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Zangger Committee (ZAC)
Formal Title: NPT NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS COMMITTEE
Summary:
The Zangger Committee (ZAC) was formed in the early 1970s to establish guidelines for implementing the export control provisions of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).
Specifically, the Committee bases its work on the NPT's Article 3.2, which states:
- "Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or
special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially
designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special
fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes,
unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the
safeguards required by this Article."
The list of controlled items developed by the ZAC (IAEA document INFCIRC/209) is known as the Trigger List because export of those items triggers International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. Examples of Trigger List items are plutonium, highly-enriched uranium (HEU), reactors, reprocessing and enrichment plants, and equipment and components for such facilities. The Trigger List has been updated substantially since it was first adopted in 1974 to provide greater detail and clarity in all areas of the nuclear fuel-cycle. The fundamental criterion under the NPT remains whether an item is "especially designed or prepared" for nuclear use.
The ZAC requirements for exports of Trigger List items are that they (1) not be used for nuclear explosives, (2) be subject to IAEA safeguards in the recipient non-nuclear weapon state, and (3) not be re-exported unless they are subject to safeguards in the new recipient state.
Unlike the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the ZAC does not cover dual-use items nor does it require nuclear supplier states to impose full-scope safeguards (FSS) in recipient countries. Under the ZAC, the recipient must have safeguards on only the transferred items. In the future the ZAC may require full-scope safeguards (FSS) under pressure from the document on principles and objectives adopted at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference.
For additional in-depth information, please consult the Inventory of Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes, which can be found on the CNS website at: http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/.
China and the ZAC:
On 30 September 1997, China officially announced its plans to join the Committee, and officially joined on 16 October 1997. In its statement to the Committee on that day, China stated:
"China supports the general goals of the Committee, appreciates the positive role the Committee has played in preventing nuclear proliferation, and stands ready to conduct regular consultations with other member countries of the Committee with issues of nuclear non-proliferation and export control with a view to making joint efforts to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons." [Statement by Ambassador Li Changhe of the Chinese Permanent Mission in Vienna at the Meeting of the Zangger Committee, 16 October 1997.]
China has reportedly told the United States that it would still not
require recipients to accept full-scope safeguards (FSS). Although China has
accepted the principle of the international trigger lists and has applied to
join the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), it still objects to the requirement of
full-scope nuclear safeguards. China's membership in ZAC could complicate plans
to add full-scope safeguards (FSS) to the Committee's export requirements in the
future. China has reportedly conditioned its membership in ZAC on the
continuation of the Committee's current export rules.
China's view on FSS remained unchanged when it argued in an April 2000 Zangger Committee meeting that the "Zangger Committee draws its authority from NPT Article III.2, which does not mention FSS." In addition, a senior Chinese official who attended this same meeting stated in a NuclearFuel article that "China has expressed its reservations about any claim that FSS be required."
[Sources: Mark Hibbs, "China To Join Zangger Committee, But Not With Full-Scope Safeguards," Nucleonics Week, 2 October 1997, pp. 1-10; Mark Hibbs, "Chinese Industry Resists Nuclear Export Controls," Nucleonics Week, 5 June 1997, p. 3; Shirley A. Kan, "Chinese Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Current Policy Issues," CRS Issue Brief, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, 17 October 1996, p. 10; AFP (Hong Kong), 22 November 1996, in FBIS-CHI-96-228, 22 November 1996; "Remarks By US Secretary of State Warren Christopher," China World Hotel, Beijing, China, 20 November 1996; "Daily Press Briefing," US Department of State, 18 September 1997; Howard Diamond, "Clinton Steps Up Effort To Enact 1985 Sino-U.S. Nuclear Agreement," Arms Control Today, September 1997, p. 31; Mark Hibbs, "China, Russia Challenge NPT Review Over Full-Scope IAEA Safeguards," NuclearFuel, Vol. 25, No.8, 17 April 2000.]
[TEXT OF THE GUIDELINES FOR NUCLEAR TRANSFERS (INFCIRC/209)]
[REVISED GUIDELINES (INFCIRC/209/REV.1)]
Key Statements/Documents on China and the ZAC:
For more on China and multilateral export control regimes, see:
[CHINA AND MULTILATERAL EXPORT CONTROL REGIMES]
For more information on China's nuclear exports, see:
[CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA) SAFEGUARDS]
Other organizations and regimes related to nuclear export control policy:
[CHINA AND THE NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GROUP (NSG)]
[CHINA AND THE NONPROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT)]
[CHINA AND THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA)]
This
material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin
Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of
International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the
opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or
its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by
MIIS.
