11/6/97: STORAGE FACILITY TO COST $5 MILLION Lithuanian government power industry consultant Gediminas Vaiciunas announced
at a press conference that the Lithuanian government has decided to construct
a storage facility for spent nuclear fuel at Ignalina. The cost of
the facility will be $5 million.[1] The Lithuanian government will
begin to take bids from private construction firms to build the storage
facility. The site will be 2.1 hectares in size and will enclose 72 hermetically
sealed containers able to hold spent nuclear fuel for approximately 50
years.[2] The storage facility is scheduled to be constructed by
the end of 1998.[1]
[1] "Business Report," Interfax, 10 November 1997; in "Interfax
Business Report," FBIS-SOV-97-311. [2] ELTA, 6 November 1997; in "Spent Nuclear Fuel To Be Deposited
For Maximum 50 Years," FBIS-SOV-97-310. [entered 2/2/98 djw]
11/97: IGNALINA PHYSICAL SECURITY
UPGRADED The enhancement of physical protection
systems at the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant was completed in August 1996
with the assistance of the United States and Sweden. Physical protection
improvements focused on four main areas: vehicle portals, a central alarm
station, communications systems, and training. A vehicle portal was installed,
including a vehicle entrapment grating, inspection pits, video surveillance
equipment, and a renovated building for personnel. Primary access points
were equipped with a new access control system which included magnetic
card readers and keypads, magnetic door locks, and request-to-exist switches.
The Central Alarm Station (CAS) was fortified by replacing the main entrance
door, reinforcing the windows, and controlling entry into the building.
Interior and exterior security sensors, and fire and safety sensors are
electronically connected to the CAS. Upgraded communication equipment include
a trunked communication system, which serves as the backbone for an expanded
communications network linking Ignalina's guard force with six other operational
units: the fire brigade, perimeter patrol, external response force, local police,
internal security, and emergency response unit. The Ignalina Nuclear Power
Plant guard force was provided with hand-held radios. In January 1996, 42 participants from the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant, government
ministries, and local law enforcement agencies completed physical protection
training courses provided by the United States Department of Energy.
[US Department of Energy, Office of
Arms Control and Nonproliferation, "Improving Physical Security at the
Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant, Visaginas, Lithuania," November 1997.]{entered
11/30/98 NK/FW}
11/97: KUTAS SPEAKS ON UNIT 1 SAFETY In an interview
with the Lithuanian journal Energy News, VATESI head Saulius
Kutas stated that VATESI needs to increase its efforts in 1998 to improve
safety at Unit 1. VATESI evaluated the system according to the Single
Failure principle, which guarantees that a protection system remain functional
even in the event of a breakdown in its circuits. The operation of
one safety protection system should also not disrupt the operation of another
protection system. Kutas said that one protection system will be
upgraded in 1998 and that five more will be installed.
[ Diana Medeliene, "VATESI Solves Important
Tasks Jointly With Foreign Colleagues," Energy News, http://www.iae.lt/ic/EnNews/10_97.htm,
No. 10, 1997.] {entered 2/15/98 djw}
10/29/97: COUNCIL OF GOVERNORS CREATED Acting on an IAEA suggestion to improve the efficiency of Ignalina management,
the Lithuanian government approved a decision to form the Council of Governors
on 29 October 1997. The council will consist of nine members: three
from parliament, three from the government, two nuclear experts, and one
municipal representative. The council will act as a mediator among
the plant, government, and parliament and will assist in resolving various
issues. The council will also make recommendations to the government
regarding the appointment or dismissal of Ignalina's General Director.
[Baltic News Service, 30 October 1997; in "Lithuanian
Nuclear Station Management Made Accountable," FBIS-SOV-97-303.] {entered
2/2/98 djw}
10/9/97: VATESI FORMALLY REQUESTS ONE YEAR EXTENSION FOR IGNALINA 1
LICENSE VATESI Director Saulius Kutas has formally requested that the Nuclear Safety
Account (NSA) grant a one-year extension for licensing Unit 1 of the Ignalina
nuclear power plant. Kutas told the NSA donors that he would like
to complete the licensing review by May 1999. VATESI blames the need
for the extension on a year-long delay of a safety study on which the licensing
is to be based. Additionally, a second bilateral program of safety
improvements with Sweden will not be completed until the end of 1998.
According to an unnamed source, the NSA representatives were "not very
happy" with Kutas' request and suggested that VATESI speed up the procedure.
No agreement has been reached with VATESI on whether the extension would
be granted.
[Arian Sains, "Lithuanian Regulator Tells NSA Ignalina Licensing
To Take a Year," Nucleonics Week, 9 October 1997, p. 15.] {entered 2/3/98
djw}
10/8/97: LITHUANIAN PRESIDENT DEEMS SHUTDOWN OF IGNALINA TOO EXPENSIVE Lithuanian President Algirdas Brazauskas responded to safety questions
by European officials at an EU-Lithuanian joint parliamentary committee
by saying that Ignalina plans to get an international license for Unit
1 now that reconstruction projects have raised the reactor's safety levels
to international standards. He stated that shutting down the reactor
anytime soon would not be an option since the shutdown cost, as high as
$500 million, is more than Lithuania can afford.
["Lithuania Cannot Afford Shutting Down A Nuclear Plant,
Brazauskas Comments," Elta, online edition, http://elta.elta.lt/txt/news.txt,
8 October 1997.] {entered 10/17/97 djw}
9/26/97: UNIT 1 RESTARTED; UNIT 2 WILL BE
CLOSED FOR MAINTENANCE Nearly a week after a coolant failure forced it to
close, Ignalina's Unit 1 was restarted and is operating at a capacity of
650 MWe. The reactor should be operating at its full capacity of
1300 MWe within a week. At that point, Ignalina's Unit 2 will be
shut down for a three-month scheduled maintenance period. According
to Ignalina Director Viktor Shelvadin, repairs on Unit 2 should be completed
by January 1998.
[Baltic News Service, 30 September
1997; in "Second Ignalina Reactor To Be Shut For Repairs," FBIS-SOV-97-273.]
{entered 10/10/97 djw}
9/21/97: UNIT 1 FAILS TO RESTART FOLLOWING SRG
REVIEW After a scheduled six-month maintenance period, Ignalina's
Unit 1 was reconnected to the power grid, only to be forced to close hours
later after above-normal cooling tube temperatures were registered.[1,3]
VATESI gave permission to restart the reactor following a safety review
by the Safety Review Group (SRG) and the replacement of ten fuel channels
closest to the core.[2,3] The decision to install fresh fuel channels
angered some EBRD representatives who felt that the fuel channel replacement
was an extension of the reactor's life, and therefore a violation of the
EBRD safety improvement grant agreement. However, international nuclear
safety experts determined that this fuel channel replacement was a wise
decision for an older RBMK model such as Ignalina's Unit 1. VATESI
director Saulius Kutas stated that although ten fuel channels were replaced,
nothing had been done to extend the reactor's life.[3] The safety
experts have conceded that up to ten fuel channels may be replaced each
year as part of routine plant maintenance. The NSA donors have accepted
that this limited replacement does not violate their agreement on life
extension of the plant.[4] Consultants
from the Vilnius-based Information Technology Institute (ITI) had completed
a safety review of Unit 1 "in record time" and agreed that it could be
put online before the end of September 1997.[2] Unnamed sources said
that the consultants rushed to restart Unit 1 before the 24-25 September
meeting of NSA donors in London in order to demonstrate that Lithuania
could run the reactor "in an approved Western manner." Further funding
for safety improvements are contingent on support from the NSA.[3]
The ITI consultants analyzed 21 possible safety flaws, but only one potential
flaw in the control and protection system was discovered. SRG and
VATESI officials agreed that the solution could be postponed until the
next scheduled maintenance period in 1998.[2]
Sources: [1] "Lithuanian Ignalina 1st Nuclear
Reactor Restarting Put Off," Baltic News Service, 24 September 1997. [2] Ariane Sains, "Ignalina Safety
Analyses Done, So Unit 1 May Restart Shortly," Nucleonics Week,
18 September 1997, p. 6. [3] Ariane Sains, "With 10 New Fuel
Channels, Lithuania's Ignalina-1 Restarts," Nucleonics Week, 25
September 1997, pp. 13-14. [4] Ariane Sains, "Lithuanian Regulator
Tells NSA Ignalina Licensing To Take a Year," Nucleonics Week, 9
October 1997, p. 15. {entered 10/10/97, updated 2/ djw}
9/17/97: SMOKE FROM PUMPS
SETS OFF FIRE ALARMS Fire alarms were activated during a check of condensation
pumps in an inoperational turbine at the Ignalina plant.[1] Chief
engineer Gennadijus Negrivoda stated that smoke caused by a lack of lubrication
in one of the pumps set off the alarms. After a fire department inspection
revealed no flames or any more smoke, the danger of fire was called off.[2]
The event had no effect on plant operations and the radiation levels remain
normal.[1]
Sources: [1] Radio Vilnius Network, 17 September
1997; in "Fire Alarm Activated at Nuclear Plant, No Damage," FBIS-SOV-97-261,
18 September 1997. [2] Baltic News Service, 18 September
1997; in "Damaged Turbine Sets Off Fire Alarm at Ignalina Power Plant,"
FBIS-SOV-97-261, 18 September 1997. {entered 9/27/97 djw}
9/15/97: LITHUANIAN PRESIDENT VISITS IGNALINA Lithuanian President Algirdas Brazauskas visited
Ignalina to meet with Director Viktor Shevaldin and other plant managers
to discuss plant safety. Brazauskas said that safety at Ignalina
has moved significantly forward and that all safety improvements requirement
by international experts will likely be fulfilled by the end of 1998.
Shevaldin stated that talks will begin on an international license for
Unit 2 following a November 1997 overhaul.
[ELTA, 15 September 1997; in "President
Brazauskas Visits Ignalina Nuclear Plant," FBIS-SOV-97-259, 16 September
1997.] {entered 9/27/97 djw}
8/5/97: CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS CATCH ON FIRE Construction materials sitting in the unused third
power unit at Ignalina caught fire and burned for approximately 20 minutes
before they were extinguished. A plant manager stated that the fire caused
no damage to the two operational reactor units nor posed any danger to
the plant's employees. The cause of the fire remains under investigation.
[Radio Vilnius Network, 6 August
1997; in "Ignalina Nuclear power Plant Construction Waste Catches Fire,"
FBIS-SOV-97-218.] {entered 8/11/97 djw}
7/22/97: GNB WINS CONTRACT TO SUPPLY CASKS; AECL RECEIVES LETTER OF
INTENT Gesellschaft fuer Nuklear-Behaelter (GNB) announced that they signed a
$10 million contract to supply 40 Constor RBMK dry spent fuel casks to
Ignalina power plant between March 1999 and 2001. GNB has already delivered
20 Castor casks. Developed together with the Central Boiler and Turbine
Institute (ZKTI) in St. Petersburg and designed specifically to store RBMK
fuel, the Constor is less expensive than GNB's original Castor cask design.
The GNB contract was complicated when the Lithuanian government decided
to award GNB's main competitor, Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. (AECL), a
letter of intent allowing AECL to sell its Macstor dry storage system to
Ignalina once GNB delivers its 40 casks. The letter of intent was offered
to AECL following a 3-3 deadlock by the six-member selection committee
over which firm to select. On 3 April 1997 Swedish International Project
(SIP) director Jan Nistad stated in a letter to the Lithuanian Minister
of the Economy Vineus Babilius that both SIP and its Swedish consultant
SKB recommended for GNB to construct 40 to 50 casks before conducting further
contract negotiations while AECL remains "on standby." According
to NuclearFuel, the bidding process between GNB and AECL involved
bitter charges of slander and political favors. SIP and German officials
cited political reasons for the decision to offer the letter of intent,
charging that AECL and the Canadian government offered to support Lithuania's
bid to join NATO if AECL won the contract. AECL strongly denies the accusation.
After the committee offered AECL the letter of intent, Nistad reminded
Babilius that the committee's decision should have been based on sound
economic and technical grounds, not political ones. He added that such
political decisions could seriously jeopardize the reputations of SKB and
the Swedish nuclear industry. SIP currently provides nearly 50 percent
of the funding for this project. AECL charged that GNB's casks were
significantly overpriced. However, the final results of the bid were
based on the fact that GNB would charge $40.8/kgU of spent fuel as opposed
to AECL's cost of $67.5/kgU. AECL claims that unlike the untested
Constor system, Macstor has had proven reliability since 1995 at the Gentilly-2
reactor in France. Although both firms claim that their systems will eventually
utilize Lithuanian materials and components, Lithuanian General Counsel
in Toronto Haris Lapas claimed that AECL would create more rapid techology
and manufacturing transfers to Lithuania than GNB would. Lapas stated
that he is confident that AECL will receive the next bid for 220 casks
since it will offer Lithuanians well-paying jobs for the next 10 to 15
years. Ignalina may require up to 600 casks to hold all its spent
fuel before it closes early in the next century.
[Mark Hibbs, "GNB To Supply 40 More Ignalina Casks; Germans
Cry Foul Over AECL Deal For Rest," NuclearFuel, 28 July 1997, pp.
11-13.] {entered 8/8/97 djw}
7/22/97: BELARUS RETURNS RADIOACTIVE CARGO TO LITHUANIA The Lithuanian Prosecutor General detained a Zil truck in Salcininkai which
was caught carrying 4.5 metric tons of "metal powder" [sic] containing
radioactive thorium 232-228. The powder had a radiation level of 300 mr/hour,
ten times higher than allowed by regulations. The shipment, owned by an
Irish company, had entered Lithuania from London and was to be transported
from the Lithuanian port of Klaipeda to Lyda, Belarus. However, Belarussian
border guards refused the shipment. Officials also detained another shipment
of the same powder in Kaunas. The Prosecutor General is currently investigating
the incident.
["Large Radioactive Cargo Detained On Lithuania's Border,"
Baltic
News Service, 22 July 1997.] {entered 8/11/97 djw}
7/15/97: JAPAN SIGNS AGREEMENT TO ASSIST IGNALINA
SAFETY The Lithuanian Minister for the Economy Vincas Babilius,
Ignalina's chief engineer Gennadijus Negrivoda, and Akemichi Kaneko, president
of the Japanese firm PESCO, signed an agreement in Vilnius under which
Japan pledges to assist in implementation of safety measures at the
Ignalina power plant. The project is to be completed by 1 April 2000. Japanese
specialists from various companies, under the coordination of PESCO, will
help Ignalina in nearly 100 projects, including maintaining a computer
data base, providing advice on plant management, and measuring rust and
oxide layers within the reactors' fuel channels.[1] The Japanese representatives
explained their desire to assist Lithuania by saying that operational safety
must not be "at the mercy" of the economic difficulties currently experienced
by the state.[2] The total amount of funds granted by the Japanese government
has not been disclosed.[1]
Sources: [1] "Japan To Help Boost Ignalina's
Safety," Baltic News Service, 15 July 1997. [2] Segodnya Television Program, 16
July 1997; in "Japan Signs Agreement on Assistance to Ignalina AES," FBIS-SOV-97-198,
17 July 1997. {entered 8/20/97 djw}
7/97: UNIT 1 WILL NOT
REOPEN UNTIL AUGUST 1997 Ignalina technical director Gennadijus Negrivoda
stated that planned repair work on Ignalina's Unit 1 will be extended until
8 August 1997. The original date for reopening had been set at 11 July
1997. Negrivoda explained that the extension resulted from several unexpected
metal pipe defects which workers discovered during renovation. He added
that even with only Unit 2 operating, Ignalina still produces more power
than Lithuania currently needs. Once Unit 1 is back online, Unit 2 will
undergo similar renovations. The Ignalina administration plans to operate
both units by the end of autumn, when demand for power increases.
[Baltic News Service, 11 July 1997;
in "Nuclear Plant Renovation Work Extended," FBIS-SOV-97-192.] {entered
8/20/97 djw}
7/97: VATESI LICENSE FOR IGNALINA MAY BE DELAYED UNTIL 1999; EBRD MAY
FORCE PLANT TO CLOSE VATESI Director Saulius Kutas stated that VATESI will not be able to license
Unit 1 of Ignalina by the required date of 1 July 1998. In 1995,
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) had agreed
that an ECU 33 million grant for safety improvements would be given to
Lithuania only if the plant was licensed by that date. Kutas stated
that formal licensing may be postponed until May 1999 since a safety analysis
report was delayed by a year and still has not yet been translated into
Russian, the working language of the plant. The EBRD has offered
to send consultants to VATESI to hasten the licensing procedure.
Licensing Assistance Project director and head of the Swedish International
Project Jan Nistad stated that sending Western consultants to assist VATESI
in licensing the plant would not be acceptable since it is a formality
for which VATESI should remain responsible. Kutas stated that if VATESI
attempts to complete the licensing by the EBRD's deadline, then it will
be accused of not being thorough, while if it does not finish, it will
be charged with violating the EBRD agreement.[1] Vice President for
Project Evaluation at the EBRD Joachim Jahnke indicated that the Nuclear
Safety Account would not permit an extension of the licensing date.[2]
Director of the EBRD nuclear safety department Mark Tomlinson has also
made it clear that the bank would not accept a delay.[1] Deputy Minister
in charge of energy issues for the Lithuanian Ministry of Economy Viktoras
Valentukevicius stated that a forced shutdown of Ignalina at the beginning
of the next centry would "mean economic catastrophe" for Lithuania since
electricity consumption has been increasing. Plant Manager Viktor
Shevaldin reported that fuel channel measurements taken during the summer
1997 maintenance shutdown indicate that Ignalina will be able to operate
safely until 2005. Valentukevicius said that the West should compensate
Lithuania if Ignalina is forced to shut down due to a formality, even if
it is in good operating condition. Lithuanian President Algirdas
Braszauskas recently reported that it would cost between $5 and 6 billion
to replace Ignalina's generating capacity. Various alternatives are
being considered for electricity generating after Ignalina is closed.
Kutas believes that in 15 years, Lithuania will be able to construct more
nuclear plants. In the meantime, Lithuanian officials are determined
to keep Ignalina operating as long as possible.[2]
Sources: [1] Ariane Sains, "Regulators Back Lithuania On Ignalina
Licensing Delay," Nucleonics Week, 10 July 1997, pp. 4-5. [2] Ariane Sains, "East-West Showdown Looms Over Decommissioning
of Ignalina," Nucleonics Week, 5 June 1997, pp. 6-7.{entered
9/12/97 djw}
6/11/97: SEVENTY KILOS OF STOLEN URANIUM FOUND Lithuanian state security officers located 50 kg of uranium
buried in an underground vault near Zalieji Lake, not far from Vilnius.[1,3]
Another 20 kg of uranium was found in the town of Visaginas. The discoveries
were made after officials interrogated Ramunas Macerauskas, the former
head of an Ignalina security unit suspected of stealing a fuel assembly
from the Ignalina plant in 1992, who turned himself into police on 10 June 1997. Ignalina purchased the fuel in August 1992 and its disappearance was
not noted until January 1993.[5] Radio Free Europe stated that the total
weight of the stolen fuel was 170kg, while Reuter claimed that it was
100kg.[2,4] The investigation followed the discovery of 10kg of uranium
close to the plant in October 1996.[2] Officials believe that the remaining
nuclear fuel has been sold.[4] Chief investigator Vytautas Pociunas stated
that three former Ignalina security guards would go on trial for the theft.
Another suspect, a former plant engineer who was questioned and released,
has since fled Lithuania.[4] Theft of nuclear substances carries a 10-year
prison sentence in Lithuania.[2]
Sources: [1] "Thirty Kilos Uranium Found Near Vilnius," Baltic
News Service, 11 June 1997. [2] "Caches of Stolen Nuclear Fuel Found in Lithuania," RFE/RL
Newsline, Vol. 1, No. 51, Part 2, 12 June 1997. [3] "Update on Stolen Uranium in Lithuania," RFE/RL
Newsline, Vol. 1, No. 52, Part 2, 13 June 1997. [4] "Stolen Uranium Seized in Lithuania," Reuters, 12 June
1997. [5] ELTA, 12 June 1997; in "Uranium Thief Surrenders
to Authorities," FBIS-SOV-97-163.
6/6/97: OSART GROUP COMMENDS IGNALINA SAFETY IMPROVEMENTS Four members of the IAEA Operational Safety Review
Team (OSART) completed an inspection at the Ignalina power plant. They
complimented the plant on fulfilling most of the management and safety
recommendations OSART had presented following a September 1995 inspection.
Head of VATESI's Ignalina supervisory group Romualdas Ciucelis said that
although VATESI has implemented most of OSART's 70 recommendations, not
all have been fulfilled to a satisfactory level, and some have not been
fulfilled at all, due to "reasons beyond their control."
["Ignalina's Safety Improving, IAEA
Experts Say," Baltic News Service, 6 June 1996.] {entered 8/20/97 djw}
6/97: LITHUANIA AND WEST DONATE $25 MILLION FOR
SAFETY IMPROVEMENTS A 100 million lita ($25 million) aid package will
be given to the Ignalina nuclear power plant by the Lithuanian government,
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), as well as
through bilateral agreements with Sweden, the United States, and Japan.
Eighty percent of the funds will be supplied by Lithuania through energy
tariffs.[1]
[Ariane Sains, "Ignalina To Get $25-Million
In Improvements This Summer," Nucleonics Week, 5 June 1997, p. 7.]
{entered 9/8/97 djw}
5/22/97: NEW COMPUTER SYSTEM TO BE INSTALLED The Ignalina nuclear power plant signed contracts
with the Swedish International Project (SIP), International Financial Systems
(IFS) of Sweden, Stone & Webster Engineering, and the US Department
of Energy (DOE) to install a new computer network. The $2 million
agreement will provide hardware, software, and computer training for the
reliability maintenance management system and configuration management
process at Ignalina. The United States intends to purchase the hardware
and training from IFS, while Sweden will pay for the software. The
three contracts were signed between the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) and IFS, SIP and IFS, and PNNL and Ignalina. The new computer
system will provide continuous monitoring of the plant and will warn operators
of any irregularities. The system will also link Ignalina's seven
independently operating databases. An Ignalina representative stated
that this system will enable Ignalina to fulfill at least one of the six
safety measures which must be implemented before the restart of Unit 1.
["Ignalina Networking," Nuclear
Engineering International, July 1997, p. 6] {entered 9/5/97 djw}
5/21-23/97: LITHUANIAN AND BELARUSIAN SCIENTISTS
TEST RADIATION EQUIPMENT Lithuanian and Belarusian scientists held a series
of experiments in the Braslavsk region of Belarus (within 30 km from Ignalina)
where they investigated the potential effects of a possible nuclear accident.
The scientists tested the reliability of radiation detection systems by
using a mobile detection device that measures the level of atmospheric
radiation, and by using a Gamma-1 system which notifies the scientists
of approaching radioactive clouds and winds. On 21 May 1997 the Lithuanian
government tested warning sirens throughout the country and Lithuanian
national radio gave instructions on what measures to take in the event
of an accident.
["Litva, Belorussiya," Byulleten
tsentra obshchestvennoy informatsii po atomnoy energii, No. 7, August
1997, p. 59.] {entered 2/6/98 djw}
5/19/97: RADIOACTIVE FREIGHT RETURNED TO UKRAINE It was discovered on 14 May 1997 that a shipment of 19.8 metric tons of
scrap stainless steel imported through Salcininkai, Lithuania from Ukraine
was contaminated with radium 226. [1] The background radiation of the shipment
was 1000 µr/hour (the permissible level is 30 µr/hour).
The shipment was to travel from Ukraine through Belarus and Lithuania to
its final destination in Mukran, Germany.[1,2] The Lithuanian customs
officers who permitted the shipment to enter the country are currently
undergoing criminal charges for violating rules of conduct and falsifying
import documents. Klaipeda district prosecutor Rasa Aleksandraviciute is
leading the investigation. The Ukranian firm Delia originated the shipment.[1]
The freight was subsequently returned to Ukraine from Klaipeda.
Sources: [1] "Radioactive Freight Returned To Ukraine From Lithuania,"
Baltic
News Service, 20 May 1997. [2] "Lithuania Seizes Radioactive Metal En Route To Germany,"
Baltic
News Service, 15 May 1997. {entered 7/11/97 djw}
5/6/97: NUCLEAR EXPERTS HOLD SEMINAR ON SAFETY The IAEA and the US Department of Energy sponsored
a seminar held on May 6th which discussed nuclear safety culture at the
Ignalina power plant. Nearly 50 nuclear energy experts from Lithuania,
Sweden, the United States, Russia, Ukraine, and other countries attended
the seminar in Visaginas. The conference focused on the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development's recommendations for improving Ignalina's
safety culture, management structure, and divisions of labor among workers.
[ELTA, 6 May 1997; in "Ignalina
Nuclear Plant, Lithuania," Transboundary Environmental News (TEN),
Vol. 3, No. 9, 1-15 May 1997.] {entered 8/8/97 djw}
5/97: IGNALINA MAY RUN 15 MORE YEARS Head of the Lithuanian Energy Institute Jurgis Vilemas
told Nucleonics Week that Lithuania may consider operating both
RBMK reactors at Ignalina for another 15 years despite outside pressure
to close them down earlier. Under a current Nuclear Safety Account agreement,
the Lithuanian government has pledged not to replace the reactors' fuel
channels in return for a ECU33 million grant. The fuel channels are expected
to wear out early in the next century. Some have questioned whether Lithuania
will be able to resist the recommendations of the European Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (EBRD) to close the plant earlier than expected since Western
powers ultimately "hold the purse strings." EBRD pressure may force the
closure of Unit 1 in two years' time since the Lithuania is more vulnerable
to international pressure than a larger country such as Russia.
[Ariane Sains, "Lithuania Considers
Running Ignalina RBMKs 15 More Years," Nucleonics Week, 15 May 1997,
pp. 11-12.] {entered 8/20/97 djw}
5/97: FRENCH AND LITHUANIAN AUTHORITIES
COOPERATE ON RADIATION SAFETY Director of Foreign Relations of the French Nuclear
Energy Committee Christian Prettre and Lithuanian Vice Minister of the
Economy Viktoras Valentukevicius signed a protocol to enhance bilateral
cooperation on radiation safety. Valentukevicius stated that the
protocol was very important since the French possess a great deal of experience
in research on the effects of radiation on humans. The protocol focuses
on several areas of cooperation: research on nuclear medicine, protecting
Ignalina staff from radiation, and informing the Lithuanian public about
radiation.
["Cooperation With Nuclear Energy Committee
of France Continues," Energy News, http://www.iae.lt/ic/EnNews/9_97.htm,
No. 9. 1997.] {entered 2/15/98 djw}
4/24/97: BRAZAUSKAS AND UKRAINIAN AMBASSADOR DISCUSS
COOPERATION Lithuanian President Algirdas Brazauskas met with Ukrainian Ambassador to Lithuania Rostislav Bilodid in Vilnius to discuss
improving bilateral relations between the two countries, including cooperation
in nuclear safety. Both officials agreed that safety enhancements at Ignalina
are significant for Ukraine since both countries have the same type of
RBMK reactors.[1] On 15 April 1997 at the annual meeting for the European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) in London, Lithuanian and
Ukrainian representatives had responded to international pressure to close
their RBMK reactors by stating that although their countries are unprepared
to shut their reactors down immediately, they would continue to guarantee
safe operations until they are eventually closed.[2]
Sources: [1] ELTA, 24 April 1997; in
"President, Ukranian Envoy Discuss Improving Nuclear Safety," FBIS-SOV-97-114. [2] Radio Vilnius, 15 April 1997; in
"Kiev, Vilnius Refuse To Shut Down Chernobyl-Type Reactors," FBIS-SOV-97-105.
{entered 8/8/97 djw}
4/17/97: TWO TONS OF RADIOACTIVE COPPER TO BE STORED AT IGNALINA Two tons of radioactive copper piping found in a garage in Utena, Lithuania
will be transported to Ignalina NPP for storage. Experts have concluded
that the pipes are the remains of a nuclear reactor, but it is unknown
where the pipes came from or who placed them in the garage. The pipes are
emitting four times the level of normal background radiation. The
owner of the garage intended to sell the copper.
["Two Tons of Radioactive Copper Snagged in Lithuania," Baltic
News Service, 17 April 1997.]{updated 7/2/97 djw}
4/10/97: LITHUANIA FORMALLY ACCEPTS SAFETY REVIEW
RECOMMENDATIONS Lithuanian Prime Minister Gediminas Vagnorius reported
that Lithuania is prepared to fully support the safety recommendations
offered by the Nuclear Safety Account (NSA). The safety analysis report (SAR) suggested a total of 72 safety improvements for Ignalina. Lithuanian
Energy Institute Director Jurgis Vilemas stated that while Lithuania can
pay for most of the upgrades, any additional multilateral aid would be
welcomed. The government has already issued a letter to the European Bank
for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) detailing how Lithuania would fulfill the SAR. Lithuania has agreed not to restart Ignalina Unit 1 until
VATESI is satisfied that all safety issues have been addressed, such as
improving plant management structure, reactor control, safety procedures
in case of an accident, upgrading the protection system in the primary
shutdown system. Unit 1 is scheduled to restart in mid-July 1997.
[Ariane Sains, "Lithuania Endorses
NSA Review, Commits To Safety Improvements," Nucleonics Week, 10
April 1997, p. 12.] {entered 8/8/97 djw}
4/8/97: SAFETY PANEL MEETS WITH LITHUANIAN
OFFICIALS The Ignalina Safety Panel, composed of experts from seven countries (France,
Germany, Lithuania, Russia, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States) met with Lithuanian President Algirdas Brazauskas, Prime Minister Gediminas
Vagnorius and other officials to discuss findings from a recent safety
analysis report (SAR).[1,2,3] The SAR was the third phase of a two-year review of Ignalina NPP to determine
whether the two RBMK reactors can be run safely.[2] The Lithuanian government and the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) commissioned
the panel to investigate whether the reactors could operate safely before
replacing the reactors' fuel channels becomes necessary (under an agreement with
the EBRD's Nuclear Safety Account, Lithuania will stop operating the reactors
once their fuel channels wear out).[4] The safety assessors cautioned Lithuania on 22 March 1997
not to restart Ignalina until $130 million in safety improvements to each
reactor are effected.[5,4] The panel's recommendation is based
on significant design and operation flaws of both units.[4] Ignalina Director Viktor Shevaldin is confident that the necessary upgrades can
be completed while the plant undergoes planned repairs during the summer.[6] Although the
panel was critical of VATESI for allowing its inspectors to become involved in
the power plant's operations, it did note that Ignalina's personnel have
the technical capability to manage the plant safely.[6,2] The panel observed
that Ignalina is a unique "meeting point" for both Western
and Eastern safety technology, and promised to request that the World
Bank and other international organizations continue to support the technology
used by both sides.[6] Vytautas Bieliauskas, head of the Nuclear Energy Office of the Ministry
of the Economy, criticized the EBRD's recommendation to close the Ignalina nuclear power
plant as having "a clear political aim" to overburden the Lithuanian economy.[7]
Sources: [1] "Visiting Nuclear Experts Do Not
Press On Ignalina's Shut-Down," Baltic News Service, 9 April 1997. [2] Ariane Sains and Ann MacLachlan,
"Ignalina Safety Panel To Meet With Lithuanian Government," Nucleonics
Week, 13 March 1997, pp. 6-7. [3] American Embassy London, "Lithuania-Safety
Panel Recommendations On Ignalina," IAEA Daily Press Review, 1 April
1997,
p. 20. [4] "Experts Warn on Safety of Lithuanian Nuclear Plant," Baltic News
Service, 22 March 1997. [5] Simon Holberton and Matthew Kaminski, "Lithuanian N-Plant
Unsafe, Say Experts, Financial Times, 24 March 1997, p. 2. [6] Interfax, 7 April 1997; in "Western
Experts To Examine Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant," FBIS-SOV-97-097. [7] ELTA, 8 April 1997; in "Closure of Nuclear Plant Seen
as Unbearable Economic Burden," FBIS-SOV-97-098. {updated 7/30/97 djw} 4/97: SAFETY ENHANCEMENTS ARE NEAR COMPLETION An Ignalina spokeswoman stated that Sweden has nearly
completed an 18-month program of safety upgrades at the power plant. Included
in the upgrades are new fire alarms, a Swedish-made ventilation system,
control systems and a closed-circuit television unit. Since 1992 Sweden
has allotted nearly $40 million for Ignalina safety enhancements.
["Is This The End For Ignalina?" Nuclear
Engineering International, April 1997, p. 3.] {entered 7/30/97 djw}
3/28/97: COMPUTER UPGRADES FOR IGNALINA Ignalina Director Viktor Shevaldin, Lithuanian Finance
Minister Algirdas Semeta, and Bank of New York representative Georg Knoth
signed a $9.9 million loan agreement. The loan will be used to replace
the outdated computer system in Unit 1. Unit 1 has been using the Russian
TITAN computer system since Ignalina was put on line in 1982. The United States'
Science Applications International Corporation will coordinate the replacement
using equipment manufactured by Digital Equipment Corporation and Computer
Products, Inc. The computer system is scheduled to be installed by the
end of 1998. According to Lithuanian Energy Institute Director Jurgis
Vilemas, a $3 million US government grant will be used to fund the installation
of a similar system in Unit 2.
["US Banks Supporting Modernization
of Ignalina Atomic Power," Baltic News Service, 3 April 1997.] {entered 4/11/97
djw}
3/17/97: AECL FAILS TO SUBMIT SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION FOR STORAGE
CASKS Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) has not met the deadline for submitting supplementary
information detailing construction plans for spent fuel storage casks. The Lithuanian Ministry of the Economy requested
that the bid be submitted on schedule so that consultations
on the casks could be held. The German company Gesellschaft fuer Nuklear
Behalter (GNB) is also bidding for the construction
contract. Two Lithuanian firms are interested in working with GNB as partners
to produce the containers: the Laivite company, based in Klaipeda, and SAF, based in Kaunas. AECL
is investigating working with two other Lithuanian
firms, Pergales Koncernas and Pramprojektas.
["Canadian Company Late For Tender To Build Storage Facilities
For Lithuania's Ignalina Atomic Power Plant," Baltic News Service, 18 March
1997.] {entered 7/11/97 djw}
2/17/97: IGNALINA CHIEF OF STAFF FIRED Ignalina Chief of Staff Rimantas Kumpis was fired for continuous violations
of staff policy. BNS reported that he was blamed for not ridding the plant
of alcoholics, drug addicts, and psychiatric patients. Earlier in February,
the Lithuanian Seimas (Parliament) Committee on National Security concluded
that employees at Ignalina posed a serious danger to the nuclear plant.
Ignalina administration was accused of hiring employees who are mentally
ill, drug-addicted, alcoholic, and have criminal records. In addition, the committee
stated that employees have no knowledge of the Lithuanian language and
that they are permitted to work without having interviewed with the Department
of State Security. Ignalina General Director Viktor Shevaldin had responded
to the committee's remarks, saying that each applicant undergoes a
thorough medical exam before employment and that there are no alcoholic,
drug-abusing, or mentally ill employees working at Ignalina. He added that
since Ignalina is a Soviet-built nuclear plant, all manuals, instructions,
designs, and schematics are in Russian. Shevaldin stated that a
switch to Lithuanian would be pointless and dangerous because all employees
must be able to understand each other. Under current Lithuania language
laws, Shevaldin himself could be dismissed, but BNS reports that the Lithuanian
government "tolerates the situation."
Sources: [1] Nikolay Lashkevich, "Psikhi i narkomany ne pomekha litovskim
atomshchikam," Izvestiya, 7 February 1997, p. 3. [2] "Lithuanian Economy Ministry in Search for a Chief of
Staff at Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant," Baltic News Service, 21 February 1997. {updated
3/12/97 djw}
2/13/97: SWEDEN EVALUATES LITHUANIAN COMPANY CASK PRODUCTION The Swedish Independent Atomic Energy Auditing Commission (IAEAC) has positively
appraised the metal cask production capabilities of the Lithuanian firm
Vakaru Laivu Remontas. The casks are to be used to store radioactive waste
from Ignalina NPP. The inspection came at the request of the German company
Gesellschaft fuer Nuklear Behalter (GNB), one of the firms bidding for a
contract to produce such casks. Director of production Arnoldas Sileika, hoping that Vakaru
Laivu Remontas will receive official international certification this year,
stated that his firm is the only company in Lithuania capable of assembling
this type of product. Official results of the IAEAC audit will be announced
soon. At the end of February 1997, the IAEAC will award the contract to
handle Ignalina’s nuclear waste to either the German firm GNB or Atomic
Energy of Canada Limited (AECL). Specialists report that since the two cask
designs are technically similar, the award will be based on which firm
offers the lower bid and will employ more Lithuanian workers in the project.
["Swedes Inspect Would-Be Maker of Nuclear Waste Containers,"
Baltic News Service, 14 February 1997.] {entered 2/27/97 djw}
2/97: IGNALINA SAFETY PANEL REVIEWS SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT In February 1997, the Ignalina Safety Panel issued a review of the European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)-sponsored Safety Analysis
Report (SAR) written by Ignalina staff, Western and Eastern experts, and
reactor designer NIKIET.[1]
The panel's conclusions were as follows: 1) the development of safety
management and safety culture, while assisted by the West, is progressing too
slowly and has yet to reach international standards; 2) reactor modifications
made after the Chornobyl accident have succeeded in making the shutdown system
fast enough to deal with all design basis accidents; 3) as the control and
protection functions of the existing control and protection system (CPS) are
inseparable, a second shutdown system is necessary to respond to certain types
of accidents; also, the SAR has not convincingly argued that a single failure
will not disable the CPS; 4) the SAR has not convincingly demonstrated that
the reactor coolant circuit will maintain high levels of integrity; 5) apart
from the CPS, the primary safety systems appear to be resistant to single
failures, though some safety support systems may be susceptible to certain
single failures, and require improvement; 6) Ignalina has accepted several
design and procedural modifications regarding reactor trips, initiation of the
emergency core cooling system, and other emergency procedures; 7) Ignalina
reactors lack Western-style containment, and while this is partially offset by
their confinement structures, their integrity in accident conditions has not
been demonstrated; 8) the venting capacity of the reactors is limited, though
it has been improved, and may prove insufficient in an accident--additional
improvements are necessary; 9) it is estimated that the pressure tubes will
come into contact with the graphite moderator between 1999 and 2001 in Unit 1,
and projects are under way to measure the diminishing gap from within the
channels, thus permitting a more accurate determination of when the tubes and
moderator come into contact; 10) implementing the modifications proposed in
the SAR will take an estimated $120 million and 125 person-years; 11) as RBMK
reactors rely heavily on operator actions to maintain safety, the manual for
emergency procedures needs to be revised to ensure that staff respond
correctly to accident situations.[2] The panel recommended also that upper
management and VATESI take safety more seriously, and that the current reactor
maintenance shutdown be extended in order to address safety issues raised by
the panel.[1]
Sources: [1] "Main Part of the Ignalina Safety Panel Recommendations on the
Ignalina NPP Units 1 & 2 In-Depth Safety Assessment," EBRD Web Site,
http://www.ebrd.com/,
February 1997. [2] "Annex 1--Major Conclusions--The Panel's Summary on
the 'In-Depth Assessment of INPP,'" EBRD Web Site,
http://www.ebrd.com/,
February 1997.
1/97: RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM SET UP IN LITHUANIA
AND LATVIA Based on recommendations by the IAEA, and in accordance
with the recommendations of the Swedish Radiation Protection Institute,
a radiation prevention center was set up in Lithuania and in Daugavpils,
Latvia (30km from Ignalina) to monitor emissions from the Ignalina NPP.
The monitoring network will measure background gamma radiation and radionuclides.
Sweden, Denmark, and Finland provided the equipment and funding and
Danish experts installed the system. Radio Riga states that the system
is to be connected to the Internet in the near future. This early warning
system is the first of its kind in Eastern Europe.
Sources: [1] ELTA, 6 December 1996; in "Early Warning Radiation Monitoring
System Installed," FBIS-SOV-96-238. [2] Radio Riga, 8 January 1997; in "Riga to Monitor Pollution from
Ignalina Nuclear Plant," FBIS-TEN-97-001. [3] ELTA, 9 January 1997; in "Radiation Center Opened at IAEA,
US Recommendation," FBIS-TEN-97-001. {entered 2/7/97 djw}
1/1/97: LITHUANIAN ENERGY COMPANY IN DEBT TO IGNALINA The Lithuanian energy company Lietuvos Energija owes Ignalina NPP $131.1
million for energy consumed. In turn, Ignalina owes the government $52 million. Gediminas Vaiciunas, a government advisor, told
Baltic News Service that settling the debts would help build funds for the account that will
be used to close Ignalina early in the next century. According to estimates,
the account must have $275 million by the years 2005-2010. The account
so far has amassed only $3.3 million.
["Ignalina Closure Fund Empty For Another Half Year," Baltic News
Service, 5 February 1997.] {entered 2/28/97 djw}
