Georgia: Sukhumi I. Vekua Institute of Physics and
Technology (SIPT) Due to the
conflict in Abkhazia,
about 200 scientists from the
Sukhumi I. Vekua
Institute of Physics and Technology (SIPT)
fled from Sukhumi,
Abkhazia to Tbilisi where they re-established SIPT
at the site of the Academy of Sciences at the MION
Institute and the Institute of Stable Isotopes.[1] The scientists who remained
in Abkhazia have continued their research work at the same location in Sukhumi
and have reportedly kept the name of the Sukhumi
Institute of Physics and Technology.[2] Sources:
[1] "Sukhumi I. Vekua Institute of Physics and Technology - SIPT," Georgian
Academy of Sciences Web Site, http://www.acnet.ge/sukhumipt.htm.
[2] "Direktor issledovatelskogo instituta v Sukhumi oprovergayet soobshcheniya o
prodazhe radioaktivnykh materialov," Interfax, 1 July 2002. {Updated 8/15/02 YP} SIPT TBILISI LOCATION:
Tbilisi
Address: 52 Rustaveli Avenue, Suites 403 and 202,
Tbilisi 380008
Tel: (8832) 996913 and 996234
Fax: (8832) 996913, 998823, and 996142
E-mail:
SPTI@sun20.hepi.edu.ge ["Sukhumi I. Vekua Institute of Physics and Technology -
SIPT," Georgian Academy of
Sciences Web Site, http://www.acnet.ge/sukhumipt.htm.]{Entered 3/23/01
GG} ADMINISTRATION IN TBILISI: Director:
Valter Kashia
["Sotrudniki MAGATE posetyat
Sukhumi dlya izucheniya radiatsionnoy obstanovki," Interfax, 21 May
2001.]{Updated 10/9/2001 KB} SIPT
SUKHUMI LOCATION: Sukhumi Address:
665 Tbilisi Highroad, Sukhumi
384914 ["Sukhumi
I. Vekua
Institute of Physics and Technology - SIPT,"
Georgian Academy of Sciences Web Site,
http://www.acnet.ge/sukhumipt.htm.] ADMINISTRATION IN SUKHUMI: Director: Anatoliy Markolia ["Direktor issledovatelskogo instituta
v Sukhumi oprovergayet soobshcheniya
o prodazhe radioaktivnykh materialov," Interfax,
1 July 2002.] {Updated 8/15/02 YP} BACKGROUND: Nuclear research began in the Sukhumi area shortly after the end of World
War II. German nuclear scientists were brought to two locations, the
Sinop sanatorium, designated Laborartory A, and the Agudzheri sanatorium on
the outskirts of Sukhumi, designated Laboratory G. Work at these two
locations concentrated on enriching uranium for bomb production, emphasizing
diffusion technologies. Gas centrifuge research was also conducted,
particularly in Laboratory A, and this research laid the groundwork for the
creation of the Soviet Union's first enrichment centrifuges. In 1953, after
Stalin's death, the German scientists were allowed to return to Germany.[1,
2] Research at SIPT may have also investigated the effects of
radiation on materials and may have been related to military programs.[3]
As a result of the conflict in
Abkhazia, about 200 SIPT scientists relocated from Abkhazia to Tbilisi where
they continue to work at research centers.[4]
Sources: [1] A.K. Kruglov, Kak sozdavalas atomnaya
promyshlennost v SSSR, (Moscow: TSNIIIATOMINFORM, 1994), pp.
163-67, 175-76, 192-93. [2] David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), pp. 190-91. [3] Discussions with Russian Nuclear Official, July 1997
and August 1997. RUS970801.{Revised 8/31/97 jl} {Revised 5/12/98
TR} [4] "Sukhumi I. Vekua Institute of Physics and Technology -
SIPT," Georgian Academy of
Sciences Web Site, http://www.acnet.ge/sukhumipt.htm.{Entered
3/23/01 GG} ACTIVITIES: Research topics at SIPT include plasma physics,
producing controlled fusion reactions in a tokamak, ion accelerator physics, semiconductors, and
thermal emission physics. ["Sukhumi I. Vekua Institute of Physics and Technology -
SIPT," Georgian Academy of
Sciences Web Site, http://www.acnet.ge/sukhumipt.htm.] {Entered 3/23/01
KB} FISSILE MATERIAL: There is no fissile material at the facility in Sukhumi. According
to SIPT Director Valter Kashiya, a 1993 inventory of materials at SIPT shows
that at the time, 655g of HEU in the form of dioxide tablets were present.
According to Kashiya, the HEU was taken in the mid-1990s from Abkhazia by
smugglers. Reports indicate that the smugglers, the nuclear material, or
possibly both were later seized in Poland.[1,2]
Other sources indicate that two kilograms of HEU,[3]
possibly in the form of icebreaker fuel,[4] were formerly located at SIPT.
The enrichment level of the uranium was estimated at 90 percent.[5] Unconfirmed allegations reported that the 2kg of HEU located at SIPT might have been stolen or diverted, possibly through Belarus.
For more information see
"Less
Well-Known Cases of Nuclear Terrorism and Nuclear Diversion in the Former
Soviet Union,"and
"A
US NGO Perspective on US-Russian MPC&A Cooperation," by
William Potter.
Sources: [1] "Sotrudniki MAGATE posetyat
Sukhumi dlya izucheniya radiatsionnoy obstanovki," Interfax, 21 May
2001. [2] Tina Tskhovrebashvili, "Abkhazskiy 'proyekt mankhetten,'" Vremya novostey, 23 May 2001, p.
6; in "Phisical [sic] Protections of N.M.," Yadernyye
materialy, No. 21, 31 May 2001. [3] NISNP Discussion with Georgian
Officials, June 1997. [4] Visit by Dr. William Potter to Russian
Nuclear Facilities, May 1996. {Revised 5/12/98 TR} [5] William C. Potter, "A
US NGO Perspective on US-Russian MPC&A Cooperation," Paper
prepared for the 39th Annual Meeting of the Institute of Nuclear Materials
Management, Naples, Florida, 26-30 July 1998. {Updated 3/1/99 TR, 10/9/2001
KB} MPC&A: Well-informed Georgian sources have indicated to the Center for
Nonproliferation Studies that 2kg of HEU were present at the SIPT in the early 1990s.[1] Despite plans for cooperation between
Russia's Kurchatov Institute and
SIPT on an MPC&A
program,[2] as of late 1997, no physical inventory of the Institute's
fissile material holdings had occurred since 1992.[3] At
the end of 1997, a Minatom team gained access to the facility to conduct an
inventory,[7,8] but the team found a deserted facility with no HEU.
The whereabouts of the HEU remain unknown.[9]
SIPT is located in Abkhazia, a region of Georgia which
claims independence. A fierce civil war erupted in the region in
1992-1993, and Georgian government troops were routed from Sukhumi in
September 1993. Since then, a ceasefire, enforced by Russian troops
acting under a Commonwealth of Independent States mandate, has prevailed,
under which Abkhazia has enjoyed de-facto independence from Georgia.
Progress towards a negotiated solution to the problem has been slow.[4]
Since the Georgian government does not control Sukhumi, it had no access
to the facility there and was not able to conduct a physical inventory of
the fissile materials. Nor had the IAEA been able to visit the site
and take count. The Abkhaz government would not recognize Tbilisi's
right to allow inspection of a facility located in Abkhazia, while Tbilisi
insisted that any visit must recognize Georgia's sovereignty over the
region. Reports indicated that Russian border guards turned back a
Russian team sent by Minatom at Abkhazia's request in summer 1997, for not
having Georgian government clearance for entry.[5] Russian sources
later noted that the failed mission was a bureaucratic misunderstanding.[6]
Unconfirmed allegations reported that the 2kg of HEU located at SIPT might have been stolen or diverted, possibly through Belarus.
For more information see "Less
Well-Known Cases of Nuclear Terrorism and Nuclear Diversion in the Former
Soviet Union,"and "A
US NGO Perspective on US-Russian MPC&A Cooperation," by
William Potter.
Sources: [1] NISNP Discussion with Georgian Officials, June 1997. [2] Visit by Dr. William Potter to Russian Nuclear
Facilities, May 1996. [3] NISNP Discussion with Georgian Official, October 1997. [4] Elizabeth Fuller, "Georgia: Search Continues For
An End To Abkhazia Conflict," RFE/RL Feature, 29 May 1997, http://www.rferl.org/nca/.../F.RU.970529133623.html [5] NISNP Discussions with Russian Nuclear Official, July
1997 and August 1997. RUS970801. [6] NISNP Discussions with Russian Nuclear Officials,
September 1997. [7] NISNP Discussion with Russian Nuclear Official, April
1998. [8] NISNP Discussion with Russian Nuclear
Scientist, July 1998. [9] William C. Potter, "A US
NGO Perspective on US-Russian MPC&A Cooperation," Paper prepared
for the 39th Annual Meeting of the Institute of Nuclear Materials
Management, Naples, Florida, 26-30 July 1998. {Updated 5/12/98 TR}{Updated 12/15/98 TR} REACTORS: It was reported that isotope-production reactors with unknown
specifications were present at Sukhumi.[1] Other sources, however, refute
this.[2]
[1] Correspondence between Dr. William Potter and
Russian nuclear scientist, August 1992. [2] Discussions with Russian nuclear official, July
1997 and August 1997, RUS970801.
VEKUA INSTITUTE DEVELOPMENTS:
7/1/2002: ABKHAZIA DENIES
ALLEGATIONS OF SELLING URANIUM TO TERRORISTS
According to Valter Kashia,
director of SIPT-Tbilisi, some of the 244 types of radioactive materials,
including enriched uranium, stored at SIPT-Sukhumi might have been sold to
terrorists or Iraq.[1] Georgian Minister of Environmental Protection and Natural
Resources Nino Chkhobadze
announced that no credible information about the state of radioactive materials
stored at SIPT-Sukhumi
is available. According to
Chkhobadze, Tbilisi offered to
set up a monitoring post at SIPT-Sukhumi with help from Georgian specialists and
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) representatives, but Sukhumi
authorities
had not yet replied as of June 2002.[2] In the meantime, SIPT-Sukhumi
Director Anatoliy Markolia and Abkhaz Foreign Minister
Sergey Shamba announced that
there has never been any uranium in Abkhazia and that radioactive materials
stored at SIPT-Sukhumi pose no threat. According to Markolia,
Georgia and Abkhazia agreed to transfer radioactive waste remaining in Abkhazia
to Georgia for burial. Markolia
also confirmed Abkhazia's willingness to allow Institute inspections by IAEA
representatives.[3] Sources:
[1] "Uranium Stored in Abkhazia Might Have Been Sold to Terrorists - Abkhaz
Scientist in Georgia," Interfax, 29 June 2002.
[2] Prime-News, 28 June 2002; in "Abkhazia denies possession of uranium-235,"
FBIS Document CEP20020701000300.
[3] "Direktor issledovatelskogo instituta v Sukhumi oprovergayet soobshcheniya o
prodazhe radioaktivnykh materialov," Interfax, 1 July 2002. {Entered 08/15/02 YP}
2/1/99: SUKHUMI WORKERS TRANSFERRED TO FILL POSTS
IN DUBNA On 1 February 1999, Atompressa reported that
50 skilled personnel from Latvia and Georgia have been transferred to
"a newly established institute in Dubna." The specialists from
Latvia transferred from the Riga Scientific Research Institute of Radio
Instrument Making and the Georgian specialists transferred from Sukhumi
Physical and Technical Institute (SFTI). [The Center for Nonproliferation
Studies has no further information on this new institute at Dubna and Atompressa
did not provide any additional details.]
["The Motto 'Personnel Resolve
Everything' Continues to be Important,'" Atompressa, No. 4 (335)
February 1999, p. 3; in "Minatom Collegium on Future Direction of
Nuclear Sector," FBIS Document FTS19990324001362.] {Entered 11/4/99 SS}
1/14/98: VEKUA INSTITUTE CONTRACT WITH MINATOM REPORTED According to Abkhazian television, the Vekua Physics and Technology
Institute has an order from the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy to produce
"a system of reception and transformation of warmth into electric
power." The information agency Sarke reported that one of the
laboratories at the Vekua Institute conducts "secret" work.
There are no Georgians working in that particular lab. ["The Sukhumi Physico-Technical Institute Will
Celebrate its 50-Years Anniversary at the End of January," Information
Agency Sarke, online edition, http://www.sanet.ge/sarke/,
14 January 1998.] {Entered 7/8/98 TR}
3/96: ISTC TO FUND 19 PROJECTS ON RADIATION SAFETY The International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) in Moscow has
provided $7.07 million in funding for nineteen safety projects such as
decommissioning nuclear reactors, nuclear safety, environmental impact of
man-made disasters, and reduction of industrial pollutants. V.G. Kashia of
the Sukhumi Institute of Physics and Technology and N.P.Khuchma of the
Research Production Complex of Electron Technology at Tbilisi State
University will head two of the projects. ["ISTC Funds 19 More Projects; To Approve Additional
Projects This Month," Post-Soviet Nuclear and Defense Monitor, 12
March 1996, pp 4-7.]
