China's Nuclear Export Controls

China's Nuclear Export Controls

I. Introduction
II. May 1997 State Council Circular on Nuclear and Nuclear Related Dual Use Export Controls
III. September 1997 Nuclear Export Control Regulations
IV. June 1998 Regulations on Dual Use Nuclear Exports
V. US Government Comments on China's Nuclear Export Control
VI. Key Statements/Documents Related to China's Nuclear Export Controls

I. Introduction

China's current nuclear export controls consist of three main components: (1) a May 1997 State Council circular on nuclear and nuclear related dual use export controls, (2) the September 1997 nuclear export control regulations (with attached control list--same as the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) control list on nuclear items (INFCIRC/254 Part I)) and (3) the June 1998 regulations covering dual use nuclear export which have an attached control list the same as the NSG's nuclear related dual use control list (INFCIRC/254 Part II). These regulations give legal effect to China's three nuclear export principles (see below) and its 11 May 1996 pledge not to provide assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. According to the regulations, only State Council-designated entities can conduct nuclear exports.

China's nuclear export controls are based on the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and China's 1994 Foreign Trade Law.

In their 29 October 1997 joint statement, the United States and China stated: "China has placed controls on exports of nuclear and dual use materials and related technology and will take further measures to strengthen dual use export controls by mid-1998." [Joint US-China Statement, 29 October 1997.]

Since 1984, China has declared that it conducts nuclear exports according to the following three principles:

(1) All exports should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes

(2) All exports should be subject to IAEA safeguards

(3) No exports should be re-transferred to a third country without prior Chinese approval

In its first statement as a full member of the Zangger Committee, China stated:

"With regard to any nuclear export, the recipient government is always requested to provide to the Chinese side an assurance in writing to acknowledge the above three principles and the export can proceed only after approval by relevant Chinese authorities. In actual implementation, China has always administered nuclear export and nuclear cooperation through a management which combines laws, regulations and administrative decrees. The State Council and the competent authorities of various industries have laid down strict and specific regulations on nuclear export and nuclear cooperation, and strictly prohibit any exchange of nuclear weapons related technology and information with other countries. Such management falls in line with China's national conditions and has proved effective in practice." [Statement by Ambassador Li Changhe of the Chinese Permanent Mission in Vienna at the Meeting of the Zangger Committee, 16 October 1997.]

China lacks any atomic energy statute. Prior to its September 1997 nuclear export control regulations, China's restrictions regarding nuclear related items were vague in China's general export laws. China also lacked any kind of trigger lists, a method commonly used by countries with no nuclear control statutes (e.g. the United Kingdom and Italy); heavy water was the only nuclear related item explicitly mentioned in China's published export control legislation before the September 1997 regulations.

China is currently not a member of the NSG, nor has it adopted all the group's export policies [particularly requiring full-scope safeguards (FSS)]. However, China has stated its adherence to and maintains export controls in line with most guidelines specified by the NSG trigger lists. China reportedly refers to INFCIRC/254 Part I and Part II when conducting its nuclear and nuclear-related dual-use exports.

Cited among the reasons for China's reluctance to join the NSG has been a tendency to regard the NSG as a discriminatory cartel of industrialized countries. However, beginning in the 1990's, China increasingly has demonstrated a willingness to conduct serious discussions with the NSG. In October 1992, a senior Chinese official reportedly stated that China was considering joining the NSG. By October 1997, Beijing joined the Zangger Committee (ZAC), an informal grouping of nuclear supplier states intended to help harmonize nuclear export policies.

In a further significant move on 26 January 2004, China's permanent representative to the United Nations and other international organizations in Vienna, Zhang Yan, filed a formal application to join the NSG.

[J. Mohan Malik, "China's Policy Towards Nuclear Arms Control In The Post-Cold War Era," Contemporary Security Policy, 8/95, p. 29; Weixing Hu, "China's Nuclear Export Controls: Policy And Regulations," Nonproliferation Review, Winter 1994, p. 6; Burrus M. Carnahan, "Export Law And Policy Of The Emerging Nuclear Suppliers: A Basis For Cautious Optimism," Eye on Supply, No. 5, Fall 1991, p. 68., "China applies to join Nuclear Suppliers Group," China Daily, 27 January 2004.]

II. May 1997 State Council Circular on Nuclear and Nuclear Related Dual Use Export Controls:

In May 1997, China issued a Circular to its government ministries and non-government entities, providing guidance on nuclear exports, i.e. what can and cannot be exported. ["Daily Press Briefing," US Department of State, 18 September 1997.] The Circular stated:

[Jiang Wandi, "Tighter Controls on Nuclear Exports," Beijing Review, 1-7 December 1997, pp. 21-22.]

Regarding the Circular, China stated:

"In May 1997, the State Council of China promulgated the Circular on Strict Implementation of China's Nuclear Export Policy, which provides that the nuclear materials, nuclear equipment and related technology, as well as non-nuclear materials for reactors, and nuclear related dual use equipment, materials and relevant technologies on China's export list must not be supplied to or used in nuclear facilities not under IAEA safeguards. No agency or company is allowed to conduct cooperation or exchange of personnel and technological data with nuclear facilities not under IAEA safeguards. I would like to point that the above regulations are applicable not only to nuclear facilities not under safeguards, but also to all activities related to nuclear explosive devices."

"The Circular also provides that in conducting the above-mentioned trade or activities in nuclear facilities with a non-signatory to NPT, any Chinese agency or company should seek prior confirmation from the State Atomic Energy Authority whether or not the nuclear facilities in question are under IAEA safeguards and ask for in advance certificate of end-use from competent authorities of the recipient government and an assurance that the equipment so imported or cooperation so conducted will not be transferred to nuclear facilities not under safeguards. In case of no nuclear facilities are involved, competent authorities of the recipient government are required to provide in advance a reasonable and reliable end-use certificate for the equipment so imported or cooperation so conducted will not be transferred to nuclear facilities not under safeguards. Such export or activities of cooperation can not proceed until confirmation and approval are granted by China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC) and the State Atomic Energy Authority with regard to the above mentioned certificates. Annexed to the Circular is the control list of dual use items which is identical to Part II of INFCIRC 254. The promulgation of the above regulations has guaranteed China's effective control on nuclear related dual use items before the promulgation of relevant laws and regulations on the export control of such items."

"The Circular has been formulated by China's State Council as empowered by the Constitution and is legally binding. All the departments concerned should comply with it and the supportive detailed rules for implementation will be formulated, no unit, companies or laboratories can be excepted." [Statement by Ambassador Li Changhe of the Chinese Permanent Mission in Vienna at the Meeting of the Zangger Committee, 16 October 1997.]

Chinese Foreign Ministry official Fu Cong stated:

["An Introduction of China's Export Control System," statement by by Mr. Fu Cong, Department of Arms Control and Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, at Tokyo Workshop on Nonproliferation Export Control Regimes, 11-12 December 1997.]

III. September 1997 Nuclear Export Control Regulations:

On 11 September 1997, China issued details of its new nuclear export control regulations, which provide for tighter control over the sale of nuclear technology and non-nuclear equipment for use in reactors to other countries. The 22-clause regulations were approved by Premier Li Peng the same day on behalf of the State Council. The regulations include an attached "Nuclear Export Control List" of nuclear exports subject to control. A draft of the rules was passed on 1 August 1997 at the 61^st meeting of the State Council's executive committee.

The regulations reiterate China's three principles for nuclear exports (outlined above). The rules state that "the state will carry out strict management and control of nuclear exports and will strictly fulfill its international obligation not to spread nuclear weapons". The rules require State Council approval for all such sales, and would prohibit the export of nuclear equipment, personnel, and technology to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities: the regulations state that "The government prohibits providing help to nuclear facilities not subject to the supervision of international atomic agencies and will not provide exports, personnel, technical exchange or cooperation to those facilities". This rule means that China will require limited-scope--not full-scope--safeguards on its nuclear exports. Applications for nuclear exports would be examined by the departments in charge of nuclear industry and nuclear exports. Countries importing Chinese nuclear technology would be prohibited from re-transfering the technology to third countries without approval from China's nuclear authorities, and the importing countries must guarantee that the technology will not be used to develop nuclear explosives. Items and technology on the attached "Nuclear Export Control List" would require the appropriate licenses before they can be exported. According to Xinhua, the regulations were issued "to strengthen controls on nuclear exports and to safeguard the security of the nation and public interests and to promote international cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy". [Ivan Tang, "Nuclear Controls Passed," South China Morning Post, 2 August 1997, p. 9; PLA Daily (in Chinese), 2 August 1997; PRC Newsletter, 7 August 1997; "Controls to Allay US Missile Fears," Hong Kong Standard, 21 September 1997; "China Issues Nuclear Export Rules," Reuter, in Washington Post, 12 September 1997, p. A29; Scott Hillis, "China Insists Nuclear Exports For Peaceful Use," Reuter, 11 September 1997; Associated Press, 11 September 1997; "China Clear About its Nuke Policy," China Daily.]

Regarding the regulations, China stated in October 1997:

"In order to transform relevant policies and regulation into law, China's State Council promulgated last September the Regulations on Nuclear Export Control, establishing in the form of law the three principles governing China's nuclear export and the policy not provide assistance to nuclear facilities not under safeguards."
"1. The Regulations provide that nuclear export is monopolized by units designated by the State Council. No other [unit] or individual is allowed to engage in such export. A licensing system is applied to the nuclear export by the State, i.e. all the items and their technologies on the "Nuclear Export Control List" should apply for an export license. The control list is the same as Part I of the INFCIRC 254."

"2. The Regulations provide that the State Atomic Energy Authority shall examine nuclear export applications. If the approved application involves nuclear materials, it shall be referred to the Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense for re-examination; if it involves other materials, it shall be referred to the MOFTEC for re-examination. Any nuclear export which has a bearing on state security, social and public interests or foreign policy, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should be consulted; when necessary, such export should be further reported to the State Council for approval. After approval, the MOFTEC will issue an export license."

"3. The Regulations provide that if the recipient government should violate its commitment made under these Regulations, or if there is an imminent danger of nuclear proliferation, the department concerned of the Chinese Government has the right to suspend such export."

"4. The Regulations provide that any violation of the Regulations is liable to punishment by law."

"The Regulations are not only distributed and made known to all the relevant units through regular channels, but also published by the People's Daily which has the largest circulation in China and other newspapers and periodicals so as to ensure the broadest possible public awareness. On September 15, the spokesman of the Foreign Ministry of the Chinese Government made a special statement to comprehensively and authoritatively expound the policy of the Chinese Government on the issue of nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear export control in connection with the promulgation of the Regulations on Nuclear Export Control." [Statement by Ambassador Li Changhe of the Chinese Permanent Mission in Vienna at the Meeting of the Zangger Committee, 16 October 1997.]

Chinese Foreign Ministry official Fu Cong made the following five points regarding the nuclear export control regulations:

"2. Before any nuclear export can be made, the Chinese Government must receive written assurances from the recipient government that the China-supplied nuclear materials, nuclear equipment, or non-nuclear materials used for reactors as well as the special fissile material produced through the use of these material and equipment will be put under the safeguards of IAEA, and will not be used for nuclear explosive purposes, and that without prior written approval by the China Atomic Energy Authority (CAEA), it will not transfer to a third party China-supplied nuclear materials, nuclear equipment or non-nuclear materials used for reactors as well as their related technologies. The recipient government also needs to pledge in written form to take appropriate measures to physically protect China-supplied nuclear materials."

"3. Nuclear export is monopolized by companies designated by the State Council. No other company or individual is allowed to engage in such export. A licensing system is applied to the nuclear export by the State, i.e. an export license is needed for the export of any item or technology on the "Nuclear Export Control List". The control list is the same as the first part of the INFCIRC/254."

"4. The State Atomic Energy Authorities shall examine nuclear export applications. If the approved application involves nuclear materials, it shall be referred to the Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense for re-examination; if it involves other material, it shall be referred to the MOFTEC for re-examination. Any nuclear export which has a bearing on state security, social and public interests or foreign policy, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should be consulted; when necessary, such export should be further reported to the State Council for approval. After approval, the MOFTEC will issue an export license."

"5. If the recipient government should violate its commitments made under these regulations, or if there is an imminent danger of nuclear proliferation, the Chinese Government has the right to suspend such export." ["An Introduction of China's Export Control System," statement by by Mr. Fu Cong, Department of Arms Control and Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, at Tokyo Workshop on Nonproliferation Export Control Regimes, 11-12 December 1997.]

IV. June 1998 Regulations on Dual Use Nuclear Exports:

China announced on 17 June1998 that the State Council had passed Decree No. 245 called "Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Export Control of Dual-Use Nuclear Products and Related Technologies." The promulgation of these regulations closed a major loophole in China's export control laws on nuclear items. The regulations were drawn up for the purpose of " tightening control over the export of dual-purpose nuclear goods and correlated technologies, preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, promoting international cooperation on the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and safeguarding national security and public interests." Similar to China's other export control laws, this law also applies China's three principles on nuclear exports to dual use nuclear goods as well. These regulations also stipulate that all companies wishing to export dual use nuclear goods must register with MOFTEC and submit detailed information about the technologies for export and the proposed end-user. MOFTEC will then consult with other government agencies such as the China National Nuclear Agency, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and possibly even the State Council when determining whether to issue an export license. These regulations also include, in article 17, a catch-all clause providing government agencies with unilateral authority to cancel exports. Indeed, the regulations do not even specify a trigger for the catch-all clause, giving the government particularly wide authority to cancel deals. The Nuclear Supplier's Group regulations on dual use exports do not even include a catch-all clause. Thus, judged against many international standards, China's dual use nuclear export regulations are both comprehensive and rigorous.

In earlier statements about dual use export controls, Chinese officials stated:

"Relevant departments of China are stepping up their efforts to complete the export control regulations on the nuclear related dual use items. The control list of the regulations will be the same as Part II of INFCIRC 254 on dual use items. The export of all the items on the list will be subject of strict examination procedures. In addition, if the relevant department of the Government has reason to believe that the export of some item may possibly cause nuclear proliferation, even though the item may not be listed, the department concerned has the right to ban or suspend such an export. The regulations will be completed by mid-1998." [Statement by Ambassador Li Changhe of the Chinese Permanent Mission in Vienna at the Meeting of the Zangger Committee, 16 October 1997.]

In 1997, Chinese Foreign Ministry official Fu Cong stated:

V. US Government Comments on China's Nuclear Export Control:

The CIA commented on China's nuclear export controls in an unclassified report on global proliferation released to the US Congress in February 1999. The report stated:

[CIA Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January - 30 June 1998, Central Intelligence Agency, 9 February 1999.]

In addition to the above mentioned report on global proliferation concerns, on 2 February 1999 CIA director George Tenet in a prepared statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on Current and Projected National Security Threats stated:

"The China story is a mixed picture, Mr. Chairman. China's senior leaders are actively studying membership in the Missile Technology Control Regime and have pledged to prevent the export of materials or technology that could assist missile and nuclear programs in South Asia. Beijing has promulgated controls on dual-use nuclear technology and tightened chemical export controls."
"We cannot yet assure you, however, that the new export control mechanisms will be effective. Both the Chinese Government and Chinese firms have long-standing and deep relationships with proliferant countries, and we are not convinced that China's companies fully share the commitments undertaken by senior Chinese leaders. While all aspects of China's proliferation behavior bear continued watching, we see more signs of progress on nuclear matters than on missile assistance. Moreover, the restructuring of China's defense industrial bureaucracy - including entities charged with export oversight - holds the potential to create confusion and incentives that would impede the effectiveness of this system. In short, Mr. Chairman, our guard remains up on this question." [George J. Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence, Statement Before the Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing on Current and Projected National Security Threats, 2 February 1999.]

VI. Key Statements and Documents Related to China's Nuclear Export Controls:

Updated: 02/06/2004

This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by MIIS.