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| (#45) 29 July 1996 | 1-5 kT | Underground | -- | China's 45th and most recent test |
| (#44) 8 June 1996 | 20-80 kT | Underground | -- | Reported detonation of two warheads |
| (#43) 17 August 1995 | 60-80 kT | Underground | -- | Prompted the Japanese Diet (legislative
body) to pass a resolution protesting China's testing;
later that month, Japan froze government grants for the remainder of 1995 (see sanctions) |
| (#42) 15 May 1995 | 95 kT | Underground | -- | Prompted Japan to
suspend the grant portion of its foreign aid program to China
(see sanctions) |
| (#41) 7 October 1994 | 40-50 kT | Underground | -- | -- |
| (#40) 10 June 1994 | 40-50 kT | Underground | -- | -- |
| (#39) 5 October 1993 | 40-80 kT | Underground | -- | -- |
| (#38) 25 September 1992 | 1-20 kT (About 8 kT) | Underground | -- | -- |
| (#37) 21 May 1992 | 660 kT-1 MT (650 kT) | Underground | -- | China's largest underground test |
| (#36) 16 August 1990 | 50-200 kT (189 kT) | Underground | -- | -- |
| (#35) 26 May 1990 | 15-65 kT (11.5 kT) | Underground | -- | -- |
| (#34) 29 September 1988 | 1-20 kT (2.5 kT) | Underground | -- | Reported to be a 1-5 kT enhanced radiation weapon ("neutron bomb") test |
| (#33) 5 June 1987 | Unknown yield (250 kT) | Underground | -- | -- |
| (#32) 19 December 1984 | 5-50 kT (1.3 kT) | Underground | -- | -- |
| (#31) 3 October 1984 | 15-70 kT (9.1 kT) | Underground | -- | -- |
| (#30) 6 October 1983 | 20-100 kT (14.9 kT) | Underground | -- | -- |
| (#29) 4 May 1983 | Unknown yield (About 1 kT) | Underground | -- | -- |
| (#28) 5 October 1982 | 3-15 kT | Underground | -- | -- |
| (#27) 16 October 1980 | 200 kT-1 MT | Atmospheric | -- | The last atmospheric nuclear explosion by China or any country |
| (#26) 13 September 1979 | Unknown yield | Underground | -- | -- |
| (#25) 14 December 1978 | Below 20 kT | Atmospheric | -- | Fission |
| (#24) 14 October 1978 | Below 20 kT (3.4 kT) | Underground | Shaft method | China's first shaft explosion |
| (#23)15 March 1978 | 6-20 kT | Atmospheric | -- | Fission |
| (#22) 17 September 1977 | Below 20 kT | Atmospheric | -- | Fission |
| (#21) 17 November 1976 | About 4 MT | Atmospheric | Air (H-6 bomber) | Thermonuclear;
Largest Chinese test |
| (#20) 17 October 1976 | 10-20 kT (2.6 kT) | Underground | -- | Fission |
| (#19) 26 September 1976 | 200 kT | Atmospheric | -- | Fission;
Partial failure of fusion; "special weapon" |
| (#18) 23 January 1976 | Below 20 kT | Atmospheric | -- | Fission |
| (#17) 27 October 1975 | Below 10 kT (2.5 kT) | Underground | -- | Fission |
| (#16) 17 June 1974 | 200 kT-1 MT | Atmospheric | -- | Thermonuclear |
| (#15) 27 June 1973 | 2-3 MT | Atmospheric | Air (H-6 bomber) | Thermonuclear |
| (#14) 18 March 1972 | 100-200 kT | Atmospheric | Air (H-6 bomber) | Possibly trigger device, containing Pu, for thermonuclear warhead |
| (#13) 7 January 1972 | 8-20 kT | Atmospheric | Air (Q-5 bomber) | Fission;
Possibly containing Pu |
| (#12) 18 November 1971 | 15-20 kT | Atmospheric | Ground (tower-mounted) | Fission;
Possibly containing Pu |
| (#11) 14 October 1970 | 3-3.4 MT | Atmospheric | Air (H-6 bomber) | Thermonuclear |
| (#10) 29 September 1969 | About 3 MT | Atmospheric | Air (H-6 bomber) | Thermonuclear |
| (#9) 23 September 1969 | 20-25 kT (19.2 kT) | Underground | Tunnel method | Fission ;
China's first underground test |
| (#8) 27 December 1968 | 3 MT | Atmospheric | Air (H-6 bomber) | Thermonuclear
device;
China's first test using plutonium (U235, with some Pu) |
| (#7) 24 December 1967 | 15-25 kT | Atmospheric | Air (H-6 bomber) | Fission (U235, U238, and Li-6) |
| (#6) 17 June 1967 | 3-3.3 MT | Atmospheric | Air (H-6 bomber) | China's first full-yield multi-stage thermonuclear test (U235) |
| (#5) 28 December 1966 | 122 kT/300-500 kT | Atmospheric | Ground (tower-mounted) | Boosted fission (U235);
Test used to confirm the design principles of a two-stage device |
| (#4) 27 October 1966 | 12-30 kT | Atmospheric | DF-2 (CSS-1) MRBM | Fission (U235) |
| (#3) 9 May 1966 | 200-300 kT/ | Atmospheric | Air (H-6 bomber) | Boosted fission (U235);
China's first test of a boosted fission device (using Lithium-6) |
| (#2) 14 May 1965 | 20-40 kT | Atmospheric | Air (H-6 bomber) | Fission (U235);
China's first air-drop explosion by aircraft |
| (#1) 16 October 1964 | 20-22 kT | Atmospheric | Ground (tower-mounted) | Fission (U235);
China's first nuclear explosion, named "Device 596," representing the year and month in which the Soviets refused to provide China with a prototype device (June 1959) |
[Sources on estimated yields: Bates Gill, "China's Military Modernization: Implications For Proliferation," Presentation at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, 27 February 1996; China Builds the Bomb, pp. 244-245; Richard W. Fieldhouse, Chinese Nuclear Weapons, pp. 49-52; Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume 5, pp. 333-336.]
[Source for yields in parentheses: Vipin Gupta, "Locating Nuclear Explosions At The Chinese Test Site Near Lop Nur," Science & Global Security, Vol. 5, 1995, p. 208.]
[Additional sources: Robert S. Norris, "French And Chinese Nuclear Weapon Testing," Security Dialogue, March 1996, p. 49; Vipin Gupta, "The Status Of Chinese Nuclear Weapons Testing," Jane's Intelligence Review, January 1994, p. 32; "Nuclear Notebook," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May 1993, pp. 48-49; Steven Mufson, "A Nuclear Challenge From China: Beijing Unnerves Neighbors With Underground Blast," International Herald Tribune, 16 May 1995, p. 1; Robert Shuey and Shirley A. Kan, "Chinese Missile And Nuclear Proliferation: Issues For Congress," CRS Issue Brief, 16 November 1995, p. 12; Joel Ullom, "Enriched Uranium Versus Plutonium: Proliferant Preferences In The Choice Of Fissile Material," The Nonproliferation Review, Fall 1994, p. 5; Seth Faison, "China Sets Off Nuclear Test, Then Announces Moratorium," New York Times, 30 July 1996; "China Exploded More Than Two Warheads--Paper," Reuter, 12 June 1996i in Executive News Service, 12 June 1996; Chong Pin Lin, "Red Fist: China's Army In Transition," International Defense Review, February 1995, p. 32.]
This
material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin
Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of
International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the
opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or
its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by
MIIS.
