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The Office
of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, formerly the Office of Nonproliferation
and National Security, National
Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), US Department of Energy (DOE), is responsible for DOE assistance programs in the
NIS.
DOE assistance programs in Kazakhstan include Material
Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) activities, the
Kazakhstan
Spent Fuel Initiative, the BN-350 Reactor Shutdown
Project, Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP),
the Nuclear Technology Safety Center (NTSC) of the
Republic of Kazakhstan, and export control assistance.
Please see the Kazakhstan:
DOE Developments section for more information on DOE programs in
Kazakhstan.
In 1994, the Republic of Kazakhstan acceded to the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) as a non-nuclear weapon state and joined the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).[1,2] As an NPT signatory, Kazakhstan
is obligated to accept IAEA safeguards on nuclear material within its territory.
On 13 December 1993, Kazakhstan and the United States signed an agreement to
cooperate on the protection, control, and accounting of nuclear materials in
Kazakhstan.
US-assisted MPC&A activities have been ongoing
at four facilities in Kazakhstan since 1993: Ulba
Metallurgical Plant, Ust-Kamenogorsk; the Baykal-1
and IGR reactor complexes
at the Institute of Atomic Energy, Kurchatov; the BN-350
reactor at the Mangyshlak Atomic Energy Combine (MAEK), Aktau; and
the Alatau Research Reactor
at the Institute of Nuclear Physics, Alatau, near Almaty. (For specific MPC&A activities
at each site, click on the preceding links.) For information on Department of Defense-led
MPC&A activities under the Cooperative Threat Reduction Initiative
in Kazakhstan, please see the MPC&A section under Foreign
Assistance: CTR in Kazakhstan. For a breakdown of MPC&A
funding between DOD and DOE from 1993-1998, see the MPC&A
Strategic Plan, US Department of Energy, January 1998.
One of DOE's major MPC&A successes, known as Project
Sapphire, was the removal of 600kg of HEU from the Ulba Metallurgical
Plant in Kazakhstan in 1994. Other examples of MPC&A activities in
Kazakhstan include the following: installation of access controls, such
as ID cards, search devices, and turnstiles; installation of alarms and
monitoring equipment; and provision of inventory equipment, such as computers
and software, tamper indicating devices, and measurement devices.[3] However, Kazakhstani officials have expressed the opinion that a great
deal of work yet remains to be done and have suggested that the following additional
upgrades be made at the four sites: modernization of alarm and communications
systems, installation of uninterrupted power sources for MPC&A equipment,
and installation of portal monitors to detect radioactive materials.[4]
Following completion of MPC&A upgrades at all four facilities in 1998, MPC&A responsibilities for Kazakhstani nuclear
facilities were transferred from DOE's MPC&A
Office to the International
Safeguard Division (ISD), in the spring of 1999. ISD's role at
the four Kazakhstani facilities is to provide ongoing training and spare
parts to maintain the level of enhanced protection, control, and
accountability.[3]
Specifically, ISD's
Strategic Plan for 2000-2001 calls for system assessments at Kazakhstani
nuclear facilities; remediation of any identified problem areas; cooperation
with Kazakhstan to develop state safeguards standards; and cooperation
with Kazakhstan to implement standardized, IAEA-compatible material accounting
systems.[5]
DOE activities at Kazakhstan's most vulnerable nuclear
site, MAEK, will continue for some
time through the Kazakhstan Spent Fuel Initiative,
administered through the Office of International Security, and the BN-350
Reactor Shutdown Project, administered through the Office of International
Nuclear Safety and Cooperation.
The Kazakhstan Spent Fuel Initiative of the Office
of International Security is centered on securing spent fuel at the BN-350
reactor at the Mangyshlak Atomic Energy
Complex (MAEK), Aktau. According to DOE, three tons of weapons-grade plutonium is contained in approximately 300MT of spent fuel at
the site.[1] Argonne
National Laboratories designed, fabricated, and installed a machine
in mid-1998 to stabilize and package the fuel for long-term storage in
steel containers.[2]
To fabricate steel storage containers, Argonne partnered with Byelkamit,
a CTR joint venture between
Byelocorp Scientific International (BSI), Inc., of Rochester, NY,
and Gidromash, a Kazakhstani torpedo-manufacturing plant.[2,3] By
mid-1999, the plant was manufacturing large steel canisters, each designed to
hold six assemblies.[2,4] Hot (highly irradiated) and cool (less
irradiated) spent fuel assemblies were packaged together in the canisters and returned to storage
ponds, making the cool spent fuel less vulnerable to diversion.[4,5] During
his visit to Kazakhstan on 28-29 August 2000, US Secretary
of Energy Bill Richardson announced that the packaging phase of the Initiative
was 85% complete, with 2,800 fuel assemblies secured. Final completion is expected in February
2001.[1] The second phase of the Initiative calls for removal of the
filled canisters for long-term storage to one of 10 sites under consideration,
including sites in Mangystau Oblast, central Kazakhstan, and at the
Semipalatinsk Test Site.[6]
DOE funding for the Spent Fuel Initiative for FY 1999, FY 2000, and FY 2001
totals $15 million, $15,459,000, and $15.8 million, respectively.[7] DOE's
FY 2002 budget request calls for $8.9 million, a 40% reduction from FY
2001. The reduction reflects the "stretch out of
completion," presumably referring to delays in selecting a long-term
storage site for the plutonium.[8]
DOE's BN-350 Reactor Shutdown Project is administered
by the Office of International Nuclear Safety and Cooperation
(INSC).
In February 1999, Kazakhstani Minister of
Energy, Industry, and Trade Vladimir Shkolnik
requested US assistance for safety upgrades and shutdown planning at the
BN-350 reactor.[1] On April 22, 1999, the government of Kazakhstan
permanently shut down the reactor, which was scheduled to close in 2003.
According to the Kazakhstan
State Corporation for Atomic Power and Industry (KATEP), the shutdown
planning stage will last two years, followed by a five-year implementation
period. The reactor will then be mothballed for 50 years, after which decontamination and decommissioning activities will
commence.[2] In May 1999, an INSC team began to provide assistance
in the areas of fire safety upgrades, sodium decontamination using a cesium
trap, Y2K readiness, and shutdown planning. Review, design, and installation
of the cesium trap will continue throughout 2000. In December
1999, Shkolnik and US Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson signed the US-Kazakhstan Implementing Arrangement
for the shutdown. The Arrangement called for the development of a
shutdown plan suitable for international review to be developed through
three joint US-Kazakhstan-led workshops in 2000. Peer review of the
plan will be conducted by the IAEA in August-September 2000.[1] In addition
to DOE's assistance, Japan and TACIS (specifically the United Kingdom and
France) have indicated
they will also contribute technical or financial support for the shutdown, the total projected cost
of which is estimated at $85 million.[1,3,4] During
his visit to Kazakhstan on 28-29 August 2000,
Richardson announced that the US has thus far budgeted
$3.8 million for the Shutdown Project.[5]
The objective of the Initiatives
for Proliferation Prevention (IPP) program is to enhance US national
security and nonproliferation objectives by engaging scientists, engineers,
and technicians from former weapons of mass destruction and weapons-related
institutes, redirecting their activities in cooperatively-developed, commercially
viable non-weapons related projects. In March 2000, US Assistant Secretary
of Energy Rose Gottemoeller reported that since the program's inception
in 1994, over 6,000 scientists with weapons backgrounds in Russia, Ukraine,
Kazakhstan, and Belarus have been engaged in 400 non-military projects.[1]
Many of the IPP projects in Kazakhstan are centered around Stepnogorsk,
the site of the National Center for Biotechnology and the Institute for
Pharmaceutical Biotechnology.[2] For general information on the IPP
Program, please see the IPP
file in the Russian Foreign Assistance section of the NIS Nuclear Profiles database.
DOE, through its Office of International Safety
and Cooperation, helped to establish the Nuclear
Technology Safety Center (NTSC) with the primary goal of ensuring the
safe shutdown and decommissioning of the BN-350
reactor in Aktau. In addition to its work on the BN-350 reactor,
the NTSC sponsors symposiums and student exchanges. DOE provided
computer equipment, software, technical guidance, and training to establish
the Center. The NTSC is a partner of DOE's International
Nuclear Safety Center (INSC), based at Argonne
National Laboratory.
DOE conducts export control workshops for government
and technical officials in the NIS and performs technical studies on
nuclear proliferation in the region. DOE plans to develop
a nuclear export control database in Kazakhstan to assist authorities with
export control license reviews. (Please see the NIS Profiles section on Kazakhstan:
Export Controls for more information on this and related
topics.)
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