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DISARMAMENT ISSUES
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COUNTRY DETAILS

United States

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1. Arsenal Size:
Approximately 10,000 warheads:
-- Active or operational warheads (deployed, responsive, and spares): 5,736 (5,236 strategic, 500 non-strategic warheads)
-- Inactive warheads: 4,225

Key Weapon Systems
-- Strategic:

ICBM (Minuteman III/ MK-12, MK 12 A).
SLBM (Trident II D5/ MK-4, MK-5).
Strategic bombers (B-52H Stratofortress, B2A Spirit).

-- Non-strategic: (Tomahawk SLCM, B61 bombs).

2. Estimated Destructive Force:
Deployed weapons: ~1800 megaton

3. Military Fissile Material Stockpile:
-- Plutonium: 92 mt (45 mt declared excess)
-- HEU: 310 mt

4. Disarmament and Commitments to Reduce Arsenal Size:

Legal obligation to pursue global disarmament under Article VI of the NPT.
Dismantled 13,000 + since 1988 under INF and START I.

Future Commitments:

Plans to reduce operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons to between 1,700 and 2,200 by the year 2012 under the Moscow Treaty.
Not in support of verifiable FMCT. The treaty should not cover existing stockpiles.

5. Nuclear Weapons Policy:

Nuclear testing:
- Observed nuclear testing moratorium since 1992.
- Signed CTBT, but Senate voted not to ratify.
- Party to PTBT (banning nuclear tests in atmosphere, in outer space, and under water test).
- 2002 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) calls for shortening the test readiness time from 24-36 months to 18 months.
Use of nuclear weapons:
- Retain first-use option. (2002 NPR)
- Committed not to use nuclear weapons against members of Tlatelolco. Signed Rarotonga. Signed but not yet ratified Pelindaba. Has not signed Bangkok.
- Acknowledged the commitments of the NWS to negative security assurances in UN Security Council Resolution 984 (1995).

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This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by MIIS.