Russia: Nuclear Weapons: Tactical Nuclear Weapons Developments

Dr. Nikolai Sokov
CNS Senior Research Associate
February 1999

STATUS OF THE 1991-92 TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPON REDUCTION INITIATIVES

In October 1991 Mikhail Gorbachev announced a set of unilateral measures on reducing tactical nuclear weapons; these initiatives were confirmed and expanded by Boris Yeltsin in January 1992. Combined, they provide for the following:

complete elimination of warheads for tactical land-based missiles, artillery shells, and mines;
elimination of one half of the warheads for anti-ballistic and anti-aircraft missiles; the remaining warheads will be stored at central facilities;
elimination of one-third of the warheads for surface ships and submarines with the exception of SLBMs; the remaining warheads will be stored at central facilities;
partial elimination of the warheads for naval aircraft; the remaining warheads will be stored at central facilities;
elimination of half of the warheads for tactical air force aircraft.

In 1996, it was announced that these measures were scheduled to be completed by the year 2000;[1] more recent information is not available, which suggests that the plan is still in effect.

NUMBERS OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Official data on the number of deployed, non-deployed, or eliminated warheads for tactical nuclear weapons have not been made public. Even when Russian officials discuss elimination of tactical nuclear warheads with their Western counterparts, they prefer to operate with percentages of eliminated warheads calculated against the 1991/92 initiatives of Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin. Unofficial estimates vary broadly, from 3,000 to 10,000 warheads.[2] The highest recent estimate was calculated by the French Ministry of Defense: 18,000 to 20,000 warheads.[3]

Several Russian estimates can be used to approximately calculate the number of warheads for tactical delivery systems. These estimates are unofficial, but are apparently more reliable than most because they were made by experts with unusually broad access to "real" data: Aleksey Arbatov (deputy chairman of the State Duma Defense Committee) and Anatoliy Dyakov (director of the Center on Disarmament, Energy, and Ecology, MPhTI). Although even these estimates contain differences, the variance is substantially smaller than usual. Official Russian data on the implementation of the 1991/92 initiatives was also presented at a meeting with NATO in February 1998. Combined, these sources allow one to arrive at reasonably accurate figures for early 1998. Finally, there is also data supplied by the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) for 1998, but it needs to be adjusted to reflect the 1991/92 initiatives.

According to Arbatov, Russia had a total of 3,800 warheads (deployed and non-deployed) in 1998 if both political and technical requirements are taken into account; if only the international unilateral obligations are implemented, the figure for 1998 is 8,000. If Arbatov's data for 1991 is taken as a baseline, then recalculation using Russian official 1998 data puts the total number of warheads in 1998 at 7,740. The discrepancy can be explained by technical and financial problems with eliminating warheads: the pace of elimination is probably significantly slower than necessary, and it is a safe bet that several hundred warheads slated for elimination for technical reasons (expiration of guaranteed service lives) could still remain in storage.

Dyakov offers somewhat different figures. According to him, Russia has a total of 8,560 deployed and reserve warheads with another 3,000 awaiting elimination. Although he does not define the term "reserve," it most likely refers to the warheads that are stored at central storage facilities, but are not slated for elimination (put another way, he means non-deployed warheads). The figure for deployed warheads is 5,710.

In addition, at another meeting with NATO on tactical nuclear warheads in 1998, Russia reportedly disclosed that one half of all tactical nuclear warheads had been eliminated and the current total stockpile was 10,000-12,000.[4]

The NRDC gives a figure of about 4,000 warheads for Russian tactical nuclear weapons, most likely the deployed ones.[5] Their totals include, however, certain warheads that should have been eliminated or withdrawn to central storage facilities by now, specifically warheads for missiles in the ABM system around Moscow and warheads for the navy. After relevant adjustments, the final figure is 2,500 deployed warheads, by far the lowest of all estimates. The difference probably stems from the method of calculation: The NRDC uses deployed delivery vehicles to calculate the number of warheads. This excludes from the calculus "spare" warheads stored at air force bases with nuclear-capable aircraft. In other words, the NRDC figure reflects not the total deployed warheads, but what in Russian military jargon is called the number of warheads "in one launch."

Even with all these uncertainties, one can suggest with reasonable confidence that Russia had, in 1998, about 8,000 total tactical warheads. After the 1991/92 initiatives are implemented, in the year 2000 Russia will have between 5,000 and 6,500 warheads, both deployed and non-deployed. Since tactical nuclear warheads for the navy (about 3,000) are kept at central storage facilities, the total number of deployed warheads for tactical delivery vehicles will be between 2,000 and 3,500 warheads.

PRODUCTION

It is unclear if Russia is currently producing warheads for tactical delivery vehicles. The 1991/92 initiatives do not prohibit the production or modernization of warheads. As early as in 1994, a representative of the 12th Main Directorate of the Ministry of Defense declared that production of such warheads had ceased completely.[6] Subsequent statements have been more cautious, however. The Russian delegation at the Conference on Disarmament disclosed that "production of nuclear munitions for land-based tactical missiles and of nuclear artillery shells and mines" had been discontinued,[7] leaving aside the warheads for aircraft and for naval short-range missiles. In the February 1998 Russian data shared with NATO, this statement is repeated: "The production of nuclear munitions for land-based tactical missiles, nuclear artillery shells and nuclear mines has ceased completely."[8]

Data obtained from interviews is contradictory. Some suggest that at least in the first half of 1998 Russia was not producing warheads; all efforts were concentrated on their elimination. At the same time, there were at least plans to resume production in the future for the purpose of replacing the warheads whose guaranteed service lives had expired or were scheduled to expire soon. There are also unconfirmed indications that Russia was producing warheads in 1998, but on a small scale and only as partial replacement for the ones that were eliminated.

POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS

All available evidence suggests that Russia intends to keep its tactical nuclear weapons for the foreseeable future; the composition of TNF will be about the same as today, i.e., compliant with the 1991/92 initiatives, with marginal variations in the qualitative parameters. The expansion of NATO creates a major uncertainty factor, however. Since the fall of 1996, Russian officials have been openly stating that the 1991/92 informal regime could be scrapped.

Discussing the potential military consequences of NATO expansion, in the fall of 1996 Russian Minister of Defense Igor Rodionov listed "building up tactical nuclear weapons along western borders" as one of the items on a short list of possible Russian countermeasures.[9] An unnamed representative of the Russian General Staff reported in an interview that the contingency plan for NATO enlargement included the possibility of redeploying nuclear forces, particularly TNW, in Belarus, Kaliningrad Oblast, and on naval ships in the Baltic and Black Seas.[10]

Although nothing like that followed the first phase of NATO enlargement, similar, if usually less detailed, statements have become common recently with respect to the possible admittance of the Baltic states into NATO.[11] This is hardly any surprise since Russia officially gave warnings about this immediately prior to the signing of the Russia-NATO Founding Act in 1997.[12]

Among the possible steps, redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons on surface ships in the Baltic Sea is apparently the most feasible. This possibility has been recently suggested by Adm. Vladimir Kuroyedov, the chief of the Russian Navy, who declared that under "threatening international circumstances" tactical nuclear weapons could be returned from central storage facilities to naval storage facilities in the Baltic Sea.[13] It should be noted that the plan calls for the movement of warheads to the bases rather than actual deployment on ships, meaning that they will be reclassified as "deployed," but will still require significant time (probably a few weeks) to be deployed on ships. Currently there are no nuclear weapons on the Baltic Sea ships and submarines whatsoever.[14]

Deployment of land-based tactical missiles remains problematic because all warheads for them are slated for elimination and 80 percent of them have already been eliminated. Conceivably, however, Russia could remanufacture missile warheads. There is also a new land-based tactical missile with a range of 400km (and thus exempt from the INF Treaty), which replaces the SS-23 "Oka."

Sources:
[1] Press briefing of Foreign Ministry representative A. Demurin: Interfax, 26 September 1996.
[2] "TYaO Rossii: Kolichestvennyye i Kachestvennyye Parametry Gruppirovki (Russia's TNW: Quantitative and Qualitative Parameters of the Force)," Voprosy Bezopasnosti (Analytical Bulletin of the PIR Center), Vol. 41, No. 21, November 1998.
[3] Reuters, 5 May 1998.
[4] Reuters, 30 April 1998, reporting on a Russia-NATO meeting in Brussels. [5] William Arkin, Robert Norris, Joshua Handler, Taking Stock: Worldwide Nuclear Deployments, 1998 (Washington: Natural Resources Defense Council, 1998), p. 27.
[6] Interview with Vladimir Yakovlev, Literaturnaya gazeta, 1 June 1994.
[7] K. Vorobyov, B. Kvok, "Disarmament: The Need for Patience and Will," Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn, 1996, No. 2, p. 38.
[8] "Summary of Russian Delegation Paper at the Nuclear Experts Meeting at NATO on 25 February 1998."
[9] Igor Rodionov, "Kakaya oborona nuzhna Rossii? (What Kind of Defense Does Russia Need?)" Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye, No. 22, 28 November 1996, p. 1.
[10] Richard Beeston, "Russia 'Has A Nuclear Answer To Wider NATO,'" The Times, 3 September 1995; "In Russia," Post-Soviet Nuclear & Defense Monitor, 13 October 1995, p. 19.
[11] For example, see the interview with the chief of the Defense Ministry's main department for international military cooperation, Leonid Ivashov: Interfax, 27 May 1998.
[12] For example, see the 21 May 1997 statement by Foreign Ministry spokesman Valeriy Nesterukhin: Reuters, May 21, 1997.
[13] Yuriy Golotyuk, "Yadernoye oruzhiye mozhet vernutsya na Baltiku, (Nuclear Weapons May Return to the Baltic)"Russkiy Telegraf, June 11, 1998, p. 1.
[14] This statement by Adm. Vladimir Kuroyedov was cited in "Na Baltike i Chernom more net yadernogo oruzhiya," Nezavisimaya gazeta online edition, http://www.ipres.ru/news/ng/98/index.html, 4 October, 1998.