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International Politics of Civilian HEU Elimination An increasing number of countries recognize the risks associated with the civilian use, storage, and transfer of highly enriched uranium (HEU). These countries are concerned that non-state actors, in particular terrorist groups, might gain access to HEU and use it to build and detonate nuclear explosives. Proposals to severely constrain if not eliminate civilian use of HEU have come not only from national governments individually or collectively (such as the Global Threat Reduction Initiative or the G8 Global Partnership initiative,) but also from international organizations. The IAEA, for example, has initiated a series of workshops to look at the technical issues involved in HEU conversion. For any of these initiatives to be realized, however, a global consensus must emerge. IAEA member states, for example, set IAEA policy, and have yet to agree on a policy of HEU minimization.
In addition to efforts at the IAEA, proposals to reduce HEU use have been put forward during the review process of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and by the Group of Eight (G8). Other non (or counter) proliferation initiatives--including the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), UN Security Council Resolution 1540, and the Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism--while not directed explicitly at the problem of civil use of HEU, are relevant to a comprehensive approach to eliminating this particular proliferation-relevant risk. PSI builds on existing nonproliferation regime institutions and practices with a view to developing legal means by which to interdict the flow of proliferation-relevant items to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern. The Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism focuses on the unlawful possession or use by non-state actors of nuclear materials or devices, including HEU. At the current time, only a few countries have supported HEU minimization as a policy, including Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania, Norway, Sweden, and the United States. Many countries, however, have been involved in programs that are reducing the use of HEU in practice, such as the RERTR program to convert research reactors from HEU to LEU (low enriched uranium). [For more, see "Past and Current Efforts to Reduce Civilian HEU Use"] The key elements for a coordinated international effort to eliminate the civilian use of HEU already exist, but require the political decision to move forward. The Non-Proliferation Treaty Process Many national governments are beginning to call for the elimination of HEU in the civilian sphere. One venue for such initiatives has been the NPT Review Conference (RevCon). At the NPT RevCon in 1995, eight European countries (Austria, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden) together with Australia, Canada, and New Zealand drafted a text to be included in the Conference's final document recommending "that no new civil reactors requiring highly-enriched uranium be constructed" (Cf. Document NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/WP.8 (21 April 1995)). However, at the time, the German delegation to the NPT Conference fought against such a formulation,[1] as it conflicted with German plans for a new HEU-fueled research reactor, the FRM-II. The increasing concerns over possible nuclear terrorism in the intervening decade have made obtaining an agreement on this proposal ever more urgent. Thus, it is no surprise that the topic was broached once again at the most recent RevCon, in 2005. In its opening statement to the 2005 conference, Kyrgyzstan noted that "the Kyrgyz Republic believes this Review Conference should consider means to enhance the security of existing stockpiles of highly-enriched uranium, while consolidating them, reducing their size, and moving toward the elimination of the use of highly-enriched uranium in the civilian nuclear sector."[2] This call was taken up by other countries, with Iceland, Lithuania, Norway, and Sweden submitted a working paper entitled "Combating the risk of nuclear terrorism by reducing the civilian use of highly enriched uranium" in an effort to seek an international consensus on this issue. Norway has been particularly active in this regard, issuing a position paper at the RevCon that called for the Conference to adopt "a moratorium on the
The Norwegian government and the International Atomic Energy Agency held a symposium on the minimization of HEU in the civilian nuclear sector on June 17-20, 2006 in order to examine both technical and policy issues related to HEU reduction. The technical workshop resulted in unprecedented consensus with regards to the technical aspects of conversion, while there was less agreement during the policy discussion at the symposium. For a report on the proceedings, please see "The Oslo Symposium: On The Road To HEU Minimization." Promoters of HEU minimization point out that the initiative is non-discriminatory, as it applies to all states' civilian programs. Moreover, as weapons states currently use more HEU in the civilian sphere than other states, they would be disproportionately affected by the adoption of such a policy. The G8 Global Partnership Initiative The Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, established at the G8 Kananaskis Summit in 2002, committed the G8 (the seven major industrial countries: France, the United States, Britain, Germany, Japan, Italy, and Canada, also known as the G7, plus Russia) "to prevent terrorists or those that harbor them from acquiring or developing....radiological or nuclear weapons...". To that end the G8 subscribed to a six-point program including, inter alia, "promoting multilateral treaties aimed at preventing the spread of weapons, materials and know how; and accounting for and securing these items so as to ensure against any state or group having access to it." The G8 action plan issued at the G8 Sea Island Summit in 2004 elaborated a series of actions to reduce the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation and the acquisition of nuclear materials and technologies by terrorists. This included support for projects "to eliminate over time the use of HEU fuel in research reactors worldwide, secure and remove fresh and spent HEU fuel, control and secure radiation sources, strengthen export control and border security..." and to use the Global Partnership to coordinate efforts to these ends.
The G8 Gleneagles Statement on Non-Proliferation of June 2005 also makes indirect reference to HEU elimination under the heading of "Nuclear Safety and Security." The statement indicates support for the establishment of the GTRI and welcomes "the progress which has been made so far." The 2005 G8 Global Partnership Annual Report also notes the "cooperation of Russia and the United States to convert research reactors to LEU (low enriched) fuel" and the repatriation of Russian-origin HEU fuel "from a number of countries, most of which are not involved directly in the Global Partnership."[4] Statements at prior G8 Global Partnership summits are striking for their lack of specificity with respect to steps to further the objective of combating nuclear terrorism by reducing civilian stocks of HEU, especially in comparison to the commentary on issues such as chemical weapons destruction, submarine dismantlement, and physical protection and accounting of radioactive sources. Given the nuclear terrorism risks associated with HEU and growing international recognition of the need to take concrete steps to reduce these dangers, it would be appropriate for the G8 Global Partnership under Russian chairmanship to provide leadership on this critical issue.[5] United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 The objective of this resolution is to prevent individuals and organizations such as terrorist groups from having access to nuclear (and other WMD) weapons. While not directly addressing the use of HEU in civil nuclear activity it does mandate that states develop effective measures to account for and secure materials that could contribute to nuclear weapons; appropriate effective physical protection measures; and appropriate effective border controls and law enforcement efforts to prevent illicit trafficking of weapons and related materials. It calls upon states "to promote dialogue and cooperation on nonproliferation so as to address the threat posed by proliferation of nuclear...weapons. One way of reducing or eliminating the threat of unauthorized persons or groups gaining access to weapons usable material is to eliminate the presence and availability of such materials.
International Atomic Energy Agency IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei has called on countries "to minimize, and eventually eliminate, the use of high enriched uranium in peaceful nuclear applications."[6] However, only the IAEA member states can empower the organization to promote actions in this sphere. The initial steps towards just such a resolution were made by Norway at the IAEA General Conference in September 2005. Both Norway and the United States delegations called for action in this area in their statements to the General Conference: the United States stated that the governments around the world should adopt the goal to "phase-out the commercial use of highly enriched uranium," while Norway's statement said that: Curbing the use of high enriched uranium (HEU) is another measure to reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation. We should therefore set ourselves the long-term target of reaching agreement on a prohibition of civilian uses. Concrete steps should be taken now. Member States should commit themselves to convert civilian nuclear installations from HEU to low enriched uranium as soon as technically feasible. The IAEA should support and promote such a conversion process. Norway would encourage the IAEA to organize a seminar on the technical challenges we are confronted with in this regard. It is equally important to implement international initiatives currently underway to secure and eliminate HEU, such as the G8 Global partnership and the Global Threat Reduction Initiative. All Member States should increase the level of transparency for HEU holdings. The IAEA should develop guidelines for the management of highly enriched uranium in the civilian sector along the lines of those for reporting plutonium. Further, the Norwegian delegates began to discuss proposed texts for a resolution on this issue with delegates from other countries. Oslo hopes to introduce such a resolution at a future IAEA General Conference. The IAEA, for its part, has conducted several meetings of its own. For example, in February 2006 a technical workshop was held to examine the options for expanding the IAEA database on research reactors to include the information needed for a global effort to reduce HEU use, including the possible expansion of the database to include all civilian HEU uses, not just research reactors. The IAEA has also been sponsoring workshops to look at the technical issues involved in HEU conversion. The Way Forward The initiatives discussed here, when taken together with national programs such as RERTR, GTRI, FFR SNF and other (e.g. Russian) HEU RERTR and fuel repatriation programs, [add links to descriptions on Past and Current Efforts to Reduce Civilian HEU Use page] provide the key elements that, given strong political leadership, could be used to eliminate much of the HEU in use in the civilian sphere. The tools to reduce the threat of WMD terrorism using HEU, the material of choice for an improvised nuclear weapon, already exist. However, greater political commitment and proper coordination will be required to fully implement these initiatives. Indeed, current science suggests that HEU will not be required for next generation power reactors or for their development. [For more, see "Civilian Uses of HEU"] It is important to note that the current proposals for HEU minimization cover only civilian use of the material. There is, however, another initiative aimed at halting production of fissile material (both HEU and plutonium) for military purposes: the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT). This is a separate initiative that is aimed at achieving a cutoff of production of fissile material for weapons purposes and reducing existing stocks of weapons material. It addresses not just the nonproliferation issues associated with fissile material, but disarmament issues as well. [For more information on the FMCT, please see Jean du Preez, "The Future of a Treaty Banning Fissile Material for Weapons Purposes: Is it Still Relevant?" http://www.wmdcommission.org/files/No9.pdf.] Yet another proposal that should not be confused with HEU minimization relates to efforts to establish multinational fuel cycle facilities and to limit the spread of uranium enrichment capabilities. This proposal, which is actively supported and promoted by the IAEA, will put the most sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle--uranium enrichment and spent fuel storage and reprocessing--under multinational or international control. States that do not have enrichment and reprocessing capabilities will forgo individual programs in this area for guaranteed access to nuclear fuel cycle services and products at these multinational centers. HEU minimization, on the other hand, does not address the question of enrichment capabilities; unless other initiatives are adopted, under the HEU minimization initiatives states would remain free to enrich uranium to LEU (uranium enriched to under 20%). At the current time, only a few countries clearly have indicated their support for HEU minimization, including Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania, Norway, Sweden, and the United States. Many countries have been involved in the RERTR and other programs that are reducing the use of HEU in the world - these countries include Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Iran, Japan, Kazakhstan, Libya, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Philippines, Romania, Russia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Turkey, the United States, and Uzbekistan. Other countries, such as China, have studied the options for HEU reduction at domestic reactors on their own. Furthermore, most countries have taken care to design their new research reactors to use LEU fuels. With the exception of Germany, which launched its FRM-II reactor using HEU fuel in 2003, and France, which will use HEU fuel in the Jules Horowitz reactor until an appropriate LEU fuel has been developed, all other new research reactors constructed since 1978 have used LEU fuel. New LEU-fueled reactors have been constructed in Algeria, Bangladesh, China, Egypt, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Peru, and the United States. There are additional LEU-fueled research reactors under construction in Australia (the OPAL reactor), Canada (the MAPLE reactors), Morocco (a Triga Mark II reactor near Rabat), and Thailand (a Triga Mark II reactor at the Ongkharak Nuclear Research Center). Although Germany launched its FRM-II reactor using 90% enriched fuel, it has required research on reducing enrichment levels, while use of fuel of less than 50% enrichment is mandatory by 2010. Germany has converted or is shutting down all of its other HEU-fueled reactors, and appears likely to support efforts to minimize the use of HEU worldwide. The two main civilian uses of HEU that continue to be at issue for the future are the use of HEU targets for the production of medical isotopes, and the use of HEU for fast reactor fuel research. [For more, see "Civilian Uses of HEU"] Other uses that may re-emerge include the use of HEU fuel in space reactors or a new generation of Russian icebreakers. Even in the areas of isotope production and fast reactor fuel research, however, reduction of HEU use is likely. Several countries have begun production of medical isotopes using LEU targets, and Australia is soon to begin such production on an industrial scale. Since other producers have argued that industrial-scale production is not financially viable, Australia's experience will be important in this regard. As for fast reactors, neither the European nor the U.S. proposals for advanced fuel cycle technologies require the use of HEU for next-generation reactors. It does not appear likely that any new reactors will be built using HEU fuel, while fuel research can be conducted using an extremely limited number of critical facilities that use either HEU or plutonium to mock-up the fast reactor fuel. Fully converting all existing research reactors and removing all fresh and spent HEU fuel currently in civilian use is a costly undertaking that has been under way for nearly three decades. [For information on conversion and fuel removal programs, see "Past and Current Efforts to Reduce Civilian HEU Use"] While there has been much important progress in removing this material from civilian use, much more needs to be done. Governments around the world should accelerate their efforts to convert reactors and to minimize and eventually eliminate civilian use of HEU. This ought to be a top priority until the job is done. States will need to continue to look beyond their own borders and treat the elimination of civilian HEU as a top diplomatic priority. Countries will have to work together to remove bureaucratic roadblocks, allocate additional funds, and accelerate the reduction of HEU in the civilian sector. This is an expensive, complex task, but the resources and technology exist to get it done.
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