11/15/96: CONTRACT FOR IMPROVING IGNALINA ADMINISTRATION COMPLETED In December 1996, work to improve Ignalina's administrative and management
systems under a two-year contract with Swedish experts will
be complete. The contract provided for assistance to Ignalina by Swedish
consultants, with funding provided by the Swedish government.
["Beginning Next Year, Lithuania's Ignalina Atomic Power
Plant Will Take Over Management Improvement Program," Baltic News Service,
11/15/96.]
{Entered 11/19/96 RD; Revised 1/13/97 JL}
12/96: ONTARIO HYDRO DROPS OUT OF BIDDING FOR WASTE FACILITY Ontario Hydro dropped out of the bidding for a contract to install a spent
fuel and nuclear waste storage facility at Ignalina due to "unsuitable
conditions." The Lithuanian Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate (VATESI)
received bids on 10 and 11 June 1996 from Ontario Hydro, Atomic Energy
of Canada, Limited (AECL), and Gesellschaft fuer Nuklear Behalter (GNB). (NuclearFuel stated that bids were received in April; see
the 4/22/96 entry below.)
The previous contract had been with GNB, but it was deemed too expensive
by VATESI officials. Experts estimate that Ignalina may need as many as
500 nuclear waste storage containers for use until the plant is shut down.
AECL is expected to win the new contract to construct the casks and dry
storage facility. AECL would work with the Lithuanian firm Kauno Pyargale
to produce the casks if awarded the contract.
Sources: [1]"Canada's Ontario Hydro Offers Long-term Investments In
Lithuanian Nuclear Power Station," Baltic News Service
Daily Report,
6/11/96; [2] Zhidrunas Damauskas, "Kanadtsy rasschityvayut na zakaz dlya Ignalinskoy
AES," Lietuvos Rytas, 24 December 1996, p. 6. {Revised 3/12/97 LBN}
10/31/96: PART OF STOLEN NUCLEAR FUEL FOUND According to the Visaginas Prosecutor's Office, a cache of
sixteen pellets of nuclear fuel, totaling less than one kilogram, was found
buried at an uninhabited estate several kilometers from the Ignalina nuclear
power plant. Officials claim that the pellets are part of the 100kg
of nuclear fuel stolen from the plant in 1992. Approximately 10kg of the
stolen fuel has been found to date. According to the Prosecutor's Office,
all of the suspects, including former plant engineer Rinat Salikhove, remain
at large. Salikhove is believed to be hiding either in Russia or in the
southern tier of the former Soviet Union.
[Interfax, 31 October 1996; in "Police Find Some of Nuclear Fuel Stolen from Ignalina,"
FBIS-SOV-96-212.] {Entered 11/18/96 RD}
10/96: PHYSICAL PROTECTION ENHANCEMENTS
COMPLETED The US Department of Energy reported
that Lithuania completed a series of thorough physical protection enhancements
at the Ignalina plant, including delay barriers, entry control systems,
an alarm assessment system, and improved communication capabilities.
["Update on MPC&A Developments
Since June 1996," US Department of Energy Report, April 1997.] {entered
9/8/97 djw}
9/23/96: SUSPICIONS THAT IGNALINA BREAKDOWNS ARE
DELIBERATE According to Latvian Radio, official Lithuanian sources
stated that the recent breakdowns at the Ignalina NPP were believed to
be deliberate and that specific individuals were under suspicion (no details
were given). Twenty-one breakdowns have occurred so far in 1996, and the
reactors have been stopped five times. The loss of power from Ignalina
has increased the country's dependence on fuel oil, prompting concern over
whether there will be enough oil to last throughout the winter.
["Authorities Suspect Breakdowns
at Nuclear Power Plant are Deliberate," IAEA Daily Press Release, 27 September
1996,
p. 12.] {entered 2/7/97 djw}
7/17/96: IAEA DIRECTOR-GENERAL DISCUSSES SAFETY AND FUTURE OF IGNALINA
WITH LITHUANIAN PRESIDENT During a visit to Vilnius, International Atomic Energy Agency Director-General
Hans Blix met with Lithuanian President Algirdas Brazauskas and Prime Minister
Mindaugas Stankevicius to discuss the current safety situation at Ignalina.
According to Blix, Ignalina's old-style reactors should be replaced, not
merely modernized. Blix admitted that Lithuania does not have the financial
ability to close Ignalina, but he stressed the need to cooperate with Russia
in the area of nuclear fuel supply.
Sources: [1] Post-Soviet Nuclear & Defense Monitor, 31 July 1996, p.13. [2] Saulius Girnius, "IAEA Director in Lithuania", OMRI Daily
Digest, Vol. 2, No.139, 19 July 1996. [3] Interfax, 18 July 1996; in "IAEA Head: Vilnius, Moscow Must
Cooperate in Nuclear Power," FBIS-SOV-96-140. [4] ELTA, 18 July 1996; in Transboundary and Environmental News
16-31 July 1996.{Entered 10/22/96 RD}
7/3/96: SWEDEN DONATES COMPUTERS
TO VATESI A group of Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate
experts delivered computers and software worth over SKr250,000 (approximately
$35,000) to the Lithuanian Nuclear Energy Safety Inspectorate (VATESI).
This delivery is one of many Swedish projects designed to assist Lithuania's
economy and improve security. The equipment will be used to improve VATESI's
system of nuclear materials control.
["New Computers To Help Control Nuclear Materials," ELTA, 4/3/96,
FBIS-SOV-96-132.] {entered 1/29/97 djw}
7/96: COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM TO BE UPDATED The Swedish International Project for Nuclear Safety
has awarded a contract to INTA, a Lithuanian-US-German joint venture, to
install a new communications system at Ignalina NPP. The $900,000 grant
will be used to replace Ignalina's badly outdated communications systems
with radio connections, pagers, and a digital communications system.
[The Baltic Times, 11-17 July 1996, p. 10.]
{entered 1/27/97 djw}
6/14/96: COOPERATION IN NUCLEAR POWER DISCUSSED BY SWEDISH AND LITHUANIAN
PRIME MINISTERS Lithuanian Prime Minister Mindaugas Stankevicius met with his Swedish counterpart,
Goran Persson, to discuss the prospects for replacing the Ignalina NPP sometime
in the next century. The two prime ministers also discussed building a
Baltic Ring pipeline that would supply Lithuania with natural gas from
Norway, thereby compensating for the loss of Ignalina's generating capacity.
Sources: [1] Burton Frierson, "Swedish PM Promises Energy Talks," The
Baltic Times, 20-26 June1996, p. 2. [2] Baltic News Service, 14 June 1996; in "Swedish Prime Minister Pledges More Financial Support,"
FBIS-SOV-96-119. [3] "Lithuanian Prime Minister Mindaugas Stankevicius Met
With His Swedish Counterpart," Post-Soviet Nuclear & Defense Monitor,
26 June 1996, p. 9. {Entered 10/28/96 RD}
6/4/96: GERMAN COMPANY TO DELIVER CASTOR CASK The first CASTOR cask for interim storage of spent fuel should be delivered
to Ignalina by the German company GNB in June 1996. The CASTOR cask, made of
ductile cast iron, is able to hold 102 half fuel-assemblies. Nineteen more
casks should be delivered to Ignalina by mid-1997. GNB has plans to supply
a further 40 casks in the future.
Sources: [1] UI NEWS BRIEFING, NB96.22-12, 4 June 1996. [2] "First CASTOR Spent Fuel Cask to Arrive Shortly," NucNet, 30
May 1996, p.20. {updated 1/29/97 djw}
4/22/96:IGNALINA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT PLANS SWITCH TO NEW FUEL The Uranium Institute reported that the Ignalina nuclear power plant plans to switch to
a newly developed, higher burn-up RBMK fuel over the next three years. The
fuel, developed in Russia, already accounts for 10% of Ignalina's core.
The fuel has an enrichment level of 3.7% U-235 and is in use in the United
States and Europe.
[UI NEWS BRIEFING, 4/23/96.]
4/22/96: THREE BIDS FROM WESTERN COMPANIES RECEIVED The Lithuanian Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate (VATESI) received bids
from three Western companies for a complete dry storage facility at the
Ignalina plant. The German company Gesellschaft fuer Nuklear-Behalter GmbH (GNB) originally had a contract to supply 60 storage casks for spent fuel.
The first 10 casks have been paid for and delivery from GNB is expected
in June 1996. However, VATESI recently determined that the project was too expensive
and hopes that the new bids, which include both the storage casks and the
storage facility, will reduce the overall cost. Officials would like to
ensure that the storage facility will be ready by early 1997, since the
storage pools at Ignalina have been overfilled for some time. Officials
noted that this situation, while not a safety hazard, makes it impossible
to keep track of spent fuel at the plant.
[Ariane Sains, "Lithuania's Ingnalina [sic] Plant Gets Three
Bids For Dry Storage Facility," NuclearFuel, 22 April 1996, p. 12.]
4/12/96:STATE CONTROL BOARD PROPOSES REMOVAL OF IGNALINA PLANT
DIRECTOR The Lithuanian state control board proposed the removal of Ignalina Director Viktor Shevaldin because the plant failed to pay $650,000
in taxes last year. Lithuanian Energy Minister Saulius Kutas reported that
Shevaldin would remain director.
["Shevaldin To Remain Director of Ignalina Atomic Power
Plant," Baltic News Service Daily Report, 4/12/96.]
4/11/96:MINISTER OF ENERGY CALLS FOR NEW NUCLEAR REACTOR Lithuanian Energy Minister Saulius Kutas said that a new nuclear reactor
is the only long-term solution to Lithuania's energy needs. Kutas reported
that cost estimates to build a new reactor would be less than $2,000 per
installed kilowatt, somewhat less than in the West. Lithuania has not ruled
out the possibility of a jointly owned reactor that could serve the Baltic
states and other neighbors. In the meantime, Lithuania plans to watch the
Belarusian and Russian nuclear power situation closely.
[Ariane Sains, "Energy Minister Sees New Reactor As Best
Solution For Lithuania," Nucleonics Week, 11 April 1996, p.5.]
4/10/96: MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS TAKES OVER SUPERVISION
OF IGNALINA’S GUARD FORCES The Ministry of Internal Affairs has taken over supervision
of Ignalina's guard forces from the Ministry of Defense in order to better
assure the security of the plant.
["Police Take Over Function of Security Guards at Lithuania's
Ignalina Atomic Power Plant," Baltic News Service Daily Report, 10 April 1996.]
3/12/96:IGNALINA’S INTERNATIONAL SAFETY ADVISORY
GROUP DISCUSSES DISCOVERY OF MISSING FUEL ROD Members of Ignalina's international safety advisory group
met in Vilnius to discuss the discovery of a missing fuel rod, which had
contained 3kg of uranium at the time it was reported missing in 1993.
VATESI Director Sigitas Kurselis indicated that the disappearance had been
under investigation for the past three years, and was connected to the December
1994 arrest of three people who had attempted to sell 8kg of uranium. The
uranium was believed to be from the missing assembly.
[Ariane Sains, "One Ignalina Fuel Rod Found But Rest
of Assembly Still a Mystery," Nucleonics Week, 14 March 1996.]
3/8/96:MISSING FUEL ROD FOUND The Lithuanian State Security Department announced that a
nuclear fuel assembly, missing since 1993, was found in the Visaginas district.
The rod was partly dismantled and a small amount of spent radioactive
fuel had been removed.[1,2] The rod contained 2.7kg of uranium,
whereas a full rod contains just over 3kg.[1] Lithuanian officials
announced that the fuel rod was probably stolen, and not merely misplaced.[3]
Sources: [1] Ariane Sains, "With Spring Thaw, Dig to Begin for
Stolen Ignalina Assembly," Nucleonics Week, 21 March 1996, pp. 15-16. [2] "Naideno ukradennoye yadernoye toplivo," Diena,
11 March 1996, p. 1. [3] UI News Briefing, 12 March 1996.
2/23/96: VATESI AND SIP COOPERATION
DISCUSSED Officials from VATESI and the Swedish
International Project (SIP) met to discuss results of VATESI-SIP cooperation
in 1995-96, and a program for 1996-97. SIP coordinates the Swedish government's
assistance projects to improve nuclear safety in Lithuania. In 1995-96
Sweden allocated SKr77 million for improvements.
["Lithuanian, Swedish Nuclear Safety
Experts Meet in Vilnius," Baltic News Service Daily Report, 23 February 1996.]
2/22/96: IMPLEMENTATION OF EURATOM REGULATORY SYSTEM IN LITHUANIA DISCUSSED Officials from VATESI and Euratom held a three-day meeting in Vilnius to discuss
implementation of the Euratom regulatory system in Lithuania. The first
stage of this ECU2 million PHARE program is expected to be completed in April
1996. By then, Lithuania should have completed the establishment of a nuclear
energy licensing system, an updated system of inspection for Ignalina,
and a decommissioning plan for the plant. Preliminary estimates anticipate
that the Ignalina Closure Fund will need to obtain 2.4 billion litas by the year 2005-10.
["International Experts Plan Lithuanian Nuclear Safety Operations
In Vilnius," Baltic News Service Daily Report, 22 February 1996.]
2/10/96: AUTHORITIES CONFISCATE 100KG OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Authorities confiscated 100kg of radioactive material, probably uranium,
in Visaginas after a group of smugglers tried to sell it for
$50,000. Ignalina NPP Director Viktor Shevaldin reported that the material
was not connected with Ignalina NPP.
Sources: [1] "100 Kilos of Radioactive Material Seized in Lithuania,"
OMRI Daily Digest, No. 31, Part II, 13 February 1996. [2] "Izyato 100 kg radioaktivnykh materialov,"
Bisnis Baltiya, 13 February 1996, p.1.
2/5/96: ANONYMOUS LETTER DEMANDS CASH, THREATENS
SABOTAGE The Lithuanian president's office reportedly received an
anonymous letter from workers at Ignalina containing a demand that he pay
out personal savings or the workers would sabotage the plant during major
repairs. Ignalina Director Viktor Shevaldin later reported that he did not learn
about the incident until 4 March 1996, and that it was not considered a serious
concern.
["Anonymous Threat to Break Operations at Lithuanian
Nuclear Power Station Not Taken Serious," Baltic News Service Daily Report, 5
March 1996.]
2/2/96: IGNALINA PLANT NOT RESPONSIBLE
FOR RADIOACTIVE FALLOUT Lithuanian Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate (VATESI) Director
Povilas Vaisnys reported that the Ignalina plant has passed a security
inspection and was not responsible for the radioactive fallout that Norway
registered in January 1996.
["Lithuanian Nuclear Plant Gets Leak
All-Clear," Reuters, 2 February 19/96.]
1/25/96: IGNALINA SECURITY IMPROVEMENTS UNDER WAY Jan Nistad, Director of the Swedish International Project,
reported that the main entrance at Ignalina is undergoing security improvements
in accordance with a contract signed with Trax AB in December 1995.
[Ariane Sains, "Liability Worries Resolved, AMM to Ship Equipment
to Ignalina," Nucleonics Week, 25 January 1996, pp. 14-15.]
1/25/96: VATESI DIRECTOR DISCUSSES DECOMMISSIONING OPTION FOR
IGNALINA VATESI Director Povilas Vaisnys stated that his organization met recently
with Italian nuclear experts to discuss decommissioning options for the
two units at Ignalina. The Lithuanian government has asked for a shutdown
plan by the end of the century.
[Ariane Sains, "Liability Worries Resolved, ABB to Ship Equipment
to Ignalina," Nucleonics Week, 25 January 1996, pp. 14-15.]
12/21/95: LITHUANIA AND SWEDEN SIGN AGREEMENT FOR
IMPROVED PERSONNEL-ACCESS SECURITY The Lithuanian Ministry of Energy and the Swedish Agency
for Nuclear Power Station Safety signed an agreement providing for the transfer
of 300,000 litas worth of devices for improved personnel-access security
at Ignalina. Sweden purchased the security access system, consisting of
computerized, magnetic-strip identification cards, metal detectors, surveillance
cameras, and other devices, from the Swedish company TRAX, a division of
ABB Corporation. The Swedish government has allocated SKr4 million ($662 million) to improve security at Ignalina.
Sources: [1] "Swedes and Americans Join In Effort To Heighten Security
of Lithuania's Ignalina Atomic Power Station," Baltic News Service Daily Report,
21 December 1995 [2] "Sweden to Aid Lithuania in Increasing Security of Access
by Personnel to Ignalina Atomic Power Plant," Baltic News Service Daily Report,
20 December 1995.
12/4/95: IAEA REPORTS THAT NUCLEAR FUEL RODS ARE BEING
STORED SECURELY A recent IAEA mission to the Ignalina plant has reported
that nuclear fuel rods at the facility are being stored securely. Such
inspections are carried out four times a year to verify NPT treaty compliance.
The fuel supplies at Ignalina, over 10,000 fuel rods, account for
approximately 99% of all radioactive material in Lithuania.
["All Nuclear Fuel Rods At Lithuanian Atomic Power Plant
Accounted For," Baltic News Service Daily Report, 4 December 1995.]
11/25/95: CONSTRUCTION OF RADIATION MONITORING STATIONS STARTED Construction of automated radiation monitoring stations began in the cities of Turmantas, Visaginas, Rimse, and Gaide.
A total of eight gamma-ray spectroscopic stations, united into a single system, will be built in
towns around the Ignalina plant in order to better monitor radiation levels.
The stations will be constructed according to an agreement between the
Lithuanian Environmental Protection Ministry and the Danish Ministry of
Internal Affairs.
["Contemporary Gamma-Ray Monitoring
System Constructed Around Lithuanian Atomic Power Plant," Baltic News Service
Daily Report, 27 November 1995.]
11/22/95: LITHUANIAN PRESIDENT DISCUSSES CLOSURE OF IGNALINA Lithuanian President Brazauskas stated that Lithuania would most likely
wait to close its reactors until after Sweden had done so. This statement
came after the Swedish energy minister said that Swedish reactors could
not be shut down completely by the year 2010, as had been decided in a
referendum in 1980. In another interview in Sweden, Brazauskas said that
it would cost over Skr30 billion to close and replace the Ignalina
power plant, a sum which Lithuania cannot afford at present.
Sources: [1] Reuters, "Lithuanian Nuclear Plant To Stay;" in Baltic
News Service Daily Report, 22 November 1995. [2] Dagens Nyheter; in "Lithuania Cannot
Afford To Close Ignalina," FBIS-SOV-95-225, 21November 1995. [3] Ariane Sains, "Lithuanian president Says Ignalina
Won't Be Shut Soon," Nucleonics Week, 30 November 1995, pp.5-6.
11/21/95: EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT DELEGATION VISITS IGNALINA A European Parliament delegation for relations with Lithuania, Latvia,
and Estonia visited the Ignalina NPP and urged the Lithuanian government
to consider early closure of the plant. In addition, the delegation proposed
that the European Commission establish an action plan to provide
financial assistance to improve Ignalina plant safety and radioactive waste disposal,
as well as to eventually provide a replacement for the plant.
["EP Delegation Demands Ignalina Nuclear Power Station Closure,"
European Union Press Release, 23 November 1995.]
11/8/95: CHARGES AGAINST TERRORIST DROPPED After spending one year in a Swedish prison for threatening
to blow up Ignalina last November if he did not receive a payment of $8
million from the Swedish government, Lithuanian national Kestuis Mazuika
returned to Vilnius. The Lithuanian prosecutor general dropped charges
against Mazuika since he had already served time in a Swedish prison.
["Lithuanian Who Attempted To Blackmail Swedish Premier
Returns Home Wealthier But Unshaved," Baltic News Service Daily Report, 8
November 1995.]
11/95:VATTENFALL AB SIGNS CONTRACT FOR
FIRE PROTECTION SUPPLY FOR IGNALINA The Swedish utility Vattenfall AB signed a $1.16
million contract with Lithuanian to supply fire protection equipment for
Ignalina.
[Nuclear Energy Institute, Soviet
Plant Source Book, January 1996, p. 198.]
10/26/95: SWEDISH PROPOSAL TO BUILD A SAFE PLANT IN IGNALINA Swedish industry leaders reportedly stated that Sweden should build a new
reactor at the Ignalina site rather than spend money to decommission its
own 12 reactors.
[Ariane Sains, "Swedish Industry Opens Campaign to Avert
Nuclear Decommissioning," Nucleonics Week, 26 October 1995, pp. 4-5.]
9/28/95: LITHUANIA AGREES TO SHUT DOWN IGNALINA The Lithuanian government has reportedly made an initial decision to establish
a fund for decommissioning of the two reactors at Ignalina. The government
has also asked VATESI to have a detailed decommissioning plan ready by
the year 2000. Under a grant from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Lithuanian government agreed that it would not replace
the unit's fuel channels, meaning Ignalina-1 would have to be shut down
by 2005 and Ignalina-2 by 2010. (However, Ignalina-1 could be shut down
earlier if VATESI decides not to re-license it after 1998.)
[Ariane Sains, "Lithuania Eyes Fund to Finance Decommissioning
Ignalina in 2005," Nucleonics Week, 28 September 1995, p.10.]
9/6/95: SWEDISH ASSISTANCE FOR DISMANTLEMENT OF IGNALINA In addition to providing technical assistance for the dismantlement of
Ignalina, Sweden has already invested approximately $20 million, and another
$10 million has been earmarked for this year, for the prevention of small
accidents and nuclear theft. The Ministry of Energy is preparing for the
eventual decommissioning of the reactors with the possible establishment
of a special fund. Lithuanian officials estimate that it will cost approximately
$300 million to dismantle just one of the reactors.
["Litva ostanetsya bez mirnogo atoma, a russkiye bez raboty,"
Izvestiya, 6 September 1995, p. 3.]
9/4-22/95: IAEA OSART VISITS IGNALINA An IAEA Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) visited
Ignalina from 4 to 22 September and reported that the plant was carrying out many programs to
improve safety.
[Nuclear Energy Institute, Soviet
Plant Source Book, January 1996, p. 199.]
9/95: FULL-SCOPE SIMULATOR TO BE BUILT A full-scope simulator will reportedly be built
at Ignalina under a 31 May 1995 grant from the Nuclear Safety Account (administered
by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development) and the Lithuanian
Ministry of Energy. Ignalina is already operating one limited-scope
simulator that models the reactor thermohydraulics.
[Janet Wood, "The Simulator Explosion," Nuclear Engineering
International, September 1995, p.50.]
8-9/95: SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT TO BE COMPLETED
BY MID-1996 The August-September 1995 issue of Internationale
Zeitschrift fuer Kernenergie reported that a plant-specific Safety Analysis Report (SAR), involving
an in-depth safety assessment of Ignalina, is scheduled to be completed
by mid-1996. The SAR will provide the documentation for the licensing of
Ignalina by VATESI if Unit 1 is to be operated beyond 1998.
[Jurgis Vilemas and Detlev Reichenbach, Internationale
Zeitschrift fuer Kernenergie, August-September 1995, p.
531.] 8/18/95: GOVERNMENT CLAIMS THAT IGNALINA
IS SAFE The Lithuanian Energy Ministry
held a press conference to respond to a July 1995 DOE Office
of Intelligence report, which charged that Ignalina has one of the most
dangerous reactors in the world. The Lithuanian government claimed that
the report was outdated. Officials added that safety measures were planned,
at an estimated cost of $100 million, which would bring the plant into
accordance with Western safety standards.
["Wrap Up in Lithuania," Post-Soviet Nuclear & Defense
Monitor, 18 August 1995, p.13.] 7/25/95: DOE REPORT: IGNALINA ON 10 WORST
REACTORS LIST On 25 July 1995, the DOE Office of Intelligence issued a report in which both
Ignalina NPP reactors were included in a list of the 10 most dangerous reactors
in the world. On a DOE
scale of A to F, all ten units received a grade of D. After the report was
issued, DOE Office of Nuclear Energy Director Terry Lash
stated that the report is "only completely
accurate on the date it was produced." Information in the report on Ignalina dates back to
May 1993.
Sources: [1] "Reports of Soviet Reactor Dangers
Not Accurate Say DOE Officials," Post-Soviet Nuclear & Defense Monitor,
7 August 1995, p.4. [2] Vladimir Kozlovsky, "Ten Most Dangerous
Reactors," Segodnya, 27 July 1995, p.7.
7/95: CHANGE OF FUEL FOR RBMK REACTORS New fuel, designed by a Russian fuel manufacturer to improve safety, was
loaded into the reactors at Ignalina. The test results will be analyzed
in 1997.
[Nuclear Energy Institute, Soviet
Plant Source Book, January 1996, p. 195.] 6/95:IGNALINA NOT TO BE PRIVATIZED The Ignalina nuclear power plant will not be included in
the privatization of the Lithuanian State Power System (LSPS).
["Lithuania: No nuclear privatization," Nucleonics Week, 22
June 1995, p. 18.]
4/6/95: GOVERNMENT CONSIDERS REPLACEMENT OF NUCLEAR REACTORS According to Jan Balinski, Deputy Director General of the Lithuanian State
Power System, the Lithuanian government is considering the construction
of nuclear reactors to replace those at Ignalina. According to Mr. Balinski,
the decision will be influenced by Sweden's decision to permanently retire
all of its nuclear facilities (in accordance with a 1980 referendum).
[Ariane Sains, "Ignalina Replacement Could Be Nuclear, But
Sweden Is Key," Nucleonics Week, 6 April 1995, p. 13.]
3/17/95: BELARUS WILL SIGN THE VIENNA CONVENTION,
EXPEDITING SAFETY IMPROVEMENTS FOR IGNALINA As a result of meetings held in Stockholm between
representatives from Belarus and Sweden, Belarus has decided to sign the
Vienna Convention. The Convention regulates third party nuclear liability
among member states. Belarus had been reluctant to join the Convention
because it did not wish to be held financially responsible for the Chornobyl
accident. Western companies were reluctant to sign nuclear contracts in
Lithuania for fear of being held financially liable to Belarus in case
of an accident. The issue has delayed safety improvements at the Ignalina
facility. Sweden is assisting Lithuania's nuclear industry in the sphere
of nuclear safety.
Sources: [1] Ariane Sains, "Belarus Agreement
On Liability Clears Path For Ignalina Upgrades," Nucleonics Week,
23 March 1995,
p. 12. [2] Ariane Sains, "Belarus Nears
Liability Agreement To Clear Way For Ignalina Upgrade," Nucleonics Week,
3 March 1995, pp. 12-13.
3/95: UK TO GRANT ASSISTANCE TO IGNALINA Great Britain is to provide a $78,000 grant for training engineers at Ignalina and the Ministry of Energy.
["Lithuania/UK: Aid to Ignalina," Nucleonics Week, 30
March 1995, p. 18.]
2/23/95: PREMIER DISAGREES WITH SEIMAS OVER PRIVATIZING IGNALINA Prime Minister Adolfas Slezevicius said that he disagreed with the Seimas'
decision to oppose privatizing the Ignalina plant until 2000 at the earliest.
["Lithuanian Premier Press Conference," OMRI Daily Digest,
No. 40, Part II, 24 February 1995.]
2/1/95: MINISTER CONDEMNS RADIOACTIVE WASTE IMPORT Bronius Bradauskas, the Minister of Environmental Protection, today condemned
government offices that want to import radioactive waste from foreign countries.
[Radio Vilnius Network, 1 February 1995; in "Minister:
No Nuclear Waste Storage," FBIS-SOV-95-022, 1 February 1995.] 2/95: IAEA ORGANIZES A GROUP OF DONORS TO ASSIST LITHUANIA The IAEA organized a group of donor countries to assist Lithuania
with MPC&A upgrades at Ignalina. The IAEA, along with Sweden, Finland,
Germany, the United Kingdom, the United States, and South Korea, has formed
a committee to manage the Coordinated Technical Support Plan (CTSP).
[Sandia National Laboratory, "Protection and Surveillance
of Nuclear Materials in the Former Soviet Union," Hearings Before the Senate
Governmental Affairs Committee Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 29
March 1996.]
1/5/95: GOVERNMENT DECIDES NOT TO REPLACE PRESSURE TUBES The Lithuanian government has decided not to replace the pressure tubes
in the Ignalina reactors because the "operation of both units at the Ignalina
plant will not be prolonged beyond the time when their reactor channels
will have to be changed."[1] The European Bank of Reconstruction and Development's
Nuclear Safety Account has provided $8.75 million toward a safety analysis
at Ignalina. An additional $41.25 million is earmarked for safety upgrades,
if Ignalina complies with the following conditions: (1) The reactors will
not be operated past the time when the pressure tubes will need to be replaced
between 1998 and 2004; (2) the safety analysis must be finished by mid-1996;
and (3) VATESI will need to issue a new license for Unit 1 if it is determined
that the reactor should operate beyond 1998.[2] The shutdown deadline for Ignalina is set for between
1998 and 2004.[1]
Sources: [1] Nucleonics Week, 5 January 1995, p. 12. [2] Robert Ebel, Nuclear Energy Safety
Challenges in the Former Soviet Union (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic
International Studies, 1995), p. 54.
12/28/94: TWO MEN INVOLVED IN URANIUM SMUGGLING ARRESTED
Respublika reported that Lithuanian police arrested two
men in Kaunas and confiscated 8kg of uranium. Initial information indicated
that the nuclear material consisted of 5% enriched U-235 and, according
to Respublika, was probably related to the 1993 disappearance from Ignalina
of a fuel rod reportedly weighing 280kg.[1] A second source noted that the figure of 280kg was
unlikely, since the weight of UO2 in a fuel assembly is 114.5kg.[2] Nuclear
News also reported on this incident, but the details differed. Nuclear
News noted that a former Ignalina plant guard in possession of approximately 8 kg of UO2
pellets had been apprehended, but did not mention an accomplice. Nuclear News
reported a different enrichment amount also: referring to an initial analysis of the
material conducted by the Vilnius Physics Institute, the publication said that
the material was enriched to about 2%.[3] Ignalina uses fuel enriched to 2%
U-235.
Sources: [1] Baltic News Service, 29 December 1994; in "Officials
On Uranium Anti-Smuggling Efforts," FBIS-SOV-94-251, 29 December 1994. [2] Correspondence with Ukrainian Official, June 1995. [3]"Confiscated U May Be A Part Of A Lost Fuel Assembly," Nuclear
News, February 1995, p. 63.
12/7/94: GOVERNMENT STEPS UP SECURITY MEASURES AT IGNALINA On the advice of the US State Department, the Lithuanian
government has stepped up security measures at the Ignalina plant to defend
against a possible Chechen attack. Fears have been raised by Chechen President
Dudayev's call to attack Russian nuclear power plants. Despite Ignalina's
location, Gennadijus Negrivoda, Ignalina's Chief Engineer, said that the
threat must be taken seriously.
[Vilnius Radio, 8 December 1994; in "Ignalina Security
Increased After Chechen Threat," FBIS-SOV-94, 8 December 1994.]
11/24/94: GOVERNMENT DECIDES TO IMPROVE PHYSICAL PROTECTION
AT IGNALINA The government has decided to improve physical protection
in and around the Ignalina nuclear power station. Jan Nistad, Director
of Special Projects at the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate (SKI) stated
that the intensive physical protection program was initially suggested
six months ago by Director General Viktor Shevaldin, who had asked for
Western assistance in the project. Some work began nearly three months
ago. The first stage includes providing infrared binoculars and improved
communications equipment. The estimated cost for this is $137,000-$274,000.
More comprehensive measures will follow, including the installation of
a key-card system that will restrict access to the plant. Representatives
from the national police, the ministries of energy, environment, and defense,
VATESI, and Ignalina will work cooperatively on a number of other measures.
Lithuanian officials will also meet with representatives from the Swedish
police, civil defense organizations, and the military to improve emergency
response actions.
[Ariane Sains, "Lithuania Begins Security Upgrades After
Sabotage Scare at Ignalina," Nucleonics Week, 24 November 1994, pp. 2-3.]
11/22/94: COMMISSION ON IGNALINA SECURITY ESTABLISHED Baltic News Service reported that a special, nine-member commission on
Ignalina security has been established by the Lithuanian government. The
commission is headed by Energy Minister Algimantas Stasiukynas and includes Defense Minister Linas Linkevicius and representatives from the power
plant, communications, environmental protection, interior affairs and national
security departments.
[BNS (Tallinn), 22 November 1994; in "Ignalina Antiterrorist
Measures Please Observers," FBIS-SOV-94, 23 November 1994, pp. 69-70.]
11/21/94:INSTALLATION OF NEW COMPUTERIZED ACCOUNTING
SYSTEM Lithuania has begun to install a new computerized accounting
system and will institute changes in personnel routines in an effort to
prevent additional fresh fuel elements from disappearing from Ignalina.
A fresh fuel element containing 200kg of uranium disappeared from Ignalina-1
in February 1993 and still has not been recovered. An inventory was conducted
after Lithuania signed a safeguards agreement and it was at that point
that the missing fuel was noticed. Lithuania sent a special report to the
IAEA notifying them of the missing fuel. Povilas Vaisnys, Director of
VATESI, stated that this disappearance is the direct result of "a bad system
of accounting...[and] it has been very difficult to count all these elements
precisely." The two RBMKs at Ignalina can be refueled without shutting
down the reactors, which means that large stores of fresh fuel are always
kept on hand. Additionally, the fresh fuel assemblies, until recently,
were not assigned specific locations and could be moved at will; this has
made them nearly impossible to keep track of. Under the new system, one
person will be solely responsible for tracking the fuel during each shift
and the fuel assemblies must be kept in specific locations. Each fuel element
can now be tracked by computers.
Sources: [1] Ariane Sains, "Lithuania Hopes New Measures Prevent Loss
of Any More Fuel," Nucleonics Week, 21November 1994, p. 15. [2] Correspondence with Ukrainian official, June 1995.
11/17/94:CANADA AND LITHUANIA COMPLETE
NEGOTIATIONS Canada and Lithuania completed negotiations on an
agreement on the export of technology and equipment for safety improvements
at the Ignalina power plant.
[News Release, Department of Foreign
Affairs and International Trade, Ottawa, 17/11; in PPNN Newsbrief, "Canada
has concluded...," Fourth Quarter 1994, p. 9.]
11/16/94: NO BOMB FOUND AT IGNALINA AFTER TERRORIST THREATS The anti-terrorist team called in after terrorists threatened to blow up the Ignalina nuclear power plant determined that
there was no bomb or other acts of sabotage on the premises. The security
alert occurred on in early November when both Swedish authorities and the German environment ministry contacted
the authorities at Ignalina regarding potential terrorist attacks.[1] Ignalina is scheduled to be reconnected to Lithuania's
power grid. Ignalina Chief Engineer Gennadijus Negrivoda said that the
second unit's output will be raised first to 750MW and, by the end of 17
November, to 1,300MW.[2,3] Lithuanian Prime Minister Adolfas Slezevicius
has claimed that the temporary shut-down will cost approximately $10 million
because of the need to resort to alternative energy sources.[4] The Swedish and Lithuanian security experts who searched
Ignalina following a terrorist threat stated that there were a number of
measures that should be taken at the nuclear power plant to improve security.
Their report also provided suggestions on how to perform routine security
checks without halting activity at the plant.[3]
Sources: [1] Andrew Huddart, "Baltic N-Plant gets all clear after
bomb threat," Reuters, 16 November 1994. [2] Baltic News Service, 16 November 1994; in "Work
At Ignalina Nuclear Plant To Resume," FBIS-SOV-94-222. [3] "All Clear for Lithuanian
N-Plant," Executive News Service, 17 November 1994. [4] "Experts Ending Search of Lithuanian N-Plant," NucNet, 19
November 1994.
11/15/94: NO INDICATIONS OF SABOTAGE FOUND IN UNIT 1 Lithuanian and Swedish inspectors found no indications that Ignalina's
Unit 1 had been sabotaged and an examination of Unit 2 was begun. Both reactors were shut down for repairs and
inspection on 14 November 1994. The older Unit 1 had been brought back on line on 11 November
1994 after a week of repairs. It will begin providing
electricity to the country by 25 November at the earliest.[1] Electricity shortages
were avoided by increased output from the Elektrenai power station, located
50km outside of Vilnius, and imports of electricity from Belarus, Estonia,
and Russia.[2]
Sources: [1] Baltic News Service, 15 November 1994; in "Officials
Say No Bombs Found At Nuclear Plant," FBIS-SOV-94-222. [2] ITAR-TASS,
15 November 1994; in "Plan
To Blow Up Plant Denied," FBIS-SOV-94-220, 15 November 1994.
11/11/94: IGNALINA ALARMED BY TWO TERRORIST THREATS Sweden and Germany alerted Lithuanian authorities to two separate
plans for bomb attacks on Ignalina NPP. As reported by Nucleonics Week,
on 4 November 1994, a Lithuanian man hand-delivered a letter to the Swedish
prime minister's office containing a threat to blow up Ignalina NPP if his
demand for SKr8 million ($1.1 million) was not met. The man promised to
return to the office on 7 November to discuss the letter, at which time he was
arrested by Swedish Security Police.[1] The man said he was sent by a secret
terrorist organization, "NUC-41 W," that had collaborators inside Ignalina
who claimed responsibility for the 1993 disappearance of a nuclear fuel
assembly.[2] It was later reported that the man in question had already
been charged, that an unnamed party or parties were possibly seeking a pardon
for him, and that if no pardon was granted, Ignalina may be targeted for attack
once more.[3] The man was later identified as Kestutis Mazuika, a resident of
Alytus.[4,5] The second threat, announced by Germany's
Ministry for Environmental Protection and Nuclear Safety, involves a bomb attack on Ignalina scheduled to occur on November
15.[4,6] This threat was linked to Vilnius resident Georgiy
Dekanidze, whose son, Boris Dekanidze, a Lithuanian
Mafia boss (the reputed head
of the "Vilnius Brigade"), was recently sentenced to death.[4,6,7] On 15 November 1994, Georgiy
Dekanidze
appeared on the Litpollinter television channel and denied threatening
to blow up Ignalina.[7] In response to the threats, the Lithuanian
Prime Minister ordered the shutdown of the two units at Ignalina to permit
inspections by an anti-terrorist group, which included four
Swedish specialists and three individuals from the Lithuanian nuclear regulatory
body, VATESI.[8] Following
the threat, Lithuanian authorities launched a program to improve plant
security. Their efforts included the procurement of new equipment, the
creation of working groups to focus on security improvement, and the introduction
of a computerized accounting system for fuel.[9] Victor Shevaldin, Director General of Ignalina, stated that
he is aware of the need to improve the physical security of the nuclear
power plant. He also mentioned that Sweden was in the position to help
Lithuania bring Ignalina up to international standards.[10]
Sources: [1] Ariane Sains, "Swedish Police Detain Man who
Threatened to Blow up Ignalina," Nucleonics Week, 10 November
1994, pp. 7-8. [2] Matthias Lufkens, Liberation (Paris), 17 November
1994. [3] "On 7 November...," PPNN Newsbrief, Fourth Quarter
1994, pp. 4-5. [4] ITAR-TASS, 12 November 1994; in "Plant
Threatened By Crime Families," FBIS-SOV-94-219. [5] Robert Ebel, Nuclear Energy Safety
Challenges in the Former Soviet Union (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic
International Studies, 1995), p. 54. [5] "Security Tightened At Lithuanian Nuclear Power Plant,"
RFE/RL Daily Report, 15 November 1994, No. 217. [6] ITAR-TASS,
15 November 1994; in "Plan
To Blow Up Plant Denied," FBIS-SOV-94-220. [7] "Lithuanian N-Plant Shut Down after
Terrorist Threat," NucNet, 15 November 1994. [8] Nuclear Energy Institute, Soviet Plant Source
Book, January 1996, p. 197. [9] "Lithuanian N-Unit Restarts," NucNet, 17 November 1994.
10/28/94:GOVERNMENT RAISES PRICE OF ELECTRICITY The Lithuanian government decided to raise the price
of electricity in an effort to secure additional income for future investments
such as safety upgrades for the Ignalina nuclear power station. This price
increase marks a doubling of energy prices this year and is another move
toward market pricing.
[Executive News Service, 28 October 1994.]
10/12/94:EBRD OFFICIAL VISITS IGNALINA Timothy Walker -- Chairman of the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development Nuclear Safety Account, Deputy Secretary
of the British Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), and head of the
DTI Atomic Energy Division -- visited the Ignalina power station. Walker
was in Lithuania on a four-day visit to ascertain the status of a
ECU32 million Nuclear Safety Fund grant that had been earmarked for plant safety
improvements.
[Vilnius Radio Network, 12 October 1994; in "UK Official To Inspect Nuclear Power
Station,"FBIS-SOV-94-198.]
10/94:SAFETY IMPROVEMENTS TO BE REVIEWED Using about $26,000 from the EBRD's Nuclear Safety
Account grant, the Russian research institute NIKIET was scheduled to review
safety improvements at Ignalina.
[Nuclear Energy Institute, Soviet
Plant Source Book, January 1996, p. 195.]
10/94: IAEA IDENTIFIES $19 MILLION FOR
ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS The IAEA identified $19 million from donor countries
such as the United States, Sweden, and Japan for implementation of assistance
programs in the nuclear sphere in Armenia, Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, and Uzbekistan. The programs were initiated
in 1993 by the IAEA and the United Nations Development Program.
["Nuclear Safety," GAO/RCED-96-4, p.
30.]
4/94: BRITISH COMPANIES WIN CONTRACT FROM
EBRD Two British companies won an ECU1.9 million ($2.4
million) contract to oversee implementation of the February 1994 Nuclear Safety
Account Grant from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(EBRD) for improvements at Ignalina.
[Nuclear Energy Institute, Soviet
Plant Source Book, January 1996, p. 189.]
3/94: PLANS TO BUILD THIRD REACTOR AT IGNALINA Lithuanian Energy Minister Algimantas Stasiukynas and Belarusian representatives
expressed interest in a plan to build a third reactor at Lithuania's Ignalina
nuclear power plant. Jan Nistad, Director of Special Projects for the Swedish
Nuclear Power Inspectorate (SKI) stated that construction of a third reactor
would cost about $2 billion.
[Ariane Sains, "Baltic States and Belarus Eye Building Third
Ignalina Unit," Nucleonics Week, 31 March 1994, p. 14.]
2/10/94:LITHUANIA AND EBRD SIGN GRANT
AGREEMENT FOR IGNALINA'S SAFETY The Nuclear Safety Account (NSA) of the European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and Lithuania signed a grant
agreement providing ECU33 million ($38.4 million) for the implementation
of the Safety Improvement Program for the Ignalina nuclear power plant.
The NSA is providing an additional ECU7.3 million to fund the safety analysis.
On 17 December 1993, contributors to the NSA approved the EBRD
grant. The Safety Improvement Program will fund project management and
engineering experts, and provide equipment for operational safety improvements.
Lithuania had to agree to three conditions in order to receive the loan.
The first condition stated that Ignalina will not operate beyond the time
that retubing is necessary, probably around 2000. The second condition
stated that by the end of 1995, a safety analysis funded by the Nuclear
Safety Account must be performed. The third condition is that Unit 1 will
not operate beyond 1998 depending on Lithuania's energy situation and the
cost of future upgrades, and if so, VATESI must issue a new license for
the unit.
Sources: [1] Robert Ebel, Nuclear Energy Safety
Challenges in the Former Soviet Union (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic
International Studies, 1995), p.54. [2] "Ignalina Wins EBRD Upgrading Funds," Nuclear Engineering
International, March 1994, p. 2. [3] "EBRD Expert Sees Ignalina-1
Shutdown Feasible For Lithuanian," Nucleonics Week, pp. 14-15, 22
September 1994.
1994: SWEDISH COMPANY HELPS TO DEAL WITH PROBLEM OF SPENT FUEL Lithuania, with the assistance of the Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management
Co. (SKB), has undertaken the project "Overall Plan for Radioactive Waste
Management" to deal with the problem of spent fuel at Ignalina.
["World Status Report 1994," Nuclear Europe Worldscan,
July-August 1995, pp. 68-9.] 1994:SWEDEN INCREASES CONTRIBUTION TO
IGNALINA SAFETY PROJECT In early 1994 Sweden increased its contribution to
the Ignalina safety project by $2.1 million and doubled its share in the
EBRD Nuclear Safety Account. In 1993-94 Sweden contributed $7.5 million
in assistance to VATESI and Ignalina.
[Nuclear Energy Institute, Soviet
Plant Source Book, January 1996, p. 194.] 12/93:CONTRACT SIGNED FOR DRY STORAGE OF SPENT NUCLEAR
FUEL The Lithuanian government signed a contract with the German company Gesellschaft
fuer Nuklear Behalter (GNB) for 60 CASTOR casks for dry storage of spent
nuclear fuel. The first delivery is expected in October 1996, with four casks to
be delivered each month thereafter.
[Nuclear Energy Institute, Soviet
Plant Source Book, January 1996, p. 194.] 12/93:IAEA AND UNDP CARRIED OUT A FACT-FINDING
MISSION The IAEA and the United Nations Development Program
carried out a fact-finding mission in Lithuania as part of the program
to improve radiation protection, nuclear safety, and waste management infrastructures
in countries of the former Soviet Union.
[IAEA Department of Technical Co-Operation, "Radiation Protection and Waste Management
Services Upgrading (LIT/9/002)," http://www.iaea.or.at/programs/tc/schedc.95/lit9002.htm,
2/21/96.] 11/93: VATTENFALL AB SUPPLIES IGNALINA
WITH EQUIPMENT The Swedish utility Vattenfall AB has supplied Ignalina
with $125,00 worth of emergency gear and fire protection equipment.
[Nuclear Energy Institute, Soviet
Plant Source Book, January 1996,p. 197.] 10/18/93: LITHUANIAN ENERGY MINISTER HOLDS NEGOTIATIONS ON THE
CONSTRUCTION OF TWO REACTORS An anonymous source revealed that the Lithuanian Energy Minister held negotiations
with Westinghouse on the construction of two AP-600 reactors. The work reportedly
would begin by 1998, at which time one of the reactors now in operation
at Ignalina may be closed.
[SocEco Agency, 18 October 1993.]
10/13-14/93: NUCLEAR AND RADIATION
SAFETY ADVISORY COMMITTEE TAKES MEASURES TO ENSURE SAFETY AT IGNALINA The Nuclear and Radiation Safety Advisory
Committee met for the first time and appointed an independent group to
review safety at Ignalina; specifically: 1) whether Unit 2 should have
operated through 1993 despite leaks, 2) the replacement of some valves,
and 3) the possibility that a fuel assembly was missing in February 1993.
Sources: [1] Nuclear Energy Institute, Soviet
Plant Source Book, January 1996, p. 192. [2] International Defense Review, 2 November 1993; in Philip Sheppard, ed., "Lithuania's Safety Committee - A Who's
Who," NucNet News, No. 393, 3 November 1993.] 5/93: NUCLEAR RADIATION SAFETY ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED The Lithuanian government issued a
decree for the establishment of the Nuclear Radiation Safety Advisory Committee,
which will aid VATESI in three areas: 1) developing standard rules for current
energy regulation, 2) developing standard rules for national legislation,
3) exercising regulatory control over Ignalina's safe operation. The committee
is composed of advisors from the United Kingdom, Germany, Sweden, Finland,
Ukraine, Russia, and Lithuania.
[Nuclear Energy Institute, Soviet
Plant Source Book, January 1996, p. 192.]
3/10/93: FUEL ASSEMBLY STOLEN
FROM IGNALINA A 7m long fuel assembly of low-enriched U-238, weighing
over 200kg, was stolen from the Ignalina nuclear power plant. It is believed
that the assembly contains approximately 2kg of strontium and 3-5kg of
plutonium. According to one expert, the above amount of strontium and plutonium
would only be found in a spent fuel assembly. The assembly would be highly
radioactive and require special equipment to dismantle it. Nuclear experts
at the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy believe that the
assembly was stolen by a plant employee. The employee acted in collusion
with the security guards, since the assembly emits high level of radioactivity
and reportedly could not have been transported past the exit unnoticed.
Sources: [1] Correspondence with Ukrainian nuclear engineer, June
1995. [2] "Krast uran ne nuzhno, on togo ne stoit," Segodnya,
p. 7.
2/1-12/93:SECOND IAEA ASSET MISSION
REVIEWS THE IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS OF PREVIOUS RECOMMENDATION A second IAEA ASSET (Assessment of Safety Significant
Events Team) mission reviewed the implementation of recommendations
made by the first team's visit in November 1989. In addition, the team reviewed
the 173 events that were reported between January 1989 and October 1992, of which 140
were relevant to plant safety. Three events were classified as Level 2
on the International Nuclear Event Scale (INES), 14 as Level 1, and the
remaining as Level 0.
[Nuclear Energy Institute, Soviet
Plant Source Book, January 1996, p. 199.]
1/93: SKB RECOMMENDS FOUR COMPANIES TO BUILD
ISFS The Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company (SKB) recommended
to representatives from Lithuania's Energy Institute, Ministry of Energy,
regulatory bodies, and Ignalina NPP that four of the nine companies
applying for the contract to build an Interim Spent Fuel Storage (ISFS)
facility at Ignalina be given further consideration.
[Bo Gustafsson, "Preparing A Dry Storage Solution For Ignalina,"
Nuclear Engineering International,
1994, pp. 6-7.]
1993: PREPARED PLAN TO IMPLEMENT SAFETY IMPROVEMENT
PROGRAM Ignalina NPP and the Ministry of Energy, with
the assistance of Western experts, have prepared a plan to implement a
Safety Improvement Program (SIP). VATESI approved the plan, which will
focus on improvements to enhance the safety of the plant and reduce the
radiation exposure of the operating personnel. Ignalina plans to invest $5 million for the
SIP over 1993 and 1994. In addition, under a grant from
the Nuclear Safety Account administered by the EBRD, $36 million was earmarked
for the SIP.
Sources: [1] Jurgis Vilemas and Detlev Reichenbach, Internationale
Zeitschrift fuer Kernenergie, August-September 1995, p.
530. [2] Prof. Jurgis Vilemas, "Nuclear Energy in Lithuania: Present
Status and Hopes for Future," paper presented at Financial Times
conference The Nuclear Industry into the 21st Century? London,
14-15 September 1994.
1993: 100KG OF URANIUM DISAPPEARED FROM IGNALINA A fuel assembly containing some 100kg of uranium reportedly
disappeared from the Ignalina plant.
[Baltic News Service, 29 December 1994; in "Officials
On Uranium Anti-Smuggling Efforts," FBIS-SOV-94-251, 29 December 1994.]
10/92: LITHUANIA SIGNS AN AGREEMENT WITH SWEDISH NUCLEAR FUEL WASTE
MANAGEMENT COMPANY The Lithuanian Ministry of Energy signed an agreement with the Swedish
Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company (SKB) in which the company agrees
to help Lithuanian authorities study the envisaged shortage of spent nuclear
fuel storage facilities at Ignalina and to help select an Interim Spent
Fuel Storage (ISFS) plan. It is estimated that Unit 1 and Unit 2 will run
out of liquid storage capacity in early 1995 and 1996 respectively. Dry
storage is therefore regarded as the only possible solution.
[Bo Gustafsson, "Preparing A Dry Storage Solution For Ignalina," Nuclear
Engineering International,
1994, pp. 6-7.]
4/9/92: IGNALINA RUNS OUT OF STORAGE SPACE FOR ITS SPENT FUEL The Ignalina NPP is reportedly running out of storage space for its spent
fuel, and it is questionable whether Russia will honor past pledges to
accept the fuel. Lithuania and Russia have concluded an agreement whereby
Russia will continue to supply nuclear fuel and nuclear repair services
to the Ignalina reactors. Lithuania has granted Lithuanian citizenship
to the plant's operators, 97 percent of whom are Russian.
Sources: [1] Ariane Sains,"Building Third
Reactor Could Permit Closing Ignalina-1, Minister Says," Nucleonics Week,
9 April 1992, p. 7. [2] "MAPI Division
Into Government and Commercial Units Proceeding," Nucleonics Week, 16
January 1992,
p. 12.
1/92: IGNALINA PLANT WORKER ARRESTED
FOR SABOTAGE A technician at Ignalina NPP, Oleg Savchuk, tried to sabotage the nuclear reactor's operations
by introducing a virus into the computer system. Almost at the same time,
there was a breakdown in the cooling system of the first reactor, but no
radiation was released. Officials of the Ministry for the Power Industry
denied that there was a link between the two incidents.[1,2] Savchuk worked
to develop the computer at Ignalina, the Titan ICS. The computer system
went into operation three years after the NPP itself came on line, despite
the fact that the system was neither perfected nor adapted to the problems
of at Ignalina. Specialists reportedly signed off on it due to pressure
exerted by the management.[3]
Sources: [1] Izvestiya, 4 February
1992, p. 8; in "Details of Sabotage Attempt at Lithuania's Ignalina AES,"
JPRS: Environmental Issues, 3 March 1992, pp. 65-66. [2] Baltfax, 31 January 1992; in
"Nuclear Station Shuts Down Reactors," FBIS: Central Eurasia, 3 February
1992, pp. 88-89. [3] Literaturnaya gazeta,
23 June 1992, p. 12; in JPRS: Environmental Issues, 7 July 1992, pp. 66-69.
{Entered 8/18/97 TR}
1992: SWEDISH-LITHUANIAN PROGRAM OF COOPERATION
BEGAN The Swedish and Lithuanian governments began a program of
cooperation to improve nuclear materials control and physical protection
at Ignalina with a budget of $10 million/year through 1997-98.
[Diana Medeliene, "We Are Working Together With VATESI
and INPP in Many Areas to Improve Safety," Energy News, No. 2, August
1995, pp.
19-20.]
1992: PROJECT TO EXAMINE FUEL CHANNELS
LAUNCHED A project to examine Ignalina's fuel channels was
launched according to an agreement between Sweden and Lithuania.
[Nuclear Energy Institute, Soviet
Plant Source Book, January 1996, p. 198.]
1991-92: SWEDISH AID FOR IGNALINA AND VATESI Sweden spent $6 million in assistance for Ignalina
and $4 million for VATESI.
[Nuclear Energy Institute, Soviet
Plant Source Book, January 1996, p. 194.]
5/4/91: POOR SAFETY CONDITIONS AT IGNALINA Instead of disassembling a fuel assembly imitator
while performing start-up alignment work, workers disassembled a real spent
fuel rod assembly. Three workers were exposed to radiation at levels higher
than the allowed maximum.
[Vladimir Kuznetsov, Segodnya, 23 September 1993, p. 6; in JPRS-TND-93-026, "Dangerous Conditions At Russia's Nuclear
Facilities Detailed," 24 November 1993, pp. 52-55.]
11/20-12/1/89: FIRST IAEA ASSET REVIEW AT IGNALINA The first IAEA ASSET (Assessment of Safety Significant
Events Team) review was conducted at Ignalina. The team reviewed the plant
operating history and incident-prevention programs. Ignalina's records
reported 40 incidents at the plant in both 1987 and 1988. From January to
October 1989,
there were only four incidents.
[Nuclear Energy Institute, Soviet
Plant Source Book, January 1996, p. 199.]
