 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
|
 |
 |
Uranium Enrichment
In November 1989, China announced it had ended production of highly enriched uranium (HEU) for military uses and that it would use its enrichment facilities for strictly civilian applications, both for its nuclear power industry and for export. China currently operates only one indigenously built facility at Heping for uranium enrichment; it also operates two larger gas centrifuge enrichment facilities at Hanzhong built by Russian firms in the 1990s, both Russian-built plants are under IAEA safeguards.
China reportedly requires 250,000-300,000 SWU/year to provide enough fuel for its current 2,100 MWe nuclear energy capacity. China's fuel exports require a capacity of 400,000 SWU/year. Thus, it is believed that China's fuel enrichment capabilities are fully for commercial applications, not for nuclear weapons.
Beginning in the early 1990s, Chinese officials had stated that China will eventually replace its gaseous diffusion facilities at Lanzhou and Heping with facilities using gas centrifuges for uranium enrichment. Also, in 1992, China's CNNC began working with Russia's MINATOM to build two new gas centrifuge facilities at a site near Hanzhong in Sichuan province. The two plants at Hanzhong became operational in 1996 and 1998, respectively and are currently producing low-enriched uranium (LEU). The first plant has a reported capacity of 200,000 SWU/y and the second one has an expected capacity of 200,000-300,000 SWU/y. Both plants are under IAEA safeguards. A third gas centrifuge facility with a 500,000 SWU/y capacity was originally expected to be built at the Hanzhong site but was recently relocated to a site 25 km north of the Lanzhou enrichment facility.
In mid 1997, Chinese officials decided to shut down the Lanzhou enrichment facility due to its inefficient reliance on a large hydroelectric plant for electricity generation and its expanding gas centrifuge cooperation with Russia. In June 1999, Chinese officials then decided to decommission the Lanzhou facility and agreed to treat large amounts of high level radioactive for eventual disposal. This decision was ordained by Premier Zhu Rongji and was a consequence of two actions: the need to restructure and streamline China's nuclear industry and the decision to build the third phase of the Sino-Russian gas centrifuge project at a site near Lanzhou instead of at Hanzhong. The decision to decommission the Lanzhou facility was reportedly made at the same time as the decision to re-locate the third Sino-Russian facility. New reports also indicated that China moved the third phase plan to Lanzhou from Hanzhong in order to prevent layoffs at the Lanzhou site. This new facility, once construction is complete, will have a larger HEU capacity than the first two facilities located at Hanzhong. [Mark Hibbs, "China said to be preparing for decommissioning defense plants," Nuclear Fuel, 5/17/99, p. 11; Mark Hibbs, "China moved centrifuge complex to keep enriching U at Lanzhou", Nuclear Fuel, 5/17/99, pp. 11-12.]
For an overview of China's estimated fissile material production and stockpile, see:
URANIUM ENRICHMENT TECHNIQUES:China's main method of uranium enrichment until the mid 1990s had been gaseous diffusion. Beginning in the early 1990s, China began working with Russia on building gas centrifuge enrichment plants. These facilities became operational in 1998 and produced LEU for China's commercial power reactors. Since 1973, China has also conducted research on Atomic Vapor Laser Isotope Separation (AVLIS) and Molecular Vapor Laser Isotope Separation (MLIS) techniques. Since 1985, however, China has focused its efforts mainly on the AVLIS process. In October 1991, China was successful in using the AVLIS method to enrich uranium to over 3 percent in one step. China plans to decide on one enrichment technique priority by the year 2000.
China's uranium enrichment capabilities have been categorized as follows:
|
|
|
| Gaseous diffusion | Industrial capacity; China operated two facilities at Lanzhou and Heping with an enrichment capacity of 100,000 SWU/year or more; Lanzhou was shut down in 1997 and decommissioned in 1999. |
| Gas centrifuge | Industrial capacity; Sino-Russian project begun in 1992 resulted in two plants at Hanzhong with a total capacity of 400,000-500,000 SWU/y; a third Sino-Russian facilities is planned for a site near Lanzhou with an expected capacity of 500,000 SWU/y. |
| Ion/Chemical exchange | Research and development |
| Electromagnetic Isotope Separation (EMIS) | Research and development |
| LAP (CRISLA) Laser Technique | Research and development |
[Sources: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, December 1993), p. 132; Sean Tyson, "Uranium Enrichment Technologies: Proliferation Implications," Eye on Supply, No. 5, Fall 1991, pp. 87-88; ]
URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITIES:
For decades China produced HEU at two gaseous diffusion plants: Lanzhou and Heping. Since 1989, the two plants were reportedly producing LEU for commercial applications. The Lanzhou facility was closed down in 1997 and a decision was made in 1999 to decommission it. The Heping plant is still in operation.
(1) LANZHOU NUCLEAR FUEL COMPLEX
(2) HEPING URANIUM ENRICHMENT PLANT
(3) RUSSIAN-BUILT FACILITY IN HANZHONG, SHAANXI PROVINCE
China and Russia signed an agreement in 1992 for Russia's MINATOM to construct a uranium enrichment plants at a site near Hanzhong in Shaanxi Province for China to produce low-enriched uranium (LEU). Russia and China then established a joint venture in January 1996 to build three commercial-scale gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facilities, involving the Russian firm Zarubeshatomenergostroy. Each module consists of 10,000 or more vertically stacked centrifuge columns, and each column has individual machines each with an annual capacity of 2-3 SWU. The stacked machines are all subcritical units, and come from surplus Russian production. The facility is operating under IAEA safeguards. According to Chinese officials, the facility will enrich only Chinese-origin uranium.
According to the Sino-Russian contract, Russia will replace any machines which break down within 15 years and will also train Chinese operators to take over the facility's operation once all three modules are finished.
The first facility was completed in June 1996 with an annual capacity of 200,000 SWU.
The second facility was completed in late 1998. Part of the module has already started operation and will have a reported capacity of 200,000-300,000 SWU/y.
The third facility will not be built at Hanzhong but rather the CNNC decided in 1999 that it will relocate it to a site north of Lanzhou. The facility may be operational by the end of 2000 and have an annual production capacity of 500,000 SWU/y.
The first facility is producing 4 percent enriched LEU for the Qinshan power reactors, and possibly for the French-built reactors at Daya Bay as well. By around 2008, all the facilities will be able to support 2,000 MW of installed nuclear power capacity, and will enrich uranium for Qinshan, Daya Bay, Lingao, and the two planned Russian VVER-1000 PWRs.
In an interview in November 1997, Russian Atomic Energy Minister Viktor Mikhaylov stated:
- "We started up the first phase of the enrichment plant 300 days ahead of
schedule. We promised to build it in 1,000 days, but were able to do so
sooner. The plant is already producing output worth $20 million a year. We
will start up the second phase about a year ahead of schedule, in 1998. It
will be able to produce output worth $30 million. We will hand over this
project fully in 2001. China is extremely happy with the cooperation with
the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy because we are engaged in high-quality
construction and are greatly ahead of schedule." [Novyye
Izvestiya (Moscow), 18 November 1997, in FBIS-SOV-97-322, 18 November
1997.]
(4) FUDAN UNIVERSITY
Shanghai. China reportedly has built a replica of the CRISLA process developed by US-based Isotope Technologies from published drawings.
(5) XIAN
Shaanxi Province. Possible enrichment facility for weapons-grade uranium.
[Sources: Mark Hibbs, "China said to be preparing for decommissioning defense plants," Nuclear Fuel, 5/17/99, p. 11; Mark Hibbs, "China moved centrifuge complex to keep enriching U at Lanzhou", Nuclear Fuel, 5/17/99, pp. 11-12; Mark Hibbs, "With More Russian Centrifuges, China Will Close Lanzhou Plant," NuclearFuel, 6 October 1997, pp. 3-4; Mark Hibbs, "China's Centrifuge SWU Plant Up and Running, Minatom Says," NuclearFuel, 27 January 1997, pp. 3-4; Mark Hibbs, "Minatom Said To Restrict Access Following Chinese Know-How Steal," Nucleonics Week, 4 January 1996, p. 11; "World Nuclear Industry Handbook 1995," Nuclear Engineering International, p. 123; "Stockpiles And Facilities Producing Fissile Materials For Weapons," Arms Control Reporter, January 1996, p. 612A6; Ministry of Atomic Energy (Russia); in ENS NucNet, 21 March 1994; Sergei Mushkaterov and Yuriy Rogozhin, Izvestiya (Moscow), 15 June 1995, p. iv; Ministry of Atomic Energy (Russia); in ENS NucNet, 21 March 1994; Yan Kong, "China's Nuclear Bureaucracy," Jane's Intelligence Review, July 1993; Lisbeth Gronlund, David Wright, and Yong Liu, "China and a Fissile Material Production Cut-Off," Survival, Winter 1995-96, p. 150; Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume 5, p. 345; Frans Berkhout, Oleg Bukharin, Harold Feiveson, and Marvin Miller, "A Cutoff In The Production Of Fissile Material," International Security, Winter 1995/95, p. 178; Richard Kokoski, Technology and the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 60; Tracking Nuclear Proliferation, p. 52; Risk Report, November 1995, p. 3.]
This
material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin
Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of
International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the
opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or
its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by
MIIS.
