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Azerbaijan:  Export Control System

Azerbaijan: Export Control System

Parts of this report were originally prepared by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies of the Monterey Institute of International Studies in May 1998 under a grant from the United States Department of Energy's Office of Nonproliferation and Arms Control. The views expressed in this report are those of the authors alone, and do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of Energy or the United States Government.

Introduction
Administrative Bodies
Export Control Legislation
Export Licensing Process
Customs/Border Issues
Export Control Developments

INTRODUCTION

Since declaring independence in August 1991, Azerbaijan has become known to the outside world primarily for its vast reserves of oil and its on-going conflict with Armenia over the separatist Nagorno-Karabakh region. As a new state with limited financial and human resources, Azerbaijan has focused its energies on these two issues.  Perhaps as a result, nonproliferation export controls have been slow to develop in Azerbaijan.

In an effort to adapt its national legislation to the demands of a market economy, the Azerbaijani Government has been striving to remove limitations in the sphere of export operations, rather than strengthen export controls.  According to an Azerbaijani official, the Government of Azerbaijan is carrying out a policy of long term liberalization of foreign trade in the country.[1]  Current legislation does not appear to contain any resolutions or regulations that deal specifically with export controls for nonproliferation purposes.  Rather, several decrees and regulations on foreign trade policy tangentially affect the controls on sensitive, military-related goods.  For the most part, however, these decrees are designed to remove restrictions on trade and facilitate the export and import of goods and services.  As in many Southern Tier countries of the Newly Independent States (NIS), it is unlikely that Azerbaijan currently is able to effectively implement the few export controls that do exist on paper.

Azerbaijan's industry is dominated by petroleum- and natural gas-related enterprises.  There appears to be little industry that could be considered relevant to production of weapons of mass destruction, other than a developed chemical industry.[2]  According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, Azerbaijan is one of only three countries in the NIS with no known nuclear or uranium mining activities.  There is only one nuclear-related site in Azerbaijan: the Izotop Industrial Complex.  Izotop is a six-hectare storage facility for low-level radioactive waste.  Located 30km outside of Baku, it holds 510 tons of radioactive waste.[3]

In September 1999, the United States and Azerbaijan signed an agreement pledging cooperation in the counterproliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and related materials.  Under the agreement, the United States agreed to train Azerbaijani officials in preventing, deterring, and investigating incidents involving the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.[5,6]  Although Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act limits the ability of the US government to provide assistance to Azerbaijan, the US Congress granted a waiver which allows for nonproliferation assistance that is in the national security interests of the United States.[4]

Section 907 has had an effect, however. Because the US Government's hands were tied, private US investment in the oil and gas sector and trade promotion have been emphasized in the United States-Azerbaijan relationship. Thus, in comparison with other countries of the NIS, Azerbaijan has a lot of catching up to do in terms of developing a true understanding of the need for effective nonproliferation export controls.
Sources:
[1] CNS correspondence with Azerbaijani official, July 1997.
[2] CIA World Fact Book 1997, CIA Homepage, http://www.odci.gov.
[3] Zerkalo, 17 February 1996, p. 13; in "Nuclear Waste Control, Handling Criticized," FBIS-TEN-96-003, 17 February 1996.
[4] NISNP Telephone Conversation with Officials from the US Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, May 1998.
[5]
MPA, 5 July 2000; in "US Allocates $100,000 in Aid Despite Section 907," FBIS Document CEP20000705000174.
[6] "US, Azerbaijan Sign Counterproliferation Pact," The Post-Soviet States & Eastern Europe Monitor, Vol. 3, No. 23, 11 October  1999, p. 14.{Updated 6/19/2001 KB}

ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES

The President of Azerbaijan has the authority to issue laws and decrees relevant to export controls.  The Cabinet of Ministers grants permission to exporters regarding the export of certain controlled goods and services, including military technologies and nuclear-related materials.  The Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations drafts regulations in the sphere of foreign trade, including the 17 December 1996 Presidential Decree "On Further Development of Foreign Trade Regulation." The Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations also grants permission to exporters regarding the export of certain goods, including know-how and the results of scientific research.  Finally, the Customs Service checks export documentation and inspects cargo before export.

LEGISLATION

Draft Export Control Law
Mr. Ali Isa Mamedov, senior advisor to the International Economic Relations Department at the Azerbaijani Cabinet of Ministers, presented an overview of draft export control legislation in Azerbaijan to the Sixth Central Asia and Caucasus Nonproliferation Export Control Forum, held 15-18 April 2002 in Tashkent, Uzbekistan.

According to Mamedov, the Azerbaijani Milli Medzhlis (Parliament) is reviewing a draft export control law, which was developed with the assistance of the United States.

The draft law, which includes 14 articles, provides a foundation for the country's export control system. The law defines WMD and the means of their delivery, other kinds of weapons, materials and raw materials, dual-use products and other categories. The draft law also defines export and import, re-export, re-import, transit, importers, and exporters. The articles stipulate the principles for controlling exports, the scope of application of the law, procedures for defining the products subject to export control, legal bases for granting licenses, participation in international organizations, and responsibilities for handling violations of the law on export control.

After the law is adopted, a presidential edict will define the authority of the governmental organizations responsible for implementing export controls. Additional normative acts, covering the following procedures, will be adopted:
1. Consideration and adoption of a control list of products subject to export control;
2. Preparation and adoption of rules for granting licenses for import, export, transit, and re-export of products subject to export control;
3. Determination of control procedures during pre-licensing and post-licensing periods, for product delivery to final customer, and for using product according to stated purpose;
4. Development of an automated licensing system;
5. Amendments to existing legislative and normative acts due to the adoption of the Law of the Republic of Azerbaijan on Export Control.

According to Mamedov, the control list will be confirmed by a separate normative act. This will facilitate future amendments to the list if needed. A draft control list has already been developed and is based on that of the European Union.
[ "Doklad Ali Isa Mamedova, Starshego sovetnika Departamenta mezhdunarodnykh ekonomicheskikh otnosheniy Kabineta Ministrov Azerbaydzhana," Tashkent Institute of Strategic and Inter-regional Studies Web Site, http://www.uzstrateg.info/frontend/index.cfm?
target=analysis&sub=article&analysis_id=34.] {Entered 1/24/03 AD}

Presidential Decree, 24 June 1997, Rules Regulating Foreign Trade in the Republic of Azerbaijan
This document almost completely eliminates all restrictions on export operations, with the exception of limitations on the quantities of certain goods that may be exported.  However, restrictions remain on the export of certain sensitive goods.  The export of the following goods may be carried out only with the explicit permission of the Cabinet of Ministers: weapons, military technology, and the essential spare parts for their production; gunpowder, explosives, and pyrotechnic substances; nuclear materials, technology, equipment, special non-nuclear materials, and radiation sources, including radioactive waste; narcotics, psychotropic substances, and chemical poisons; scientific-technical information; and certain types of technology, materials and equipment which could be used in the creation of military technology or arms.  These goods also may not be exported on credit or by consignment.[1]

Cabinet of Ministers Resolution, July 1997
This resolution calls for the installation of radiation control devices at all customs posts at airports, seaports, and railroads, as well as at the national borders to monitor vehicle traffic.  The installation of such devices will be carried out over the course of 1997 and 1998.  The resolution tasks the Customs Service and the Ministry of Health to establish the procedures for radiation monitoring at these posts.  The decree further requires that all enterprises and organizations submit an inventory of all radioactive materials to the appropriate state ministries and agencies by 15 December 1997, as well as to inform the appropriate state ministries and agencies of any new imports of radioactive material.  In addition, special insurance will be required in order to transport radioactive materials through the territory of Azerbaijan.[2,3]

Customs Code
The new comprehensive Customs Code, which defines the responsibilities of the customs organs in the sphere of export control, was adopted by the Milli Madzhlis (Parliament) in mid-1997.[2,3]

Cabinet of Ministers Resolution No. 247, 15 November 1995
This resolution decreases the bureaucratic hurdles for export licensing, removes quotas on exports of strategic goods, and eliminates the requirement for multiple Ministerial approvals for strategic goods.  In addition, the decree requires that the State Customs Committee report trade transactions to certain government agencies on a monthly basis.  This resolution supercedes Cabinet of Ministers Decree No. 222 from June 1994.[4]

Presidential Decree, 17 December 1996, On Further Development of Foreign Trade Regulation
This decree stipulates that all foreign trade activities are allowed except those that are specifically restricted by the text of the decree.  The decree addresses the rules and procedures for standard import, export, and barter operations for non-sensitive goods.  It also lists those goods that can only be exported or imported with the explicit permission of the Cabinet of Ministers, (i.e. the Cabinet of Ministers must issue an official decision in order for the export or import contract to be legal).  The list of goods includes arms, weapons, military equipment, and related products; nuclear material, equipment, technology, special non-nuclear material, and radioactive sources; narcotics and chemical toxins; and some types of scientific and technical information related to military production.[5]
 
In addition to the documents listed in this section, there is an additional regulation called Rules Regulating Import-Export Operations in the Azerbaijan Republic.  According to an Azerbaijani official, this document was published in the Baku newsletter Byulleteny Bisnesmena, No. 30, 1997.  The exact date and precise contents of this regulation are unclear.
Sources:
[1] CNS Correspondence with Azerbaijani Official, July 1997.
[2] "Uzhestochaetsya Kontrol Za Radiatsiye Na Tamozhennykh Postakh," Informatsionny Byulleten Pravozaschitnogo Tsentra Azerbaydzhana, 13-19 July 1997.

[3] "Customs to Tighten Control Over Radioactive Substances," Bakinskiy rabochiy, 2 August 1997, p. 2.
[4] "Government of Azerbaijan Efforts to Foster Foreign Trade," BISNIS Cables, 1 February 1996.
[5] "Presidential Decree Introduces New Foreign Trade Regulation for Azerbaijan," 21 January 1997, Harbarlar-l@usc.edu List Serve Discussion Group, provided courtesy of the Business Information Service for the Newly Independent States (BISNIS).

EXPORT LICENSING PROCESS

As noted in the 24 June 1997 Presidential Decree, explicit permission from the Cabinet of Ministers is required in order to export weapons, military technology, and the essential spare parts for their production; gunpowder, explosives, and pyrotechnic substances; nuclear materials, technology, equipment, special non-nuclear materials, and radiation sources, including radioactive waste; narcotics, psychotropic substances, and chemical poisons; scientific-technical information and certain types of technology, materials and equipment that could be used in the creation of military technology or arms.  It is not clear whether or not there is a formal interagency process that helps to inform decisions taken by the Cabinet of Ministers regarding export of these items.  According to one Azerbaijani official, there are no clear legal or procedural parameters to help guide the Cabinet in its decision to either approve or deny an export license request, "which opens up opportunities for abuse of power by some bureaucrats."  In addition, there are no particular limitations regarding which companies are allowed to export sensitive goods such as dual-use items, weapons, and military technology.  However--again according to the same Azerbaijani official--private companies that produce or trade in such items "practically do not exist."

Also noted in the June 1997 Presidential decree is a category of goods that requires approval from the Ministry of Trade for export.  These goods include such items as wild plants, snake venom, artwork, and the results of scientific research.  In order to grant approval for the export of technology and scientific inventions, the Ministry of Trade must consult with the Academy of Sciences and the State Committee for Science and Technology.
[CNS Correspondence with Azerbaijani Official, July 1997.]

CUSTOMS AND BORDER ISSUES

As with most Southern Tier NIS, the smuggling of WMD materials across Azerbaijani borders presents a major proliferation challenge.  Azerbaijan has a 179km border with Iran to the south and a 284km border with Russia to the north.[1]  The following recent example serves to highlight the concerns in Azerbaijan, in particular:  in March 1998, Azerbaijani customs officials detained a shipment of alloyed steel on the Azerbaijani-Iranian border because the shipping documents were not in order.  The shipment was transiting Azerbaijan from Russia.  The Azerbaijani government informed the United States of the interception, and the US government in turn analyzed a sample of the steel.  It was determined that the steel was suitable for use in the construction of liquid propellant missiles.  On 7 April 1998, the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) announced that it had arrested three individuals for plotting to smuggle 22 tons of alloyed steel to Iran via Azerbaijan.[2]  The good news about this case is that it shows that Azerbaijani customs agents are able to intercept suspicious cargo.  However, it is still disturbing that the Russian smugglers believed they would be able to ship the illegal missile-related materials through Azerbaijan.

Azerbaijan has signed border agreements with all of its neighbors: Georgia, Iran, Russia, Turkey, and Turkmenistan (with whom it shares a Caspian Sea border).[3]  Although Russia and Azerbaijan jointly guard their common border,[4] Russian border guards are not stationed on Azerbaijan's borders with Iran and Turkey.  According to an Azerbaijani official, Azerbaijan makes no distinctions between its NIS and other external borders.[3]

Azerbaijan and Iran have held at least one discussion specifically devoted to customs relations.  In March 1997, the Head of the Azerbaijani State Customs Service met with Iran's Ambassador to Azerbaijan.  At the meeting, representatives of the two countries discussed training of Azerbaijani customs agents in Iran, expansion of bilateral customs relations, and an exchange of customs-related information.[5]
Sources:
[1] CIA World Fact Book 1997, CIA Homepage, http://www.odci.gov.
[2] "Transcript: State Department Noon Briefing, April 28," Department of State Off-Camera Briefing Index, Briefing by James B. Foley, 28 April 1998, http://www.fas.org/news/russia/1998.
[3] CNS Correspondence with Azerbaijani Official, July 1997.
[4] Arif Useynov, Segodnya, 16 February 1996; in "Azerbaijan Initialed Agreement on Cooperation With Russia On Border Issues," FBIS-SOV-96-044-S.
[5] "Iran, Azerbaijan Discuss Customs Relations," Iran News Economic Desk, 16 March 1997, on Harbarlar-l@usc.edu List Serve Discussion Group.

 

Page last updated 6 August 2003

Comments or questions? Contact Kenley Butler at MIIS CNS: Kenley.Butler@miis.edu

 

CNSThis material is produced independently for NTI by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2002 by MIIS.

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