Lithuania:  State Nuclear Safety Inspectorate (VATESI)

Creation. When Lithuania gained independence in 1991, it assumed full responsibility for the two 1350 MWe units at Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant. However, without a nuclear regulatory agency, Lithuania was unprepared to handle safety issues related to the plant.[1] Therefore, on 18 October 1991 the Lithuanian Parliament (Seimas) established the Lithuanian State Nuclear Safety Inspectorate (VATESI). The Lithuanian government approved its status as a regulatory and inspection agency under the Ministry of Energy on 21 October 1992.[2] On 12 December 1996 the Ministry of the Economy assumed responsibility for VATESI.[5]

Responsibilities:

1. Establishing regulations, principles, and criteria for nuclear energy safety and materials usage, storage, and transportation
2. Preparing and performing inspections
3. Making proposals for laws and other legislative acts in the sphere of nuclear safety
4. Accounting for all nuclear and radioactive materials with IAEA cooperation
5. Issuing licenses to operators of nuclear- or radiation-related facilities or technologies (to begin in early 1998)[2]

Safety. As with most Soviet-constructed RBMK-1500 reactors, Ignalina lacked a modern system of radiation containment in the event of an accident. The Soviets had concentrated only on the output of the RBMK reactors while few safety measures were taken into consideration.[2] VATESI has undertaken several international obligations to ensure both safe operating procedures and heightened physical protection of the plant. Besides the IAEA, VATESI works closely with the Lithuanian Nuclear and Radiation Safety Advisory Commission.[3]

Authority. A decisive functionary line exists between VATESI and Ignalina: while Ignalina administration is responsible for the day-to-day safety of the two nuclear units, VATESI determines national policy, safety regulations, and safety measures. VATESI reports directly to the government and is authorized to shut down Ignalina if it determines that safety regulations are being neglected.[2] VATESI has offices in Vilnius, Kaunas, and at the Ignalina plant near Visaginas to ensure continuous monitoring.[2,3]

Governing Board.  VATESI established a seven-member Governing Board to assist the Lithuanian government in directing VATESI policies, ensure that VATESI reports its activities, and ensure a continuous information exchange with the government and Parliament.  The Board consists of two Seimas (parliament) members and leaders of several government ministries.  The Board met for the first time in November 1997 and intends to convene once every three months.[6]

Technical Support. The creation of VATESI was complicated by the fact that there were few local nuclear experts qualified to analyze safety regulations and hold inspections. Today, VATESI has only about twenty experts working both in Vilnius and at Ignalina. However, the IAEA has recommended that a regulatory staff of approximately 80-100 personnel is necessary for a nuclear plant of Ignalina’s size.[2]

VATESI therefore supports various Technical Support Organizations (TSOs) to fill in the expertise gap.[2] The goal of the TSOs is to encourage local research in nuclear technology while raising safety standards at Ignalina to world levels. Unfortunately, no Lithuanian technical or research institute participated in the construction of Ignalina or conducted nuclear research prior to Lithuanian independence. The Independent Safety Analysis Group (ISAG) was the first TSO, formed by the Lithuanian government at the Lithuanian Energy Institute in Kaunas. ISAG projects have allowed Ignalina and VATESI to assess the influence of infrastructure modifications of the plant on safety.[1]

 

Because weak infrastructure is perhaps the most pressing problem at Ignalina, the Construction Reliability Center (formed in 1994 by VATESI, Kaunas University of Technology scientists, and the Lithuanian Energy Institute) and the Department of Welding and Material at Vilnius Gedimino Technical University have been assessing construction problems at Ignalina. In 1995, VATESI granted permission to the State Information Technology Institute (VITI) to design and upgrade information systems, software, and automatic control systems related to the modernizing of the TITAN computer program at Ignalina. Specialists at the Ultrasonic Laboratory designed and produced devices to measure fuel channel wall thickness (another pressing problem since Ignalina will close when the fuel channels require replacement). Finally, the Department of Deformation Mechanics at Kaunas University of Technology analyzed the Safety Analysis Report (SAR) on spent fuel casks and provided its own independent conclusions to the government.[1,2]

VATESI admits that complete Lithuanian technical expertise is still lacking, given the recent independence of the country. Although the Lithuanian scientific community complains that government subsidies are scarce, TSOs are often the first scientific research institutions to receive funding due to their importance for Lithuania's security.[3]

Swedish Assistance. Considering its close proximity to Lithuania, Sweden currently provides more financial and technical assistance to Lithuania than any other country does to ensure the safe operation of Ignalina. Sweden's three prime goals are to reduce the chance of a nuclear accident, to secure all nuclear materials in Lithuania, and to prohibit the unlawful use of radioactive materials.[1] Motivated by the fact that Lithuania was operating two nuclear reactors with essentially no regulatory organization, Sweden created its first set of nuclear safety contracts with Ignalina in December 1991. By 1996 Sweden had donated over Skr 200 million (over $30 million) for Ignalina upgrades.[2] The Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate (SKI) developed the Swedish International Project (SIP; also called the Safety Improvement Program), which immediately began working with VATESI, the Lithuanian Ministry of Energy and Ignalina.[1] Approved in 1993, SIP gives immediate priority to projects having the greatest impact on improving safety and reducing radiation exposure to Ignalina personnel. With an annual budget of nearly $10 million, SIP enabled Swedish experts from all fields to assist in projects aimed at improving Ignalina's safety.[1,4]

Cooperation between Sweden and VATESI:

1. Increasing financial support for VATESI and TSOs.
2. Creating cooperation and exchange programs between Ignalina and Swedish nuclear facilities.
3. Supporting and proposing solutions for technical projects, primarily in safety and construction evaluations.[2]

The overall efficiency of Swedish cooperation with VATESI and Ignalina allowed for loans of over $50 million for immediate improvements from the Nuclear Safety Account, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Lithuanian government.[2]

International Assistance. In addition to Sweden, VATESI and Ignalina work especially close with the Russian nuclear regulatory agency, Gosatomnadzor, and the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy, Minatom, both of which employ many RBMK reactor experts. Germany, Canada, France, Japan, Finland, Ukraine, and the United States have also provided both financial and technical assistance to Ignalina.[3]

Future Considerations. Former head of VATESI Povilas Vaisnys stated that VATESI's most pressing problem is securing and storing Ignalina's rising quantity of radioactive waste and constructing an interim storage facility for spent fuel.[3] Presently, VATESI is in the process of creating a state materials control and accounting system and has already prepared regulations in accordance with IAEA regulations. VATESI will determine the list of export commodities to be controlled, supervise export control procedures, and analyze requests for import, export, and transit licenses. A reactor unit licensing program is scheduled to begin in early 1998. The licensing of the Ignalina reactors will take into consideration safety norms, safety level evaluations, inspections and enforcement measures.[2] This program presents considerable administrative difficulties since no country has any experience in initiating a licensing program for already-operating units.[1]
Sources:
[1] Jurgis Bilemas and Detlev Reichenbach, Internationale Zeitschrift fuer Kernenenergie, atw 40. Jg., August-September 1995, p. 530-31.
[2] Diana Medliene, ed., Valstybine Atomines Energetikos Saugos Inspekcija (1991-1996), (Vilnius: VATESI), 1996, pp 4, 8.
[3] Diana Medeliene, "Safe Operation of the Nuclear Plant is Our Common Task," Energy News, February 1995, pp. 20-22.
[4] Diana Medeliene, "We Are Working Together With VATESI and Ignalina In Many Areas To Improve Safety," Energy News, 2/95, pp. 19-20.
[5] "Parliament Votes to Abolish, Create Various Ministries," Radio Vilnius Network, 12/12/96, FBIS-SOV-96-241.
[6] Diana Medeliene, "VATESI Solves Important Tasks Jointly With Foreign Colleagues," Energy News, http://www.iae.lt/ic/EnNews/10_97.htm, No. 10, 1997.
{updated 2/15/98 djw} 

Last updated 20 March 1998

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