Features

This material is produced by the Monterey Institute's Center for Nonproliferation Studies
China
Arms Control/Nonproliferation Diplomacy  
Nuclear Policy
Nuclear Nonproliferation
Missile Nonproliferation
Other Arms Control/Nonproliferation
Reference
Index
Search
Glossaries

China's Attitude Toward Outer Space Weapons

According to China's public position, outer space should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. China is officially opposed to any militarization of space, including (and perhaps especially) space-based missile defense systems. China has also made strong statements against any type of arms race, including arms races in space. In both the 1998 and 2000 white papers on national defense, China called for the creation of a multilateral mechanism to prevent an arms race in outer space. The 1998 White Paper stated that: 

"Outer space belongs to all mankind, and should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes to benefit mankind. To this end, China stands for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of weapons deployed in outer space. It opposes the development of anti-satellite weapons. China maintains that the international community, the big powers with the capacity to utilize outer space in particular, should take the following realistic steps to prevent a weaponized outer space: A complete ban on weapons of any kind in outer space, including anti-missile and anti-satellite weapons, so as to keep outer space free of weapons; a ban on the use of force or conduct of hostilities in, from or to outer space; and all countries should undertake neither to experiment with, produce or deploy outer space weapons nor, to utilize outer space to seek strategic advantages on the ground, for example, using disposition of the important parts of ground anti-missile systems in outer space for the purpose of developing strategic defensive weapons.  In addition, negotiations should be held as soon as possible for the conclusion of a legally-binding international agreement with the above-mentioned contents."

The 2000 White Paper expressed similar opposition to the weaponization of outer space, adding that:

"At present, there are intentions, plans and actions to pursue unilateral military and strategic superiority in, and control of, outer space. They are not only real but also growing. Therefore, it is realistic and urgent that the international community takes effective measures to stop such negative developments." Over a period of years, the international community has, for the purpose of promoting the peaceful uses of outer space and preventing an arms race there, drawn up a series of multilateral or bilateral legal instruments regulating State Parties' space activities. However, these instruments have not reflected the development of the most advanced aerospace technology today, and therefore are unable to effectively prevent the militarization of or an arms race in outer space. China believes that the most direct and effective way to achieve this purpose in the new century is to negotiate and bring into being a new international legal instrument, in addition to continued strict compliance with the existing ones."

Despite these claims, some analysts believe that China is covertly developing military space assets, including anti-satellite technology.  Writings by China's military analysts, as well as various media outlets, have highlighted the importance of the development of a military space program and control of space is seen as key to Beijing's ability to defend against U.S. dominance in the future.

China and Arms Control in Outer Space

China became a member of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) in 1981 and acceded to the Outer Space Treaty (OST) in December 1983. Beginning in 1984, China has consistently  proposed draft resolutions to the UN General Assembly on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, insisting that space is to be used strictly for peaceful purposes, and criticized the United States and the former Soviet Union for failing to take the lead in seeking prohibitions on all military uses of outer space.

China is publicly opposed to the weaponization of space for a number of reasons.  Most notable, Beijing opposes the use of space-based equipment in missile defense systems, such as the space-based sensors and intercept warheads in outer space potentially to be deployed in planned US missile defense systems.  Although not mentioned in official statements, China is concerned that the US deployment of missile defenses, especially national missile defense (NMD), will negate its strategic nuclear deterrent, potentially forcing China into an expensive arms race that it can not currently afford.  Beijing's focus on arms control in outer space is an attempt to block future deployment of missile defense by the US.

In addition, as the US rapidly improves its ability to deploy weapons systems in space, China is concerned that this preeminence will enable the US to use this technology to achieve global dominance.  Considering the difficulty China's defense industry has had in developing and absorbing new technologies and the cost of developing space-based sensors and weapons, Beijing worries it will be unable to match the US for an indefinite period of time.  Without an formal multilateral agreement banning the deployment of space-based weapons, the US will have an increasing strategic advantage for the foreseeable future. Moreover, Beijing is aware of US preparation for future space warfare against China, as seen by various reports of US war games with China as “enemy.” For example, in early 2001, a war game in Colorado pitted the US against an opponent threatening a small neighbor (i.e. China threatening Taiwan), where both the two main countries facing off were relying heavily on space assets. As a result of these reports, China increasingly views itself as the target of US increased militarization (and possible weaponization) of space. [ Jason Sherman, “China Looks Askance At Space War Game,” Defense News, 28 February 2001, p.3]

China views current international legal instruments, such as the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, the Treaty on the Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and the Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty as inadequate to prevent an arms race in outer space.  Consequently, China has proposed on numerous occasions the re-establishment of an Ad Hoc committee on the Prevention of An Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) at United Nations' Conference on Disarmament (CD).  China wants the Ad Hoc Committee to be "an open-ended and all embracing mechanism within which all sides can freely express their own views."  In a February 2000 Working Paper presented to the CD, China proposed that a legal instrument on PAROS include the following points:

The US, however, has been resolute in its opposition to PAROS. Washington has consistently stated that it does not believe a new regime is necessary for outer space, and the Bush administration will most likely continue to avoid any agreement that could curtail its plans to develop and deploy missile defense systems.  In addition, US military doctrine includes expanding operations into space, which could potentially be curtailed by any negotiated treaty.  Officially, the US has opposed the formation of an ad hoc committee, in part criticizing the ambiguity of the proposed mandate.  In a 1999 Space News article an unnamed US official stated:

"If you read carefully the various proposals that have been made banning what they call 'the weaponization of space,' could be read to include a communications satellite ...  Our position is clear.  We have no plans to develop things that go 'boom!' in space.  But we do have, and will continue to have, data-relay and command-and-control satellites." [Peter B. de Selding, "China Urges U.N. Ban On Space Weaponry," Space News, 22 March 1999 p. 1, 19.]

In the same report, then Chinese Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament, Li Changhe criticized this view:

"Military satellites involve rather complex issues and their role should not be all together negated. Therefore, the primary goal at present in our efforts to prevent the weaponization of and an arms race in outer space is to ban the testing, deployment and use of weapons, weapon systems and components in outer space."  

Conflict between the US and China has made reaching consensus in the CD impossible. While China has been persistent in its efforts to keep the PAROS on table, the US has been equally persistent in its efforts to block it. As a result, China has blocked further work on a treaty to control fissile material which the US believes to be a priority for the CD.   This has lead to stalemate since 1997, preventing agreement on a Program of Work and essentially stalling the work of the entire Conference.

Continued Stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament

The 2002 session of the Conference on Disarmament started with most observers holding out little hope for resolution to the US - China stalemate.  The Bush administration seemed unwilling to alter its stance, even if it meant continued stagnation on other issues such as a fissile material treaty.  According to a statement by the US Permanent Representative to the CD, Ambassador Eric Javits:

"maintaining international peace and security is an overarching purpose that guides activities on earth as well as in outer space, but in the final analysis preserving national security is likewise necessary and essential. For these reasons, the United States sees no need for new outer space arms control agreements and opposes negotiation of a treaty on outer space arms control." ["US Committed to Peaceful Use of Outer Space, Official Says," US State Department, 30 May 2002]

In what was hoped would ultimately be a breakthrough, China softened it demands with regards to the Ad Hoc Committee, showing willingness to settle for less formal discussion, although with the continued understanding that the talks would be aimed at creating a binding agreement.  The US, however, found this compromise unacceptable since the assumption remained that the final product of these discussions would be in the form of a formal agreement. [Wade Boese, "CD Inches Closer to Starting Negotiations," Arms Control Today, July/August 2002.]

In May 2002, the delegations of China and Russian Federation jointly presented a working paper to the CD entitled Possible Elements for a Future International Legal Agreement on the Prevention of the Deployment of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects, in the hope "that all other delegations will carefully study, support and co-sponsor this paper."  The Working Paper was officially presented to the CD on 27 June 2002, with additional co-sponsorship of Belarus, Indonesia, Syria, Vietnam and Zimbabwe.  The Working Paper laid out "the general framework and concrete contents of the future legal instrument on outer space." Both delegations again called for the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee on PAROS at the CD, "so as to start substantive work on the negotiation of such a legal instrument."    [Press Release By the Delegation of China to the Conference on Disarmament, 29 May 2002, available from http://www.china-un.ch/eng/30623.html; "Russia-China CD Working Paper on New Space Treaty" Disarmament Documentation, The Acronym Institute Website, 27 June 2002,
http://www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0206/doc10.htm]

Although this and a number of other initiatives at the 2002 session aimed to break the deadlock in the CD, the body once again ended its session in September without reaching agreement on a program of work.  The UN Press Release announcing the session's conclusion summed up the continuing stalemate:

"deep controversies persisted over how to deal with agenda item 3 entitled 'prevention of an arms race in outer space' (PAROS). The question of whether and how quickly differences concerning PAROS could be overcome remained the critical one." [UN Press Release, "Conference on Disarmament Adopts Annual Report, Concludes 2002 Session, 09 September 2002]

The 2003 session of the CD and the UN General Assembly also failed to end the stalemate between China and the US.  China's permanent Ambassador to the United Nations in Geneva, Hu Xiaodi, once again delivered statements during the plenary sessions calling for negotiations and progress on PAROS, but without progress. The US continued to stand by its assertion that there exists no need for additional agreements because the current agreements banning the deployment of weapons of mass destruction in space and on celestial bodies is an "extensive and comprehensive system for promoting peaceful uses of outer space and for providing a framework for legitimate national security applications." [Keynote address at Houston Space Policy Summit by Norman P. Neureiter, Science and Technology Advisor to the Secretary of State, 12 October 2002.] 

In the wake of the Shenzhou-5 launch that put China's first man into space, China has publicly stressed that it believed only in the use of space for peaceful purposes.  However, some US analysts believe that China may be clandestinely developing space weapons to counter US technological superiority, with particular emphasis on reducing the ability of US forces to respond in a Taiwan scenario. ["Hong Kong Article on Beijing's Development of Space Weapons," Hong Kong Cheng Ming, 01 September 2003 in FBIS CPP20030910000052.] 

 

Key statements/documents on China and outer space/space weapons:

 

  • Statement by Hu Xiaodi, Ambassador for Disarmament Affairs of China, at the 58th UNGA First Committee on the Issue of the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, 21 October 2003.
  • Statement by Hu Xiaodi, Ambassador for Disarmament Affairs of China, at the Plenary of the Conference on Disarmament, 31 July 2003.
  • Joint Working Paper by the Delegations of China and the Russian Federation: Possible Elements for a Future International Legal Agreement on the Prevention of the Deployment of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects, 28 May 2002
  • Statement by Hu Xiaodi, Ambassador for Disarmament Affairs of China, at the Plenary of the Conference on Disarmament, 24 February, 2000.
  • Statement by Hu Xiaodi, Ambassador for Disarmament Affairs of China, at the Plenary of the Conference on Disarmament (on Prevention of an arms race in outer space) 10 February 2000.
  • China Working Paper entitled, "China's Position On and Suggestions For Ways to Address the Issue of Prevention of An Arms Race in Outer Space at the Conference on Disarmament," 9 February 2000
  • "China's National Defense," Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 27 July 1998.
  • Statement by Li Changhe, Chinese Ambassador for Disarmament Affairs, to the Conference on Disarmament, at the Plenary Meeting, 12 March 1998.
  • Explanatory Speech by Fu Zhigang Concerning the Voting Position at the 52nd UNGA First Committee on the Draft Resolution of The Role of Science and Technology in the Context of International Security and Disarmament (proposed by India), 12 November 1997.
  • "China: Arms Control And Disarmament," Information Office of the State Council of the Peoples Republic of China, November 1995.

      LINKS

    CHRONOLOGY OF OUTER SPACE/SPACE WEAPON-RELATED STATEMENTS AND DEVELOPMENTS

    CHINA AND THE OUTER SPACE TREATY (OST)

    CHINA AND THE COMMITTEE ON THE PEACEFUL USES OF OUTER SPACE (COPUOS)

    CHINA AND THE COMMITTEE ON THE PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE IN OUTER SPACE (PAROS)

    CHINA'S ATTITUDE TOWARD MISSILE DEFENSE

    CHRONOLOGY OF MISSILE DEFENSE-RELATED STATEMENTS AND DEVELOPMENTS

    AN ANNOTATED CHRONOLOGY OF THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE IN NORTHEAST ASIA, 1990-PRESENT

    Updated 11/26/2003

    CNSThis material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by MIIS.

    Get the factsGet informedGet involved