NTM of verification are the capability of a country unilaterally to verify an agreement, through imagery and detection equipment based in space, land, air, or water. Although NTM does not include information gathered through human intelligence, there is some concern that NTM could include detection devices that could be construed as forms of espionage.
China has stated its opposition to the use of unilateral NTM for use in treaty verification, and China has criticized US and other countries' allegations against China for violations to its nonproliferation commitments on the basis of NTM or human intelligence.
For example, China was highly critical of US actions leading up to the 1993 inspection of a Chinese ship, the Yinhe ("Galaxy"), when it was alleged that the ship was carrying chemical weapon precursors to Iran--an allegation based on US intelligence sources. The ship was searched and no such items were found, however. Following the Yinhe incident, the Chinese government stated:
"In the course of this incident, the United States has acted in an utterly indiscreet and irresponsible manner as it provided its so-called 'intelligence' to the various parties even before it had got the basic facts about the Chinese ship straight. When the Chinese side, after careful investigation into the matter, made clear to the U.S. side that the 'Yin He' did not carry the two chemicals, the U.S. side, insisting on having its way, continued to misguide the public opinion and put pressure on the countries concerned. Recently, the U.S. has so often willfully brought pressure to bear on other countries on the ground of its so-called 'intelligence' which was no more than hearsay or self-invented stories. This is a show of hegemonism and power politics pure and simple. The 'Yin He' incident is only one example in this regard." [Statement by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the Yinhe incident, 4 September 1993.]
During the negotiations for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), China strongly objected to the use of NTM as an adequate basis for inspections, arguing that allowing on-site inspections on the basis of "human intelligence or other espionage information" would amount to "legitimizing espionage" which "infringes on national sovereignty." Although China eventually signed a CTBT that contained provisions for NTM, it submitted a declaration along with its signature that stressed China's opposition to "the abuse of verification rights by any country, including the use of espionage or human intelligence to infringe on the sovereignty of China."
Chinese Disarmament Ambassador Sha Zukang also stated that "As they are under national discretion, national technical means are inherent to be selective and discriminatory". Sha added that NTM may "easily open the door to possible abuse." [Stephanie Nebehay, Reuter, 6 June 1996]
To illustrate this Chinese position, on 13 July 1996, a Chinese diplomat negotiating the CTBT, who asked not to be identified, said that China would never sign an "unequal treaty" which gave "one very advanced country" (possibly meaning the United States) the exclusive power to conduct on-site inspections. He said, "We cannot allow a few countries to be self-proclaimed international police and we can never accept this...It is so obvious that these national technical means could be misused and the implication is clear that the future treaty could be unequal". [AFP (Hong Kong), 13 July 1996, in "PRC: AFP: Nuclear 'Negotiator' Warns Against 'Unequal Treaty,' FBIS.]
In a statement to the Conference on Disarmament (CD), Sha Zukang stated:
- "China is firmly opposed to using human intelligence or espionage
information in triggering an OSI in the name of 'national technical means.'
China will never allow legitimizing espionage, as it infringes upon national
sovereignty, in the CTBT or other future international arms control and
disarmament treaties."
[Statement by Ambassador Sha Zukang to the Conference on Disarmament, 1
August 1996.]
For more on China's position on the CTBT, see:
[CHINA AND THE COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY (CTBT)]
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This
material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin
Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of
International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the
opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or
its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by
MIIS.
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