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Summary:
On 3 April 1991, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 687, which dictated the terms for the Gulf War cease-fire and required Iraq to declare and destroy its stockpile of weapons of mass destruction. The resolution established a special commission to monitor and verify the elimination of Iraq's weapons called the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) on Iraq. UNSCOM was organized into five divisions, each responsible for a specific mission. The five missions were to ensure the destruction of Iraq's chemical and biological weapons, confirm the destruction of ballistic missiles, verify the control and removal of nuclear materials, conduct long-term monitoring of Iraqi compliance, and provide operations support. Unlike some arms control agreements, UNSCOM inspection activities did not have a pre-determined end-date. However, the demise of UNSCOM was effectively brought about when Iraq refused to cooperate further and expelled UNSCOM inspectors in 1998.
For more in-depth information, please consult the Inventory of Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes, which can be found on the CNS website at: http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/.
China and UNSCOM:
China was a member of UNSCOM, and held a permanent seat on the 19-seat Special Commission. China was involved in the chemical destruction activities of UNSCOM.
During the fall 1997 dispute between Iraq and UNSCOM, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Tang Guoqiang stated, "We call on the parties concerned to exercise restraint, and to avoid intensifying the conflict...We hope Iraq will continue to cooperate with the United Nations' relevant organizations, and carry out the Security Council's resolution completely and earnestly. Meanwhile, the international community should factually evaluate the process through which Iraq carries out the resolution, and take relevant measures in good time." ["China urges restraint over Iraqi ban," Reuter (Beijing), 30 October 1997.]
In December 1997, Chinese Foreign Minister Shen Guofang stated:
- "We are extremely concerned about the development of events in Iraq. We
appreciate the efforts being made to settle this issue by the parties
concerned. We have consistently said the relevant resolutions adopted by the
Security Council on Iraq should be comprehensively and strictly implemented.
Iraq should restore cooperation with the United Nations as quickly as
possible and completely meet the relevant obligations. Since this crisis
took place, China, as the chairman of the Security Council this month, has
been calling for all the parties concerned to adopt a calm and restrained
attitude and for the settlement of the issue through dialogue and
cooperation to avoid the situation escalating and particularly to prevent
armed conflict. China has made constructive efforts to this end. China is
also willing to maintain consultation and cooperation with all the parties
concerned in order to alleviate the crisis." ["Foreign
Ministry News Briefings,"
Beijing Review, 1-7 December 1997, p. 9.]
After Iraq refused to cooperate with UNSCOM in 1998, several informal proposals were submitted to the UNSC in January 1999, presenting plans for replacing UNSCOM with another continuous monitoring arrangement. These proposals were followed by an in-depth draft resolution submitted to the UNSC by China, France, and Russia. However, the United States and the United Kingdom rejected this draft resolution. It was only in the aftermath of September 11th that the United States succeeded in pushing for the reestablishment of inspections in Iraq, in the form of cooperation between the newly-established United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the IAEA.
For other UN arms control and nonproliferation-related organizations in which China has participated, see:[CHINA AND THE UN FIRST COMMITTEE (UNFC)]
[CHINA AND THE UN DISARMAMENT COMMISSION (UNDC)]
[CHINA AND THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA)]
[CHINA AND THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD)]
[CHINA AND THE UN REGISTER OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS (UNROCA)]
Last Updated 10/24/2003
This
material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin
Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of
International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the
opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or
its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by
MIIS.
