Russia's New National Security Concept: The Nuclear Angle

by Dr. Nikolai Sokov, CNS Senior Research Associate, January 2000 (revised July 2004)

To return to the main Nuclear Weapons entry, see the Nuclear Weapons Overview file.

On 10 January 2000, Acting President of Russia Vladimir Putin (later elected president in March 2000) signed the new National Security Concept of the Russian Federation.[1] Officially, the new document was classified as a "revision" of the previous, 1997 concept; this status was probably intended to emphasize the continuity of policy between the Yeltsin and Putin administrations. The work on the new version of the National Security Concept began, apparently, soon after the appointment of Putin as secretary of the Security Council in the early 1999. An earlier draft was published on 5 October 1999.[2]

By its nature, the Concept establishes only broad guidelines for national security policy, and thus addresses nuclear strategy only briefly and in general terms. These guidelines are developed and detailed in the Military Doctrine, which was approved four months later.[3]

The key articles of the new Concept pertaining to nuclear weapons are the following:

• "The most important task of the Russian Federation is to implement deterrence in the interests of preventing aggression on any scale, including with the use of nuclear weapons, against Russia and its allies."
• "The Russian Federation should possess nuclear weapons capable of guaranteed infliction of a predetermined damage to any aggressor state or coalition of states under any circumstances."
• One of the principles concerning the use of force by Russia is "the use of all forces and means at its disposal, including nuclear weapons, in case it needs to repel an armed aggression, if all other measures of resolving the crisis situation have been exhausted or proved ineffective."

The first two provisions repeat without changes the language of the 1997 National Security Concept, but the third one read differently. In 1997 it said: "Russia reserves the right to use all forces and means at its disposal, including nuclear weapons, in case an armed aggression creates a threat to the very existence of the Russian Federation as an independent sovereign state." [4]

The new language effectively assigned a new mission to the country's nuclear arsenal. Whereas under the 1997 document, nuclear weapons were reserved solely to deter a large-scale attack, which was not likely either then, or later, the 2000 concept allowed for the use of nuclear weapons to deter smaller-scale wars that do not necessarily threaten Russia's existence and sovereignty. The new mission also implies a limited use of nuclear weapons in contrast to an all-out nuclear strike in response to a massive attack.

The introduction of a new mission clearly relates to the assessment of threats to Russia, which include, according to the Concept, "the desire of some states and interstate groups to diminish the role of the existing mechanisms of providing for international security, first of all the United Nations and the OSCE;" "the strengthening of military-political blocs and alliances, first of all the eastward enlargement of NATO;" "the possibility that foreign military bases and large groups of armed forces appear in the immediate vicinity of Russian borders;" and "the transition of NATO toward the practice of military actions outside its area of responsibility without the authorization of the UN Security Council."

The document recognizes the inadequacy of Russian conventional forces vis-ŕ-vis those of leading global political and military powers and talks about "the growing technological gap with some leading powers and the growth of their capability to create new-generation weapons and equipment" that allow "a fundamental change in the forms and methods of combat." Under these conditions, reliance on nuclear weapons when "all other measures of resolving the crisis situation have been exhausted" looks logical.

The revision of nuclear strategy was apparently launched at a meeting of the Security Council in April 1999 shortly after the beginning of the war in Kosovo. That war vastly reinforced earlier concerns that the United States and NATO might threaten limited military action against Russia (or actually start a limited military action) to achieve certain political gains, such as, for example, forcing it to withdraw from certain newly independent states or to stop the war in Chechnya. Even as early as in the spring of 1999 it was clear that the Chechen war would resume in the near future. It began in the fall of 1999 in response to the incursion of Chechen militants into the neighboring Russian republic of Dagestan.

The text of the Concept, however, creates the clear impression that reliance on nuclear weapons is intended to be a temporary "fix" until conventional forces are reformed and modernized. While provisions pertaining to the nuclear doctrine are limited to barely two paragraphs, the document concentrates primarily on conventional modernization. Arguably, when this task is implemented, reliance on nuclear weapons could be reduced.

Arms control continues to occupy an important place in Russia’s national security policy, especially the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, as well as of the means of their delivery. Proliferation is included as a separate plank in the list of threats to national security, which is hardly surprising since many potential proliferants are located close to Russia and also because proliferation of nuclear weapons is likely to undercut Russia’s special status in the international system as one of only five officially recognized nuclear powers. The concept also lists among priorities “measures to ensure international control over the export of military and dual-use products, technologies, and services.”

The concept confirms Russia’s intention to implement arms control agreements, but the attitude toward new agreements has changed. The 1997 Concept simply postulated that Russia would “participate in the process of negotiations on reduction of nuclear and conventional arms, as well as control over proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means of their delivery.” The new document modifies this goal quite considerably. Now, Russia intends to “adapt the existing arms control and disarmament agreements to the new conditions in international relations, as well as develop, as necessary, new agreements, first of all with respect to confidence and security building measures.”

The new provision might indicate a new attitude toward arms control. The agreements concluded during or immediately after the Cold War were adequate for a superpower, but are uncomfortable for Russia: some elements are too restrictive while others do not sufficiently restrict other countries. The START process, although it is not mentioned specifically in the concept, is one example: the ban on MIRVed ICBMs is, some suggest, no longer in Russia’s interest, and reportedly Moscow seeks to revise it in START III. There is an ongoing debate about the acceptability of the self-imposed restrictions on tactical nuclear weapons. Of all of the arms control agreements to which Russia is a party, only the Nonproliferation Treaty and the Chemical Weapons Convention are viewed positively. The remaining "old," highly prescriptive, detailed agreements are seen as no longer needed in a world that is no longer dominated by intense superpower rivalry. This new attitude is similar to the one espoused by the United States under the George W. Bush administration. The 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) illustrates this new approach: the treaty is effectively a confidence-building measure, and Russia apparently insisted on making it legally binding, to enhance its predictability.
Sources:
[1] Kontseptsiya natsionalnoy bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsiy. Utverzhdena Ukazom Prezidenta RF ot 17 dekabrya 1997 g. No. 1300 (v redaktsii Ukaza Prezidenta RF on 10 yanvarya 2000 g. No. 24) http://www.scrf.gov.ru/Documents/Decree/2000/24-1.html.
[2] Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye, No. 46 (169), 26 November 1999.
[3] Voyennaya Doktrina Rossiiskoy Fedeeratsiy. Utverzhdena Ukazom Prezidenta RF ot 21 aprelya 2000 g. No. 706 http://www.scrf.gov.ru/Documents/Decree/2000/706-1.html.
[4] Kontseptsiya natsionalnoy bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsiy. Utverzhdena Ukazom Prezidenta RF ot 17 dekabrya 1997 g. No. 1300, http://194.226.83.2/documents/decree/1997/_1300-1.html.

Last updated 16 November 2004
For more recent developments, see the General Nuclear Weapons Developments file.

Comments or questions? E-mail Nikolai Sokov:  nsokovATmiis.edu.

This material is produced independently for NTI by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2002 by MIIS.

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