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Summary:
In 1974, the United States proposed the formation of a Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to ensure that suppliers uniformly applied a comprehensive set of guidelines and that nuclear cooperation did not contribute to proliferation. In order to join the NSG, a country must meet three conditions: (1) Be an NPT party, (2) Be an existing or emerging nuclear supplier, and (3) Have an effective export control system. The NSG grew from seven to fifteen countries by 1978 when its guidelines and control list were published, and has since grown to 40. Although suppliers consulted regularly on a bilateral basis, the NSG did not meet throughout the 1980s. The NSG resumed meeting multilaterally in The Hague in March 1991 and has held annual plenary sessions since that time.
The NSG Guidelines include a number of important conditions to control the export of nuclear-related items. For export of items on the NSG Trigger List, the NSG Guidelines currently require (1) an agreement between the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the recipient state requiring the application of safeguards on all fissionable materials in its nuclear activities (also known as "full-scope IAEA safeguards") -- not just on the exported items, (2) physical protection against unauthorized use of transferred materials and facilities, and (3) restraint in the transfer of sensitive facilities, technology, and materials that could contribute to the acquisition of plutonium or highly enriched uranium.
In 1992, the NSG adopted controls on nuclear-related dual-use goods that could contribute to unsafeguarded nuclear activities. The NSG Dual-Use Guidelines prohibit the transfer of controlled items to a non-nuclear weapon state for use in a nuclear explosive activity or an unsafeguarded nuclear fuel-cycle activity, or when there is an unacceptable risk of diversion to such an activity. The Guidelines require recipients to provide assurances (1) specifying how transferred items will be used, (2) stating that they will not be used for proscribed activities, and (3) stating that the suppliers consent will be obtained before any retransfers of the items.
Members of the NSG [as of May 2004]: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
For more in-depth information, please consult the Inventory of Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes, which can be found on the CNS website at: http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/.
China and the NSG:
China was admitted to the NSG on May 28, 2004 during the Group's Fourteenth Plenary Meeting in Göteberg, Sweden. Beijing's previous reluctance to join the NSG stemmed from its view of the NSG as a discriminatory cartel of industrialized countries. However, beginning in the 1990's, China increasingly demonstrated a willingness to conduct serious discussions with the NSG, and by October 1992 a senior Chinese official reportedly stated that China was considering joining the Group. In October 1997, Beijing made further advances toward alignment when it joined the Zangger Committee (ZAC), an informal grouping of nuclear supplier states intended to help harmonize nuclear export policies.
[Sources: China applies to join Nuclear Suppliers Group," Xinhua via China Daily, 27 January 2004, Nonproliferation Center, "The Weapons Proliferation Threat," March 1995, p. 5; Shirley A. Kan, "Chinese Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Current Policy Issues," CRS Issue Brief, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, 17 October 1996, p. 9; Mark Hibbs, "Germany Will Likely Approve HTR Technology Export To China," Nucleonics Week, 18 November 1992, p. 5; Weixing Hu, "China's Nuclear Export Controls: Policy And Regulations," Nonproliferation Review, Winter 1994, p. 5.]
For more on the NSG, see:
[TEXT OF THE GUIDELINES FOR NUCLEAR TRANSFERS (INFCIRC/254/Rev.2/Part 1)]
[TEXT OF THE GUIDELINES FOR NUCLEAR-RELATED DUAL-USE TRANSFERS (INFCIRC/254/Rev.2/Part2/Mod.1)]
For more on China and multilateral export control regimes, see:
[CHINA AND MULTILATERAL EXPORT CONTROL REGIMES]
For more information on China's nuclear exports and export controls, see:
[CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA) SAFEGUARDS]
For information on other international agreements, organizations, and regimes related to nuclear export control, see:
[CHINA AND THE NONPROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT)]
[CHINA AND THE ZANGGER COMMITTEE (ZAC)]
[CHINA AND THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA)]
Last Updated June 2004
This
material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin
Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of
International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the
opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or
its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by
MIIS.
