. The thorough
destruction of nuclear weapons is the objective, and the prevention of nuclear
weapon proliferation one of the effective means and necessary steps to attain
this goal. In order to achieve the complete elimination of nuclear weapons so as
to free the mankind forever from the threat of nuclear war, --the relevant
nuclear weapon States should renounce the nuclear deterrence policy
characterized by" the first use of nuclear weapons";
--the U.S.A and the Russian Federation, bearing special responsibilities for
nuclear disarmament, should continue to cut down drastically their respective
nuclear arsenals;
--all the nuclear weapons deployed on foreign soil should be withdrawn to their
owner's territory;
--all the nuclear weapon States should, as soon as possible, undertake
unconditionally and in a legally-binding manner not to be the first to use
nuclear weapons, nor use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against
non-nuclear-weapon States. International legal instruments should be concluded
to this effect;
--all States Parties and the whole international community should push for the
early entry into force of CTBT in accordance with its provisions, the
negotiation and conclusion of a universal and verifiable fissile material
cut-off treaty as soon as possible, and on the basis of the above-mentioned
measures, negotiations to conclude a convention completely banning all the
nuclear weapons.
Ⅱ.Implementation of the Provisions of NPT Relating to Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons, Safeguards and Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
1. In order to achieve the objective set out in NPT for preventing nuclear
weapon proliferation, States parties should work for the building-up of a just
and fair new international political and economic order, and strive to do away
with hegemonism, power politics and the nuclear deterrence strategy
characterized by "the first use of nuclear weapons"' In this way, all countries
would feel secure, thus removing the fundamental incentives to acquire, develop
or retain nuclear weapons.
2.To achieve the NPT's objective of nuclear weapon non-proliferation, the
practice of double standards or multi-standards must be opposed, bloc export
control arrangements should be replaced by nondiscriminatory and universally
negotiated multilateral treaties.
Safeguards
All States parties should support the IAEA program for strengthening the
effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards system, conclude
agreement with IAEA on the application of the model protocol and implement these
agreements as soon as possible. IAEA should promote its work in safeguards and
in the peaceful use of nuclear energy in a balanced way.
Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zones
1. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones by the non-nuclear-weapon
States on the basis of voluntary consultations and arrangements freely arrived
at is conducive to the prevention of nuclear weapon proliferation and
contributes to the maintenance of international peace and security. All
nuclear-weapon States should pledge their support for the establishment of
nuclear-weapon-free zones, respect their status and undertake corresponding
obligations, including the legal obligation towards the nuclear-weapon-free
zones as well as the unconditional obligation of not being the first to use
nuclear weapons and not using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against
non-nuclear-weapon States.
2.States parties to a nuclear-free-zone, if they are States parties to other
international or regional agreements at the same time, should ensure that their
observance of other international or regional agreements do not contradict their
obligations to the treaty establishing the nuclear-weapon-free zone.
3. Nuclear-weapon-free zones should constitute a geographical entity whose
boundaries are to be clearly defined by the prospective States parties to the
nuclear-weapon-free zone treaty through full consultations with other States
concerned, especially in cases where territories in dispute are involved, with a
view to facilitating agreement of the other States concerned.
Ⅲ.Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty
1. To negotiate and conclude a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) will be
conducive to promoting nuclear disarmament and preventing nuclear weapons
proliferation.
2. Only mutually coordinated and jointly implemented with other nuclear
disarmament measures, will FMCT be meaningful for achieving the complete
prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons.
3. The commencement, progress and conclusion of FMCT negotiations are closely
related to the development of international peace and security. With a view to
early negotiation and conclusion of FMCT and promoting the goal of a
nuclear-weapon-free world, all the States parties to NPT should:
--strive to establish a just and fair new international political and economic
order, firmly oppose and do away with hegemonism, power politics and the pursuit
of absolute military superiority in international relations;
--respect one another's sovereignty and territorial integrity, abide by the
Charter of the United Nations and the norms governing international relations,
oppose the use or threat of military force against other countries under any
pretext, and never resort to military force in international relations without
the authorization from the United Nations Security Council;
--refrain from engaging in the research, development and deployment of space
weapon systems and missile defense systems that undermine strategic security and
stability;
--call upon the relevant nuclear weapon States to renounce the nuclear
deterrence policy characterized by "first use of nuclear weapons", and withdraw
all the nuclear weapons deployed on foreign soil to their owner's territory;
--request all the nuclear weapon States unconditionally undertake not to be the
first to use nuclear weapons, nor use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against
non-nuclear-weapon States. International legal instruments should be concluded
to this effect.
In line with the above-mentioned measures, the Conference on Disarmament should
commence negotiations in accordance with the mandate contained in the Shannon
report, with a view to concluding a universal and effectively verifiable treaty
banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other
explosive devices.
5. FMCT should only prohibit the production of fissile material for nuclear
weapon purposes. The production of fissile material for other military or
civilian uses should not be prohibited.
6. The verification measures of FMCT should be determined in accordance with the
scope of the treaty as set out by the relevant resolutions of the United Nations
General Assembly, rather than copying the verification models of other treaties
conventions.
7. The future FMCT requires universality, with all the nuclear-capable States
joining in the treaty.
Ⅳ.Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy
1. The practical enhancement of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy will
contribute to full implementation of all objectives of NPT, and play a
significant promotive role in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.
Relevant work in this regard is an important part towards full implementation of
NPT, and should be concretely undertaken.
2. In the fulfillment of the obligations of NPT regarding the peaceful uses of
nuclear energy, the tendency to restrict or even to impede the right of the
developing countries for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy under the pretext
of preventing nuclear weapons proliferation should be opposed and terminated.
3. A few countries have established export control regimes which are beyond NPT
and discriminatory and exclusive in nature. Under various pretexts, they adopt
double standards and impede the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the relevant
international cooperation by the States Parties to NPT, especially the
developing countries. Such acts should he opposed, because it will undermine the
basis for the prevention of nuclear weapon proliferation. The bloc-oriented
export control regimes should be replaced by globally universal
non-proliferation regimes established through multilateral negotiations.
4. It is imperative for IAEA to strengthen its work in the peaceful uses of
nuclear energy. IAEA should not over-emphasize the safeguards function at the
expense of its work to promote international cooperation for the peaceful uses
of nuclear energy.
This
material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin
Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of
International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the
opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or
its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by
MIIS.
