Research Overview on China and Arms Control Nonproliferation Issues

Research Overview on China and Arms Control / Nonproliferation Issues

Background	Nuclear Disarmament/ Arms Control	China's Nuclear Policies and Programs	Nuclear Non- proliferation
Missile Non- proliferation	Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBW) Non- proliferation	Other Issues	US Positions

Background

The stated position of Chinese leaders is that the ultimate goal of disarmament/arms control is the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of all weapons of mass destruction--nuclear, biological, and chemical. China holds that effective disarmament and arms control must be achieved in a fair, reasonable, comprehensive, and balanced manner, and is opposed to the use of either arms control or the sale of weapons to interfere with the "internal affairs" of other countries. Chinese policy is tempered by its national security requirements, and is based on the assumption that as the world becomes increasingly multipolar, arms control is necessary to assure a stable and secure environment that will allow economic development.

China believes that the foundation for arms control is a peaceful global security environment and that progress in disarmament can only be made on the basis of equality, mutual trust and benefit and lasting peace. Without peace and stability, countries will not feel secure in reducing their arsenals. China condemns hegemony and power politics as relics of the Cold War that do not promote disarmament. China urges all countries to abide by the five principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity -- mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each others' internal affairs, equality, mutual benefit and peaceful co-existence -- as the foundation for world peace and arms control. For China, the establishment of a new and fair international order is fundamental for progress in disarmament.

After the fall of the Soviet Union, Chinese official statements expressed optimism that a new era of peace had arrived and that the confrontation between the superpowers would give way to global disarmament. However, US-led military action in Iraq and Serbia and the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade have reignited Chinese fears that the US is bent on global hegemony. In addition, US plans to deploy National Missile Defense (NMD) and Theater Missile defense (TMD) systems have been met with strong resistance from China. China believes that NMD will undermine its second strike capability and that TMD will prevent it from recovering Taiwan. China is increasingly pessimistic about global arms control and foresees a global arms build-up to thwart US military intentions.

In official statements, China has held that the purpose of disarmament is to increase the security of all countries and that disarmament should not be used by stronger nations to control weaker nations. In addition, countries should refrain trying to achieve absolute security. Only by reducing threats from militarily stronger countries will weaker countries feel secure enough to refrain from improving their arsenals. To this end, China has called on the United States and Russia to drastically reduce their nuclear arsenals before China commits itself to nuclear disarmament.

The second purpose of disarmament is to promote economic development. Military expenditures divert resources that could be used to develop private commerce. By limiting the production of weapons, arms control can improve the quality of life for its citizens. In addition, arms control regimes should promote scientific and technological cooperation in order that it does not hinder the economic development. China is a strong proponent of the transfer of nuclear energy technology under IAEA safeguards.

In keeping with its focus on disarmament as a means to promote international security, China has consistently argued that multilateral agreements should take precedence over bloc arrangements. China has historically opposed arrangements such as the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) and the Australia Group (AG) on the grounds that they are discriminatory in nature. However, in the last few years China has modified their export controls to correspond with these limited membership arrangements. Most scholars agree that China views bilateral nonproliferation agreements between the US and China as extensions of US-China relations and not as commitments to the global nonproliferation regime. Because of this, China's participation in bloc agreements is often subject to the ups and downs in its relations with the US.

Additional documents that provide the official Chinese position on arms control/disarmament/nonproliferation include:

Today, China participates in a number of international agreements, organizations, and regimes related to arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament.

Nuclear Disarmament/Arms Control

The Chinese government advocates "the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons." China believes that the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) is the fundamental nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation regime and must be faithfully observed. China wants to maintain a peaceful global environment free from arms races so that it may develop its economy.

China is a strong proponent of an unconditional no-first-use (NFU) policy and is the only P-5 nuclear weapons state to pledge not to undertake "to be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time or under any circumstances." China's NFU policy forms the foundation of its nuclear policy and China advocates its adoption by the other nuclear weapon states. China holds that adopting an unconditional NFU policy will delegitimize nuclear weapons and lay a foundation for their complete elimination. China also supports the establishment of nuclear weapon free zones (NWFZs), maintaining that these types of agreements are of "great importance to the advancement of nuclear disarmament, the prevention of nuclear proliferation and the promotion of international and regional peace and security." In addition, China also calls for all states with nuclear weapons deployed beyond their borders to withdraw all weapons within their own borders and specifically call on US and Russia to take the lead in nuclear disarmament and make drastic reductions in their nuclear arsenals. China believes that only after drastic cuts in the US and Russian nuclear arsenals are made can other nuclear weapon states be expected to reduce their numbers of nuclear weapons.

China has given its support to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), signing the treaty in 1996 and upholding a moratorium for nuclear testing. However, China has yet to ratify the treaty and Beijing has admitted that the US Senate's rejection of the CTBT hwill delay its own ratification. China's accession to the CTBT was complicated by a number of international and domestic factors. During the CTBT negotiations, many within the Chinese leadership, especially military officials, appeared concerned that China's nuclear weapons program had not advanced far enough to allow for an end to testing. In fact, in the two years prior to the PRC's declaration of a testing moratorium, China significantly increased the regularity of nuclear testing. China's earlier opposition to the CTBT was also due to concerns about the treaty's verification regime and the proposed elimination of peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs). China believed that the use of national technical means (NTM) was discriminatory since only the US and Russia had the means to operate intelligence satellites, and this could lead to the abuse of these capabilities for individual gain. China also opposed on-site inspections on the grounds that this could allow the use of human intelligence which would impinge on national sovereignty. China also argued for exempting from the treaty peaceful nuclear explosions, stating developing nations should not be forced to foreclose the possibility of using nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes that may have economic benefits. However, international and domestic pressure (particular from the Foreign Ministry's arms control community) convinced China's leadership to declare a testing moratorium and sign the treaty.

China has remained stridently opposed to the research, development and deployment of missile defenses and space-based weapon systems. Beijing believes that missile defense systems will undermine strategic security and stability by degrading its deterrent capability. Because of this, China fears that states will need to increase their nuclear arsenals to overcome the proposed missile defense systems. China is especially critical of any proposal that would include Taiwan in a missile defense system, fearing that the increased security may help foster pro-independence factions on the island. China has openly opposed deployment of space-based weapons, fearing it will lead to an arms race in outer space. Together with the Russian Federation and a number of other state, China has actively sought negotiations on a treaty on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. (For more information, see China's Attitude Toward Outer Space Weapons in this database.)

China also supports or participates in several other international agreements, organizations, and regimes that contribute to arms control/disarmament/nonproliferation.

China's Nuclear Policies and Programs

In a statement to 2000 NPT Review Conference, China stated that its "very limited nuclear force is for the sole purpose of self-defense, and for maintaining world peace, countering nuclear blackmail and threat, preventing nuclear war and ultimately eliminating nuclear weapons." According to its nuclear weapons declaratory policy, China undertakes not to use nuclear weapons first under any circumstances, or to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states or nuclear weapon free zones. Beijing has also stated that it "does not endorse the policy of nuclear deterrence based on the first use of nuclear weapons," and that "China has always exercised the utmost restraint with respect to the development of nuclear weapons and kept its nuclear arsenal to a minimum level."

China reportedly has a nuclear weapons stockpile of between 400-450 total warheads. These warheads are deployed on various delivery systems. Three hundred are "strategic" in nature, used to arm China's ballistic missiles--intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), short- to medium range ballistic missiles (SRBMs and MRBMs)--and combat aircraft. The remainder of China's warheads are reportedly tactical in nature, possibly including artillery shells, rockets, and mines.

A few useful background sources on China's nuclear weapons program and arsenal include:

"NRDC Nuclear Nuclear Notebook: Chinese Nuclear Forces," prepared by Robert S. Norris and William M. Arkin of the Natural Resources Defense Council, available in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November/December 2000.
Robert S. Norris, Andrew S. Burrows, and Richard W. Fieldhouse, Nuclear Weapons Databook, Vol.5: British, French, and Chinese Weapons (Washington, DC: Natural Resources Defense Council, 1994).
John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China's Strategic Seapower: The Politics of Force Modernization in the Nuclear Age (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994).
John Wilson Lewis and Hua Di, "China's Ballistic Missile Program: Technologies, Strategies, and Goals," International Security, Fall 1992.
John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988).

In its public statements, China is clear about when it will not use nuclear weapons, but its doctrine on actual use of nuclear weapons is not so clear. China has not published an official doctrine governing the use of nuclear weapons. it appears to follow a doctrine of minimal deterrence, but some Chinese strategists have adocated a shift to limited deterrence that provides a more flexible nuclear response capability.

China's Nuclear Weapon and Delivery Vehicle Modernization

China is pursuing the modernization of its nuclear weapons as well as the modernization of its delivery vehicles, including two new ICBMs and one new SLBM, for deployment in the coming decade.

China has conducted a total of 45 nuclear weapons tests, all at its Lop Nur test site in northwest China. China's most recent test was conducted on 29 July 1996, after which it declared a moratorium effective from 30 July. During its testing, China stated on several occasions that it had "all along exercised utmost restraint on nuclear testing," and the number of its tests were "extremely limited in number."

China also has a large infrastructure to support its nuclear weapons program, including nuclear weapon related facilities for the design, production, and dismantlement of nuclear warheads.

Estimates of China's fissile material stockpile vary, but it is widely assumed that China has enough weapons-usable fissile material in its stockpile to double or even triple its current arsenal of nuclear warheads.

China's Civilian Nuclear Program

China has capabilities in all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, from uranium mining and milling to uranium enrichment and reprocessing.

With its economic reforms and more open economy since the late 1970s, China has placed more emphasis on its ever increasing energy needs. To meet its current and future energy needs, China is pursuing an ambitious nuclear energy program. China currently has three operational power reactors, and its constructing and planning more, with substantial assistance from foreign countries such as Russia, South Korea, and France. Beijing plans to rely to a great extent on nuclear energy to meet its needs in the coming decades. China also is pursuing a fairly ambitious peaceful nuclear research program, for various applications.

In 1985, China announced its decision to voluntarily put some of its civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards, and on 20 September 1988, signed an agreement with the IAEA (contained in the IAEA document INFCIRC/369). In 1998, China signed the Additional Protocol to the IAEA Safeguards Agreement, and in March 2002, China completed domestic legal procedure for the entry into force of the Additional Protocol.

China is a strong supporter of the export of nuclear energy technology. China believes that it is every country's right to have secure energy sources and does not support organizations whose nuclear energy transfer regulations are more strict than IAEA safeguards. As a result, China and the US have disagreed on the transfer of nuclear technology to Iran and Pakistan.

Nuclear Nonproliferation

As part of its effort to promote its own peaceful nuclear energy program and to obtain hard currency and technology, China conducts nuclear cooperation and trade with a number of countries. China has governmental nuclear cooperation agreements with more than 15 countries, including: Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Germany, Iran, Japan, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russia, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States, and the former Yugoslavia.

China states that is conducts its nuclear exports according to three principles:

(1) All exports should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes
(2) All exports should be subject to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards
(3) No exports should be re-transferred to a third country without prior Chinese consent

However, throughout the years, especially before China joined the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (1984) and acceded to the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) (1992), allegations were made regarding China's nuclear weapon related assistance to other countries, especially to countries in the Middle East and South Asia.

China has denied any such allegations, stating that it "has strictly abided by its obligations on nuclear non-proliferation" and that "China is a responsible country, and has never applied double standards. China has all along pursued the policy of not endorsing, encouraging, or engaging in nuclear weapons proliferation and not assisting other countries in developing nuclear weapons." China has also stated that it "has never exported such sensitive technologies or equipment as those for uranium enrichment, reprocessing, and heavy water production."

China also imports a substantial amount of nuclear technology from abroad, related to all aspects of the fuel cycle.

For China's position on its nuclear trade, see:

Wang Guangya, Vice Foreign Minister, Article on China's Non-Proliferation Policy and Practice, 17 October 2002

White Paper on Arms Control and Disarmament, November 1995

China's National Report on the Implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 17 April 1995.

Missile Nonproliferation

In 1992, China agreed to abide by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), however it did not automatically accept the MTCR technology annex that proscribes the transfer of key technologies. In 2002, China promulgated new and expanded export controls for missiles and related technology which corresponded closely with the MTCR. Prior to the release of these new regulations, China's transfers of missiles, missile technology and components, missile production facilities and equipment, and technical training to countries in the developing world caused many in the international community to worry that China was contributing to dangerous missile proliferation. Of particular concern are the transfers in the early 1990's of ballistic and cruise missiles capable of functioning as delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to countries of proliferation concern, including Pakistan, Iran, and Syria. Many nonproliferation specialists continue to worry about China's perceived willingness to transfer production technology and expertise, enabling countries in the developing world to produce advanced missiles indigenously.

In the past, China stated that the focus of nonproliferation efforts should be on the restriction of WMD themselves, not on their delivery systems. China also argued that if one type of delivery system is to be restricted (e.g. ballistic missiles), then other delivery systems, such as combat aircraft, ought to be restricted as well. China criticized the international regime on the restriction of ballistic missile exports, the MTCR, on these grounds. China was also critical of unilateral US sanctions imposed for alleged Chinese violations of MTCR guidelines, which apply even to countries, such as China, that are not members of the MTCR. Despite this earlier opposition, the 2002 regulations included both the MTCR's "presumption of denial" approach, end-user certifications, and a "catch-all" clause. Many analysts believe that these regulations mark a realization in China's leadership of the dangers of the proliferation of WMD and their delivery systems to its own security.

China also imports missiles and missile technology from a number of counties, most prominently Russia.

For more information on China's missile exports and imports, see the section on Missile Nonproliferation in this database.

China also has advanced indigenous missile and space launch programs. China deploys a variety of short, medium, and longer range ballistic and cruise missiles, and conducts civilian space launches to outer space, placing satellites into orbit for its own needs and for foreign customers.

Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBW) Nonproliferation

China is a party to most of the major international agreements regulating chemical and biological weapons, including the Geneva Protocol, the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), though China is not currently a member of the Australia Group (AG) on CBW export controls.

Officially, China opposes both chemical and biological weapons programs. In its November 1995 white paper on arms control and disarmament, China stated that it supports, as the ultimate goal of disarmament, "the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (including chemical and biological weapons)." China also stated that it "has consistently advocated the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of chemical weapons. It does not produce or possess chemical weapons," and also that China "has consistently advocated a complete prohibition and thorough destruction of biological weapons. It opposes the production of biological weapons by any country and their proliferation in any form by any country." ["China: Arms Control And Disarmament," Information Office of the State Council of the Peoples Republic of China, November 1995.]

Despite China's official position, there have been allegations that the Chinese government is still secretly pursuing chemical and biological weapons programs, in violation of its CWC and BWC commitments. These allegations have originated primarily in the United States. Since the entry into force of the CWC in 1997, China has hosted numerous regular on-site inspections and remains a State Party in good standing with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

In its January 2001 report entitled, Proliferation: Threat and Response, the US Defense Department stated:

"Beijing is believed to have an advanced chemical warfare program including research and development, production, and weaponization capabilities. China's chemical industry has the capability to produce many chemicals, some of which have been sought by states trying to develop a chemical warfare capability. Foreign sales of such chemicals have been a source of foreign exchange for China. The Chinese government has imposed restrictions on the sale of some chemical precursors and its enforcement activities generally have yielded mixed results.
"While China claims it possesses no chemical agent inventory, it is believed to possess a moderate inventory of traditional agents. … Chinese military forces most likely have a good understanding of chemical warfare doctrine, and its forces routinely conduct defensive chemical warfare training. Even though China has ratified the CWC, made its declaration, and subjected its declared chemical weapons facilities to inspections, we believe that Beijing has not acknowledged the full extent of its chemical weapons program.
"China continues to maintain some elements of an offensive biological warfare program it is believed to have started in the 1950s. China possesses a sufficiently advanced biotechnology infrastructure to allow it to develop and produce biological agents. ... China is believed to possess an offensive biological warfare capability based on technology developed prior to its accession to the BWC in 1984. China actively participates in international efforts to negotiate a BWC compliance protocol."

China has been accused of exporting CBW-related technology to countries of concern in the developing world, including Iran. China denies these charges.

For Chinese and US views on the issue, see:

For more information on Chinese CBW issues, see the section on CBW Nonproliferation contained in this database.

Other Issues

For other key issues related to China and nonproliferation, see:

US Positions

Chinese positions on nonproliferation can be contrasted with United States positions by reviewing one principal statement and one key document:

General US positions on arms control are contained in the following three basic strategic documents:

Updated 02/10/2003

This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by MIIS.