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Georgia: Export Control System
This is an archived page. Please visit the new Georgia country profile
Georgia: Export Control System

 

Parts of this report were originally prepared by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies of the Monterey Institute of International Studies in January 1998 under a grant from the United States Department of Energy's Office of Nonproliferation and Arms Control.  The views expressed in this report are those of the authors alone, and do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of Energy or the United States Government. 

Introduction
Administrative Bodies
Export Control Legislation
Export Licensing Process
Export Control Developments

INTRODUCTION

In the first few years following its independence in 1991, Georgia was plagued by ethnic and civil strife. When President Eduard Shevardnadze came to power in late 1995, he managed to return the country to some degree of stability. Since that time, Georgia has focused much of its energies on dealing with pressing political, economic, and social problems, including the on-going separatist movement in the Abkhazian region of the country. As a result, Georgia's nonproliferation export controls remain in an early stage of development.

According to a paper written by Georgian Foreign Ministry officials in fall 1997, Georgia first began to understand the role that export controls could play in its security and potential prosperity after participating in the Washington Forum on Export Control and Nonproliferation for Senior Government Officials, held in Istanbul in September 1996. The meeting was organized by Turkey and the US Departments of State and Commerce, and focused on Caucasian and Central Asian states.[1]  After this initial exposure, however, Georgia mobilized fairly quickly to address the issue.  In December 1996 an interagency working group was created to develop a legal basis for export controls.  Less than a year later, Georgia had already drafted a comprehensive export control law, which was passed by the Georgian Parliament on 28 April 1998.[2,3] The Law committed the executive branch to pass a series of implementing documents that would provide detailed control lists and descriptions of export control authorities and export licensing procedures. The President of Georgia defined this task more specifically in Presidential Edict No. 424 of 4 July 1999.[4]  Presidential Edict No. 408 of 22 September 2002 adopted a comprehensive list of dual-use items subject to export control, defined export control authorities, and licensing procedures.[5]
 
Georgia does not produce nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, but the country's industrial and medical sectors use components that could also be used in WMD systems.[6]  In addition, there are two nuclear research institutes in Georgia that once housed small quantities of HEU.  In 1994, long before Georgia had begun to focus on export controls, the Institute of Physics in Georgia exported approximately 5kg of 90% HEU to Uzbekistan for use in its nuclear research reactor.[7]  In April 1998, all remaining fresh and spent fuel was removed from the Institute and transferred to the United Kingdom under Operation Auburn Endeavor/Project Olympus.  The second nuclear research institute, the Sukhumi Institute of Physics and Technology (SIPT), was located in Abkhazia until the mid-1990s, when armed conflict in the region caused the relocation of its personnel to Tbilisi.  In 1997 a Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy inspection team reported that 2kg of HEU that had been at the facility in Abkhazia in the early 1990s was missing.  The whereabouts of the HEU are unknown.[8]  The Abkhazian instability also raises concerns regarding Georgia's potential as a transit country for illegal exports.  Approximately one half of Georgia's 310km Black Sea coastline is located in Abkhazia and is not monitored by Georgian authorities.
Sources:
[1] David Bakradze and Mamuka Kudava, "Export Control System in the Republic of Georgia," The Monitor, Vol. 3/4, No. 4/1, University of Georgia, Fall 1997/Winter1998, Center for International Trade and Security Web Site, http://www.uga.edu/cits/.../monitor_fa_win_1998.pdf..
[2] NISNP Discussion with Georgian Official, February 1998.
[3] Cassady B. Craft, Suzette R. Grillot, Liam Anderson, "The Dangerous Ground:  Nonproliferation Export-Control Development in the Southern Tier of the Former Soviet Union," Problems of Post-Communism, Vol. 47, No. 6, November/December 2000, p. 46.

[4] Georgian Presidential Edict No. 424, 4 July 1999.
[5] Georgian Presidential Edict No. 408, 22 September 2002.

[6] NTV, 8 December 1999; in "Sistema eksportnogo kontrolya za obychnym vooruzheniyem, a takzhe za produktsiyey i tekhnologiyami dvoynogo naznacheniya formiruyetsya v Gruzii," UNIAN, No. 049 (084), 6-12 December 1999.
[7] Michael R. Gordon, "Russia Thwarting U.S. Bid To Secure A Nuclear Cache," New York Times, 5 January 1997, pp. A1, A4.

[8] William C. Potter, "A US NGO Perspective on US-Russian MPC&A Cooperation," paper prepared for the 39th Annual Meeting of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management, Naples, Florida, 26-30 July 1998.{Updated 6/20/2001 KB}

EXPORT CONTROL ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES

The Ministry of Economy, Industry and Trade (MEIT) is charged with:

- bringing the list of controlled dual-use items into conformity with international norms; implementing export control rules; attracting technical assistance from donor countries and international organizations;[1]

- carrying out the legal activities necessary for implementation of export, re-export, and transit state control rules, together with the respective governmental agencies;[2]

- issuing one time licenses for export, re-export, and transit of dual-use items.[3]

The Standing Interagency Commission on Military-Technical Issues under the National Security Council is responsible for:

- giving recommendations to MEIT on export, re-export, and transit of sensitive strategic dual-use items. Sensitive strategic items are marked in the list of dual-use products with an asterisk (*);[3]

- defining control lists and lists of products subject to export control together with the governmental agencies and submitting them for approval to the President of Georgia;[4]

- defining the list of states, for which exports of dual-use items are restricted through Georgian customs, and submitting it for approval to the President of Georgia.[4]

The Customs Department of the Ministry of Finance is charged with:

- tracking the export and import of licensed goods;

- submitting information to MEIT on a quarterly basis regarding the export or temporary import of dual-use items subject to export control.[3]
Sources:
[1] Georgian Presidential Edict No. 424, 4 July 1999.
[2] Georgian Presidential Edict No. 408, 22 September 2002.
[3] The Statute on State Control Rules of Export, Re-export and Transit of Dual-use Goods Subject to Export Control, adopted by Georgian Presidential Edict No. 408, 22 September 2002.
[4] Law of Georgia on the Export Control of Weapons, Military Equipment, and Dual-Use Items, 28 April 1998.


EXPORT CONTROL LEGISLATION

Georgian Presidential Edict No. 408, On Some Measures for Resolution of the Issues of Export, Re-export, and Transit of Dual-use Goods Subject to Export Control, 22 September 2002
This Edict adopted:

- The Statute on State Control Rules for Export, Re-export, and Transit of Dual-use Goods Subject to Export Control. The statute mainly appoints agencies in charge of the export control and licensing procedures (including the intergovernmental process).

- The list of dual-use goods subject to export control. The list is comprehensive and is in line with international standards. The list includes 26 groups of goods with detailed description of the products in each group.

- A standardized form for export licensing of dual-use goods.[1]

Georgian Presidential Edict No. 424, On Some Measures of Export Control of Dual-use Goods (Technologies, Equipment, Services), 4 July 1999

This Edict was issued according to Article 6, Section "d" of the Georgian export control law (which entered into force on 1 September 1998), which gives the President of Georgia the responsibility to define the authority of the executive bodies in the field of export control. The Edict is a transitional document which is designed to facilitate the establishment of the export control system according to the Georgian export control law.

The edict assigns the Ministry of Economy, Industry, and Trade (MEIT) the task of implementing export controls on the bases of recommendations from the Standing Interagency Commission on Military-Technical Issues under the National Security Council. MEIT is instructed to expand the list of controlled dual-use items, and the statute on rules for export, re-export, and transit of dual-use goods in cooperation with the respective governmental agencies, and submit to the president for confirmation.

The Edict defines a 15-month transitional period before the control list enters into force, during which MEIT, the Foreign Ministry, the Ministry of Justice, the Georgian Academy of Sciences, and other relevant ministries and agencies should take necessary steps to establish an export control system and introduce that system to companies and enterprises.[2]

Law of Georgia on the Export Control of Weapons, Military Equipment, and Dual-Use Items, 28 April 1998
Georgia's first comprehensive export control law was approved by the Georgian Parliament in early 1998 and entered into force on 1 September 1998.[2,3]  The law was developed by an interagency working group in cooperation with experts from the US Department of Commerce. The working group consisted of officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Trade and Foreign Economic Relations, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of State Security, the Department of Border Defense, the Customs Department, the National Security Council, and two Parliamentary Committees:  the Judiciary Committee and the Committee for Defense and Security of Georgia.  The Parliamentary Subcommittee on Military Industries of the Committee for Defense and Security took the lead in drafting the law.

The law provides a sound legal basis for nonproliferation export controls in Georgia. It explicitly states that one of the main principles regulating export controls in Georgia is the observation of international obligations regarding the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The law gives the government of Georgia the responsibility for developing an export control system and for defining the responsibilities of executive branch agencies in the sphere of export controls. In addition, the government is specifically responsible for granting export permission for items subject to export control. Although the government is tasked with drawing up control lists, the law states that the following categories of items of are subject to export controls:

- conventional arms and military technology; and raw materials, materials, special equipment and technology, and services connected with their production;

- nuclear materials, technology, equipment, and facilities; special non-nuclear materials and products; dual-use equipment and technologies; radiation sources and isotope products; and "lists of items established by international nonproliferation regimes;"

- chemicals and dual-use technologies which could be used in the creation of a chemical weapon "in accordance with lists of items established by international nonproliferation regimes;"

- disease agents, their genetically changed forms, and fragments of genetic material which could be used in the creation of a bacteriological (biological) weapon; and "lists of items established by international nonproliferation regimes;"

- equipment, materials, and technologies that could be used in the creation of a missile, and "lists of items established by international nonproliferation regimes;"

- scientific-technical information, services, and results of intellectual activity that is connected to military products;

- any other products defined by the government of Georgia.

The law also outlines the process for obtaining an export license and explicitly states that nuclear materials can only be exported if the importing country guarantees that:

- the items will not be used in the production of a nuclear weapon or for the achievement of any military goal;

- the items will be placed under IAEA safeguards;

- the items will be placed under physical protection at levels not less than those recommended by the IAEA;

- the items will be re-exported only if the third country can guarantee the three conditions above;

- in the case of HEU enriched to over 20 percent, plutonium, or heavy water, re-export will take place only with the written permission of the relevant authorities within Georgia.[3]

The law commits executive branch to pass a series of implementing documents that will provide more detailed control lists and descriptions of export control authorities and export licensing procedures.[4] For a translation of the 1998 law, please click here.

Cabinet of Ministers Decree No. 35, 23 January 1995; Cabinet of Ministers Decree No. 475 (Amendment to Decree No. 35)
These decrees establish procedures for issuing export licenses for certain goods and services and specify those goods that can be exported only by licensed enterprises.  According to these decrees, certain goods may not be exported under any circumstances, including rare-earth metals and arms, as well as non-military items such as antiques, museum-quality artwork, copper, and other precious metals. All or parts of these decrees were presumably superseded by Georgia's 1998 export control law and Presidential Edict No. 408 of 22 September 2002.

Cabinet of Ministers Decree No. 744, 30 November 1995
This decree prohibits the export of munitions from Georgia.[4]
Sources:
[1] Georgian Presidential Edict No. 408, 22 September 2002.
[2] Georgian Presidential Edict No. 424, 4 July 1999.

[3] Cassady B. Craft, Suzette R. Grillot, Liam Anderson, "The Dangerous Ground:  Nonproliferation Export-Control Development in the Southern Tier of the Former Soviet Union," Problems of Post-Communism, Vol. 47, No. 6, November/December 2000, p. 46.
[4] Law of Georgia on Export Control of Weapons, Military Equipment, and Dual-Use Items, 28 April 1998.
[5] David Bakradze and Mamuka Kudava, "Export Control System in the Republic of Georgia," The Monitor, Vol. 3/4, No. 4/1, University of Georgia, Fall 1997/Winter1998, Center for International Trade and Security Web Site, http://www.uga.edu/cits/.../monitor_fa_win_1998.pdf.
{Updated 6/20/2001 KB, Updated 2/5/2003 AD}

EXPORT LICENSING PROCESS

According to the Georgian export control law and Presidential edicts No. 424 of 4 July 1999 and No. 408 of 22 September 2002, one-time licenses for the export of dual-use items are issued by the Ministry of Economy, Industry and Trade (MEIT). In the case of sensitive strategic dual-use items, MEIT issues licenses on the basis of recommendations from the Standing Interagency Commission on Military-Technical Issues under the National Security Council.

Licenses for the export of dual-use items can be issued if relevant governmental agencies of the importing state agree that the imported products:

- will not be used for the development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), or other military purposes;

- will be subjected to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards during the entire period of their use;

- will be physically protected in accordance with IAEA recommendations.

By a decision of the Georgian President, the export and re-export of dual-use items to those states that violate international agreements on the development, storage, destruction, or use of WMD, as well as exports that threaten Georgian national interests, may be restricted.

For export, re-export, or transit licenses, an exporter must apply to MEIT and submit the following documents:

- a license application, according to the Georgian general administrative code requirements;

- an export contract, which (in case of export) should stipulate that MEIT has the right to request information from relevant governmental agencies of the importer state concerning the final use of the imported products.

After receiving the license, the exporter must submit original copies of the license and contract to Customs. If the license is annulled after it is issued, MEIT must notify the Customs Department of the Ministry of Finance and the National Border Guard.[1,2]
Sources:
[1] Statute on State Control Rules of Export, Re-export, and Transit of Dual-use Goods Subject to Export Control, adopted by Presidential Edict No. 408, 22 September 2002.
[2] Law of Georgia on the Export Control of Weapons, Military Equipment, and Dual-Use Items, 28 April 1998.

 

Page last updated 6 August 2003

Comments or questions? Contact Kenley Butler at MIIS CNS: Kenley.Butler@miis.edu

 

CNSThis material is produced independently for NTI by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2002 by MIIS.

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