3/12/2003: US PROVIDES KAZAKHSTAN WITH RADIATION CONTROL EQUIPMENT
In March the United States gave Kazakhstani customs and border guard services radiation control equipment worth $200,000 under the framework of the US-Kazakhstani bilateral Export Control and Border Security program. According to Deputy Director of the Kazakhstani Border Guard Service Marat Mardenov, the equipment included 11 advanced dosimeters, which will improve control of illegal movement of radioactive materials at the border. Previously, under this program, the Kazakhstani Border Guard Service received vehicles, radio equipment, and vision devices.
[Viktor Galinskiy, "Radiatsionnyy kontrol na granitse," Kazakhstanskaya pravda online edition, 12 March 2003, www.kazpravda.kz/archive/12_03_2003/nr.html#nr16.] {Entered 03/18/2003 AD}

2/24/2003: NEW COOPERATIVE INITIATIVE BETWEEN KAZAKHSTANI AND BRITISH CUSTOMS SERVICES
During a February 2003 visit to the United Kingdom by Kazakhstani Customs Control Agency Chairman Berdibek Saparbayev, the Kazakhstani and British customs services reached an accord to draft an agreement that would allow the two sides to exchange information and experience and cooperate in personnel training. During the visit, the Kazakhstani delegation became familiar with the mechanisms and procedures of the British customs control system.[1,2]
Sources:
[1] Interfax, 24 February 2003, "Kazakhstani, British customs services agree to share experience, information," FBIS Document CEP20030224000103.
[2] Press-release of the Kazakhstani Ministry of Foreign Affairs, No. 8, 17-23 February 2003, http://www.mfa.kz/russian/pr_8_03.htm. {Entered 4/22/2003 AD}

2/21/2003: KAZAKHSTANI AND CHINESE CUSTOMS SERVICE COOPERATION
At a 21 February 2003 meeting in Almaty, Kazakhstan, Chinese and Kazakhstani customs officials signed an agreement, under which the two countries will exchange customs information on a quarterly basis. The information exchange is intended to help both sides detect violations of export control laws. The two sides also agreed to meet annually to discuss further areas of cooperation in the field of customs and border security.[1] Until the two countries determine a formal procedure for information exchange between their respective customs administrations, communications and information exchange will be conducted through diplomatic channels.[2]
Sources:
[1] Kazakh TV 1, 21 February 2003; in "Kazakhstani, Chinese customs sign agreement on exchange of statistics," FBIS Document CEP20030222000006.
[2] CNS Communication with Daniyar Kerimbekov, Kazakhstani Customs Administration, 16 April 2003. {Entered 4/23/2003 AD}

11/28/2002: KAZAKHSTAN SIGNS PROTOCOL WITH UZBEKISTAN ON FREIGHT TRANSIT INFORMATION EXCHANGE
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, during the eighth session of the intergovernmental commission on cooperation between the two countries held in Tashkent, signed a protocol on providing mutual information on freight transit between the two states.  Other bilateral cooperation issues discussed during the commission include setting up an international water energy consortium, construction of the Kungrad-Beyneu-Aktau road, delivery of Kazakhstani grain to Uzbekistan, and energy cooperation.
[Interfax-Kazakhstan, 28 November 2002; in "Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan sign protocol on freight transit information exchange," FBIS Document CEP20021128000216.] {Entered 5/30/2003 AE}

9/25/2002: UNITED STATES GIVES $2M TO SUPPORT KAZAKHSTAN BORDER CONTROL AGENCIES
As part of the State Department-funded Export Control and Border Security program (EXBS), the United States supplied Kazakhstan with $2,384,000 worth of equipment, presented by U.S. embassy officials during a graduation ceremony at the Almaty Border Guard Academy.  The equipment, consisting of 181 high-frequency radios, 32 computers, 28 portable computers, 60 scanners, and 60 radiation pagers, was presented to the Kazakhstani Border Service, Customs Control Service, and the Ministry of Defense.
["SShA potratili na obespecheniye bezopasnosti granits Kazakhstana boleye $2 mln.," Interfax, 25 September 2002.] {Entered 6/2/2003 AE}

9/16/2002: KAZAKHSTAN REFUTES ALLEGATIONS OF ILLEGAL EXPORT OF OSMIUM-187

On 16 September 2002, during the opening of the International Eurasian Nuclear Forum in Almaty, Kairat Kadyrzhanov, Director of the Kazakhstani Institute of Nuclear Physics, refuted allegations that radioactive materials are being illegally exported from Kazakhstan. He noted that Kazakhstan abides by its obligations to prevent the proliferation of nuclear materials. According to Kadyrzhanov, the Kazakhstani government controls industrial enterprises and scientific institutions, and all border posts have equipment that can detect nuclear materials.  In 2002 to date, there have been five attempts to sell osmium-187 in Russia. In the former Soviet Union, osmium was produced in Russia by Norilsk Nickel and in Kazakhstan by Kazakhmys. According to Russian experts, investigations indicated that the confiscated osmium originated in Kazakhstan. According to Aleksandr Kim, Deputy Chair of the Kazakhstani Atomic Energy Committee, osmium-187 is on the Kazakhstani control list.  However, Kim noted that osmium-187 is not a nuclear material and cannot be used to create a nuclear bomb.

[Kuat Ibrayev, "Kazakhstan oprovergayet obvineniya v nezakonnom eksporte osmiya-187," Panorama online edition, http://www.panorama.kz/, No.36, 16-20 September 2002 .] {Entered 10/3/2002 AI}

8/28/2002: US GIVES FIVE ALL-TERRAIN VEHICLES TO REGIONAL CUSTOMS DEPARTMENT
On 22 August 2002, during a ceremony marking the Kazakhstani Border Guard Service's tenth anniversary, US Ambassador to Kazakhstan Larry C. Napper presented 15 all-terrain vehicles made by the Uralskiy Avtomobilniy Zavod (UAZ) to Kazakhstani Border Guard Service deputy director Major General Artemchuk. The United States will donate 14 additional vehicles to the Border Guard Service in two weeks. The vehicles were donated under the State Department's Export Control and Border Security program (EXBS), which works to strengthen export controls in Central Asia, specifically concentrating on border security to prevent illicit trafficking of weapons of mass destruction, arms, and other illegal materials. The EXBS program provided equipment and training to the Kazakhstani Customs Committee, Border Guard Services, Ministry of Defense, and to Kazakhstani border posts.[1] Interfax reported that five all-terrain vehicles donated by the United States will be operated at northern border posts that divide Kazakhstan with Russia, in Zhanazhol, Karagoga, Ayymzhan, Bidaik, and Kyzylzhar.[2] The fiscal year 2001 budget for the EXBS program in Kazakhstan was $5.1 million.[1]

Sources:

[1] "U.S. Ambassador presents vehicles to Kazakhstani Border Guard Service," US Embassy Almaty press release, http://www.usembassy-kazakhstan.freenet.kz/
press-releases/pr22e.htm, 22 August 2002.

[2] Interfax, 28 August 2002; in "US gives five all-terrain vehicles to regional customs department," FBIS Document CEP20020828000387.{Entered 9/18/2002 AI}

5/14/2002:  KAZAKHSTAN DENIES SUPPLYING IRAQ WITH NUCLEAR MATERIALS
On 14 May 2002, the Caspian Information Agency cited a BBC report stating that Mukhtar Dzhakishev, president of Kazatomprom, had denied allegations made by the government of Israel that Kazakhstan is supplying materials and technology for nuclear weapons production to Iraq. Dzhakishev emphasized that uranium materials in Kazakhstan are monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and undergo annual IAEA verification. According to Dzhakishev, uranium exported from Kazakhstan is not suitable for the production of nuclear weapons.
["Kazakhstan refutes Israel's accusation," 14 May 2002, Caspian Information Agency Web Site, http://www.caspian.ru.]{Entered 7/18/2002 YP}
 
4/15-18/2002:  SIXTH FORUM ON EXPORT CONTROLS:  BARRIER AGAINST WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, PROLIFERATION, AND TERRORISM
The Sixth Central Asia and Caucasus Nonproliferation Export Control Forum, Export Control: a Barrier against Weapons of Mass Destruction, Proliferation and Terrorism was held on 15-18 April 2002 in Tashkent. The Forum was co-sponsored by the US and Uzbekistani governments, and gathered representatives from Central Asia, Caucasus, the United States, and Europe, as well as experts in the field of nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The Forum addressed the risks of WMD proliferation and terrorism, and the role of interagency coordination and international cooperation to ameliorate these risks.[1] During the plenary sessions, country representatives highlighted the progress made by their governments in strengthening their export control systems in the past year. Discussions focused on national export control regulations and licensing processes, the possibility of adopting the European unified control list, the regional Transit Agreement currently under discussion among Central Asian and Caucasus countries, and border security. At the end of the meeting, the delegates produced a list of recommendations to bring back to their respective capitals, stressing, among other things, the importance of completing and signing the Transit Agreement; harmonizing export control systems by adopting the European Union control list and standardizing end-user certificates; encouraging interagency cooperation and involvement of the scientific community in the export control process; customs officials training and creating export control command centers to assist their work at the borders. The delegates also underscored the importance of facilitating information sharing and coordination, particularly when trafficking incidents occur in the region.[2]

In his speech to forum participants, Kairat Sarzhanov, Multilateral Cooperation Advisor in the Kazakhstani Ministry of External Affairs, highlighted past activities in the development of effective export controls through joint cooperation with the United States. Sarzhanov said that the adoption of an export control list created on the basis of the European Union list in 2000 was an important event for Kazakhstan. He noted that increased action to penalize violators of export control regulations will be important for the development of Kazakhstan's export control system.[3]

Sources:

[1] "US Department of State and the Institute for Strategic and Regional Studies under the President of Uzbekistan Hosts Forum "Export Controls: Barriers Against Weapons of Mass Destruction, Proliferation, and Terrorism", The United States Embassy in Uzbekistan Web Site, http://www.usembassy.uz/2002/020412.htm, 12 April 2002.

[2] "Materialy VI foruma po eksportnomy kontrolyu," Tashkent Institute of Strategic and International Studies Web Site, http://www.uzstrateg.info/frontend/
index.cfm?target=analysis&asection_id=8

[3] "Doklad Kayrata Sarzhanova, Sovetnika Departamenta mnogostoronnego sotrudnichestva Ministerstva inostrannykh del Respubliki Kazakhstan," Tashkent Institute of Strategic and International Studies Web Site, http://www.uzstrateg.info/frontend/
index.cfm?target=analysis&sub=article&analysis_id=35

{Entered 12/9/02 AI}

1/4/2002: KAZAKHSTAN LACKS FUNDS TO INSTALL DETECTION EQUIPMENT
According to an official at the Kazakhstani Committee on Atomic Energy, in 2001 Kazakhstan received equipment through an International Atomic Energy Agency assistance project to help customs authorities detect nuclear and other radioactive materials crossing the Kazakh-Kyrgyz border at the Kordai customs check point between Almaty and Bishkek. Due to a lack of financial resources, however, the Yantar 2-U equipment had not yet been installed as of January 2002. Approximately $6,000 is needed to pay a Russian company, Ural-Aspect, for installation. Customs officers must also be trained in the use of the equipment.
[CNS NIS Representative Office Memorandum, 14 January 2002, KAZ020114.]{Entered 8/18/2002 YP}

9/19/2001: KAZAKHSTAN DENIES SALE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO BIN LADEN
On 19 September 2001 the Kazakhstani Committee for National Security denied allegations that terrorist Osama bin Laden had acquired nuclear weapons in Kazakhstan.[1] French terrorism specialist Roland Jacquard claimed in his book, Au nom d'Oussama ben Laden/Dossier sur le terroriste le plus recherché du monde, released on 17 September 2001, that bin Laden managed to obtain in Kazakhstan several primitive nuclear bombs kept in briefcases protected by secret codes.[2,3] According to Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy officials, such a purchase is highly unlikely. Following the breakup of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan transferred all nuclear weapons on its territory to Russia. (See Kazakhstan:  Nuclear Weapons Overview.)  Kazakhstan has never had its own nuclear weapons production facilities.[3]
Sources:
[1] Interfax, 19 September 2001; in "Kazakhstan denies Bin-Ladin bought nuclear bombs on its territory," FBIS Document CEP20010919000311.
[2] "Une biographie de ben Laden vient de paraître en France," Yahoo! Actualités, Yahoo! Web Site, http://fr.news.yahoo.com/010918/1/1vejq.html 
[3] "'Kuzkina Mat' Osamy Ben Ladena," Izvestiya online edition, http://www.izvestia.ru/rubr.cgi?idr=637&idbl=&id=6107. {entered 9/20/01 DK}
 
6/25/2001:  STANDARDIZED CUSTOMS SYSTEM TO BE INTRODUCED IN JULY 2001
On 25 June 2001, Amaniyaz Yerzhanov, Deputy Chairman of the Kazakhstani Customs Committee, announced that as of 1 July 2001, the country's customs offices will use a standardized computerized information system that will include electronic versions of current customs regulations.  According to Yerzhanov, the standardized system will ensure transparent customs operations and enhance communication between offices.
["Kazakhstan to introduce single customs information system from 1 July," Interfax, 25 June 2001; in FBIS Document CEP20010626000019.]{Entered 10/22/2001 KB}
 
2/21/2001: US TO PROVIDE BORDER AND EXPORT CONTROL ASSISTANCE
At a news conference in Almaty on 21 February 2001, US Ambassador to Kazakhstan Richard Jones announced that the United States will provide a $4 million grant for Kazakhstan's border troops and will install a new monitoring system at ministries and state organizations to improve control over the export of strategic materials. 
[Interfax, 21 February 2001; in "Envoy Outlines US-Kazakh Projects for 2001," FBIS Document CEP20010222000082.] {Entered 3/7/2001 NA}
 
11/18/2000: KAZAKHSTAN INTRODUCES NEW CONTROL LIST
On 18 November 2000 a new control list entered into force for Kazakhstan's export control system.  The new list conforms with existing international export control regimes and contains 1,266 items, including arms and military equipment; dual-use goods; and materials, equipment, and scientific and technical information and services that can be used to create weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.  The list is designed to use both the five-digit code of the European Union's Commodity Control List and the nine-digit code of the CIS Foreign-Trade Commodity Classification.[1]  From 28 November to 1 December 2000 the Kazakhstani Ministry of Energy, Industry, and Trade and the US Department of Commerce held a four-day seminar in Astana for Kazakhstani export control officials on using the new export control list.[2,3]
Sources:
[1] Dauletbay Ismagulov, "Ob eksportnom kontrole v Respublike Kazakhstan," Panorama online edition, http://www.panorama.kz, No. 44, November 2000.
[2] Khabar Television, 28 November 2000; in "Export control seminar opens in Kazakh capital," FBIS Document CEP20001128000099.
[3] NISNP Correspondence with BXA official, 8 December 2000, KAZ001208.{Entered 12/4/00 NA}
 
2/25/2000: SANCTIONS IMPOSED ON TWO COMPANIES FOR SALE OF MIG-21s TO NORTH KOREA
The US State Department has imposed sanctions on the Metallist Plant of Uralsk, Kazakhstan, and Agroplast of the Czech Republic for their involvement in the transfer of MiG-21 aircraft to North Korea in March 1999. According to a State Department official, sanctions that could have been imposed on the Kazakhstani government for the deal were waived due to its cooperation with the joint US-Kazakhstani investigation into the incident and because continued assistance to Kazakhstan was determined to be in the national interests of the United States. US law prohibits military transfers to states that are considered sponsors of terrorism, such as North Korea.
[Adam J. Herbert, "Two Companies Sanctioned for Illegal Sale of MiG-21s to North Korea," Inside the Air Force, 25 February 2000, p.1; in Nautilus Website,  http://www.nautilus.org/napsnet/dr/0002/FEB25.html.] {entered 6/23/00 MBN}
 
2/4/2000: ACQUITTAL AND AMNESTY FOR OFFICIALS INVOLVED IN KAZAKHSTANI MIG-21 TRANSFERS TO NORTH KOREA
The military court of the Almaty garrison acquitted Lieutenant General Bakhytzhan Yertayev, chief of the Kazakhstani General Staff, and convicted Aleksandr Petrenko, former entrepreneur and former advisor of the Kazakhstani presidential staff on 4 February 2000.[1,2] The two men were accused of complicity in the sale of 40 MiG-21 aircraft to North Korea. Petrenko, the only person convicted of criminal activity in the incident, was immediately amnestied. He had worked as a representative of both Metallist and Agroplast, two firms involved in the deal. They facilitated the contract signed on 14 October 1998 stipulating that 40 MiG-21 aircraft be delivered to Agroplast, a Czech firm acting as an intermediary for North Korea. Although the transaction should have totalled $8 million, only $1.8 million was found and confiscated from Petrenko by the Kazakhstani government.[3] In March 1999, an international scandal followed the discovery of six disassembled MiG-21s and their spare parts aboard a Ruslan transport aircraft at Baku city airport where it had stopped to refuel. The chartered Russian plane had left Taldy-Kurgan, Kazakhstan, and was bound for the Czech Republic where Agroplast, in the city of Liberec, was to serve as the intermediary point before delivery to North Korea. It was first thought that the MiG parts were bound for Yugoslavia in violation of a UN embargo. However, while two sets of conflicting documentation aboard the plane declared the alternate destinations of the Czech Republic and Slovakia, the crew had filed flight-path documentation stating that their ultimate destination was North Korea.[4,5] The Kazakhstani government initially maintained that the parts were sold to Agroplast, denied that the Balkans or North Korea was their destination, and said that the parts had been returned to Kazakhstan.[6] Following a joint Kazakhstani-US investigation lasting several months, the Kazakhstani government admitted that the MiGs were sold to North Korea and that five shipments had successfully taken place, but disclaimed any advance knowledge of the $8 milllion deal.[1,7]  It was further revealed by the investigation that servicemen in the Kazakhstani Air Defense Forces and 12 Belarussian specialists were sent to North Korea to help reassemble the aircraft. Kazakhstani President Nursultan Nazarbayev asked North Korea to return the 30 MiG-21s that were sold.[3] North Korean officials said in September 1999 that they had not received any Kazakhstani MiG-21 planes. US and South Korean reports, however, insist that the aircraft were successfully transferred to North Korea.[7] The scandal resulted in the forced resignation of the Chairman of the Committee for National Security Nurtay Abykayev and Minister of Defense Mukhtar Altynbayev, who approved the deal.[4,8] Abykayev was appointed deputy head of the Kazakhstani Ministry of Foreign Affairs in April 2000, and Altynbayev is now in command of the air force.[9] As a result of the scandal, the president revoked the conventional arms export licenses of all private companies, and shifted the responsibility for oversight of export controls from the Ministry of Defense to the prime minister. Kazakhstani Foreign Minister Kasymzhomart Tokayev recognized that the incident had damaged US-Kazakhstani relations, adding that Kazakhstan would work towards repairing the relationship.[10] While this transfer did not involve weapons of mass destruction, it reflects on the overall effectiveness of Kazakhstan's export control system.
Sources:
[1] "No One Responsible In MiG Aircraft Sale to North Korea?" Jamestown Monitor, Vol. VI, Issue 26, 7 February 2000.
[2] "Kazakh Oficer Acquitted of Illegal MiG Sale," Interfax, No.2, 4 February 2000.
[3] Andrey Korbut, "Consequences of Aircraft Scandal," Nezavisimaya gazeta, 25 November 1999, p.5; in "Almaty Findings in MiG-21 Deal Outlined," FBIS Document CEP19991126000026.
[4] "Ploskiy shtopor," Trud, No. 28 (23501), 15 February 2000, p.3.
[5] "Skandal s postavkoy istrebiteley v KNDR privedet k peredelu sfery torgovli oruzhiyem v Kazakhstane," Voprosy bezopasnosti, Vol. 60, No. 16, September 1999.
[6] Adam J. Herbert, "Two Companies Sanctioned for Illegal Sale of MiG-21s to North Korea," Inside the Air Force, 25 February 2000, p.1; in Nautilus Website,  http://www.nautilus.org/napsnet/dr/0002/FEB25.html.
[7] Mike Collett-White, "Kazakhstan Ends Probe of MiG-21 Sales to N.Korea," The Globe (Almaty), No.90, 19 November 1999, p.2.
[8] Oral Karpishev, "North Korea Denies Receiving MiG-21s from Kazakhstan," ITAR-TASS, 22 September 1999; in "DPRK Sources Deny Reported Transfer of Kazakh MiG-21s," FBIS Document FTS19990927001507.
[9] Mikhail Golubev, "Kazakh Diplomacy Will Be Reinforced by a Security Officer Dismissed for an International Scandal," Kommersant, 5 April 2000; in "Abykayev Posting Recalls MiG-21 Scandal," FBIS Document CEP20000405000209.
[10] Judith Miller and Steve Levine, "To Appease U.S., Kazakhstan Acts on MIG Sales," New York Times online edition, http://www.nytimes.com, 12 September 1999. {Entered 6/23/00 MBN}
 
12/14/99: STRENGTHENING OF KAZAKHSTANI EXPORT CONTROLS
On 14 December 1999, the government of Kazakhstan passed Decree No. 1919 ratifying regulations that strengthen existing export control legislation.  President Nazarbayev ordered the strengthening of Kazakhstan's export controls following a scandal involving the transfer of Kazakhstani MiG-21s to North Korea.[1]  Under the new regulations, nuclear, special non-nuclear materials, dual-use items, technologies, installations, and equipment for their production may only be exported to non-nuclear weapon states if end-use assurances guarantee that the exported item will not be used for the production of nuclear weapons or any other military goal.  Exported items must also be subject to IAEA safeguards and physical protection measures that are equal to or greater than IAEA recommendations.  The importing country may re-export items only if the above conditions are met.  Written permission must be granted by Kazakhstan's Committee on Atomic Energy for the re-export of highly enriched uranium (above 20%), plutonium, or heavy water.  If necessary, a commission appointed by Kazakhstan's export control authority or officials from the Kazakhstani embassy in the importing country will monitor the end use of the exports.  In cases of end-use violation, Kazakhstan's export control authority will inform the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Committee for National Security.[2]
Sources:
[1] Delovaya nedelya, No.2 (380), 14 January 2000, p. 7.
[2] Government Decree No. 1919, Ob utverzhdenii Pravil osushchestvleniya eksportnogo kontrolya v Respublike Kazakhstan i Pravil oformleniya obyazatelstv po ispolzovaniyu vvozimoy v Respubliku Kazakhstan produktsii, podlezhashchey eksportnomu kontrolyu, i proverok ikh ispolneniya, 14 December 1999. {entered 7/24/00 MBN}
 
12/14/99: NEW COMMISSION ON EXPORT CONTROL ISSUES
On 14 December 1999, the government of Kazakhstan passed Decree No. 1917 creating the Government Commission on Export Control Issues and abolishing its two predecessors:  the Government Commission on Export Control and the State Commission on the Export and Import of Arms, Military Items, and Dual-Use Items.  The new commission will submit proposals to the government on the following:  (1) state policy on delivery, re-export, and transit of controlled items; (2) coordinating activities of all central agencies and departments involved with export control; (3) monitoring agencies to ensure compliance with export control laws; (4) improving the Kazakhstani export control system, improving Kazakhstani legislation, and participating in international export control regimes; and (5) bringing Kazakhstan's export control system in line with international nonproliferation regimes.  The Prime Minister of Kazakhstan will head the commission.
[Government Decree No. 1917, O sovershenstvovanii sistemy eksportnogo kontrolya v Respublike Kazakhstan, 14 December 1999.] {entered 7/24/00 MBN}
 
5/26/99: KAZAKHSTAN RATIFIES NUCLEAR ENERGY AGREEMENT
The Majlis, the lower house of the Kazakhstani parliament, ratified an agreement with the United States on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy on 26 May 1999. The agreement was signed in November 1997 and ratified by the US Senate on 19 June 1998.  The agreement, which must also be ratified by the Senate of Kazakhstan to enter into force, defines conditions of storage, delivery, and re-export of nuclear materials and delivery conditions for nuclear equipment and components.  Kazakhstani Minister of Science Vladimir Shkolnik said that the agreement is in compliance with international agreements, allows Kazakhstan to expand its exports of uranium and uranium processing services, and will improve economic relations with the US nuclear industry.
["Parlament Kazakhstana ratifitsiroval soglasheniye s SShA o sotrudnichestve v oblasti mirnogo ispolzovaniya yadernoy energii," Interfax, No.3, 26 May 1999.]{entered 7/7/99 FW}
 
11/10/98:  INTERNATIONAL FORUM ON EXPORT CONTROLS HELD IN ASTANA
The Third International Regional Forum On Export Control and Nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus was held in Astana on 10-12 November 1998.  The conference was organized by the US Departments of State and Commerce, the Turkish Government, and the Kazakhstani Ministry of Energy, Industry, and Trade. The Forum addressed a number of export control issues, including the need for a Kazakhstani state agency for export control policy, the absence of training in export control in Kazakhstan and the lack of legislative norms in the Newly Independent States.
Sources:
[1] Yaroslav Razumov, "V Astane, proydet mezhdunarodnyy forum po kontrolyu za nerasprostraneniyem yadernogo oruzhiya," Panorama, No.43, 6 November 1998.
[2] Correspondence from Emily Ewell Daughtry, CNS Newly Independent States Representative Office, 8 June 1999. {entered 6/10/99 FW}
 
1/28/98: NUCLEAR AGREEMENT WITH KAZAKHSTAN SENT TO CONGRESS
On 28 January 1998, US President Bill Clinton sent Congress the text of a proposed agreement on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy between the United States and Kazakhstan.[1,2]  In the text, Clinton stated that Kazakhstan's commitment to nonproliferation goals and its adherence to the NPT have set the conditions for US technical cooperation.  The proposed agreement allows the United States to transfer to Kazakhstan "technology, equipment (including reactors), and components for nuclear research and nuclear power production," and gives the United States consent rights to "retransfer, enrichment, and reprocessing as required by US law."  The agreement does not permit the transfer of sensitive technologies, restricted data, or major critical components of nuclear facilities.
[Office of the White House Press Secretary, "Nuclear Agreement with Kazakhstan Sent to Congress," press release, 29 January 1998.]{entered 11/4/98 FW}
 
8/96: KAZAKHSTANI NAVY RAISE FLAG IN AKTAU
The new Kazakhstani navy is equipped with two patrol boats, which were assembled at the Zenit plant in Uralsk (former Soviet shipyard complex in Western Kazakhstan) , and several patrol boats presented to Kazakhstan by the United States under the CTR program's export control assistance. The navy will enforce national legislation and export controls in the areas of the Caspian sea which fall under Kazakhstan's jurisdiction. At the flag-raising ceremony, US Ambassador to Kazakhstan Elizabeth Jones said that there are plans to provide Kazakhstan with six additional patrol boats.
Sources:
[1] Tatyana Abramenko, "Stal li Kazakhstan morskoy derzhavoy?," Panorama, No. 32, 23 August 1996.
[2] NISNP E-Mail correspondence with Kazakhstani government official, 23 October 1996.{Entered 10/4/96 GB; Updated 12/2/96 GB}
 
7/6/96: KAZAKHSTAN, KYRGYZSTAN, CHINA, AND PAKISTAN SIGNED A PROTOCOL ON UNIFIED CUSTOMS PROCEDURES
for the transit of goods between the four countries.
[OMRI Daily Digest, No. 131, Part I, 9 July 1996.]
 
6/3/96: KAZAKHSTANI SENATE PASSED AN EXPORT CONTROL LAW
The Kazakhstani Senate, the upper chamber of Parliament, passed the first comprehensive export control law "On export control of weapons, military equipment, and dual-use materials." The lower chamber of the Kazakhstani parliament, the Mazhilis, approved the draft law on 3 May 1996.
Sources:
[1] Communication with Kazakhstani government official, 20 June 1996.
[2] Panorama, "Mazhilis odobril Zakonoproyekt ob eksportnom kontrole vooruzhenniy, voennoy tekhniki i produktsii dvoynogo naznacheniya," No. 17, 3 May 1996, p. 2.
 
5/96: TRANSPORTATION AND BORDER CONTROL PROBLEMS IN PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL VIEWED
According to Kazakhstani Atomic Energy Agency (KAEA) officials, there is no systematic regulation or single coordinating body responsible for the physical protection of nuclear material during its transport in Kazakhstan, including the transit of foreign-owned material. While guards for nuclear facilities are provided by the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), the Ministry of Defense provides guards during transport. The issue of nuclear smuggling is the responsibility of the MVD (specifically, its new investigative body) and the Committee of National Security. Currently, the KAEA is working on a nuclear materials transport regulation, the final version of which will depend on a new Kazakhstani transportation law. According to KAEA, it is unclear how the Belarus-Russia-Kazakhstan Customs Union will affect the border tracking of nuclear material at internal CIS borders, which make up more than 75% of Kazakhstani borders and are also few and far between. Though the export of nuclear material to Russia, for example, would still require a license, it might no longer be tracked when across the border. The Kazakhstani Customs Service has an agreement with the United States on the stationing of radiation detection devices on border check-points and KAEA (which has not been involved in the negotiation of the agreement) hopes to have access to their database
[Emily Ewell, "Trip Report - Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Ukraine," May 1996.]

 
4/9/96: ROCKET FUEL THEFT ATTEMPT AND FUEL SPILL
An attempt to steal a tank filled with a component of rocket fuel took place at the railroad station near the Sary-Shagan anti-missile defense test site. The theft attempt resulted in the leakage of the equivalent of 46 tons of the highly toxic substance.
[Vyacheslav Kokhanov, "Uran-235 tyanet na tsentner," Komsomolskaya pravda, 9 April 1996, p. 3.]
 
1/31/96: CONCERNS ON NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY THEFT
Kazakhstan's State Security Committee Chairman Zhenisbek Zhumanbekov announced that illegal exports and technical/economic espionage are among the country's most crucial domestic problems. In a late 1995 interview, Zhumanbekov reported 406 cases of attempted illegal export of raw materials for the year and said that his bureau is trying to halt the theft of nuclear technology.
["Corrupt Business Rampant In Kazakhstan," Post-Soviet Nuclear and Defense Monitor, 31 January 1995, p. 11.]
 
1/14/96: KAZAKHSTAN, BELARUS, RUSSIA ESTABLISH CUSTOMS UNION
Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Russia concluded an agreement on establishing a Customs Union which would abolish customs control along their borders. Forthwith, customs control will be provided only for transport loads among the three countries. Kazakhstani resolutions No. 367 and 381, passed respectively on 9/6/95 and 9/19/95, laid the governmental foundation for this action. In turn, a working group meeting between Kazak Deputy Prime-Minister Nigmatzhan Isingarin and Russian Under-Secretary Aleksey Bolshakov, held in mid-12/95 in Moscow, examined ways to formally implement a customs union and strengthen bilateral economic collaboration. However, many in Kazakhstan's business community have expressed concern over Russia's delay in formally ratifying the creation of a customs union. According to Mukhtar Ablyazov, president of the company "Astana-Holding," delayed ratification reflected Moscow's attitude that the agreement was not established between "equal partners."[1-5]
 
At least three obstacles to the customs agreement had been named previously. First, Belarus opposed augmenting the union. Second, the IMF also opposes the union and one official suggested that the union will not effect a "structural perestroyka of the economy." Undoubtedly, refusing to acknowledge the wishes of the IMF could prove harmful for the CIS countries involved. Third, the CIS presidents who have supported the union have faced sharp criticism from nationalists. For example, upon returning from a 2/95 meeting in Moscow, during which the idea of a union was discussed, Kazakhstani Prime Minister Akezhan Kazhegeldin was assailed by nationalists for "betrayal of national interests."[6]
Sources:
[1] "They Do Not Give the 'OK' To The Customs House," Pravda, 14 January 1996, p. 1.
[2] "On The Affirmation Of The Protocol Of The Meeting Of the Government Delegations From The Russian Federation And The Republic of Kazakhstan About The Conclusion Of The First Stage In The Realization Of The Agreement On A Customs Union, Undersigned By Republic of Belarus And The Russian Federation With The Republic Of Kazakhstan In Moscow On January 20, 1995, from August 19, 1995," Sobraniye Aktov Presidenta Respubliki Kazakhstan i Pravitelstva Respubliki Kazakhstan, 30 November 1995, pp. 53-55.
[3] "On The Abolishment Of Customs Control Along The Border Of The Republic of Kazakhstan And The Russian Federation," Sobraniye Aktov Presidenta Respubliki Kazakhstan i Pravitelstva Respubliki Kazakhstan, 30 November 1995, pp. 34-35.
[4] "Kazakhstani-Russian Collaboration Goes Well," Kazakhstanskaya pravda, 13 December 1995, p. 1.
[5] "The Customs Union Is Not Really In Such A State As It Was Conceived," Panorama, 12 January 1996, p. 5.
[6] "A New Trend In CIS Integration?," The Monitor, Vol. 1 No. 2, Spring 1995.
 
1/96: REPORTS STATE THAT IRAN PURCHASED URANIUM FROM KAZAKHSTANI PLANT
Western diplomatic sources reported that Iran secretly bought enriched uranium from Russian diplomats based in Mazar-e-Sharif, in northern Afghanistan. The uranium was stolen by underpaid security guards at a nuclear plant in Kazakhstan and was transported to Mazar-e-Sharif in lead cylinders. The main destination for such smuggled nuclear materials is increasingly the city of Peshawar, on the Pakistani frontier.
[Tim McGirk, "Iranians Buying ex-Soviet Uranium," FBIS-NEW-96-062, 28 March 1996.]
 
12/12/95: DECREE ON THE CUSTOMS COUNCIL
President Nazarbayev signed a decree "On the Establishment of the Customs Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan," representing the culmination of four years' preparation to begin unifying Kazakhstan's disparate customs services. Increasing government revenue was cited as the animus for reorganization. Presently in Kazakhstan there are 19 customs bureaus and 6 independent customs houses.
[Sergey Belenko, "Customs Gives 'OK' After Four Years," Kazakhstanskaya pravda, 13 December 1995, p. 2.]
 
11/9/95: KAZAKHSTANI TRAIN DELAYED NEAR NORTH KOREAN BORDER
A Kazakhstani train, reportedly carrying weapons for North Korea, was allowed to cross the Russian border by a special decision of the Russian government in the light of the creation of a common customs space. The train was detained at the Far East Khasan station on 10/14/95 in accordance with the Russian Customs Code which prohibits the transport of foreign weapons across the country's border. The source suggests that the Russian government obtains guarantees from Kazakhstan that it will not resell the currently shipped Russian military equipment, for example, MIG-29 and SU-27, to "militarily dangerous" regimes.
["North Korea Builds Up Its Military Potential Thanks to Friendship with Kazakh Generals," The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, Vol. XLVII, No.46, 13 December 1995, p. 17.]

 
9/7/95: NAZARBAYEV ON ILLEGAL TRAFFICKING OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS
In an official statement, President Nazarbayev expressed concern over continued illegal trafficking of nuclear materials and nuclear devices in light of the recent, indefinite renewal of the NPT. Asserting that technical measures alone are insufficient for strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation regime, President Nazarbayev called for greater transparency and openness in nuclear matters and stated his official support for the IAEA system of safeguards.
[N. A. Nazarbayev, "Measures Against Illicit Trafficking In Nuclear Materials And Other Radioactive Sources," International Atomic Energy Agency General Conference, GC(39)/27, 20 September 1995.]
 
9/95: US CUSTOMS SERVICE'S ASSISTANCE TO KAZAKHSTAN
The US Customs Service consulted Kazakhstani specialists in Aktau on the organization of a marine patrol program during a 5-day course. Other US Customs assistance included a delivery of laboratory equipment (September 1995), assessment of Kazakhstani customs automation efforts for export control (4 days, completed in August 1995), orientation to US customs operations (14 days, competed in July 1995), and export control enforcement assessment of Kazakhstani customs (10 days, completed in January 1995).
Sources:
[1] "Nuclear Non-proliferation: US Customs Service Training And Anti-Smuggling Efforts In The Newly Independent States," Department of the Treasury, US Customs Service; Testimony Before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee on Government Affairs, US Senate; Statement of Connie J. Fenchel, Chief -- Strategic Investigations of the US Customs Service, 22 March 1996.
[2] OMRI Daily Digest, No. 101, Part I, 24 May 1996.
 
8/14/95: ALMATY DENIES IT PLANS TO SELL URANIUM TO LIBYA
Bulat Nurgaliyev, Kazakhstan's Deputy Foreign Minister denied reports that Almaty is planning to sell uranium to Libya. Valerian Shemanskiy, First Vice President of KATEP reiterated that Kazakhstan would abide by all of its NPT obligations.
[Interfax, 14 August 1995; in FBIS-SOV-95-157, "Almaty Denies Reports of Uranium Deal With Libya," 14 August 1995.]
 
8/9/95: LIBYA IS PREPARED TO PURCHASE KAZAK URANIUM
According to reports citing the official Libyan news agency JANA, the government of Libya is prepared to purchase an unspecified amount of uranium from Kazakhstan. No details were given and uses for the material were not specified.
[ Pannier, Bruce, "Kazakhstan to Sell Uranium to Libya," OMRI Daily Digest, No.155, Vol.1, 10 August 1995, p. 4.]
 
8/95: US CUSTOMS SERVICE CONDUCTS NON-PROLIFERATION WORKSHOP
Representatives from Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan convened in Almaty to attend a workshop on nuclear nonproliferation and anti-smuggling efforts, sponsored by the US Customs Service. Twelve participants attended the 8 day seminar.
["Nuclear Non-proliferation: US Customs Service Training And Anti-Smuggling Efforts In The Newly Independent States," Department of the Treasury, United States Customs Service; Testimony Before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee on Government Affairs, US Senate; Statement of Connie J. Fenchel, Chief -- Strategic Investigations of the US Customs Service, 22 March 1996.]
 
2/4/95: KAZAKHSTAN TO DEVELOP AN EXPORT CONTROL SYSTEM
According to a report on parliamentary hearings by Yergali Bayadilov, Director General of Kazakhstan's Atomic Energy Agency, a system of physical protection and export controls will be established by the middle of 1995. Bayadilov said that the IAEA plans to render Kazakhstan assistance in this sphere worth $800,000.
[Panorama, 4 February 1995, p. 2; translated in FBIS-SOV-95-028, "Parliament Considers Future of Nuclear Power," 4 February 1995.]
 
11/25/94: DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER DENIES KAZAKHSTAN’S INTENTIONS TO SELL URANIUM TO IRAN
Kazak Deputy Foreign Minister Bulat Nurgaliyev told Interfax on 25 November, that Almaty did not hold any talks with Iran on the sale of highly-enriched uranium. He categorically dismissed allegations that Kazakhstan was prepared to sell the uranium to Iran if it had not been purchased by the United States According to Nurgaliyev, "if none of the depository states to the Non-Proliferation Treaty...had showed interest in purchasing this uranium, it would have been transferred under IAEA guarantees at the same place where it was previously stored -- at the plant's storage facility."
[Interfax, 25 November 1994; in FBIS-SOV-94, "Official Denies Talks With Iran On Uranium Sales," 25 November 1994.]
 
11/93: IRAN INVITES KAZAKHSTANI NUCLEAR EXPERTS TO WORK ON ITS NUCLEAR PROGRAM
Iranian President Ali Akhbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani reportedly requested that Kazakhstan send nuclear experts to Iran to work on its nuclear program. Kazak nuclear experts have met with Iranian Deputy President for Atomic Affairs and Chairman of the Iranian Atomic Energy Association, Reza Amrollahi, to discuss the Iranian proposition.[1]
Numerous unconfirmed reports have surfaced regarding the sale of two nuclear devices to Iran.[2-10]
Sources:
[1] Al-Shira (Beirut), 1 November 1993, p. 12; in JPRS-TND-93-036, "Kazakhstan Seeks Iran's Help To Develop Nuclear Capability (sic)," 17 November 1993, p. 44.
[2] Roger Fallgot and Ian Mather, "Iran Has N-Bomb" The European, 30 April 1992, pp. 1-2.
[3] JPRS-TND-92-002, "Kazakhstan Denies Selling Nuclear Technology," 31 January 1992, p. 49.
[4] Defense News, 24 February 1992, pp. 47-48.
[5] Sydney Morning Herald, 28 March 1992, p. 23.
[6] Radio Rossii Network (Moscow), 24 January 1992.
[7] Jerusalem Post, 23 April 1992, pp. 2-4.
[8] The Guardian, 3 September 1992.
[9] Nucleonics Week, 6 August 1992, pp. 12-14.
[10] Mednews, 8 July 1992, pp. 1-5, 7.
 
6/93: KAZAKHSTAN, UKRAINE TO DEVELOP JOINT EXPORT CONTROLS
Delegations from Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Armenia gathered to develop a joint system for monitoring exports of dual-use technology. Russia drew up national lists of restrictions to assist the republics in establishing their individual export control systems.
[Russian Television Network, 6/3/93; in FBIS-SOV-93-106, "Conference Views Dual-Purpose Technologies, Restrictions," 6/4/93, p. 6.]
 
2/9/93: COOPERATION IN EXPORT CONTROLS WITH ARMENIA, BELARUS
Kazakhstan reached agreement with Armenia, Belarus, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan to cooperate in the control of exports of raw materials, equipment, technology, and services which could be used for making weapons of mass destruction.
Sources:
[1] ITAR-TASS, 9 February 1993, "Six CIS States Join Forces To Enforce Export Control."
[2] FBIS-SOV-93-026, 10 February 1993.
 
6/26/92: KAZAKHSTAN SIGNS MINSK ACCORD
In Minsk, Belarus on 26 June 1992, eight countries of the CIS (Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan) signed the Agreement on Coordination of Work Related to the Issues of Export Control over Raw Materials, Materials, Equipment, Technologies, and Services Used or Capable of Being Used for the Manufacture of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles as Their Means of Delivery, otherwise known as the Minsk Accord on CIS Export Control Coordination.  The signatories agreed to pursue coordinated export control policies, including the application of sanctions against all economic entities that violate the export control requirements.
[Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes (Monterey, CA:  Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, August 2000), p. 73.]{Entered 12/6/2000 KB}