Russia: Nuclear Weapons: Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Tables Russia: Substrategic (Tactical) Nuclear Weapons Tables

 
Dr. Nikolai Sokov, CNS Senior Research Associate
February 1999

Categorization note: All delivery vehicles in the tables below are nonstrategic and classified de-facto as tactical in the 1991/92 US-Russian initiatives. There is no accepted breakdown into intermediate-range and tactical systems for aircraft; long-range SLCMs are classified as strategic according to the Soviet/Russian position under the START I Treaty. All these weapons, however, were embraced by the 1991/92 initiatives and are reflected in this table.

AGGREGATE ESTIMATE OF RUSSIAN SUBSTRATEGIC (TACTICAL) NUCLEAR WEAPONS

(figures appropriate for comparison are in bold)
 
Category 
Total in 1991 (1)
Subject to elimination under the 1991/92 initiatives (2) 
Subject to elimination by 1997 (Arbatov's estimate) (3)
Share of 1991 totals eliminated by January 1998 (4)
Total Warheads by January 1998 (5)
Land-based missiles 
4,000 
4,000 
4,000 
80% 
800 
Artillery shells 
2,000 
2,000 
2,000 
80% 
400 
Mines 
700 
700 
500 
80% 
140 
Air Defense 
3,000 
1,500 
2,400 
1/2 (100% implementation) 
1,500 
Air Force 
7,000 
3,500 
6,000 
1/2 (100% implementation) 
1,500 
Navy 
5,000 
2,000 
3,000 
1/3 (100% implementation) 
3,400 
Total 
21,700 
13,700 
17,900 
  
7,740 
Sources:
(1), (2), and (3): Aleksey Arbatov, "Sokrashcheniye Nestrategicheskikh Yadernykh Vooruzheniy (Reduction of Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons)," in Aleksey Arbatov, ed., Yadernyye Vooruzheniya i Bezopasnost Rossii (Nuclear Weapons and Russia's Security) (Moscow: IMEMO, 1997), p. 56. The figures in (3) represent a combination of reductions required by the 1991/92 initiatives and those mandated by technical considerations (expiration of guaranteed service life).
(4) Adapted from "Summary of Russian Delegation Paper at the Nuclear Experts Meeting at NATO on 25 February 1998". The figures represent the share of the 1991 totals (the totals themselves remained undisclosed).
(5) Amounts calculated using columns (1) and (4).

 

OTHER ESTIMATES OF RUSSIAN SUBSTRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Anatoliy Dyakov's estimate of deployed and non-deployed warheads:
Category 
1991 Total (1)
Deployed warheads
in 1998 (2)
Total stockpile 
in 1998 (3)
Land-based missiles   
-0- 
  
Artillery shells   
-0- 
  
Mines   
-0- 
  
Air Defense   
1,250 
  
Air Force   
2,060 
  
Navy   
2,400 
  
Total 
17,100 
5,710 
8,560 
Source: Anatoliy Dyakov, "Sokrashcheniye Yadernykh Vooruzheniy i Voprosy Transparentnosti (Reduction of Nuclear Weapons and Transparency Issues)," report at a seminar at PIR Center, Moscow, 8 October 1998.
Natural Resources Defense Council estimate of deployed warheads for 1998:
Category   Deployed Warheads
ABM + Air Defense  1,200 (100 + 1,100) 
Air Force (except Air Defense)  1,000 
Navy  1,200 
Total  3,400 (~4,000 in the NRDC table)

(2,500) 
Source: William Arkin, Robert Norris, Joshua Handler, Taking Stock: Worldwide Nuclear Deployments, 1998 (Washington: Natural Resources Defense Council, 1998), p. 27.

Note: Apparently, the NRDC data includes 900 "extra" warheads. The 100 warheads for ABM missiles and 800 warheads for the navy (SLCMs—presumably short range—and anti-submarine weapons) should have been either eliminated or transferred into the non-deployed category. According to the "Summary of Russian Delegation Paper at the Nuclear Experts Meeting at NATO on 25 February 1998," elimination of ABM and air defense warheads mandated by the 1991/92 initiatives has been completed, which should mean that the 100 warheads for the ABM missiles no longer exist. According to the Chief of the Navy Adm. Vladimir Kuroyedov, there are no tactical nuclear weapons for surface ships and submarines on the Baltic or the Black Seas, including none on the naval bases; all of these are in central storage facilities. This leaves only 2,500 deployed warheads.

 


Comments or questions? E-mail Nikolai Sokov at MIIS CNS: nsokov@miis.edu
 

CNSThis material is produced independently for NTI by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2003 by MIIS.

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