The Nuclear Suppliers Group 
Fact Sheet Released by the Bureau of Nonproliferation
U.S. Department of State, November 1, 2000



With 39 member states, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is a widely accepted, mature, and
effective export-control arrangement, which contributes to the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons
through implementation of guidelines for control of nuclear and nuclear-related exports. Members
pursue the aims of the NSG through voluntary adherence to the Guidelines which are adopted by
consensus and through exchanges of information on developments of nuclear proliferation concern. 

The first set of NSG Guidelines (Part 1) governs exports of nuclear materials and equipment which
require the application of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards at the recipient
facility. The Part 1 nuclear control list is called the "Trigger List" because the export of such items
"triggers" the requirement for IAEA safeguards. 

The second set of NSG Guidelines (Part 2) governs exports of nuclear-related dual-use equipment
and materials. The NSG Guidelines also control technology related to both nuclear and
nuclear-related dual-use exports. Both Parts 1 and 2 of the NSG Guidelines aim to ensure that
nuclear trade for peaceful purposes does not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or
explosive devices while not hindering such trade. 

The NSG was formed in 1974 following the Indian nuclear explosion which demonstrated how
nuclear technology and materials transferred for peaceful purposes could be misused. The NSG
Guidelines, first published in 1978, established requirements for: (1) formal recipient government
assurances confirming safeguards and no nuclear explosive use; (2) adequate physical protection;
and (3) particular caution in the transfer of sensitive facilities, technology and weapons-usable
materials. The Guidelines also strengthened retransfer conditions. 

Nuclear suppliers took note when the 1990 NPT Review Conference committee on implementation
of Article III recommended that NPT parties: (a) consider further improvements in measures to
prevent diversion of nuclear technology for nuclear weapons; (b) coordinate controls of exports of
significant nuclear-related items; and (c) require full-scope safeguards as a condition of nuclear
supply to non-nuclear weapon states. Shortly thereafter, it became apparent that nuclear export
controls had not prevented Iraq, a party to the NPT, from pursuing a clandestine nuclear weapons
program through acquisition of significant dual-use items. In response to these developments, the
NSG decided in 1992 to: (a) establish guidelines for the control of transfers of nuclear-related
dual-use equipment, materials and technology which could make a significant contribution to
unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle or nuclear explosive activities; and (2) adopt a policy of requiring
full scope IAEA safeguards as a condition of supply of nuclear Trigger List items to non-nuclear
weapon states. 

Chairmanship of the NSG rotates on an annual basis with the host of the annual Plenary meetings
assuming the Chair for that year. The Plenary can decide to set up technical working groups on
matters such as review of the Guidelines or control lists, procedures, information sharing,
transparency and outreach activities. The NSG Dual Use Consultations (DUR) meets at least twice
a year to coordinate dual-use control issues. The Permanent Mission of Japan in Vienna serves as
the NSG Point of Contact in providing administrative support, including provision of meeting space
and distribution of documents. 

The 2000 Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) Plenary and related meetings took place in Paris the
week of June 19-23 under the chairmanship of France. The Plenary accepted the U.S. offer to chair
the 2001 NSG Plenary at Aspen, Colorado, in early May at which time the U.S. will assume the
chairmanship for that year. The Plenary welcomed Belarus, Cyprus and Turkey as new NSG
members and Slovenia as an observer. The outgoing Italian Chairman of the NSG reported that
Slovenia had taken all the necessary steps to qualify for NSG membership and recommended early
action in confirming the necessary member consensus for Slovenian membership. The Plenary noted
that Kazakhstan has also been working to accord its nuclear export controls with the NSG
Guidelines and authorized the French Chair to continue contacts with Kazakhstan regarding future
NSG membership. The British Chair of the Implementation Working Group (IWG) reported
substantial progress toward reaching consensus on restructuring which would confirm the primacy of
the plenary and replace the Dual Use Regime with a Consultative Group to deal with both Part 1
(Nuclear) and Part 2 (Dual-Use) issues. There has been less progress toward reaching consensus
on revisions to clarify and strengthen the Part 1 Guidelines (primarily because of Russian
opposition). The Italians presented a report on the status of controls over transfers of intangible
technology, recommending that the NSG continue to follow the issue. The Plenary agreed to do so.
The outgoing Italian Chair reported outreach activities with non-members including--China, Egypt,
India and Iran. The Plenary agreed that the French chair should continue to coordinate outreach
contacts with non-members. 

In Vienna meetings during October 2000: (a) Slovenia was welcomed as a new member and
subscribing government; (b) the Transparency Working Group heard details about a German
Government offer to host the proposed NSG Website and a Netherlands Government offer to
provide funding; (c) the Implementation Issues Working Group made substantial progress toward
reaching agreement on restructuring proposals to strengthen the Plenary and to eliminate the current
separate Dual Use Regime; and (d) the Dual Use Consultations heard a report from the U.S., under
the agenda item "Programs of Concern in Sensitive Countries," regarding India's nuclear program
and concerns about the proposed (Russian) supply of low enriched uranium to the Indian Tarapur
reactors. This issue is expected to be fully discussed in a special intersessional plenary meeting
called by the NSG Chair (France) for early November 2000 in Vienna. 

[Bureau of Nonproliferation, US Department of State Website, http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/bureaunp.html.]