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Georgia: Operation Auburn Endeavor
This is an archived page. Please visit the new Georgia country profile
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- On 23 April 1998, after
more than two years of negotiations, the
United States, the United Kingdom, and Georgia successfully carried out
Operation Auburn Endeavor, in which HEU- and LEU-based fresh
and spent fuel was transferred from the shutdown IRT-M research reactor in Mtskheta, on the
outskirts of Tbilisi, Georgia, to the Dounreay Nuclear Complex in Scotland.
US government documents indicate that the material consisted of approximately 4.3kg of
fresh fuel (largely HEU, with some LEU, as well) and approximately 800g of
HEU/LEU-based spent fuel.[1]
Documents from the UK House of Commons indicate that an additional 5.8kg of
LEU-based fresh fuel and 3.7kg of LEU-based spent fuel were also
removed.[2]
The project went by different names: the US
Department of Energy called it "Project Partnership," US military
personnel called it "Auburn Endeavor," Oak Ridge National Laboratory
personnel called it "Project Olympus," and the Georgians called it
"Program Export."[3]
- In
January 1996, prompted by concerns over inadequate material protection,
control, and accounting standards, the United States began negotiating with
Georgia and Russia to transfer 4.3kg of fresh
fuel and 800g of
spent fuel at Mtskheta to Russian territory. Russia had delayed plans to
transfer the materials to its territory with claims of improper shipment
containers, insufficient funds, and environmental hazards.[4] Negotiations
became more difficult after an 11
January 1997 statement by Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy spokesman Georgiy
Kaurov in which Russia indicated its willingness to accept the HEU fuel if Georgia
were to sign an
agreement conditioning the transfer on Georgia's
ultimate responsibility for the waste left after reprocessing.[5] According
to Institute of Nuclear Physics Director Giorgi Kharadze, Georgia did not
have a place to safely store nuclear waste.[4]
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- Similar to
Project Sapphire, in which the United States purchased approximately 600kg of weapons-grade
uranium from Kazakhstan and shipped it to Oak Ridge National Laboratory in
Tennessee, Auburn Endeavor allowed the West to help eliminate a potential
nuclear proliferation risk. However, US State Department concerns over upsetting
Moscow and Clinton Administration worries over protests and legal
challenges from US environmental groups prevented the United States from accepting the
material. Following the February 1997 assassination attempt on
Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze, US concerns over the material
intensified. The United States asked France to accept the material,
but the French refused. Finally, British Prime Minister Tony Blair
agreed to take the uranium and spent fuel. Though the operation
violated British regulations against receiving nuclear material,
London indicated that the safety and security of the material was important enough to make an
exception.[6] Environmentalists and
Scottish nationalists criticized the operation as "ill-conceived and
dangerous,"[7,8] all the more so when it was
learned that an additional 9.5kg of LEU material accompanied the agreed-upon
4.7kg.[2] The British foreign ministry noted in a
public statement that most of the material would be used to produce medical
isotopes for the treatment of
cancer.[7]
- The operation was
directed by the US
National Security Council. The US Departments of State, Defense (DOD), and
Energy (DOE) executed the mission. The Department of State negotiated
agreements with and managed policy issues in Georgia and the United Kingdom.
DOD, through US European Command military personnel, was responsible for
transportation, logistics, and coordination of security with Georgia. DOE was responsible for repackaging the fuel and interacting with the
Georgian Institute of Physics and UK nuclear authorities. The fresh fuel was
repackaged
in US-supplied containers and transported by US Air Force C-5B cargo aircraft
from Tbilisi, Georgia, to Kinloss Royal Air Force Base
outside Inverness, Scotland. In Scotland the fresh and spent fuel was
transported to the Dounreay Nuclear Complex for interim storage and final disposition.[1]
The United States reportedly paid Georgia $125,000 for the material.[9]
Sources:
[1] Alexander W. Riedy, et al., "Multilateral
Nonproliferation Cooperation: U.S.-Led
Effort to Remove HEU/LEU Fresh and Spent Fuel from Tbilisi, Georgia to Dounreay,
Scotland (Operation Auburn Endeavor/Project Olympus)," 40th
Annual Meeting: Proceedings of the Institute of Nuclear Materials
Management (Documation, 1999).
[2] Select Committee on Trade and Industry Minutes of Evidence,
"Examination of Witness, Mr. D. Henderson (Questions 243 - 259),"
1 July 1998, United Kingdom Parliament Web Site, http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/.../80701p03.htm.
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[3] Robert N. Ceo, Kenneth A. Thompson, Wesley J. Bicha, "Gamma Ray
Measurements of Reactor Fuel Elements in the Republic of Georgia," 40th
Annual Meeting: Proceedings of the Institute of Nuclear Materials
Management (Documation, 1999).
[4] Michael R. Gordon, "Russia Thwarting U.S. Bid To
Secure A Nuclear Cache," New York Times, 5 January 1997, pp. A1,
A4.
[5] Scott Parrish and Emil Danileyan, "Russia Ready
To Accept Uranium From Georgia," OMRI Daily Digest, 13 January 1997.
[6] Michael Gordon, "U.S., Britain
Relocate Nuclear Material From Volatile Georgia," New York Times,
online edition http://www.nytimes.com,
21 April 1998.
[7] "Protests Fly As U.K. Takes
Georgia Nuclear Material," Reuters, 21 April 1998.
[8] Ben Partridge, "Georgia: Uranium
Flies to Britain For Reprocessing Amid Criticsm of Secret Deal," RFE/RL
Russian Dailies, 23 April 1998, Radio
Free Europe/Radio Liberty Web Site, http://www.rferl.org.{Updated 5/12/98 TR}
[9] Ben Partridge, "Georgia: Nuclear Waste Arrives at Scottish
Plant," RFE/RL Russian Dailies, Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty Web Site, http://www.rferl.org, 24 April
1998.{Updated
1/12/2001 NA}
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Last updated 10 May 2001
Comments or questions? Contact Kenley Butler at
MIIS CNS: Kenley.Butler@miis.edu
This material is produced independently for NTI
by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the
Monterey Institute of International Studies and
does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has
not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers,
employees, agents. Copyright © 2002 by MIIS.
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