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Past and Current Efforts to Reduce Civilian HEU Use Background Nonproliferation has been an important issue since the beginning of the atomic age. The use of low enriched uranium or LEU fuel (uranium with the proportion of the U-235 isotope under 20%) was an integral part of the Atoms for Peace Program initiated by President Eisenhower in 1953; many of the first foreign research reactors were fueled with LEU. The LEU fuel technology used at that time soon reached its limits. In order to improve the performance of the reactors with existing technology and to allow more powerful reactors to be built, HEU fuel soon became the standard used by the vast majority of research reactors. In the decade after the launch of the Atoms for Peace program, the United States, the Soviet Union, and other nuclear weapons states exported research reactors fueled with HEU to approximately 40 countries. In addition to research and test reactors, HEU was and continues to be used in other civilian technologies: for naval and space propulsion, medical isotope production, and as fuel for commercial fast neutron reactors. [For more, see "Civilian Uses of HEU", or view a map of worldwide holdings of civilian HEU and clean-out] The 1974 "peaceful" nuclear test by India dramatically changed global views on exports of fissile material and technologies. In 1975, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), a multinational body that sets guidelines for nuclear exports, including dual-use technologies and materials, was created. Ever since, major nuclear exporters have required the establishment of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) full-scope safeguards for transfers of nuclear material and technologies. The IAEA also established guidelines for physical protection of civilian sites and material. Still, the level of protection varies from country to country, and vulnerability of HEU remains a concern at many civilian sites that were not originally designed with security considerations in mind. The rise of terrorism and the danger that HEU from the civilian sector could be used to construct an improvised nuclear bomb increased international concern regarding the security of this material. An effort to accelerate the return of vulnerable civilian HEU worldwide (see GTRI, below) and to promote the reduction and subsequent phase-out of HEU use in the civilian sector has been launched, but much remains to be done. [More on the HEU threat] In two instances, ad hoc operations to remove HEU from vulnerable sites were organized in 1994 and 1998 from nuclear facilities in the former Soviet republics. The first operation, known as Project Sapphire, involved the removal of 581 kg of HEU, including some weapon-grade HEU, from the Ulba Metallurgy Plant, a nuclear fuel fabrication facility near Ust-Kamenogorsk, Kazakhstan. The considerable amount of material, its poor security, and information about Iranian interest in the material and the facility were driving forces behind the U.S. government involvement. The Ulba HEU was transported to Oak Ridge National Laboratory in the United States in November 1994. The second operation - Auburn Endeavor - involved the removal on April 24, 1998 of approximately 4.3 kg of HEU fuel (mostly fresh HEU fuel) and 9.5 kg of fresh and spent fuel LEU from the Institute of Physics in Mtskheta, Georgia. The operation involved the governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Georgia. The material was transported to the Dounreay Nuclear Complex in Scotland. Subsequent HEU fuel removal operations from third countries have returned HEU material to the country of its origin; however, in some cases "repatriating" this fuel is not possible—more flexibility in these programs is necessary. Efforts to Convert Reactors to LEU and to Remove HEU from Sites of Concern Both the United States and the Soviet Union launched efforts in the late 1970s to mitigate the threat of possible misuse of HEU from civilian installations. The primary focus of these efforts was on developing replacement fuels and converting HEU-fueled research reactors to use uranium of lower enrichment. Foreign reactors received the priority in these efforts. U.S. Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) Program In 1978, the United States initiated
the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors Program.
The original mission of this program was to develop LEU fuel
for foreign research and test reactors with power levels of more than 1 MW that the United States was supplying with HEU.
Since its inception, 43 research reactors in the United States and other countries have been converted to LEU. Several types of replacement LEU fuels have been developed. Uranium-silicide fuel developed in the 1980s has a uranium density sufficient to convert the vast majority of reactors. Uranium-molybdenum (U-Mo) fuels with very high uranium densities are currently under development and testing and could potentially replace HEU fuel in the remaining reactors. The technical report on U-Mo fuel development results is scheduled to be submitted to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission for review in early 2010, so that its use in U.S. non-power reactors can be approved by the end of 2010. Since RERTR's inception, many countries have joined the program and started their own efforts to convert reactors and isotope production to LEU. RERTR and other HEU minimization efforts have increased global awareness of the risks associated with the use of HEU for research and other civilian purposes. While there is no international agreement on banning the use of HEU in future research reactors, no new civilian research reactors with a power level more than 1 MW that use HEU fuel have been built in the Western countries since the early 1980s, with the exception of Germany's FRM-II reactor. Seventeen new research reactors worldwide were built using LEU fuels. Despite its achievements, the program has some shortcomings. Until recently, US federal funding for this program was very low, which affected the pace of the development of replacement fuels. Fuel development and testing, in general, require a long-term commitment. Additional funding would likely have led to more aggressive R&D in this area. The program also suffered some technical setbacks, including recent difficulties with the U-Mo dispersion fuel. As a consequence, the LEU fuel availability and reactor conversion deadlines for reactors that require new fuels have been extended to 2014. In addition, the RERTR program does not cover fast critical assemblies or propulsion reactors, some of which contain substantial amount of HEU in their cores. Fast critical assemblies and propulsion reactors logically should be included into RERTR or similar efforts. [For more on reactors and critical assemblies, see "Civilian Uses of HEU." For more on propulsion reactors, see "Russia: Civilian-Use Nuclear Reactors"] Soviet Program to Lower Enrichment Level in Exported Reactors Also around 1978, the Soviet Union initiated a program with the goal of reducing the enrichment level of fuel (from 80% to 36%) for reactors supplied to its allies in Eastern Europe and some other parts of the world. The first stage of the Soviet program involved a reduction from 80% to 36% enriched fuels. By the late 1980s, higher density cermet fuel (ceramic in a metal matrix) with 36% enriched U-235 had been developed to use in the Soviet-supplied reactors abroad, and the Soviet Union stopped providing nuclear fuel of higher than 36% enrichment level to these reactors. The program envisioned the development of new LEU fuels, however, activities to further reduce enrichment levels to below 20% were hampered in the late 1980s by the economic and political problems within the Soviet Union. After the breakup of the USSR, several former Soviet republics found themselves in the possession of HEU-fueled research reactors. The conversion of these reactors to LEU required international attention, along with the lowering of the content of U-235 to below 20% in all Soviet-supplied reactors. In 1993, the U.S. Department of Energy initiated discussions with the Russian government and laboratories to restart efforts aimed at conversion of Soviet-supplied reactors to LEU fuel. Russian scientists were invited to participate in annual International RERTR meetings. In September 1994, representatives of the U.S. Department of Energy and the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy signed a protocol of intent on cooperation in the development of higher-density 19.75% enriched uranium fuels and on the demonstration of the feasibility of and conversion to LEU fuel of specific reactors. Concrete work in this area started in 1996. The progress in the development and qualification of replacement LEU fuels has been slow. In October 2005, the VR-1 reactor in the Czech Republic was the first Soviet-supplied reactor to complete the conversion and receive new LEU fuel.[1] Russia also supplied Libya's IRT-1 reactor with LEU fuel in December 2005. Conversion of Libya's critical facility was completed in January 2006, while conversion of its 10 MW reactor is planned to be completed in summer 2006. The U.S.-Russian RERTR program also became involved in HEU fuel removal activities, under which Russia takes back Soviet-supplied fresh and spent fuel from reactor operators if the operators agree to convert to LEU. (For more information, see below.) However, as of June 2006, none of the Russia's own HEU-fueled reactors had been converted to LEU. U.S. Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel (FRR SNF) Acceptance program Along with reactor conversion efforts, the United States takes back irradiated aluminum-based and TRIGA HEU and LEU fuels from U.S.-supplied research reactors. Fresh fuel is also accepted. Removal of the spent fuel addresses security and nonproliferation concerns. At the same time, the removal of spent fuel serves as an incentive for countries to convert to LEU. Reactor operators must commit to convert to LEU for the United States to accept their spent fuel. About 5 metric tons of HEU and 15 metric tons of LEU are eligible to be shipped back to the United States. There have already been 28 such shipments. However, the spent fuel acceptance program is scheduled to be completed only in 2019. Some U.S.-supplied reactor operators have yet to commit to convert to LEU and ship their fresh and spent HEU fuel back to the United States. Soviet-Origin HEU Fuel Repatriation After the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, efforts to convert research reactors, particularly in third
countries, and take back HEU fuel received new impetus. The United States and Russia began to work
closely on removing fresh and spent HEU fuel from countries they had earlier
supplied with research reactors and HEU fuel. Since 2002, Russia has accepted
Soviet-origin fuel containing HEU from the following countries in the
framework of the
Russian Research Reactor Fuel Return Program (RRRFR):
"HEU can be directly used in manufacturing nuclear weapons. Our common objective consists of reducing, to the greatest extent possible, and, ultimately, eliminating the use of such materials in civilian nuclear activity." [3] In May 2004, the U.S. and Russian governments signed a formal agreement on cooperation on the transfer of Soviet/Russian origin research reactor nuclear fuel to the Russian Federation.[4] Plans provide for the return of all spent and fresh fuel by 2010. In one instance, downblending of fresh HEU was carried out without its transfer to Russia. In a joint operation involving Kazatomprom and the Nuclear Threat Initiative that began in 2001, 2,900 kg of 26% enriched nuclear fuel was transferred from Aktau, site of the BN-350 fast neutron reactor, to Ulba Metallurgy Plant to be blended down to non-weapons usable forms of uranium for use in commercial and scientific activities. The HEU fuel involved was fresh HEU fuel assemblies designed, but never used, for the BN-350 reactor which was shut down in 1999. The fuel assemblies were transported to Ulba, where security upgrades had been installed to permit HEU storage. A blend-down line and additional security upgrades to allow HEU processing were designed, licensed, and installed at Ulba to carry out the operations. Costs of the project, approximately $2 million, were shared equally between the Washington, DC-based Nuclear Threat Initiative and Kazatomprom, Kazakhstan's state-owned uranium company. The IAEA applied safeguards during transport, commissioning, and downblending. In February 2006, the blend-down of all 2,900 kg of fresh HEU fuel was completed. [View a map of worldwide holdings of civilian HEU and clean-out] In addition to converting facilities to use LEU fuel and repatriating HEU, there have also been efforts to consolidate fresh and spent HEU fuel at a smaller number of relatively secure locations. The U.S.-Russian Materials Consolidation and Conversion (MCC) program, established in 1999, reduces excess Russian civilian HEU by blending it down into LEU. As of mid-2005, 6.5 of an estimated 17 tons of U-235 in excess Russian civilian HEU had been blended down.[5] Both the United States and Russia have large quantities of HEU that are no longer needed in their defense programs. In Russia, excess HEU from weapons is blended down to LEU within the framework of the "Megatons to Megawatts" program (also know as HEU-LEU program). According to the1993 U.S.-Russia agreement, 500 metric tones of weapons HEU are slated for the downblending by 2013. The resulting LEU is then shipped to the United States to be used in LEU fuel for commercial nuclear power generation. [For more information see "Overview of the US-Russian HEU-LEU Program"] The United States initially declared some 174 metric tons of HEU as excess to military needs, designating this material as civilian.[6] An additional 200 metric tons were officially removed from the U.S. weapons stockpile in November 2005; of this amount, about 20 metric tons will be down-blended to LEU.[7] Since the amount of HEU that is actually excess to military needs is likely far greater than the amount that has officially been declared excess to date, there have also been calls to speed up the various blenddown programs. A current effort spearheaded by the Nuclear Threat Initiative involves a detailed study of the Russian nuclear complex to determine the options for speeding up the U.S.-Russian HEU-LEU program, and what costs various scenarios entail. [For more, see "Accelerating the Blend-Down of Russian Highly Enriched Uranium."] Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) The slow progress of the RERTR program and international cooperation in this area in the late 1990s and early 2000s primarily can be attributed to the meager funding of these activities and lack of attention from the government. In 2004, the U.S. Department of Energy, in response to criticism about the slow pace of the nuclear and radioactive material clean out, launched the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI). The GTRI Program subsumed LEU fuel development, reactor conversion, and HEU fuel repatriation activities worldwide, as well as a number of other initiatives addressing nuclear and radioactive material security. The GTRI program includes the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) Program; Russian Research Reactor Fuel Return (RRRFR) Program; Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel (FRRSNF) Acceptance Program, and others. Over 90 countries joined GTRI after its inception. Much more substantial and regular funding than in previous years, totaling $450 million over the next decade, has been promised for this work. The GTRI efforts also include the Emerging Threats and Gap Material Program which is designed to address vulnerable, high-risk, nuclear and radiological materials that could be of terrorist concern throughout the world that are not currently being addressed under existing programs. [For a recent overview of GTRI accomplishments, please see GTRI: Two Successful Years of Reducing Nuclear Threats, available at http://www.nnsa.doe.gov/docs/factsheets/2006/NA-06-FS04.pdf.] Export Controls and Other International Efforts to Limit Civilian HEU Use Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines There is no explicit ban on the export of HEU for civilian purposes as long as countries subscribe to IAEA full-scope safeguards. The Nuclear Suppliers Group was established in 1975 to ensure that suppliers applied a uniform approach to nuclear exports to make sure that nuclear cooperation did not contribute to proliferation. HEU, as nuclear material of direct application for weapons purposes, was included into the so-called Trigger List. Any export of items from this list requires the application of safeguards on all fissionable materials (not only the supplied material) in the recipient's nuclear activities. These safeguard arrangements are also known as "full-scope IAEA safeguards." (Part one of the IAEA Information Circular INFCIRC/254 contains the Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers.) Some countries have instituted even more restrictive export control regulations than those of the NSG. In 1992, the United States, for example, adopted the so-called "Schumer amendment" to the Energy Policy Act, which required foreign reactors supplied with HEU fuel by the United States, to commit to convert to LEU as quickly as possible and prohibited U.S. HEU exports if foreign reactors do not take such obligations. The implementation of this amendment, in combination with LEU fuel development and a drop in the construction of new reactors, facilitated a rapid decline in U.S. HEU exports from an annual peak of nearly three tons in the late 1960s to a few tens of kilograms or less by the early 1990s--a reduction of 99%.[8] Unfortunately, the 2005 Energy bill passed by Congress in July 2005 included provisions relaxing restrictions on HEU exports for medical isotope production. The primary beneficiaries of the new law are big producers of medical radioisotopes, who claim that conversion to LEU is too costly and could disrupt production of needed medical isotopes. The new law, passed after heavy lobbying efforts by Canadian medial isotope producer MDS Nordion, will permit the export of U.S. HEU to medical isotope producers even if they do not commit to convert to LEU. [For more, see Despite Nuclear Terrorism Risks, Congress Relaxes HEU Export Controls.] Other
countries don't have similar restrictions, and in some cases HEU consumers
were able to substitute U.S. HEU exports with exports from other countries.
Russia, for example, concluded agreements to supply HEU for
research reactors in some EU countries (for reactors in France, Germany, and
Netherlands).
Other Resources:
Websites: "Office of Global
Threat Reduction," U.S. National Nuclear Security
Administration website,
<http://www.nnsa.doe.gov/na%2D20/na21_index.shtml>.
"Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test
Reactors (RERTR) Program," NIS Nuclear and Missile Database, NTI website,
<http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/ russia/forasst/doe/rertr.htm>.
"Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors,"
Argonne National Laboratory website,
<http://www.rertr.anl.gov>.
"Removing Material From Vulnerable Sites" in
NTI Securing the Bomb report,
<http://www.nti.org/e_research/cnwm/securing/vulnerable.asp>.
"Russia: Overview of the US-Russian HEU-LEU Program,"
NIS Nuclear and Missile Database, NTI website,
<http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/ fissmat/heudeal/overview.htm>.
"2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," United Nations website,
<http://www.un.org/events/npt2005>.
Philipp Bleek, "Global Cleanout: An Emerging Approach to
the Civil Nuclear Material Threat," (Cambridge, MA and Washington, D.C.: Belfer
Center for Science and International Affairs and the Nuclear Threat Initiative,
September 2004),
<http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/BCSIA_content/ documents/bleekglobalcleanout.pdf>.
Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier, Securing the Bomb 2005:
The New Global Imperatives (Cambridge, MA and Washington, D.C.: Belfer Center
for Science and International Affairs and the Nuclear Threat Initiative, May
2005),
<http://www.nti.org/c_press/ release_cnwmupdate_050505.pdf>.
Oleg Bukharin, Christopher Ficek, and Michael
Roston, "U.S.-Russian Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors
(RERTR) Cooperation," in RANSAC Policy Update, Summer 2002,
<www.ransac.org>.
Cristina
Chuen, "Reducing the Risk of Nuclear Terrorism: Decreasing the
Availability of HEU," CNS website, May 2005,
<http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/050506.htm>.
Robert L. Civiak, "Closing the Gaps: Securing High
Enriched Uranium in the Former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe," May 2002, p. 9,
Federation of American Scientists website,
<http://www.fas.org/ssp/docs/ 020500-heu/index.html>.
Charles Ferguson and William Potter, eds., The Four
Faces of Nuclear Terrorism (Abindgdon, Oxfordshire, UK: Routledge, June 2005).
Excerpts available at:
<http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/books/4faces.htm>.
Alexander Glaser and Frank N. von Hippel,
"Global Cleanout: Reducing the Threat of HEU-Fueled Nuclear
Terrorism," Arms Control Today, January/February 2006, available online
at:
<http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_01-02/JANFEB-heuFeature.asp>.
Alan J. Kuperman, "Civilian Highly Enriched
Uranium and the Fissile Material Convention," in Paul L. Leventhal, ed.,
Nuclear Power & the Spread of Nuclear Weapons (Dulles: Brassey's
Inc., 2002), pp. 249-260, as cited in Alan Kuperman, "Bomb-grade
bazaar," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March/April 2006,
<http://www.thebulletin.org/article.php?art_ofn=ma06kuperman>.
Morten Bremer Maerli and Lars van Dassen, "Eliminating
Excessive Stocks of Highly Enriched Uranium," Pugwash Issue Brief, Vol. No. 1
(April 2005), available at:
<http://www.pugwash.org/publication/ pb/2005brief.6.pdf>.
Frank von Hippel, "A Comprehensive Approach to
Elimination of Highly-Enriched-Uranium From All Nuclear-Reactor Fuel Cycles,"
Science and Global Security, No. 12 (2004),
<http://www.princeton.edu/~globsec/publications/ pdf/von_Hippel_SGS_137-164_1.pdf>. Scott
Parrish, "Despite Nuclear Terrorism Risks, Congress Relaxes HEU Export
Controls," CNS website, August 2005,
<http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/050804.htm>.
U.S.
Government Accountability Office, DOE Needs to Take Action to Further Reduce the
Use of Weapons-Usable Uranium in Civilian Research Reactors, GAO-04-807, July
2004,
<http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04807.pdf>.
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