INF On-Site Inspection Status Russia: Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF)

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INF On-Site Inspection Status


Background

The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union entered into force on June 1, 1988, when President Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev exchanged instruments of ratification at the Moscow Summit. The Treaty called for the elimination of all U.S. and Soviet ground-launched missile systems with a range of 500 to 5,500 kilometers (about 300 to 3,400 miles) within three years after entry into force.

Thirty days after the Treaty entered into force, the INF's precedent-setting regime of intrusive, on-site inspections began:

  • Baseline Inspections. From July 1988 through August 1988, both signatories had the right to conduct baseline inspections at each other's facilities. Facilities were specified in the Treaty's Memorandum of Understanding, to help verify data exchanged on treaty-limited items (TLI).

  • Closeout Inspections. Both sides had the right to conduct closeout inspections at eliminated facilities to verify that all INF-related activities had ceased. As permitted by the Treaty, some sites were eliminated prior to entry into force, and in those cases closeout inspections were combined with baseline inspections. The last closeout inspections were conducted in August 1991.

  • Elimination Inspections. These on-site inspections were designed to confirm the destruction of missiles, launchers and associated equipment according to the stringent procedures specified in the Treaty. Eliminations were accomplished by explosive demolition, burning, crushing, cutting or static fire, and required 30 days pre-notification. Additionally, each side was permitted to eliminate up to 100 INF missiles during the first six months of the Treaty by launching the missiles to destruction. Only the Soviet Union exercised this launch-to-destroy option, eliminating 72 missiles prior to December 1, 1988. The Soviet Union had 5,349 items, including missiles, launchers, support structures and support equipment, to be destroyed during the three-year elimination period. Meanwhile, the United States had over 2,700 similar items to destroy in the same period. The last elimination inspections were conducted in May 1991.

  • "Quota" or "Short-notice" Inspections. The Treaty provides for a series of short-notice inspections over a period of 13 years to ascertain the number or absence of TLI at a site. Twenty quota inspections per treaty year were permitted during the first three years of INF implementation. The quota inspections will continue at the rate of 15 per treaty year through May 31, 1996, and at a rate of 10 per treaty year from June 1, 1996 through May 31, 2001.

  • Continuous Portal Monitoring Inspections. Continuous monitoring inspections are permitted at two former ballistic missile assembly plants: Votkinsk, Russia (former SS-20 final assembly facility) and Magna, Utah (former Pershing II production facility). Portal monitoring is designed to permit monitors located outside the facility to ensure that prohibited SS-20s or Pershing IIs are not being produced and shipped. The Treaty requires that each Party permit the other to begin continuous monitoring 30 days after entry into force and continue until May 31, 2001.

Implementation Progress

The first three years of the Treaty's implementation were marked by almost continuous elimination of missiles, launchers and related equipment. Beginning with the first Soviet SS-12 missile destruction at Saryozek in August 1988, U.S. inspectors witnessed the elimination of 1,846 intermediate-range Soviet missiles through May 12, 1991. Similarly, since the first elimination of a Pershing I-A missile at Longhorn Army Ammunition Plant near Marshall, Texas on September 8, 1988, Soviet inspectors viewed the destruction of 846 intermediate-range U.S. missiles. All declared shorter-range INF systems (those with ranges from 500 to 1,000 km) were eliminated one month ahead of the November 30, 1989 deadline. All other eliminations were completed on time by May 1991.

As a result of the breakup of the Soviet Union in December 1991, Belarus, Kazakstan, Russia and Ukraine became the implementing parties to the Treaty, responsible for conducting inspection and escort missions. Three additional points of entry for INF inspectors were also established: one in Minsk, Belarus; another in Almaty, Kazakstan; and a third in Kiev, Ukraine. Similarly, new Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers (NRRC) were created in each of the same cities. Additionally, instead of Soviet escorts, Belarussian, Kazak and Ukrainian officials now escort U.S. inspectors to former Soviet sites on their respective territory. There was no impact, however, on continuous portal monitoring.

Monitoring operations began in both countries in July 1988 and continues today. At Magna, Utah and Votkinsk, Russia, up to 30 inspectors -- from the former Soviet Union (FSU) and United States, respectively -- remain outside the gates of former INF missile assembly plants to confirm that exiting vehicles do not contain prohibited missiles.

Quota or "short-notice" inspections of formerly declared facilities also continue. These inspections help maintain confidence that the Parties are complying with the Treaty.

Role of OSIA

The On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA) is responsible for conducting and coordinating U.S. inspection activities. Since July 1, 1988, inspectors from OSIA have conducted almost 500 baseline, elimination, quota and close-out inspections, and maintained a continuous monitoring presence at the former SS-20 missile final assembly plant in Votkinsk, Russia. During the same period, OSIA escorted almost 300 foreign inspection teams at U.S. sites in the United States, Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. Escort duties also continued 24-hours-a-day at the Soviet/FSU continuous monitoring facility at Magna, Utah.

After receiving responsibility for implementing inspection provisions under the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), OSIA combined inspection personnel and resources formerly dedicated to the INF Treaty and START. Similarly, OSIA ended any differentiation among its inspection and escort teams, preferring to combine experts of both groups into more versatile verification teams. Today, the Agency fields roughly 60 personnel divided into about 12 separate inspection/escort teams for START/INF activities.

The On-Site Inspection Agency

The On-Site Inspection Agency is a joint-service Department of Defense organization responsible for implementing inspection, escort and monitoring requirements under the verification provisions of U.S. international arms control treaties and confidence-building agreements. With its headquarters at Dulles International Airport in Washington, D.C., the Agency has field offices at Travis Air Force Base, California; Magna, Utah; Las Vegas, Nevada; Yokota Air Base, Japan; Rhein-Main Air Base, Germany; and Votkinsk, Russia. Additionally, OSIA operates Arms Control Implementation Units in U.S. Embassies in Minsk, Belarus; Almaty, Kazakstan; Moscow, Russia; and Kiev, Ukraine. Approximately 850 men and women from the U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines and Federal Civil Service are assigned to OSIA.

The Agency was formed in January 1988 to implement the on-site inspection, escort and continuous monitoring provisions of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union. OSIA has subsequently been assigned inspection, escort and monitoring responsibilities for other international arms control agreements to which the United States is a signatory.

As of May 1996


 

Comments or questions? E-mail Nikolai Sokov MIIS CNS: nsokovATmiis.edu

CNSThis material is produced independently for NTI by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2003 by MIIS.

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