Adam Bernstein
CNS Senior Research Associate
January 1998

Russia has the largest and most acute fissile material protection, control, and accounting (MPC&A) problem of all the Newly Independent States--and the world--in terms of quantities and accountability of HEU and plutonium, numbers of sensitive nuclear sites in need of enhanced security, and level of uncertainty and dislocation in its nuclear facilities and among its nuclear workers. In all, Russia has about 160 metric tons of separated plutonium and about 1000 metric tons of highly enriched uranium from both civil and military production,[1] distributed among 100 or more facilities, including material production sites, power and research reactors, and other research facilities.[2] Many of these sites are not well protected against theft and diversion of nuclear materials, and have poorly measured stocks of fissile material.[3] Moreover, the nuclear complex has undergone radical changes since the breakup of the Soviet Union, with the result that many workers at sensitive nuclear facilities are without pay or work. Similarly, the relative openness of many sites, while a welcome development, increases the risk of theft and diversion of materials by insiders. For many facilities, that risk is exacerbated by the fact that MPC&A funding requirements must compete with the need to survive as an institution in the post-Cold-War era, absent the guaranteed state contracts available during the Cold War.
 

PHYSICAL PROTECTION

IDENTIFYING AND PROTECTING SITES WITH FISSILE MATERIAL

The most pressing security problem for the Russian nuclear complex is to physically protect sensitive nuclear materials from the new threats arising in the post-Cold War period. To varying degrees, and in the face of significant changes in both the threats and the complex, the Russia government and nuclear industry have begun to respond to this security imperative. Security has been upgraded at dozens of sites throughout Russia, both unilaterally and with foreign assistance from the United States, European countries, the IAEA, and Japan. US MPC&A assistance to Russia to date has focused primarily on physical protection, from both external and internal threat.

In addition to Russia's own actions, the United States government has developed an interest in maintaining security in the Russian complex, an effort it believes will advance US nonproliferation objectives. Thus, as a result of the US Cooperative Threat Reduction program, the United States has developed an improved understanding of the locations and security conditions of tens of tons of Russian fissile materials. However, the United States and other countries have not been allowed into some of the most important and sensitive sites, in particular the four warhead disassembly plants where tons of HEU and plutonium are stockpiled. It is known that worker unrest exists at at least one of these plants due to lack of pay, raising the specter of internal diversion of material. Furthermore, as demonstrated by the discovery of hundreds of kilograms of HEU in Kazakhstan in 1994, it is possible that other locations with important quantities of fissile materials remain to be discovered.
 

PROTECTION FROM EXTERNAL THREATS

The methods used to protect fissile material from outsider threat include the following: consolidation of material in "nuclear islands" to the greatest  degree possible; physical barriers such as walls, barbed-wire fences, or vehicular barriers; detection sensors, video cameras, and alarms; and a resident guard force to respond to the alarms.

According to Russian MPC&A experts, the most advanced aspect of nuclear security in Russia is physical protection from external threats.[4] The Soviet philosophy of physical protection was geared toward outsider threats, and Russia has inherited this approach. As a result, much of the necessary physical protection infrastructure, such as guard forces and secure perimeters, is either already in place or could easily be put into place were money available for the purpose. The basic problem when it comes to physical protection is not experience, but money to pay security forces and acquire physical protection equipment. Guard forces, know-how, and technology are available, in part because they are already existed in the nuclear complex, and because they are used by organizations such as banks and various government offices. Most indigenous production of physical security equipment takes place at Eleron, a manufacturing facility under the auspices of Minatom.

In  spite of the historic emphasis on external threats, CNS visits to several nuclear sites reveal have revealed poor external physical protection, such as incomplete perimeter fences, stocks of material near the unguarded periphery of sites, and poorly trained or part-time guard forces.[5] While this small number of sites is not necessarily representative of conditions throughout the complex, it is clear that more progress must be made.
 

PROTECTION FROM INTERNAL THREATS

Methods of protection focusing on insider threat include careful vetting and training of personnel, badge I.D. systems, turnstiles, and portal monitoring using weight measurement and radiation detection devices.

The idea of insider threat, and of close control and accounting of materials to deal with this threat, were essentially lacking in the Soviet system. Because of the secrecy surrounding the nuclear complex, the close watch kept on nuclear workers, and the essential absence of exit points or markets for smuggled materials, little thought was given to the possibility of insiders smuggling materials out of facilities. Yet it is precisely this possibility that has been brought forth by the economic and institutional disarray in the complex and by its relative openness, meaning that Russian physical security practices are poorly adapted to dealing with what may be the most significant threat.

One problem cited by Western visitors regarding insider threat is frequent deference to authority within the nuclear complex. Thus, US visitors have been able to bypass portal monitors and detection devices when accompanied by directors during facility tours. The overriding of security procedures by figures of authority appears to be commonplace.[6]

OVERALL STATUS OF PHYSICAL PROTECTION

Progress has been made in improving security at many sites in the last several years. However, it is difficult to quantify the overall adequacy of Russian physical protection for nuclear sites. The degree to which facilities are secure from external and internal threat varies considerably throughout the complex. A US MPC&A expert with extensive experience at one large nuclear facility said that significant resources were devoted to physical security at the site, that both workers and the directorate take physical protection seriously, and that security at the site is better than what is commonly reported in the United States press, and may in certain ways better than the security at comparable US sites.[7]

On the other hand, CNS visits to another Russian nuclear research center with large amounts of HEU revealed a virtually complete absence of standard external physical protection measures such as perimeter defenses, armed guards and external surveillance cameras. Similarly lax circumstances prevail at other sites that CNS has visited.[8] In sum, whether due to Russian efforts and the influx of US and other foreign assistance, Russian physical protection has become a mixed bag of old and new practices and attitudes, and of outdated and up-to-date equipment, both at relatively stable and economically strapped facilities.
 

MATERIAL CONTROL AND ACCOUNTANCY

Control of fissile materials refers to an array of measures including video surveillance of nuclear material storage and processing sites, bar coding of nuclear material packages, and manual or computerized tracking of the flows and amounts of materials in and among facilities. The tracking methods, such as computer databases, must themselves be secure to prevent falsification of data. Fissile material accountancy refers to the physical measurement of plutonium and HEU mass and isotopic composition using gamma-ray and neutron counters and other measurement techniques (accountancy of bulk material), and to the counting of items containing predetermined amounts of material (item accountancy).

Both material control and accountancy will take longer to implement in Russia than physical protection measures, for at least two reasons. First, the Soviet system of accounting and control did not rely heavily on measurement of materials and regular comparison of physical inventories with book inventories,  using instead "continuous personal, financial, administrative, and criminal responsibility" as the primary means of control and accounting.[9] This means there is likely to be great uncertainty in the amounts of plutonium and HEU in the military stockpile, which can only be remedied by time-consuming re-measurement of materials in diverse forms. Second, the technology for material accounting and control is not well developed in Russia. Neither R&D efforts nor equipment are widespread: when they exist they appear to have been introduced primarily by the US and other foreign MPC&A assistance programs. While some expertise exists in the manufacture of essential items such as neutron counters, there has not been enough  government (or private) investment available to allow the manufacturers of such items to be self-sufficient, as the new economy demands.

Because of the secrecy surrounding fissile material stocks in Russia, it is difficult to ascertain exactly how long a complete and accurate inventory would take. One expert estimated that the first step of a "nuclear archaeology," or recovery of book inventories might take up to two years at his laboratory alone.[10] To perform accurate measurements of fissile material stockpiles will take far longer.

In addition to accurate accounting of plutonium and HEU inventories, plans exist at both the ministerial and laboratory levels to computerize the inventory, so that quantities and flows of materials can be accurately tracked over time. More generally, there is a move towards development of integrated MPC&A systems such as those at modern fissile material production facilities in Europe and the United States, employing standard MC&A concepts such as material balance areas (MBA), shipper-receiver inventory differences and material unaccounted for (MUF).

TRAINING PROGRAMS

Some Russian laboratories have begun to offer material control and accountancy training for nuclear workers. The Institute of Physics and Power Engineering (IPPE) in Obninsk, and the Moscow Engineering and Physics Institute (MEPhI or MIFI) have both implemented MPC&A training programs. IPPE operates the Russian Methodological Training Center, (RMTC), while MEPhI introduced the first Masters program in MPC&A in Russia in September of 1997. Both of these programs are funded in part by the DOE. The MEPhI program includes both a technical component for which DOE provides training and equipment, and a political component related to nonproliferation that is funded by CNS and implemented by the PIR Center in Moscow.
 

REGULATORY AUTHORITY AND LEGISLATION

During the Soviet period, responsibility for protection of nuclear material rested with the Ministry for Medium Machine Building, the precursor to Minatom. Since the breakup of the Soviet Union and the restructuring of the nuclear complex, this responsibility has devolved to Minatom, the Russian Federal Inspectorate for Nuclear and Radiation Safety, known as Gosatomnadzor or GAN, the Ministry of Defense, (MoD) and the State Customs Committee. The responsibility is divided up as follows:
 

• Minatom is responsible for implementation of nuclear material control and accounting in the civil industry and at some defense-related facilities;
• MoD is responsible for implementation of nuclear material control and accounting in the defense sector;
• GAN has regulatory authority over MC&A activities in the civil sphere; (For a detailed report by Yuriy Volodin, Deputy Head of Gosatomnadzor, on the GAN system for regulating and monitoring MPC&A, click here.)
• MoD has regulatory authority over nuclear weapons and defense related nuclear facilities;
• The State Customs Committee is responsible for transfer of nuclear materials across state borders;
• Some independent civil nuclear laboratories, affiliated with neither Minatom nor MoD are responsible for implementing MPC&A at their facilities.

The principal legal basis for regulation and control of nuclear materials is contained in a few federal ukases, decrees, and laws. These have all been produced since the breakup of the Soviet Union. The most important are:
 

• The Federal law of the Russian Federation, "On the Use of Atomic Energy," passed by the State Duma on 20 October 1995. This law defines the legal basis and principles for regulations governing the security of nuclear materials.

• The 15 September 1994 Presidential Ukase (No. 1923) entitled "Top-Priority Measures for the Improvement of the System of Accounting for and Safeguarding Nuclear Materials."

• The 13 January 1995 Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation (No. 34) "On Top-Priority Work to Develop and Implement a State Material Control and Accounting System for Nuclear Materials for 1995."

• The 14 October 1996 Decree  (No. 1205) entitled "Concept of the System of for State Material Control and Accounting (MC&A) of Nuclear Material."

• The 21 January 1997 Presidential Ukase (No. 26) defining the federal bodies responsible for regulation of Nuclear Energy.

• The 7 March 1997 Decree of the Russian Federation (No. 264) entitled "Rules of Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, Nuclear Facilities and Stores of Nuclear Materials."

Still lacking is federal legislation detailing the rules governing material control and accounting (as opposed to physical protection). MC&A rules that do exist are at the administrative, sector or laboratory level. Some of these rules have been reworked to reflect the planned modernization of fissile material control and accounting, while others remain on the books as largely defunct holdovers from the Soviet period.[11]
 

FISSILE MATERIAL SECURITY IN THE POST-CTR WORLD

While a good deal of equipment and training has been supplied to Russia by the United States,  some analysts remain concerned that without an enduring "safeguards culture"  in Russia, US assistance provided in the last several years may fall into disuse. Training programs and newly created MPC&A directorates do exist, and the civil nuclear authority GAN appears to have increasing influence, but there are differing levels of commitment to MPC&A, both in financial and rhetorical terms, among and within the responsible ministries and laboratories. Additionally, there is concern within Minatom and elsewhere that too much overt US assistance with MPC&A will be attacked as a security breach by nationalist elements.

Sources:

[1] David Albright, Frans Berkhout, William Walker, Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996: World Inventories, Capabilities and Policies (New York: Oxford University Press Inc., 1997), pp. 399-400.

[2] US GAO, NUCLEAR SAFETY, "Concerns With Nuclear Facilities and Other Sources of radiation in the Former Soviet Union, GAO/RCED-96-4, (Washington DC: US General Accounting Office, November 1995),  p. 1.

[3] Gennadiy Pshakin, "Recent MPC&A Expereience in Russia", (paper presented at the workshop on the comparative analysis of approaches to the protection of fissile materials, July 28-30, 1997, Stanford University), p. 2.

[4] Gennadiy Pshakin, "Recent MPC&A Experience in Russia", (paper presented at the workshop on the comparative analysis of approaches to the protection of fissile materials, July 28-30, 1997, Stanford University), p. 5.

[5] Dr. William Potter, "Highlights from Visits to Russian Nuclear Facilities, (May 11-25, 1996), CNS unpublished trip report, June 1996, p. 1.

[6] Dr. William Potter, "The Outlook for the Adoption of a Safeguards Culture in the Former Soviet Union", (paper prepared for the 38th Annual Meeting of the Institue for Nuclear Materials management, Pheonix, Arizona), July 1997, p. 5.

[7] CNS interview with an MPC&A expert from a US national laboratory, December, 1997.

[8] Dr. William Potter, "Highlights from Visits to Russian Nuclear Facilities, (May 11-25, 1996), CNS unpublished trip report, June 1996, p. 2.

[9] Yuri Voilodin, Valentin Zakharov, Gennadiy Pshakin, Alexander Roumiantsev, "On the Way to Establish an Effective State MPC&A System, Round Table Discussion, Yaderny Control Digest,  Vol. 5, Fall 1997, p. 2.

[10] CNS Interviews with Russian MPC&A experts, August 1997.

[11] Yuri Volodin, "Current Status of Nuclear Materials Control and Accountability in Russia", (paper presented at the workshop on the comparative analysis of approaches to the protection of fissile materials, July 28-30, 1997, Stanford University), pp. 1-4.