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Parts of this report were originally prepared by the Center
for Nonproliferation Studies of the Monterey Institute of International Studies
in May 1998 under a grant from the United States Department of Energy's Office
of Nonproliferation and Arms Control. The views expressed in this report are
those of the authors alone, and do not necessarily represent the views of the
Department of Energy or the United States Government.
Introduction Administrative Bodies Export Control Legislation Export Licensing Process Customs/Border Issues Export
Control Developments
INTRODUCTION
Since declaring independence in August 1991, Azerbaijan has become known to the
outside world primarily for its vast reserves of oil and its on-going conflict
with Armenia over the separatist Nagorno-Karabakh region. As a new state
with limited financial and human resources, Azerbaijan has focused its energies
on these two issues. Perhaps as a result, nonproliferation export controls
have been slow to develop in Azerbaijan.
In an effort to adapt its national legislation to the demands of a market
economy, the Azerbaijani Government has been striving to remove limitations in
the sphere of export operations, rather than strengthen export controls.
According to an Azerbaijani official, the Government of Azerbaijan is carrying
out a policy of long term liberalization of foreign trade in the country.[1]
Current legislation does not appear to contain any resolutions or regulations
that deal specifically with export controls for nonproliferation purposes.
Rather, several decrees and regulations on foreign trade policy tangentially
affect the controls on sensitive, military-related goods. For the most
part, however, these decrees are designed to remove restrictions on trade and
facilitate the export and import of goods and services. As in many
Southern Tier countries of the Newly Independent States (NIS), it is unlikely
that Azerbaijan currently is able to effectively implement the few export
controls that do exist on paper.
Azerbaijan's industry is dominated by petroleum- and natural gas-related
enterprises. There appears to be little industry that could be considered
relevant to production of weapons of mass destruction, other than a developed
chemical industry.[2] According to the International Atomic Energy Agency,
Azerbaijan is one of only three countries in the NIS with no known nuclear or
uranium mining activities. There is only one nuclear-related site in
Azerbaijan: the Izotop Industrial
Complex. Izotop is a six-hectare storage facility for low-level
radioactive waste. Located 30km outside of Baku, it holds 510 tons of
radioactive waste.[3]
In September 1999, the United States and Azerbaijan
signed an agreement pledging cooperation in the counterproliferation of nuclear,
chemical, and biological weapons and related materials. Under the
agreement, the United States agreed to train Azerbaijani officials in preventing,
deterring, and investigating incidents involving the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction.[5,6] Although Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act
limits the ability of the US government to provide assistance to Azerbaijan, the
US Congress granted a waiver which allows for nonproliferation assistance that
is in the national security interests of the United States.[4]
Section 907 has had an effect, however. Because the US Government's hands
were tied, private US investment in the oil and gas sector and trade promotion
have been emphasized in the United States-Azerbaijan relationship. Thus, in
comparison with other countries of the NIS, Azerbaijan has a lot of catching up
to do in terms of developing a true understanding of the need for effective
nonproliferation export controls.
ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES
The President of Azerbaijan has the authority to issue laws and decrees
relevant to export controls. The Cabinet of Ministers grants permission to
exporters regarding the export of certain controlled goods and services,
including military technologies and nuclear-related materials. The
Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations drafts regulations in the sphere of
foreign trade, including the 17 December 1996 Presidential Decree "On
Further Development of Foreign Trade Regulation." The Ministry of Foreign
Economic Relations also grants permission to exporters regarding the export of
certain goods, including know-how and the results of scientific research.
Finally, the Customs Service checks export documentation and inspects cargo
before export.
LEGISLATION
Draft Export Control Law
Mr. Ali Isa
Mamedov, senior advisor to the International Economic Relations Department at the Azerbaijani
Cabinet of Ministers, presented an overview of draft export control legislation in Azerbaijan to the Sixth Central Asia and Caucasus
Nonproliferation Export Control Forum, held 15-18 April 2002 in Tashkent,
Uzbekistan.
According to Mamedov, the Azerbaijani Milli
Medzhlis (Parliament) is reviewing a draft export control law, which was
developed with the assistance of the United States.
The draft law, which includes 14 articles, provides a foundation for the
country's export control system. The law defines WMD and
the means of their delivery, other kinds of weapons, materials and raw
materials, dual-use products and other categories. The draft law also defines export and import, re-export, re-import, transit, importers, and exporters.
The articles stipulate the principles for controlling exports, the scope of
application of the law, procedures for defining the products subject to export
control, legal bases for granting licenses, participation in international
organizations, and responsibilities for handling violations of the law on
export control.
After the law is adopted, a presidential edict will define the authority of
the governmental organizations responsible for implementing export controls.
Additional normative acts, covering the following procedures, will be adopted:
1. Consideration and adoption of a control list of products subject to export
control;
2. Preparation and adoption of rules for granting licenses for import, export,
transit, and re-export of products subject to export control;
3. Determination of control procedures during pre-licensing and post-licensing
periods, for product delivery to final customer, and for using product according
to stated purpose;
4. Development of an automated licensing system;
5. Amendments to existing legislative and normative acts due to the adoption of
the Law of the Republic of Azerbaijan on Export Control.
According to Mamedov, the control list will be confirmed by a separate normative
act. This will facilitate future amendments to the list if needed. A draft
control list has already been developed and is based on that of the European
Union.
Presidential Decree, 24 June 1997, Rules Regulating Foreign Trade in
the Republic of Azerbaijan This document almost completely eliminates all restrictions on export
operations, with the exception of limitations on the quantities of certain goods
that may be exported. However, restrictions remain on the export of
certain sensitive goods. The export of the following goods may be carried
out only with the explicit permission of the Cabinet of Ministers: weapons,
military technology, and the essential spare parts for their production;
gunpowder, explosives, and pyrotechnic substances; nuclear materials,
technology, equipment, special non-nuclear materials, and radiation sources,
including radioactive waste; narcotics, psychotropic substances, and chemical
poisons; scientific-technical information; and certain types of technology,
materials and equipment which could be used in the creation of military
technology or arms. These goods also may not be exported on credit or by
consignment.[1]
Cabinet of Ministers Resolution, July 1997 This resolution calls for the installation of radiation control devices at all
customs posts at airports, seaports, and railroads, as well as at the national
borders to monitor vehicle traffic. The installation of such devices will
be carried out over the course of 1997 and 1998. The resolution tasks the
Customs Service and the Ministry of Health to establish the procedures for
radiation monitoring at these posts. The decree further requires that all
enterprises and organizations submit an inventory of all radioactive materials
to the appropriate state ministries and agencies by 15 December 1997, as well as
to inform the appropriate state ministries and agencies of any new imports of
radioactive material. In addition, special insurance will be required in
order to transport radioactive materials through the territory of
Azerbaijan.[2,3]
Customs Code The new comprehensive Customs Code, which defines the responsibilities of the
customs organs in the sphere of export control, was adopted by the Milli
Madzhlis (Parliament) in mid-1997.[2,3]
Cabinet of Ministers Resolution No. 247, 15 November 1995 This resolution decreases the bureaucratic hurdles for export licensing, removes
quotas on exports of strategic goods, and eliminates the requirement for
multiple Ministerial approvals for strategic goods. In addition, the
decree requires that the State Customs Committee report trade transactions to
certain government agencies on a monthly basis. This resolution supercedes
Cabinet of Ministers Decree No. 222 from June 1994.[4]
Presidential Decree, 17 December 1996, On Further Development of
Foreign Trade Regulation This decree stipulates that all foreign trade activities are allowed except
those that are specifically restricted by the text of the decree. The
decree addresses the rules and procedures for standard import, export, and
barter operations for non-sensitive goods. It also lists those goods that
can only be exported or imported with the explicit permission of the Cabinet of
Ministers, (i.e. the Cabinet of Ministers must issue an official decision in
order for the export or import contract to be legal). The list of goods
includes arms, weapons, military equipment, and related products; nuclear
material, equipment, technology, special non-nuclear material, and radioactive
sources; narcotics and chemical toxins; and some types of scientific and
technical information related to military production.[5] In addition to the documents listed in this section, there is an additional
regulation called Rules Regulating Import-Export Operations in the Azerbaijan
Republic. According to an Azerbaijani official, this document was
published in the Baku newsletter Byulleteny Bisnesmena, No. 30, 1997.
The exact date and precise contents of this regulation are unclear.
EXPORT LICENSING PROCESS
As noted in the 24 June 1997 Presidential Decree, explicit permission from the
Cabinet of Ministers is required in order to export weapons, military
technology, and the essential spare parts for their production; gunpowder,
explosives, and pyrotechnic substances; nuclear materials, technology,
equipment, special non-nuclear materials, and radiation sources, including
radioactive waste; narcotics, psychotropic substances, and chemical poisons;
scientific-technical information and certain types of technology, materials and
equipment that could be used in the creation of military technology or arms.
It is not clear whether or not there is a formal interagency process that helps
to inform decisions taken by the Cabinet of Ministers regarding export of these
items. According to one Azerbaijani official, there are no clear legal or
procedural parameters to help guide the Cabinet in its decision to either
approve or deny an export license request, "which opens up opportunities
for abuse of power by some bureaucrats." In addition, there are no
particular limitations regarding which companies are allowed to export sensitive
goods such as dual-use items, weapons, and military technology.
However--again according to the same Azerbaijani official--private companies
that produce or trade in such items "practically do not exist."
Also noted in the June 1997 Presidential decree is a category of goods that
requires approval from the Ministry of Trade for export. These goods
include such items as wild plants, snake venom, artwork, and the results of
scientific research. In order to grant approval for the export of
technology and scientific inventions, the Ministry of Trade must consult with
the Academy of Sciences and the State Committee for Science and Technology.
CUSTOMS AND BORDER ISSUES
As with most Southern Tier NIS, the smuggling of WMD materials across
Azerbaijani borders presents a major proliferation challenge. Azerbaijan
has a 179km border with Iran to the south and a 284km border with Russia to the
north.[1] The following recent example serves to highlight the concerns in
Azerbaijan, in particular: in March 1998, Azerbaijani customs officials
detained a shipment of alloyed steel on the Azerbaijani-Iranian border because
the shipping documents were not in order. The shipment was transiting
Azerbaijan from Russia. The Azerbaijani government informed the United
States of the interception, and the US government in turn analyzed a sample of
the steel. It was determined that the steel was suitable for use in the
construction of liquid propellant missiles. On 7 April 1998, the Russian
Federal Security Service (FSB) announced that it had arrested three individuals
for plotting to smuggle 22 tons of alloyed steel to Iran via Azerbaijan.[2]
The good news about this case is that it shows that Azerbaijani customs agents
are able to intercept suspicious cargo. However, it is still disturbing
that the Russian smugglers believed they would be able to ship the illegal
missile-related materials through Azerbaijan.
Azerbaijan has signed border agreements with all of its neighbors: Georgia,
Iran, Russia, Turkey, and Turkmenistan (with whom it shares a Caspian Sea
border).[3] Although Russia and Azerbaijan jointly guard their common
border,[4] Russian border guards are not stationed on Azerbaijan's borders with
Iran and Turkey. According to an Azerbaijani official, Azerbaijan makes no
distinctions between its NIS and other external borders.[3]
Azerbaijan and Iran have held at least one discussion specifically devoted to
customs relations. In March 1997, the Head of the Azerbaijani State
Customs Service met with Iran's Ambassador to Azerbaijan. At the meeting,
representatives of the two countries discussed training of Azerbaijani customs
agents in Iran, expansion of bilateral customs relations, and an exchange of
customs-related information.[5]
Page last updated
6 August 2003
Comments or questions? Contact Kenley Butler at
MIIS CNS: Kenley.Butler@miis.edu |