Nuclear Warhead Modernization

Nuclear Warhead Modernization:

MULTIPLE REENTRY VEHICLE (MRV)/MULTIPLE INDEPENDENTLY TARGETABLE REENTRY VEHICLE (MIRV) MODERNIZATION/WARHEAD MINIATURIZATION

In an effort to preserve its second strike capability, China has had an ongoing program to develop multiple reentry vehicle technology (MRV) and multiple independently targeted reentry vehicle (MIRV) technology. As part of this effort China has also sought to miniaturize its nuclear warheads. Yet, to date, China has not yet deployed any multiple warheads - either MRVs or MIRVs- on its current ballistic missile force. The effort to develop these technologies reflects China's concerns over the US development of a national ballistic missile defense system and the possible deployment of theater ballistic missile system in Japan and/or Taiwan. MRVs/MIRVs could be used to preserve China's second strike capability by overwhelming a TMD or NMD system.

Warhead design began in 1967 with the motto, "small size, quick maneuverability, great penetrability, improved safety, and high reliability." By the end of the 1970s China had deployed its first generation of missiles that could carry single nuclear warheads. The DF-3 could carry a 2,150 kg payload over 2,650 km and the DF-4 could carry a 2,200 kg payload over 4,750 km. The DF-5 was developed to carry a thermonuclear warhead and so was designed to carry a heavier 3,200 kg payload. In the 1980s, China's efforts to design, develop and produce smaller nuclear warheads were driven by the need to develop newer, more accurate, more reliable and more survivable ballistic missile. The lighter payload capacity for these new missiles required a lighter warhead. By the late 1990s, China had begun to deploy the smaller warheads on its second generation missiles such as the DF-21 and DF-31. It is these newer, smaller and lighter warheads that could also be used in MIRVed configurations if China chose to pursue that path.

China's efforts to develop MRV and MIRV technology date back to the early 1980s. In September 1981, China successfully delivered three satellites with one launch vehicle: two satellites were delivered in the nose cone and one was delivered during stage separation. This event may have been China's first foray into the area of MRV/MIRV development. Since the mid-1980s, China has reportedly conducted missile flight tests involving MRVs. In addition, beginning in the early 1990s China initiated a nuclear test series which indicated that it is developing a number of new small warheads with higher yield-to-weight ratios possibly for use on multiple warhead land-based missiles. While China is primarily developing these newer, smaller warheads for deployment on its new generation of ballistic missiles, they are also probably part of an effort to provide the PLA with a MRV/MIRV capability.

China's MIRV development is further supported by a classified 1996 Air Force National Air Intelligence Center (NAIC) report which states that China has designed an upper rocket stage called the "Smart Dispenser" (SD) for a new space launch vehicle "for the purpose of accurate and simultaneous deployment in orbit of two US-made Iridium mobile telecommunications satellites." The report concluded that "a minimally modified SD stage could be used to deploy multiple reentry vehicles (RVs)" and that "the SD stage can be considered a 'technology bridge' to a viable post- boost vehicle (PBV)." The SD could be modified for use on DF-4 and DF-5. [Bill Gertz, Betrayal, Washington DC: Regnery Publishers, 1999, p.251-254.]

China is also developing penetration aids in addition to MRV/MIRV technology. Another classified 1996 NAIC report states that the DF-31 will quite likely feature the use of penetration aids such as decoys or chaff and an improved solid propellant and that China has probably "reemphasized accuracy and defense penetration as primary goals for its developmental ballistic missiles." This was evidenced by two probable tests of decoys on a CSS-5 Mod 2 on 10 November 1995 and a CSS-5 Mod 1 on 10 January 1996. This report was confirmed by the 2 August 1999 DF-31 launch. A classified NAIC report revealed that during the 1999 test an undetermined number of decoys decoupled from the primary warhead and "spread out in different directions when the payload reached space."[Bill Gertz, "China Develops Warhead Decoys to Defeat U.S. Defenses, Washington Times, 16 September 1999, p 1.]

In early 1999, attention focused on Chinese efforts to steal US technology and information related to ballistic missile development. The Select Committee on US National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China (aka the Cox Committee) initially conducted an investigation into whether two US companies - Hughes and Loral - had provided China with information for its space launch vehicles (SLVs) which could help China's ballistic missile programs, possibly including the development of MIRVd missiles. The Cox Committee investigation was later expanded to cover Chinese efforts to steal nuclear warhead design information from the US. The Cox Committee investigation eventually concluded that the technical assistance that Hughes and Loral provided to China was only useful in improving the reliability of China's ballistic missiles and did not contribute to missile modernization program. Whether or not China will actually build and deploy MRV/MIRVd missiles and in what configuration is an open question. China has still not taken this step.

A September 1999 National Intelligence Council document called "Foreign Missile Developments and Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States Through 2015" concluded that China has had the technical capability for MRVs for over two decades but apparently chose not to develop and deploy them. The report noted, however, that by leveraging current technologies China could develop a basic MRV or MIRV capability for its current missile force "in a few years." Specifically, the report said:

"China has had the the technical capability to develop multiple RV payloads for twenty years. If China needed a multiple RV capability in the near term, Beijing could use a DF-31 type RV to develop and deploy a simple MRV or MIRV for the DF-5 in a few years. MIRVing a future mobile missile would be years away." [Foreign Missile Developments and Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States Through 2015, The National Intelligence Council, Washington, DC, September 1999, p. 11.]

In June and July of 2001 China reportedly conducted three nuclear related tests at Lop Nor. These tests were followed by a similar "event" in November. These could have been part of China's effort to develop smaller warheads, possibly for a MIRV capability. None of the "events" produced a "detectable nuclear yield or blast." Preparations were spotted by US intelligence imagery. [Bill Gerts and Rowan Scarborough, "Inside the Ring," Washington Times, 7 December 2001.]

A Japanese newspaper, citing unnamed sources, reported that China test launched a medium range DF-21 missile equipped with multiple warheads in December 2002 from a facility in Shanxi Province, with the intention of countering America's National Missile Defense system plans. China's Foreign Ministry Spokesperson would not confirm the report, and stated, "The allegation that the national defense construction of China is targeted against the weapons systems is utterly groundless." [Hiroyuki Sugiyama, "China Tests Multiple-Warhead Missiles; New ICBMs to be Deployed," The Daily Yomiuri (Internet version) in English, Tokyo, 07 Feb 03 (FBIS Transcribed Text); "Foreign Ministry Spokesperson's Press Conference on February 11, 2003," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, < http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/42281.html>]

[Sources: Richard W. Fieldhouse, Chinese Nuclear Weapons, pp. 29-30; Chong Pin Lin, "Red Fist: China's Army In Transition," International Defense Review, February 1995, p. 32; Duncan Lennox, "Briefing: Ballistic Missiles," Jane's Defence Weekly, 17 April 1996, p. 44; Vipin Gupta, "The Status Of Chinese Nuclear Weapons Testing," Jane's Intelligence Review, January 1994, p. 31; Eric Arnett, ed., Nuclear Weapons After the Comprehensive Test Ban: Implications for Modernization and Proliferation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996) p. 5; SIPRI Yearbook 1995 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 378-379; Paul Godwin and John J. Schulz, "Arming The Dragon For The 21st Century: China's Defense Modernization Program," Arms Control Today, December 1993, p. 8; The Military Balance 1995/96, p. 176; Paul Dibb, "The Future Military Capabilities Of Asia's Great Powers," Jane's Intelligence Review, May 1995, p. 230; Francis Deron, Le Monde (Paris), 8/25/95, p. 2, in FBIS-TAC-95-005, 25 August 1995; "China Exploded More Than Two Warheads-Paper," Reuter, 12 June 1996, in Executive News Service, 12 June 1996; Nicholas Doughty, Reuter, 12 October 1994; in Executive News Service, 12 October 1994; Banning N. Garrett and Bonnie S. Glaser, "Chinese Perspectives On Nuclear Arms Control," International Security, Winter 1995/96, pp. 55-56; Paul H.B. Godwin and John J. Schulz, "China And Arms Control: Transition In East Asia," Arms Control Today, November 1994, p. 9; Lien Ho Pao (Hong Kong), 12 November 1995, p. 8; "New Nuclear Weapons Said Goal Of Current Tests," FBIS-CHI-95-218, 12 November 1995; Robert S. Norris, "Nuclear Arsenals of the United States, Russia, Great Britain, France and China: A Status Report," presented at the 5th ISODARCO Beijing Seminar on Arms Control, Chengdu, China, November 1996, p. 5; "British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Forces," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November-December 1996, p. 66. Gertz, Bill. Betrayal, Regnery Publishing, Washington DC, 1999. pp.251-254. Gertz, Bill. "China Develops Warhead Decoys to Defeat U.S. Defenses, Washington Times, 16 September 1999, p1. John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai. China's Strategic Seapower: The Politics of Force Modernization in the Nuclear Age, Stanford: Stanford Univeristy Press. 1994. pp. 176-177.]

For more information, see:

[CHINA'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS MODERNIZATION AND TESTING](See especially [CHINA AND NUCLEAR DELIVERY SYSTEM MODERNIZATION])

[CHINA'S BALLISTIC MISSILE DESIGNATIONS AND CHARACTERISTICS]

[CHINA'S NUCLEAR TESTING PROGRAM]

[CHINA'S NUCLEAR DOCTRINE]

This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by MIIS.