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On 21 November 1994, 581kg (1,278 pounds) of HEU was transferred from the Ulba
Metallurgy
Plant 20 miles outside of the northern Kazakhstani city of Ust-Kamenogorsk
to the Y-12 plant at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Tennessee, in
a highly secret project code-named "Sapphire." The project was initiated
by President Nursultan Nazarbayev with the full knowledge of Russia, according
to Kazakhstani Deputy Prime Minister Vitaliy Mette, in order to prevent
the possibility of diversion by terrorists, or by any of the so-called
nuclear threshold states near Kazakhstan. Government officials claimed
that apart from the plutonium in missiles remaining on its territory, Kazakhstan
no longer has any significant nuclear stockpiles. William H. Courtney,
the US Ambassador to Kazakhstan, led the secret negotiations in cooperation
with the Kazakhstani government and the US Departments of Defense and Energy.
The uranium, reportedly left over from the Soviet Union's secret Alfa submarine
program, had been stored at Ulba in unsecured and unsafeguarded facilities,
without electronic means of accounting. Instead, quantities were simply
recorded by hand into books.
Experts estimate the uranium was sufficient to make 20-25 nuclear bombs,
though it was said a "skilled bomb-maker" could have produced as many as
36. One estimate said the material was sufficient for up to 50 bombs. Kazakhstani
experts maintained that only about 5 percent of the HEU was pure enough
to be used for weapons, while the rest would have required further processing.
Thirty-one technicians, led by Oak Ridge scientist Alex Riedy, went to Kazakhstan
to repackage the uranium into 1,300 steel canisters for shipment by two
C-5 transport planes from Kazakhstan to the United States. Empty canisters
marked with Tehran addresses were reportedly found in the room next to
the one where the uranium was stored.
The United States agreed to compensate Kazakhstan for the material,
though the transaction was "not handled as a straight business deal." The
US compensation to Kazakhstan, though undisclosed, was estimated at between
$10 and $20 million, in both cash and in-kind assistance.[1-8] The
compensation package was delivered by August 1997 and included the following: eight pursuit
vehicles with radio and patrol lights; five mini-vans; eight light pick-up
trucks; four buses with radios; 20 Nikon 35mm cameras plus lenses, flash assemblies
and cases; 102 computers; 80 printers; 10 scanners; assorted software; 10
photocopiers; and medical supplies.[9] According to
a 29 July 1996 Nuclear Fuel report, the US Enrichment Corp. (USEC)
planned
to sell LEU (on DOE's behalf) derived from the Kazakhstani HEU in mid-1997.
After the material was shipped to DOE's plant, USEC hired Babcock &
Wilcox Naval Nuclear Fuel Division to blend down the HEU. According to
B&W, roughly 90% of the material was in the form of uranium mixed with
beryllium and a binding agent; the rest was in the form of uranium oxide
or metal. The average enrichment was 89-90%. Proceeds from the sale of
the blended material were to go to the US Treasury.[10] Defense Secretary William Perry said conditions for Project Sapphire
may have been unique, and that there were no plans to carry out any further
such transfers.[11]
At the time, Vitaliy Nasonov, then deputy chief of the Russian Ministry
of Atomic Energy Information
Department, indicated that the amount of HEU transferred to the United States from Kazakhstan
could only have been about 167kg of tablets of uranium-235-beryllium alloy,
and 27.4kg of uranium-235 dioxide powder-- which comes to a total of only
194.4kg. Possible military uses for the Kazakhstani uranium were dismissed,
as Russian experts believe that only Russia and the United States are capable
of producing a bomb from uranium-235 alloyed with beryllium. The 27.4kg
of uranium-235 dioxide could only be converted into weapon-grade uranium
after costly processing. Nasonov's claims are contradicted by both Kazakhstan
and US reports.[12] For a US
report on the material see "Sapphire Sampling Plan," Prepared by Oak Ridge
Y-12 Plant (December 1994).
11/2/96: KAZAKHSTAN'S COMMENT ON SHORTFALL IN HEU SHIPMENT
Responding to a 24 October 1996 Washington Times report that the amount
of Kazakhstani highly enriched uranium (HEU) was 120 pounds (54.5 kg) short
of the initially declared weight of 1,278 lb. (581 kg), Kazakhstani Ambassador
to the United States Bolat Nurgaliyev stated that no material was diverted
before the United States shipped away the HEU purchased from Kazakhstan. He underscored
that the Kazakhstani HEU weight declaration was an approximation subject
to verification of the United States. Nurgaliyev also described that in
1992, Iranian representatives made contact with the Ust-Kamenogorsk facility
(where the HEU was stored), "but what they were trying to buy was not HEU."
He added that there was "absolutely no indication Iran was interested in
HEU." Kazakhstan renounced its possession of nuclear weapons in 1993, signed
the NPT, shipped all warheads to Russia and signed the HEU deal with the
United States. Nurgaliyev said that the United States compensated Kazakhstan
for the HEU, providing between $20 million and $30 million in cash and
goods in kind.
10/24/96: SHORTFALL IN KAZAKHSTANI HEU URANIUM SHIPMENT REPORTED
The Washington Times reported that a 120-pound (54.5 kg) shortage
has been discovered in the process of blending down the Kazakhstani HEU
shipped to the United States on 11/21/94 under Project
Sapphire. The initially declared amount of the HEU was 1,278 lb. (581
kg). A US Department of Energy (DOE) spokesman commented that there was
difficulty in obtaining precise measurements of the HEU contained among
2.4 tons of discarded metals, oxides, and uranium-beryllium alloys shipped
from Kazakhstan. DOE issued a statement that said, "both governments clearly
understood that the quantities of highly enriched uranium were imprecise.
The point was to secure the material first and perform precise characterization
of the material later." In response to a question of whether it was possible
that the HEU could have been diverted between the time the HEU was inspected
in Kazakhstan and the time the material was put on US planes, Assistant
Secretary of Defense Kenneth Bacon said that there was adequate security
during all parts of the shipment of the Kazakhstani HEU. He added that
there was no indication that any of the Kazakhstani HEU may have been ended
up in Iran. The DOE's statement specifically denied that any of the material
is missing or stolen. According to a 30 August 1996 memo of the US Oak Ridge
National Laboratory, the estimated cost for Project Sapphire "will be approximately
$3.5 million inclusive of the first year of storage costs." On 27 October 1996,
the Iranian Atomic Energy Agency issued a statement that Iran reserves
the right to file a complaint to the International Atomic Energy Agency
regarding some "US officials' claim" that the missing portion of the Kazakhstani
HEU shipped to the United States under Project Sapphire could have been
stolen by Iran.
11/25/94: MINATOM ACCOUNTED ONLY FOR ONE-THIRD OF HEU
Izvestiya reported that Russia's Minatom could only account for one-third
of the HEU that the United States removed under agreement from Kazakhstan's
Ulba fuel reprocessing facility in Ust-Kamenogorsk. Minatom believed that
only 200 kg of HEU were at the facility; however the United States airlifted
600 kg back to the United States.
11/21/94: HEU HAS BEEN UNSECURED
The uranium that was transferred from the Ulba Metallurgical plant in Ust-Kamenogorsk
to the Oakridge Lab in the United States in Project Sapphire had been in unsecured and unsafeguarded facilities, without
electronic means of accounting. The amounts of radioactive materials present
were physically recorded by hand into books. Reportedly, this was not an
isolated case of inadequate MC&A in Kazakhstan.
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